Daniel S. Lev and Ruth McVey, Editors

MAKING INDONESIA

Essays on Modern Indonesia in Honor of George McT. Kahin

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

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MAKING INDONESIA

PETA NEGARA KESATUAN REPUBLIK INDONESIA



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Tg.	Tanjung	W.	Waduk
Kr.	Karang		
M.	Karang		

Batas Negara
Batas Provinsi
Batas Landas Kontinen
Batas Landas Kontinen/Ekonomi Eksklusif
Batas Laut Teritorial
Batas ZEE
Batas ZEE berpotensi/belum disidhkan
Batas ZEE pada kesepakatan
Batas ZEE dan Landas Kontinen Indonesia (200 mil laut)
Batas ZEE dan Landas Kontinen belum disidhkan
Batas Laut Nasional
Garis Laut Teritorial pada kesepakatan
Batas Zona Tambahan
Garis Pangkal
Titik Dasar
Alur Laut Kepulauan Indonesia (ALKI)
Batas Waktu Indonesia Australia terkait Pengaturan perikanan zona ZEE dan Landas Kontinen (lihat daftar Batas Wilayah Tambahan nomor 12 dan 13)
Batas Waktu Indonesia Australia terkait Pengaturan perikanan
Batas Waktu Indonesia Australia terkait Pengaturan perikanan
Landas Kontinen Indonesia di Luar 350 Mil Laut

Warna Ketinggian
>7000 m
6000 - 7000 m
5000 - 6000 m
4000 - 5000 m
3000 - 4000 m
2000 - 3000 m
1000 - 2000 m
500 - 1000 m
200 - 500 m
100 - 200 m
50 - 100 m
0 - 50 m

Warna Kedalaman
0 - 25 m
25 - 50 m
50 - 100 m
100 - 200 m
200 - 500 m
500 - 1000 m
1000 - 2000 m
2000 - 3000 m
3000 - 4000 m
4000 - 5000 m
5000 - 6000 m
>6000 m

PETA NEGARA KESATUAN REPUBLIK INDONESIA

Peta ini menggambarkan wilayah kedaulatan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia di darat dan laut, baik berupa laut teritorial (laut wilayah), perairan kepulauan, dan perairan pedalaman, serta hak berdaulat Indonesia di Zona Tambahan, Zona Ekonomi Eksklusif, dan Landas Kontinen, yang penetapannya didukung atas dasar Peraturan Perundang-Undangan dan instrumen hukum lainnya tentang batas wilayah Indonesia dengan negara tetangga dengan prinsip-prinsip hukum internasional. Peta WRI edisi 2020 ini menggunakan batas Negara yang telah disepakati tahun 2020, atau telah ditanggung-oleh beberapa perubahan fitur di dalam wilayah RI/R.

KONTRIBUTOR

Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Politik dan Keamanan, Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Perekonomian, Kementerian Dalam Negeri, Kementerian Luar Negeri, Kementerian Pertahanan, Kementerian Hukum, Kementerian Keuangan, Kementerian Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral, Kementerian Perhubungan, Kementerian Kelautan dan Perikanan, Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Badan Informasi Geospasial, Kementerian Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia. Badan Informasi Geospasial, Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional, Pusat Hidro Oseanografi TNI Angkatan Laut

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2. Keputusan Kepala BIG Nomor 225 Tahun 2025 tentang Penetapan Unsur Garis Pantai Untuk Wilayah Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia Edisi Tahun 2025.
3. Geodetic Reference Geographic Mission (SRTM) versi 2.0 dan ETOPO v1 versi 2.0.
4. Garis batas antara wilayah administrasi daerah otonom mengacu pada Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri.
5. Kepmendagri Nomor 300.2.2-2126 Tahun 2025 tentang Pemberian dan Pemutakhiran Kode, Data Wilayah Administrasi Pemerintahan, dan Pulau.
6. Perka BIG Tentang Laut Kepulauan Indonesia (ALKI) skala 1:500.000 dan 1:400.000, DIKIMDROS TNI AL, 2013.
7. Peta Zona Ekonomi Eksklusif Wilayah Kepulauan Indonesia skala 1: 1.000.000, DISHIDROS TNI AL, 2015.
8. Peta Garis Pangkal Wilayah Negara Kepulauan Indonesia skala 1: 300.000, DISHIDROS TNI AL, 2016.
9. Gazetir Republik Indonesia (GRI) tahun 2020.
10. Peta Batas Wilayah Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia disesuaikan dengan Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 38 Tahun 2002 tentang Daftar Koordinat Geografis titik Titik Garis Pangkal Kepulauan Indonesia sebagaimana telah diubah dengan Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 37 Tahun 2008 tentang Perubahan atas Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 38 Tahun 2002 tentang Daftar Koordinat Geografis Titik-Titik Garis Pangkal Kepulauan Indonesia.
11. Beberapa Undang-Undang terkait Pembentukan Provinsi, Kabupaten/Kota di Indonesia.
12. Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 8 Tahun 2017 tentang Pengesahan Pulau-pulau Kecil Terluar

NEGARA KESATUAN REPUBLIK INDONESIA

Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI) merupakan Negara Kepulauan (*Archipelagic State*) yang berbatasan dengan 10 (sepuluh) negara (2 darat, Indonesia berbatasan dengan Malaysia, Papua Nugini, dan Timor-Leste, Selebihnya di laut, Indonesia berbatasan dengan India, Palau, Malaysia, Singapura, Vietnam, Filipina, Palau, Papua Nugini, Australia, dan Timor-Leste.

I. WILAYAH DARAT NKRI

Wilayah darat NKRI terdiri atas daratan pada semua pulau yang berada di sebelah dalam garis pangkal Kepulauan Indonesia. Khusus di P. Kalimantan, P. Sebatik, P. Papua, dan P. Timor berbatasan dengan perjanjian-perjanjian sebagai berikut:

1. Batas negara dengan Malaysia di P. Kalimantan dan Sebatik mengacu kepada perjanjian batas antara Pemerintah Inggris dan Pemerintah Hindia Belanda (Konvensi 1891, Traktat 1915, dan 1928), RI/2 antara Pemerintah Indonesia dan Pemerintah Malaysia Nomor 32 dan Nomor 34 Tahun 2003 serta Nomor 33 Tahun 2003 serta Nomor 34 Tahun 2003 serta Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Malaysia Nomor 51 Tahun 2020 serta Aneks II (RI/2, RI/3/B - RI/3/B) dan Nomor 34 Tahun 2003 untuk area Ujung Pasir Pulau Sebatik, Hero Dwi Pitter - Ak32.
2. Batas negara dengan Papua Nugini di P. Papua mengacu kepada Perjanjian antara Indonesia dan Australia mengenai garis-garis Batas Tertentu antara Indonesia dan Papua Nugini tanggal 12 Februari 1973, Yang disahkan dengan Undang-undang Nomor 6 Tahun 1973. Disahkan dengan Deklarasi antara Pemerintah Indonesia dan Pemerintah Papua Nugini tentang Hasil Pengukuran 52 Meridian Monumen Batas di Perbatasan Indonesia - Papua New Guinea tanggal 17 Juli 1996.
3. Batas negara dengan Timor-Leste di P. Timor mengacu kepada perjanjian antara Pemerintah Hindia Belanda dan Portugis pada Tahun 1904 dan Permanent Court Award (PCA) 1914, Perbatasan Sementara antara Pemerintah Indonesia dan Pemerintah Republik Demokratik Timor-Leste ditandatangani di Dili pada tanggal 8 April 2005, serta Kesepakatan No.1 Perbatasan Sementara antara Indonesia dan Timor-Leste pada tanggal 21 Juni 2014.

II. WILAYAH DAN ZONA PERAIRAN NKRI

Indonesia memiliki berbagai jenis wilayah laut, yaitu perairan pedalaman, perairan kepulauan, dan laut teritorial serta memiliki hak berdaulat di zona tambahan, zona ekonomi eksklusif, dan landas kontinen.

Dasar Hukum terkait zona perairan NKRI adalah:

1. Undang-Undang Nomor 17 Tahun 1983 tentang Zona Ekonomi Eksklusif Indonesia.
2. Undang-Undang Nomor 17 Tahun 1985 tentang Pengesahan United Nations Convension on the Law of the Sea (Konvensi Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa tentang Hukum Laut).
3. Undang-Undang Nomor 10 Tahun 1985 tentang Perairan Indonesia.
4. Undang-Undang Nomor 43 Tahun 2008 tentang Wilayah Negara.
5. Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 37 Tahun 2002 tentang Hak dan Kewajiban Kapal dan Pesawat Udara Asing dalam Melaksanakan Hak Lintas Alur Laut Kepulauan Melalui Alur Laut yang Ditetapkan.
6. Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 38 Tahun 2002 tentang Daftar Koordinat Geografis Titik-Titik Garis Pangkal Kepulauan Indonesia sebagaimana telah diubah dengan Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 37 Tahun 2008 tentang Perubahan atas Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 38 Tahun 2002 tentang Daftar Koordinat Geografis Titik-Titik Garis Pangkal Kepulauan Indonesia.
7. Keputusan Presiden No.6 Tahun 2001 tentang Pengelolaan Kawasan Pulau Rote Ndao Tertutup.
8. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 12 Tahun 2014 tentang Penetapan Sungai Bidara Pinisikum Kabiraf Anyama Ha GE-05/P/03.A/KB/1967, tanggal 28 Juni 1967, yang memutuskan bahwa wewa-wegatan perselingkuhgaraan pemerintahan, penggunaan lebih utama dan atau komunitas TimorSha'oTimo diubah menjadi orang dan komunitas Timorgtimo, dan untuk penyebutan Timor-Leste di Pulau Timor dan Pulau-pulau Kecil Terluar di Timorgtim.
9. Undang-Undang Nomor 32 Tahun 2014 tentang Kelautan.

Wewa

A. Batas Laut Wilayah (Teritorial)

1. Undang-Undang Nomor 2 Tahun 1971 tentang Perjanjian Antara Republik Indonesia dan Malaysia tentang Penetapan Garis Batas Laut Wilayah Kedua Negara di Selat Malaka.
2. Undang-Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 1973 tentang Perjanjian Antara Indonesia dan Australia Mengenai Garis-garis Batas Tertentu antara Indonesia - Papua New Guinea.
3. Undang-Undang Nomor 7 Tahun 1973 tentang Perjanjian Antara Indonesia dan Singapura tentang Penetapan Garis Batas Laut Wilayah Kedua Negara di Selat Singapura.
4. Undang-Undang Nomor 4 Tahun 2010 tentang Perjanjian Antara Republik Indonesia dan Republik Singapura tentang Penetapan Garis Batas Laut Wilayah Kedua Negara di Bagian Barat Selat Singapura.
5. Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2017 tentang Perjanjian antara Republik Indonesia dan Republik Singapura tentang Penetapan Garis Batas Laut Wilayah Kedua Negara di bagian Timur Selat Singapura.

B. Batas Wilayah Tambahan

1. Undang-Undang Nomor 18 Tahun 2007 tentang Penetapan antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Republik Sosialis Vietnam tentang Penetapan Batas Landas Kontinen tanggal 26 Juni 2003.
2. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 89 Tahun 1969 tentang Penentapan Aneks Perjanjian Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Malaysia tentang Penetapan Garis-garis Landas Kontinen antara Kedua Negara.
3. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 42 Tahun 1971 tentang Penetapan antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Commonwealth Australia Mengenai Batas-batas Dasar Laut Tertentu di Laut Timor.
4. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 21 Tahun 1972 tentang Penetapan Aneks Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, Pemerintah Malaysia, dan Pemerintah Kerajaan Thailand tentang Penetapan Garis-garis Batas Landas Kontinen Bagian Utara Selat Malaka.
5. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 26 Tahun 1972 tentang Penetapan Aneks Perjanjian Antara Pemerintah Kerajaan Thailand dan Pemerintah Malaysia tentang Penetapan Garis-garis Batas Landas Kontinen antara Kedua Negara di Bagian Utara Selat Malaka dan Laut Andaman.
6. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 66 Tahun 1972 tentang Penetapan antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Commonwealth Australia tentang Penetapan Batas-batas Dasar Laut Tertentu di Laut Timor dan Laut Arafuru.
7. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 51 Tahun 1974 tentang Penetapan antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Republik India tentang Penetapan Batas Landas Kontinen antara Kedua Negara di Laut Andaman.
8. Memorandum Saling Pengertian antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Australia Mengenai Operasi Kelayan Tradisional Indonesia di Area Memasang Eksplorasi Australia dan Landas Kontinen Tanggal 7 November 1974.
9. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 1 Tahun 1976 tentang Penetapan antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Kerajaan Thailand tentang Penetapan Garis-garis Batas Dasar Laut antara Kedua Negara di Laut Andaman.
10. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 29 Tahun 1977 tentang Penetapan antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Republik India tentang Penetapan Batas Landas Kontinen antara Kedua Negara di Laut Andaman.
11. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 20 Tahun 1978 tentang Penetapan antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, Pemerintah Republik India, dan Pemerintah Kerajaan Thailand tentang Penetapan Titik Pertemuan Tiga Garis Batas dan Penetapan Garis Batas Kedua Negara di Laut Andaman.
12. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 21 Tahun 1982 tentang Penetapan Hasil Perundingan antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dengan Pemerintah Papua Nugini tentang Batas-Batas Maritim antara Republik Indonesia dan Papua Nugini dan Kerjasama tentang Masalah-masalah Yang Berhubungan dengan Batas-batas Tersebut.
13. Memorandum Saling Pengertian antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Australia Mengenai Hubungannya Kerjasama Pengawasan Perikanan - dan Pengaturan Pelaksanaannya tanggal 29 Oktober 1981.
14. Perjanjian antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Australia tentang Penetapan Batas Zona Ekonomi Eksklusif dan Batas Landas Kontinen Tertentu tanggal 14 Maret 1997.
15. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 26 Tahun 2014 tentang Pengesahan Persetujuan antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Republik Filipina mengenai Penetapan Batas Zona Ekonomi Eksklusif, 2014.
16. Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission made by Indonesia in respect of the Area of the Sea, the Seabed and the Subsoil of the Andaman Sea, Northern Part of the Indian Ocean and the Eastern Part of the Indian Ocean Indonesia untuk area sebelah Barat Laut Sumatera melanggar 16 Juni 2008). Rekomendasi tersebut disahkan pada tanggal 28 Maret 2011. Atas dasar hal tersebut batas wilayah yurisdiksi landas kontinen Indonesia bertambah sekitar 4.209 km2.

Daniel S. Lev and Ruth McVey, Editors

MAKING INDONESIA

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But this is a people robbed and spoiled;
they are all of them snared in holes,
and they are hid in prison houses:
they are for a prey, and none delivereth;
for a spoil, and none saith, Restore.

Who among you will give ear to this:
who will hearken and hear for the time to come?

Isaiah 42: 22–23

For George Kahin
Who has always heard

PANCASILA

KETUHANAN YANG MAHA ESA

KEMANUSIAAN YANG ADIL DAN BERADAB

PERSATUAN INDONESIA

KERAKYATAN YANG DIPIMPIN OLEH HIKMAT KEBIJAK-SANAAN DALAM PERMUSYAWARATAN / PERWAKILAN

KEADILAN SOSIAL BAGI SELURUH RAKYAT INDONESIA

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FOREWORD

In more than one sense, most of the essays in this volume, and much else, would not have been written without George Kahin. As a founder of the Cornell Southeast Asia Program, as scholar, and as educator, he has made an extraordinary difference. Rather than dwell on these contributions, we have chosen the book's dedicatory lines to reflect on the moral character of his work, which has been informed consistently by an unequivocal concern for both truth and justice. This commitment, evident in his research on the Indonesian revolution and on the intervention of the United States in Viet Nam, Indonesia, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, has provided his writings with a clarity of purpose that lends them continuing immediacy.

Kahin exercised his sense of justice at a time in American history when having one was not easy or rewarding. Having grown up in Seattle, in his early twenties when the Second World War broke out, he was one of few who went to the assistance of persecuted Japanese on the west coast. Between his undergraduate years at Harvard and graduate studies at Johns Hopkins, he served in the army, where his interest in Indonesia took root. The forty years between 1948, when he first went to Indonesia to do research on the revolution, and 1988, when he retired, coincided almost exactly with the Cold War. It was not the best of times either for for impartial studies of politics or courageous stands of principle. Kahin did both, paying the heavier dues required of dissenting voices. Early in his career Washington denied him a passport for a time, while years later Jakarta, in a classic case of ambivalence, blacklisted him with one hand and gave him a distinguished medal with the other.

A sense of justice and scholarship do not always go well together, for one easily subverts the other. It never happened with Kahin. He neither sacrificed truth to a cause, nor refused to talk with those whose policies he criticized. Either inclination requires some arrogance, of which there is no trace in Kahin's character. Similarly, as a graduate teacher, unlike so many others, he never insisted that students espouse his political issues or moral values, any more than he imposed a set of analytical or methodological dogmas. But the standards he set by example are compelling. Kahin's scholarly vocation has led him to respect detail and balanced analysis, as his public engagement is marked by respect for the options actually available to decision makers. If he is an idealist committed to making a better world, he is also a realist fully aware of how the world is.

As much as Kahin has contributed to extant knowledge of Southeast Asia, he never meant his work to circulate only among academic specialists. Rather he has tried to explain a complex region of the world to all those who hardly know it or know it only through a fog of ideology, myth, and prejudice: among them the United States policy makers with too much power to remain safely ignorant and a public that, with fuller knowledge, might put a brake on them. Never, however, has he talked up to power or down to others, not in the United States, nor in Indonesia or elsewhere. Whether testifying before a Congressional committee or offering an inter-

pretation of political history, his arguments are balanced and attentive to other views with a scrupulousness that he has tried to convey to students and colleagues.

Kahin's vision of scholarship liberated him from the petty rivalries and pretensions of academic life. As a graduate teacher he was not interested in clones, but respected his students' imaginations, curiosities, and intellectual bents. The essays written for this book, reaching as they do over more than a century and a diversity of topics, nicely reflect Kahin's own concern to broaden, not narrow, the range of research on modern Indonesia and to ask new questions, not impose preconceived answers. His own questions have always been unencumbered by the implication that they have definitive answers or are the only questions worth asking. Believing that knowledge ought to be shared, Kahin has always been generous with his own, and above all he has kept intellectual doors open, research honest without pretense, and scholarship responsible without posturing.

With Lauriston Sharp, John Echols, and Frank Golay, George Kahin shaped Cornell's Southeast Asia Program. He built the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project into the principal center of Indonesian studies, imbuing it with an understanding of scholarly community and purpose that has attracted a constant flow of students from around the world, not least Indonesia itself.

From his work the contributotrs to this volume benefitted greatly as students, colleagues, or visiting scholars. We wish to acknowledge our debt by offering this collection of papers devoted to one of his principal research interests, the evolution of independent Indonesia.

BUILDING BEHEMOTH: INDONESIAN CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE NATION-STATE

Ruth McVey

The nation-state is a chimera; the hyphenation betrays its origins in two not quite compatible principles. The nation involves collective commitment; its impulses are egalitarian, its foundation is sentiment. The state, however, presents itself not as ideal but as fact. It is hierarchic, suspicious of mass energies; its element is stability, and its desire is for control. Yet in the last century this ideological odd couple has made itself into a particularly powerful focus of organization and thought, the institution which much of mankind now considers to be its proper source of social identity and centre of loyalty, the apex of nearly all hierarchies, the almost unques-tioned locus of power.

Indonesia's experience in the making of nation and state is particularly instructive, for the archipelago had no common identity prior to its incarnation as the Netherlands East Indies. And, since some parts experienced less than half a century of foreign rule while others were deeply transformed by centuries of colonial exploitation, the experience of Dutch dominion divided local populations as much as it brought them together. Yet the Indonesian state was not simply a shell bequeathed by colonial administrators: independence was wrested from the Dutch by revolutionary force. Something therefore had engaged the imagination of a significant portion of the populace, making it willing to follow new leaders in the name of a quite new idea, that of a collective Indonesian personality.

Moreover, after the war of independence the country remained remarkably resistent to separatist tendencies in spite of great cultural, economic and ideological disparities and the near-collapse of central power. Even the "regional rebellion" which shook the state in the late 1950s was, at the level of those who led it, about who ruled in Jakarta rather than whether Sumatra or Sulawesi should have sovereignties of their own. It is therefore worth contemplating the things that went to make up Indonesian nationalism and the ways in which Indonesian leaders used, reshaped, and suppressed these elements in their efforts to transform a desire for the future into an instrument of rule.

The seminal source on Indonesian nationalism and the making of the Indonesian nation-state is still George Kahin's *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, first published in 1952. Kahin, observer and historian of the Indonesian revolution,

pioneered the investigation of Indonesian nationalism's sources in the social, economic and cultural experience of the archipelago's people under colonialism. This volume gathers together some of the reflections of scholars stimulated by his work. Some of these studies are large-scale, others small, some concern the beginning of this century and others the end; but all deal with the mentalities that have inspired and shaped the Indonesian nation-state, the opportunities, constraints, and revisions created by its process of becoming. Although their interpretations differ, reflecting what various scholars have made of Indonesia as well as what Indonesians have made of themselves, they show, I think, some striking continuities which are useful for understanding the dynamics of Indonesian nationalism and state-building. On the following pages I will attempt to draw these out, and also to provide a historical setting in which readers unfamiliar with recent Indonesian history may locate the action of the individual essays.

Central to the force and direction of Indonesian nationalism and to the character and legitimacy of the Indonesian state has been, it seems to me, the idea of achieving modernity. At the turn of the century this was a condition foreign to the peoples of the archipelago but visible to them via the colonial experience as the possession of wealth, power, and mastery over nature. Their civilizations had been defeated by European masters of modernity, leaving them without a sense of what they were but with an image of something totally different that they might be. If at first this prospect seemed to many unattainable or unacceptable, it gradually became the only imaginable future.

As Anderson's essay makes clear, the Western inventions and ideas that massively confronted Indonesians—especially in Java and the plantation areas of East Sumatra—from around the turn of the century brought about a revolution in indigenous thought patterns. Time became imagined as linear, evolutionary; cosmic centers became mere stops on a railway line. Truth was no longer to be found in royal utterances but in the marketplace; it was not what was sacred but what was useful.

The new verity was located especially in the journals and pamphlets that contained "news" and discussed the meaning of the changed world. For the great part these were written in the Malay patois that had been the archipelago's trading language and had been adopted by the Dutch colonial authorities as the standard vehicle for communication with their indigenous subjects. This incipient national language, together with the spread of modern schooling and the development of a native-staffed civil service whose members were transferred about the archipelago, brought about a consciousness of a new arena of action and belief, an "imagined community," as Anderson has elsewhere described it, which saw the Netherlands East Indies not as an agglomeration of Dutch conquests but as the embryonic nation-state, Indonesia.[1] But this concept emerged only gradually, as the idea of a territorial focus of loyalty came to seem real to Indonesians; indeed, the idea of "Indonesia" as a particular place was first broached not by indigenes but by Europeans and then taken up by the colony's Eurasians.

Since very few Indonesians enjoyed any modern education, and fewer still had careers that took them into archipelago-wide networks, Indonesia remained for some time the notion of a very small group. But many more were affected by the sense of civilizational dislocation, and they sought explanation and succor first of all in uni-

[1] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

versal ideologies. To them, the whole world and not just their particular part of it seemed to be in motion, and global explanations seemed most likely to contain the meaning of this.[2] Religious modernism and Pan-Islamism was one such source; Communism was another, thanks partly to the involvement of radical Dutch socialists in the nascent Indonesian labor movement and partly to the way in which some of its notions fit with indigenous ideas of social justice.

Freedom—*kemerdekaan*—was in the air, and by this was understood not just liberation from colonial rule but also the older, indigenous meaning of freedom from the exactions of the state, landlords, social superiors. The new age promised not only equality but prosperity, as the new technological wonders were mastered and applied to the needs of society. The movement to be *merdeka* was thus as much to seize modernity as sovereignty from the Dutch.

Indonesian nationalism proper was born of this ferment, of its excitement and its failure. The early exuberance of the national awakening profited from a reforming optimism on the part of colonial rulers, impelled since the turn of the century by a new Ethical policy which encouraged native strivings for modernity on the assumption that this would attach them to their Dutch mentors. In the 1920s this gave way to suspicion that Indonesian freedoms would be gained at the expense of Dutch interests, and that the colonial rulers' first task was not enlightenment but control. In the new climate of oppression, the mass of the politically mobilized populace quietly withdrew from leaders who no longer seemed capable of bringing great change; others participated in an abortive, Communist-led (but also Muslim) rebellion in 1926-27.

The revolt's failure left on stage a small, highly educated group drawn largely from the lower rungs of the indigenous elite of Java and Minangkabau (West Sumatra). Their common language and much of their thinking was Dutch, but their loyalties went neither to the culture of their birth nor of their education. Rather, they saw themselves as the rightful rulers of the nation-to-be, Indonesia; to colonial officials they were final proof that the Ethical policy of enlightenment had been a mistake. Though the new generation of nationalists posed far less a threat than earlier leaders in terms of following or rebellious intent, the more popular and radical among them were one after another removed from circulation. The Ethical policy's humanist optimism was replaced by a technocratic mystique which held that only the European masters of modernity possessed the economic administrative, and scientific know-how necessary to further the population's welfare; only after a long period of tutelage and apprenticeship could indigenous leaders hope to assume the archipelago's management.

The 1930s saw the nadir of the Indonesian movement, with political activity so restricted as to be meaningless to the populace. Those who wished to improve the lot of the common man sought this in non-political ways: through cooperatives, educational programs, the foundation of welfare organizations. As for those who overstepped the bounds, they found themselves in a world that was both isolated from and central to the latter-day Netherlands East Indies: the world of prison and exile.

Rudolf Mrázek's contribution describes the epitome of this alternative society, the concentration camp at Boven Digoel, New Guinea. It was a curious world, for it

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[2] See especially Takashi Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java 1912–1926* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). *Doenia Bergerak* [The World in Motion] ws the name of a well-known radical journal of the day.

contained at once the denial of the Ethical policy's attempt at rapprochement through enlightenment and the last consistent effort to realize it. The inmates were given, within the bounds of their isolated world, more freedom for reading, teaching, and expression than they could expect outside, and they enjoyed better health and housing provisions as well. Digoel was to show how well-run, how prosperous things could be if only the people would cooperate; it was not Dutch lack of good will, not the abandonment of Dutch standards of civilization that had led to repression, but the refusal of misguided or prideful indigenes to acknowledge the need for tutelage before modernity could be achieved and they could stand as equals to the Dutch.

By no means all of Digoel's inmates concurred in this game; as Mrázek shows, they were divided into those who went along and those who refused to have any more to do with the system than was necessary for survival. Those who were closest to the Dutch in education and culture were often among the least cooperative; Mrázek describes two of them, Sutan Sjahrir (who would lead three Republican governments during the revolution) and the future Indonesian vice-president, Mohammad Hatta. People like these had less to lose by not cooperating, for as high-status intellectuals they had privileges ordinary prisoners (and warders), did not enjoy. But a principal reason was also their anxiousness about the boundary between collaboration and resistance, modernity and assimilation. Their habitual language was Dutch, their references were to European civilization, their goal was a modernity which was difficult to imagine except in Western terms. Where, then, did an Indonesian identity lie? Not in any particular local culture; these they saw as "feudal" or primitive. Indonesianness must rest in something that was new, modern, yet close to the people. But how to communicate with a populace that was as far from them culturally as it was geographically during their imprisonment? At the time, the question may have seemed academic, but within a few years Japanese invasion would make it real.

During World War II, Hatta, with Sukarno, constituted the duumvirate that represented the Indonesian population under Japanese rule; in August 1945 the two leaders became vice-president and president of the newborn Indonesian Republic. Sjahrir, as the principal politician to have refused collaboration with the Japanese, was brought in to serve as a prime minister acceptable to Allied opinion. None of these leaders had been elected, of course; as instruments of control they had little more than their superior education and the personal followings accumulated during their years of political involvement. Of the three, only Sukarno had the actor's temperament and the cultural expansiveness that enabled him to persuade the common folk that he spoke with their voice.

But how to play on popular sentiment when an even more pressing need was to convince an incoming Allied force that Indonesian leaders who had been Japan's collaborators were also the ones they should deal with? For at heart, even Sukarno was a conservative, doubting the ability of mass action to overcome all obstacles. Indeed, when he and Hatta had been confronted with the vacuum of power that marked Japan's surrender, they had hesitated to declare Indonesia's sovereignty, doing so only after militant youth kidnapped them and forced the issue. Indonesia's declaration of independence, instead of the high ceremony and ringing statement of goals that we might expect of a revolutionary state, was a bare announcement read before a few people, under the reluctant gaze of the Japanese.

And yet it marked a time of extraordinary expectation and mobilization. Much has been written of the revolutionizing impact of the Japanese period on the Indonesian population—the humiliation of the Dutch, the nationalist rhetoric and mass mobilization, the emphasis that what mattered was not expertise but will. All this suddenly brought freedom and modernity within the reach of ordinary Indonesians. With willpower, daring, and sacrifice they would seize these treasures from the colonialists. But how? The first weeks after the Japanese surrender became known as the *Bersiap* period—the Time of Preparedness—after the youthful revolutionaries who raced about the streets calling out that they were "ready," and summoning everyone to prepare as well. Ready for what they did not know, but they were sure that they were about to embark on an adventure of peril and infinite possibility, the realization of a new nation and a new self.

The ensuing effort to prevent a Dutch return saw a division between those Indonesians who advocated *perjuangan*—struggle, all-out confrontation with the colonialists—and those who preferred the more gradual course of *diplomasi*. The sides in this dispute were not fixed; depending on the perceived desperateness of the domestic situation, the balance of international power, and the raw calculations of personal rivalries, leaders shifted from one pole to another during the course of the revolution. As Barbara Harvey's contribution shows, there were many reasons why Indonesia's revolutionary leaders remained much more divided and heterogeneous than Viet Nam's, and their geographical and international contexts further widened these differences.[3]

In one sense, the Indonesian leadership's argument over struggle versus diplomacy was another version of the division between "cooperators" and "non-cooperators" in the oppressive final decades of colonial rule, and between the *werkwilligen* and *naturalisten* at Boven Digoel. How much should one accede to unjust and demeaning conditions in order to gain a minimal opportunity for action? Is the clarity of an absolute stand and the inspirational value of political martyrdom worth more for the future than what is gained by present compromise and humiliation? At what point does the realistic acceptance of constraints become collaboration with the oppressor?

Such considerations were now complicated by the fact that the Indonesian leaders were no longer only speaking as those who demanded but also as those who controlled resources. They therefore had to bear in mind what effect an intransigent or compromising stance might have on what they had gained. Those who came from elite families—and almost invariably the highly educated stemmed from at least the lower levels of traditional elites, from families that had taken service in the colonial regime—they had to think of the consequences of releasing the mass energies which had boiled to the surface of the revolution. In the localities where these had escaped they had all too often directed themselves against established local elites, in the name of Islam and/or Communism.

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[3] We might also note that there is another point at which the Vietnamese experience might usefully be contrasted with the Indonesian—namely the period in which Vietnamese intellectuals were considering whether to focus their national movement on Viet Nam itself (or Annam, Tonkin, or Cochin-China) or on the wider world of Indonesia. Indonesian leaders, though they continued to debate right up to the eve of independence the virtues of cultural claims that would include Malaya and possibly drop new Guinea, generally found the boundaries of the Netherlands East Indies their 'natural' focus; but Indochina was to remain a place insufficiently imagined.

National leaders also had to think of the consequences of pushing aside the administrative and social-economic hierarchies on which rested the running of the state. The Japanese occupiers had found it convenient to maintain these, and any attempt to present the Republic as a state worthy of international recognition would also necessarily rely on this unique source of connections and expertise. So, what for some was a singular opportunity to achieve the goals of the world-in-motion, to destroy every trace of colonialism and "feudalism" and realize freedom and social justice, opened for others the danger of anarchy, collapse, and a new enslavement.

The dispute between *diplomasi* and *perjuangan* thus also came to appear as a struggle between the modernizers and the masses; Kahin's *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* was written from the viewpoint of the former and Anderson's *Java in a Time of Revolution* from the latter. As Harvey points out, these were not the only elements that entered into the matter, but the formulation is important because it is widely shared by Indonesians and lies at the heart of the question of what independence was for and what the Indonesian nation-state should be about.

Because generation (youth's greater sense of possibilities, the training and inspiration of young men by the Japanese) and geography (location in areas whose social orders had been most deeply compromised by colonialism) were as important as education and class in determining popular sympathy for *perjuangan* or *diplomasi*, there was a conflation of youth/Java/anti-Westernism/social radicalism as opposed to older generation/Outer Islands/gradualist/conservative that was to have a powerful influence on the way Indonesia was viewed—and Indonesians viewed themselves—in the generation following independence. As we shall see in Mary Heidhues's description of the revolution in Bangka, the actual line-up of forces in almost any specific locality was far more complex and shifting; yet it contained enough of the general pattern to endorse it as a stereotype and thus to confirm Java and the Republic as the locus of freedom and modernity.

As in Digoel, some of the most westernized Indonesian leaders were also the most intransigently opposed to compromise with colonialism. This was notably true of those who as students had (like Hatta and Sjahrir earlier) gone to the Netherlands, where they had found in Dutch radical leftism a congenial Western but anticolonial ambience. Together with locally educated modernizers, these returned students assumed the leadership of the Left Wing coalition that dominated Republican governance for the first years of the revolution. Increasing disillusion with the results of *diplomasi*, together with the pressures of Cold War polarization, led them first to a breach with those who were committed to compromise—Sjahrir chief among them—and then to all-out intransigence. They now argued that true independence could only be realized by fully engaging the revolutionary impulses of the people. In the increasingly desperate circumstances of the embattled Republic, this was both a popular position and a socially explosive one. The radicals, who now proclaimed themselves openly Communists, had little control over the mass action they had endorsed, and in September 1948 they found themselves following rather than leading a revolt against the leadership of the Republic.

The "Madiun Affair" of September 1948 was swiftly crushed, evidence not only of its own disorganization but, more significantly, of a broad consensus within the Republic as to where legitimate leadership lay. Indeed, outside the rebellious core areas of East and Central Java, many Communist party organizations refused to join in the revolt. For a future generation of Communist leaders this would be proof that

what counted first was the idea of the Indonesian nation, and that the class struggle must be pursued through and not against the goal of national self-realization.

If the Madiun Affair was a disaster for the Communists, it was equally unfortunate for the Dutch, who had hoped to use Indonesian inability to contain Communism to justify their planned invasion of the Republic. Now, alas, the Indonesians had crushed Communism militarily, without any outside assistance; the Americans were enchanted, and they were very much more powerful than the Dutch. Nonetheless, the invasion went ahead; Netherlands forces swiftly overran Java, and by the end of 1948 the Republic's principal leaders were in prison.

As in colonial days, the Dutch endeavored to isolate their internees from possible sources of popular support. As Mary Heidhues recounts, they were taken to the island of Bangka in the western part of the archipelago; it was a place which, aside from a lively smuggling trade, had hardly been affected by the revolution or the prewar national movement. Both the Dutch and Japanese had made use of established local elites, and thus had not brought the "traditional" order of things into question. One way or another, however, the colonial regime and especially the wartime occupation had undermined the old hierarchies economically, politically, and psychologically, in Bangka and the archipelago as a whole. By the time of the revolution people in even Indonesia's more distant parts were sensing that their old world was coming to an end. Aspiring elites, young people, and those with positions to defend all endeavored to find a place in the still inchoate emerging dispensation. This did not mean the populace of these areas rose up, or that effective organizations were constructed. On the contrary, the far-flung territories appeared politically as a vast plain, across which small groups of activists scurried as the winds of romance or perceived advantage blew them.

As the Dutch came to realize they could not simply restore Indies colonial rule, they began to advocate a "federal" system which would reduce if not exclude a role for the Republic. However, the Dutch-sponsored indigenous leaderships insisted on the Republic as a major component of any federal arrangement. The modernists among them found the Republic a guarantee against lapse into "feudal" obscurantism; the others had no confidence the Dutch could protect them in the long run. However they might dislike the idea of dominance by poor and populous Java, they were by now too taken by the idea that "Indonesia" was the natural focus of sovereignty in the archipelago, and that they must find a place in this new reality.

By 1949 colonial rule was coming to seem an anachronism; it no longer appeared right or indeed possible that a tiny country half way round the world could gain a vast and populous archipelago. Like Java's sacred centers at the turn of the century, Dutch colonialism had come to represent a world that people no longer imagined. With that its power was lost, and Dutch rule became a mere way station on Indonesia's road from tradition to modernity.

In the end, the Dutch had no choice but to sit down with their prisoners and negotiate their own surrender. Half a year later the federal structure to which the revolutionaries had acceded collapsed at the first touch of pressure from Republican forces. All these things seemed to confirm the naturalness, the modern inevitability of the new Indonesian nation-state and the rightness of its unitary form. Yet it also raised the question of where its true leadership lay.

Reflecting on the course of the revolution, influential Indonesian military men would conclude that it was the politicians' insistence on negotiations, on *diplomasi*, that had brought the Republic so close to ruin. Their belief was encouraged by the

fact that the Republic's army had originated quite separately from its political leadership, having evolved from units trained by the Japanese to fight off an eventual Allied invasion. The Indonesian army could claim that it had made itself, and that it embodied the fighting spirit that ultimately convinced the Dutch they could not prevail.

In truth, the revolutionary army had factional as well as military divisions; its leaders spent most of their energy not in anticolonial battle but in attempting to assert authority over their ragtag forces and to absorb or eliminate the many militia groups that pullulated around the revolution's fringes. They jockeyed for power among themselves and sought civilian political support in their struggle for resources and recognition. In short, they displayed much of the disunity and disorganization that Harvey notes as distinguishing the Indonesian revolution generally from the Vietnamese. Nonetheless, within the military the myth grew of the army as bearer of the revolution, true source of the national spirit and guardian of its values. It would not take much—other than agreement within the military itself—for it to conclude that it was also the rightful locus of political leadership.

But at the beginning of the 1950s no one in power really questioned that Indonesia would have a parliamentary regime. This was not because nothing else had been contemplated. Indonesian nationalists before the war had debated more paternalistic and communal bases for governance as more appropriate to indigenous values (and elite interests). The constitution adopted by the newborn Republic in 1945 had, under the influence of current Japanese ideas of leadership and the perceived needs of the moment, envisioned a strongly authoritative presidential regime. This had soon been replaced by a parliamentary system, however, both to win favor from the victorious Allies and because many modern-educated Indonesians had imbibed from their Dutch mentors the idea that parliamentary democracy was a sign of maturity as a modern state. Moreover, it appeared appropriate to the country's condition of many regions, ideologies, and interests that needed to be represented and to negotiate with each other.

In fact, there had been a considerable winnowing of Indonesia's ideological possibilities during the course of the independence struggle, resulting in a post-revolutionary governing elite which initially appeared relatively cohesive and authoritative, so that the negotiation of the archipelago's differences did not seem an insuperable task. Towards the end of the Japanese occupation, as independence began to seem less a dream than an imminent possibility, Indonesian leaders tried to formulate a general understanding on the ideological principles of the new state. In June 1945, at a session of the Japanese-sponsored Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Independence, Sukarno proposed five principles—nationalism, internationalism (later interpreted as humanitarianism, a concern for the global welfare of mankind), democracy, social justice, and belief in One God. The Panca Sila clearly had its origins in modern Western democratic ideas, and at the same time it was explained as a critique of Western practice based on claimed indigenous values of harmony and compromise.

The Panca Sila made the nation the first of its principles and religion the last; it did not name Islam, let alone enjoin Islamic law upon its Muslim members. Nonetheless, during the revolution most Muslim activists worked through Islamic parties and militias within the Republican framework. For some, however, the nationalist leadership remained too distant from their religious and social concerns, and they carried on a largely independent struggle against the Dutch. In 1948, as part of the

crisis in the beleaguered Republic which also brought conflict between the nationalists and the Left, the largest of the Muslim armed groupings declared its separate purpose of establishing an Islamic State of Indonesia. The Darul Islam movement soon spread from its West Java base to several Outer Island areas, and provided a military challenge to Jakarta for nearly fifteen years after the end of the revolution. It drew on strong feelings, yet its own vision was blurred; it agreed on Indonesia as the central political entity but its leadership remained localized, its organization rudimentary, and its Islamic commitment more noticeable as a slogan of rebellion than as a real civilizational alternative. Ultimately, the effect of the revolt was to increase the secular imaginations of Indonesia's national leadership, and especially the military's distrust of militant Islam.

The revolution also saw the rejection of a federal form for Indonesia, however appropriate this might have been to the archipelago's diversity. In colonial days, modernist Indonesians had feared the "feudalism" and backwardness embodied in local ways. During the revolution the Dutch compounded this suspicion with their support of non-Javanese polities and their promotion of a federalist Indonesia. In postrevolutionary Indonesia, only very limited applications of customary law (and more importantly, the physical inability of the state to impose central patterns outside Java) would give leeway for expressing local character and needs. Java's political preponderance and its demands on national resources caused great resentment among non-Javanese, but the struggle to resolve this was directed to changing the leadership of the regime in Jakarta rather than the constitutional arrangements of the Indonesian republic. Both those who held power in Jakarta and those who rebelled against them in the late 1950s were committed to a governance which they conceived as modern and Indonesian.

As we have seen, an ideological orientation towards radical social change fell victim during the revolution to the emphasis on diplomacy over struggle and to the choice of Western rather than Soviet patronage in the emerging Cold War contest. At the same time capitalist principles were too identified with colonial exploitation and alien economic activity. To the new political-bureaucratic leadership, as for many early nationalists, nostalgic concepts of village harmony seemed a better basis for an authentic Indonesian order. The early postrevolutionary ruling elite generally endorsed socialist or cooperative slogans which stressed social harmony and progress under a modernizing but caring leadership. Similarly, they were uncomfortable with overt diplomatic alignment with the West, preferring at least a nominal Old War neutrality in spite of their anticommunist convictions.

As a result of the turbulence of Indonesia's parliamentary period, this initial ideological consensus has generally been seen as ephemeral, the reflection of an elite too tiny and too isolated for its views to prevail for long. It is worth noting, though, that it has also been the general ideological orientation of the New Order regime which has ruled Indonesia since 1965. The chief difference is, of course, the loss of the parliamentary principle itself. The authoritarian character of the later regime is partly the product of its strong military element and partly the result of a conclusion by Indonesia's modernizing elite that a more open polity would not allow it to maintain its authority and achieve its goals. In other words, we can also see Indonesia's early postrevolutionary orientation as a statement of elite intent, which in the end could only be made to stick by resorting to massive force.

The postrevolutionary leaders' ideological agreement was only very relative, however; frustration, rivalry, and the pressure of clienteles soon began to emphasize

their differences, and what began as nuances of opinion ended as bitter conflicts of principal. The young state did not have the economic and administrative resources to control or satisfy those who claimed its recognition of their needs. Political parties, which were now the fulcrum of policy-making, lacked organization and a clear sense of direction now that sovereignty had been achieved. They turned increasingly to religious and ethnic appeals in order to attract followings, and thus they exacerbated centrifugal pressures. Most, moreover, had their strength on Java; of the main parties only the modernist Islamic Masyumi was important in the Outer Islands, and gradually it came to represent regional resentment of Javanese rules. In some areas, such as Bali, the parties attached themselves to long-standing local rivalries. In places where indigenous hierarchies had more completely dissolved—and especially on Java—they crystallized religious, cultural, and economic variations into distinct ideological communities which competed for political power. By the middle of the 1950s it looked very much as if the hard-won Indonesian nation-state might fall apart.

Political leaders followed two contrasting approaches in confronting the problem of postrevolutionary disorder. One, initially dominant and represented notably by Sjahrir and Hatta, urged that popular sentiment be contained and that government should pursue a program of economic and administrative rationalization that would bring foreign investment and technological advance. The revolution was over, they held; the genie of mass participation must be put back in its bottle, to be released only gradually as the state's wherewithal was capable of meeting its demands. Others—chief among them Sukarno, whose influence grew the more the parties seemed deadlocked—held to the contrary approach that the revolution had not really been completed, and that therein lay the source of present weakness and confusion. Only a rekindling of the spirit of the liberation struggle could restore unity and vitality. The elimination of Dutch economic as well as political influence, the reacquisition of West Irian (which as Netherlands New Guinea had been conceded to the Dutch under the independence accord), and the general promotion of Indonesia's leadership in the global anti-imperialist cause were ways in which such advocates proposed to harness popular energies and loyalties.

This contrast reflected two different ways of locating legitimate rule, which were to become increasingly important in shaping the Indonesian state. The first found it in the same scientific superiority with which the late Dutch colonial regime had argued its right to rule: those who possess a superior understanding of modernity should run the country, guiding the populace towards the benefits of progress. The second located it in the Revolution, now raised to a mystical source of unity and energy. What was foreign, routine, hierarchical needed to be swept aside; what mattered was not book-learning but spirit. It is worth noting, though, that for all the inflammatory rhetoric and reference to the Revolution and the People, this was not necessarily a socially radical stance; rather, it emphasized the need for the People to sacrifice for the good of the nation, and for domestic social unity to be maintained in front of the foreign enemy.

McVey's contribution argues that under these circumstances Indonesian Communist leaders found a new appeal, adopting elements from both legitimating arguments and applying them to a demand for social reform. They thus turned on its head the relationship between international and national elements which we observed at the beginning of the national movement; whereas then the nation had been conceived in the context of a whole world in motion, now the world revolution

was seen as a means to achieving the Indonesian national self. They argued that the key to Indonesia's self-realization was organization, which was the essential source of dynamism and modernity. Communism, the PKI leaders asserted, possessed in (a suitably Indonesianized version of) Marxism-Leninism the science of how to focus and fulfill popular desires.

The PKI's popular support grew apace during the parliamentary period, but the party failed to convince those who had something to lose in the way of property or position, or to win over the religious. The first feared socialist redistribution, however the Communist leaders might argue that proper organization would bring prosperity without pain. The second feared the secularism of both international Communism and the postcolonial PKI leadership. Increasingly, these social elements began to coalesce around another organizational-ideological structure, the army.

During the 1050s the Indonesian military managed to overcome most of its early postrevolutionary disunity, partly through reorganization and partly through the experience of fighting religious and regional rebellion. From the late 1950s the army rooted itself deeply in Indonesia's economy and administration, taking advantage of the seizure of Dutch enterprises and the proclamation of martial law which followed the intensification of the regional crisis in 1957. It thus acquired a major stake in the economic and administrative status quo. At the same time, its leadership achieved an ideological formulation of its relationship to the nation-state, in particular through the concept of *dwifungsi,* the army's right to a role in the civilian as well as military guidance of the country.

Parliamentary democracy could not survive the combination of centrifugal pressures and the rival centralities of populist nationalism, Communism, and militarism. In 1959, as the result of a marriage of convenience between the army and Sukarno, the Republic reverted to its original 1945 constitution, which both symbolized a return to the Revolution's sources and authorized a highly concentrated leadership. The new Guided Democracy regime initially allowed little leeway for political parties. The Masyumi was banned, as was the Western-leaning Indonesian Socialist Party which Sjahrir had led. (Sjahrir himself was eventually imprisoned; Vice-President Hatta was brought to resign.) The tolerated political groups had to acquiesce to being sectoral participants in a corporatist system. But President Sukarno needed something to counterbalance the army's power, and in particular he required an instrument that could organize the mass support elicited by his charisma. Increasingly, he found this in the PKI.

Since one of Guided Democracy's avowed purposes was to avoid the disintegrative effects of social unrest, the Communist leaders could not easily pursue domestic redistributive demands, but they found common cause with Sukarno's efforts to rekindle the revolutionary spirit through a campaign to remove all Western influence and to lead a world crusade against capitalist imperialism. Yet they could not completely eschew domestic issues if they were to keep their own popular support, and Sukarno himself came increasingly to see domestic opponents of social change as a major reason for Indonesia's failure to renew its revolutionary dynamism. As the economic situation worsened, and the President pursued an ever more radical course, opinion grew within the army that it must assert forcibly its gains to be the guardian of the national interest. The coup of October 1, 1965, eliminated those generals who, though anticommunist, had temporized with Sukarno, and it provided the psychological setting for a major break with the past.

As Robinson's essay shows in the case of Bali—a center of postcoup violence—the social tensions and local rivalries which gave the army-sponsored anticommunist pogroms an element of mass participation were neither the origin nor the energizer of the killings. Whereas during the revolution social violence in Republican Bali (and in Java, Aceh, and eastern Sumatra) had been produced by local pressures which expressed themselves through nationally identified organizations, the killings of 1965-66 were the result of both central decisions and, for the great part, central pressures. "Let us hope that the authorities on Bali will not continue to act as if Bali were a separate country," a military spokesman chided insufficiently enthusiastic officials.[4] Participation in the nation meant taking part in the extermination of the enemies of the state. It was a stark statement of a major shift in ideological emphasis, from the community of the nation to the discipline of the state.

Now the revolution, or attempts to revive it, was truly over. In the New Order that was erected on the ruins of Guided Democracy one was not supposed to refer to the "Revolution" but to the "War of Independence," for revolution's implication of instability and systemic change had become unacceptable. What mattered now was order and control; state-building was the central political task. It was not, of course, that Indonesia's rulers only now addressed themselves to the question of control; as we have seen, this had been a matter of concern from the beginning of the revolution. But only now did it overcome all other considerations, and only now did the state possess the physical means of enforcing it, through the military's penetration of society and through an increasing control of economic resources.

The New Order did not initially appear simply as the expression of military rule. It gained much of its initial effervescence from the enthusiasm of students, intellectuals, and modern-minded administrators—people to whom Sjahrir had become a martyr in the cause of rational modernity. One of their principle demands was for a return to the "rule of law," which they saw as representing the positive aspects of Western democratic rule, the freedoms for individual expression and legal equality without, however, a return to the "free-fight liberalism" of the parliamentary period and its Pandora's box of mass politics. They were, to be sure, a small group and in no position to make their views prevail once the army decided their role had changed from useful to disruptive. The idea of the individual as something distinct from society, and of a separation between society and the state, was something which few people could conceive and even fewer thought to be of critical importance.

As Lev's contribution shows, broader Indonesian understandings of the rule of law by no means coincided with libertarianism. Moreover, people who had lived through the turmoil and privations of the past generation looked with a certain nostalgia to the colonial period as normal times—*zaman normal.* Life may have been oppressive then but at least, it was imagined, you knew where you stood. Consequently, the New Order's employment of once-hated colonial ordinances limiting the expression of critical opinion was not received with as much irony as we might imagine.

If one could see in the Guided Democracy period a certain stylistic revival of the Japanese and revolutionary periods, the New Order even more clearly resurrected the colonial mode of rule. In the New Order, as in the colonial one, the fulcrum of society was the state and its administrators. Both regimes held that the populace was unsophisticated and innocent; partisan politics would only corrupt it. Under the

[4] Quoted in Robinson's account, p. 130 below.

New Order, the people were to be politically demobilized—to form a "floating mass" which would be connected and controlled by officialdom. Parties were not forbidden, but the process of limiting them which began under Guided Democracy proceeded apace, until no effective opposition was possible and elections had been reduced to a ritual affirming loyalty to the state.

Under the New Order, all parties were eventually forced to adopt the state-endorsed ideology of the Panca Sila, which thus came to serve as an instrument for the *Gleichschaltung* of social organization and thought. The principles of the Panca Sila were generally humanitarian and egalitarian, as we have seen, but that did not prevent their being employed to endorse coercion and hierarchy. The state has declared itself the protector of these values; therefore anyone who opposes the state is opposed to them too, and the ideals act as legitimizers of their own suppression.

The New Order also revived the late Indies concept of the state as possessor of the keys to modernity. In place of the PKI's assertion that the secret lay in the organization of mass energies, New Order ideologues emphasized the state's command of technology and economic science. With this expertise officials would lead the population on the path of Development. This meant on the one hand the capitalist opening-out of Indonesia's economy, both in terms of opportunities for domestic enterprise and for foreign penetration, and on the other hand the strengthening of the Indonesian state.

State-building was not seen just as a matter of internal control but also of international standing. For, as Shiraishi's contribution points out, the New Order continued one important aspect of the pre-1965 state, the effort to establish Indonesia as a leader among nations. Foreign (capitalist) observers of New Order economic policy would be delighted by Indonesian leaders' ability to make decisions which cut heavily into entrenched bureaucratic interests, but puzzled by their promotion of expensive high-tech projects which did not fit ideas of developmental rationalism. They forgot perhaps that President Suharto was both an army general and a member of the generation that had fought the war of independence. Although he abhorred the revolutionary romanticism of his predecessor, he retained—as Shiraishi stresses —the idea that international recognition of Indonesia's greatness was essential to the country's national fulfillment. Hence he pursued the confirmation of Indonesian centrality to the Non-aligned Movement and to ASEAN and devoted a considerable part of state wealth to advanced industrialization, particularly that of military relevance.

Yet the New Order has not simply expanded stability, deference, and control; it has also undermined these things. Though politically the regime denied the revolution, economically and socially it has had a revolutionary effect. By the 1990s Indonesia had a middle class of some substance; a considerable portion of society, especially in Java, was urbanized, and in the countryside technological change and entrepreneurial opportunities had created a modern-minded and economically self-confident elite.

Though the New Order emphasized hierarchy and the revival of tradition (seen as a social stabilizer now, rather than the tool of a vanishing "feudalism"), the changes it promoted ate away at their cultural and economic bases. At the upper reaches of society, money-making opportunities in the private sector turned attention away from state service as the necessary source of enrichment and power, while the general expansion of business and services created a milieu which was apart from and in certain respects antagonistic to state power. The arguments for more recog-

nition of individual rights have acquired a much broader if still unorganized constituency, concerned for the protection of property and perquisites as much as for democratic ideals. The result has been that, at the very moment the state seemed most unassailable, its legitimacy has come into question.

We can see this in the spread of skepticism regarding the statist understanding of law's role, which Lev describes, and in Frederick Bunnell's discussion of the efforts to create independent arenas for social action. The latter have come from a growing consciousness that state and society are not coterminous, that certain activities are properly undertaken outside and perhaps even against bureaucratic control. They are also the result of the ever-narrowing possibilities for political expression under the New Order. By the mid-1980s, these had been so reduced that, as in the repressive final decade of colonial rule, Indonesian reformers looked to cooperative movements, social welfare associations, and other non-political modes of achieving improvement.

Some non-governmental organizations have challenged state omnipotence while insisting on their non-political character, most notably the legal aid organization Lembaga Bantuan Hukum, referred to by Lev and Bunnell. Such groups have usually led an uncertain existence, relying partly on international support and partly on the opinion—shared by at least some sectors of officialdom—that they serve the useful purposes of letting off steam and exposing abuse of office. Many associations, however, have deliberately eschewed any appearance of confrontation with the state; the Bethesda community development group described by Bunnell is an example. For the bureaucrats, such groups might appear useful auxilaries to official development efforts, and perhaps a way to achieve structural reform at the local level without conceding too much by way of control at the top. However, their organizational and cadre-forming activities raise memories of the PKI's construction of a mass base uncontrolled by the state. Furthermore, though it might enhance the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of official programs if the common people were persuaded that they could undertake development initiatives on their own, it would also introduce them to the very subversive idea that prosperity did not depend on state guidance. As for the participants in such NGOs, they have had to ponder whether their efforts merely serve to support the state's ends, and whether any freedom of action they appear to have won is not a temporary indulgence rather than a real gain. In other words, they have had to address much the same questions the *werkwilligen* of Digoel had to ask themselves many years ago.

By the mid-1990s the combination of intense emphasis on social stability, state control, and capitalist development has resulted in what might best be described as dynamic paralysis. Moreover, Indonesia's paramount leader is now old, has no evident successor, and represents a style of rule whose roots lie in a vanishing past. Politically the country is in stasis, a condition in which it cannot remain. No doubt, once momentum is re-established, its direction and moving force will seem to be inevitable, but it is well to remember that they are hardly obvious now.

For all the uncertainty of Indonesia's future course, we should bear in mind that quite a few things that were scarcely imagined at the beginning of the century now seem established. The nation Indonesia has been thought of, its essential boundaries defined, and a state founded. The values of the Panca Sila have been sufficiently enshrined in official ideology as to constitute a statement of civilizational intent. Rulers have used rather than observed these principles, but their reiteration affirms demands on those in power and asserts a measure for legitimacy. (Those who doubt

that such things may have consequences need only reflect on the fate of the Soviet Union).

It is unclear whether Indonesia will continue to pursue modernization through export-oriented capitalism, but it seems evident that in one way or another it will seek modernity. It is open to question whether the state will continue to be all-dominant, but it seems certain that it will continue to play a major role in Indonesian lives. How the expanding bourgeoisie and proletariat will find a voice is a conundrum, but it seems sure that these groups will continue to grow and must be accommodated in some way.

Indonesia's turbulent past and the particular characteristics of its current patrimonial rule are the immediate causes of its perplexity as a nation-state. Its experience is also, however, a variation on a global theme. Indonesia's movement from mobilization to control, from nation-building to state-building, has been its own but is also part of a wider trend. Likewise, its present uncertainty reflects a global unsureness about the role of state and nation in a world increasingly conscious of the limits of state power and the constructed nature of national communities. In the long run, this poses a fundamental threat to the nation-state's ideological and organizational dominion, however overwhelming its command of force may be. It is also a reminder that the nation-state, like other institutions by which men have so far governed themselves, was born of a certain time and, once that day has passed, will either transform itself beyond our present recognition or cease to be imagined at all. The early Indonesian activists were right, after all: it is the whole world and not just one part of it that is in motion.

LANGUAGE, FANTASY, REVOLUTION: JAVA 1900–1950

Benedict R. O'G. Anderson

In 1870 the first railway line in colonial Java opened for business. Running between Semarang and Surakarta, it was initially intended to ferry not human beings but sugar. But by 1875 it was carrying annually close to 900,000 passengers. By 1894, the number of passengers had reached almost six million,and the lines linked most towns of substantial importance on the island.[1] Viewed from the villages and ricefields through which they hurtled, the trains, or *kereta api* (literally, "carriages of fire"), were utterly astounding, maybe more so than anything that had appeared in rural Java in centuries. Most astounding of all was the incessant repetition of their magical appearances. Day after day, night after night, at perfectly predictable times, they thundered past.[2] If one was a Javanese passenger one saw, out of the window, a new Java: one in which human beings flashed by anonymously in the blurred foreground of magnificent, slowly changing panoramas. And these panoramas were easily decipherable from the maps now readily available in offices and railway timetables, and from the signboards at each single station announcing its name. Java as a *landscape,* viewed bifocally—horizontally from carriage window, vertically from the cartographer's bird's-eye—was something previously unheard of. Yet, once experienced, it changed, in becoming normal, the sense-of-reality of millions of natives.[3] Java started to become a *figurable space,* as well as an ancestral

[1] See Takashi Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912–1926* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 8.

[2] The opening of Pramoedya Ananta Toer's marvellous novel *Bumi Manusia* (Jakarta: Hasta Mitra, 1980), set in the Java of 1900, contains the following pregnant passage: "Trains—carriages without horses, without oxen, without buffalo—had now for over ten years been witnessed by my countrymen And even today astonishment still remains in their hearts. Batavia-Surabaya can be traversed in only three days! And they're predicting it will soon take only a night and a day! A night and a day! A long train of carriages, as big as houses, full of goods, and people too, pulled by the power of water alone. If I had, during my life, the chance to meet Stephenson, I would have offered him a floral wreath, all of orchids. A grid of railway tracks had splintered my island." [I have modified the translation on p. 3 of Max Lane's English version of *Bumi Manusia,* entitled *This Earth of Mankind* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1982).]

[3] See Kenji Tsuchiya's brilliant discussion in his "Kartini's Image of Java's Landscape," *East Asian Cultural Studies,* XXV, 1–4 (March 1986), pp. 59–86, especially section III.

countryside. And when after 1900 modern schools began to spread, the whole earth came to be figured, through the imagining of the great sixteenth-century Flemish mathematician-geographer Mercator, by a single atlas page on which railway Java was no more than a marginal dot.

Among the most important commodities transported by the railways were the colony's first true newspapers, printed initially in Dutch, later also in "Malay," Chinese, Javanese, and so forth.[4] Though the number of native readers remained relatively small until well into the twentieth century—thanks to the extreme conservatism of the colonial regime's educational policies[5]—for those who were literate these newspapers created, quite abruptly, new realities. On the one hand, they represented the whole world—just as the railway maps re-presented Java—within the single, easily comprehended frame of its pages; and these pages, far from being esoteric, were immensely public, being regularly issued, day by day, and easily purchased in the place traditionally furthest removed from Truth: the market. On the other hand, they completely transformed traditional apprehensions of time. Early on in Pramoedya Ananta Toer's great novel *Bumi Manusia* the hero ruminates on his discovery that night in Java occurs simultaneously with day in Holland; and that this simultaneity is gauged by the mechanical clocking of world-time chronometry.[6] It was no longer possible to say, unequivocally: the sun has set. One had to specify, set where? The sacred combination-days of the intercalated Javanese calendar were no longer simply part of the natural world; they were "operational" only within specific longitudes, and subordinated to a new, mathematically-conceived cosmological time.[7] And since newspapers, by their intrinsic format, juxtaposed events all over the world *insofar as they took place on simultaneous days and nights*, they formed an insistent, daily concretization of the new chronometry.[8]

In effect, the fundamental coordinates of the old world were being rapidly eroded. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Javanese rulers had called themselves *Pakubuwono* (Nail of the Cosmos) and *Hamengkubuwono* (Holder of the Cosmos) without much self-consciousness, though from today's perspective there is something irremediably laughable about rival rulers with capitals (Surakarta and Jogjakarta) less than fifty miles apart calling themselves by such world-conquering appellations. By 1900, however, Jogjakarta and Surakarta were, above all, railway junctions along the trunk-line between the great port cities of Batavia and Surabaya.

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[4] See Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion*, pp. 32–34; and Ahmat Ada, *The Vernacular Press and Indonesian Consciousness 1855–1913* (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, Studies on Southeast Asia, no. 16, 1994), *passim*.

[5] The figures provided in George McT. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 31 and 36, show that up till 1900 roughly 0.001% of the native population was attending Western-style *primary* schools. The numbers attending secondary schools were infinitesimal. After 1910 the situation improved, but by no means spectacularly.

[6] Adapting from Lane's translation, *This Earth of Mankind*, pp. 4–5: "How dizzying it was to fit together the uncertainty of the clocked hour: when my island was blanketed in the darkness of night, her country was lit with sunshine. When her country was embraced by the blackness of night, my island shone brightly under the equatorial sun."

[7] See David S. Landes, *Revolution in Time: Clocks and the Making of the Modern World* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), for a splendid study of this whole subject.

[8] For a fuller discussion, see my *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised, enlarged edition (London: Verso, 1991), pp. 38–41, 61–63.

These cities in turn were subordinate to The Hague; and The Hague was the capital of a speck on the northwest periphery of Europe. More important still, there was no longer any place or person whereby the Cosmos could be nailed. In colonial classrooms cheap globes were starting to be happily *spun* by "native" children.

Under the influence of locomotive and newspaper, time was also changing its larger trajectory. In the old Hindu-derived view of "history"—not that this is really an appropriate word here—the cosmos moved steadily down through successive epochs, from the *Krtayuga* (Golden Age) to the *Kaliyuga* (Age of Destruction), heralding in due course a cyclical reappearance of the Golden Age.[9] Subsequent Muslim and Christian reckonings marked out the time of waiting between Message and Apocalypse. In Europe too, English-speakers had for centuries lived with and by the apocalyptic, Latin calibration of Anno Domini (AD).[10] Yet sometime in the early nineteenth century the matter-of-fact, vernacular-English concept BC, Before Christ, took root and spread around the world with extraordinary rapidity, perhaps because the very idea of Before Muhammad or Before Gautama seemed, perhaps still seems, unimaginable and/or sacriligious. BC, which, thanks to nineteenth century archaeology, palaeontology, and astronomy, soon included many more years than AD, dragged the latter down with it into a single flat transhistorical grid, such that the only difference between 10 BC and 10 AD was 20 years. This was increasingly intelligible in an industrializing, science-minded, world-conquering Europe, but dizzily problematical in a colonial Java where lowly peasants sped (third class, to be sure) on railways that Arjuna and Bima, Hayam Wuruk and Gajah Mada, could not have imagined. Down time? Up time?

One other fundamental coordinate that was being sapped in these same years was language. In all the centuries since the Portuguese first popped up in the Archipelago as harbingers of Western domination, it seems never to have occurred to any indigenous ruler to commission a dictionary (whereas from the very beginning Portuguese sailors and merchants were compiling local wordlists). We know that a number of indigenes did in fact learn Portuguese (but how?) and later a simple form of Dutch.[11] And what was subsequently known as *brabbel-Maleisch* (gibberish-Malay) was spread by the Dutch East India Company for its own interinsular imperial purposes.[12] But all these languages seem to have been acquired *en passant*, orally, by trial and frequent error; none made any profound impact until quite modern times. Was the "failure" to produce dictionaries an instinctive tactic of defense?

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[9] The Javanese courts used a so-called Saka-year chronometry, with numerical accretions each lunar year. But this reckoning was a calculus of microtime within the larger framework of the *yugas*.

[10] This style of reckoning seems to have been invented by the Scythian monk, Dionysius Exiguus (c. 530 AD). It did not come into wide use, however, until popularized all over Western Europe by the Venerable Bede (673–735 AD). I say 'apocalyptic' because the panic and expectation that spread in Europe in what were now imagined as the final years of the tenth century derived from the belief that the world would end at the millenium, 1000 years after Christ's incarnation.

[11] Charles Boxer notes, for example, that already in the sixteenth century the "Muslim rulers of Macassar were . . . fluent in Portuguese." See his *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415–1825* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 128.

[12] See the splendid account given in John Hoffman's "A Colonial Investment," *Indonesia* 27 (April 1979): 65–92.

We shall never know. What is certain is that up till the end of the nineteenth century, the absence of self-produced Asian-European dictionaries left such complex indigenous languages as Javanese, Sundanese, Buginese, and Balinese on a (to be sure, narrowing) cosmological high ground. The true names of things were assumed to be those provided by each language's vocabulary. Javanese, for example, was never viewed by its speakers and readers as *a* language (among others, all equidistant from Being). It was, basically, simply, "language." *Basa*, just like *bahasa* in Classical Malay, meant "language," but it always included in its broad semantic field the notions of civility, rationality, and truth. This conception meant that in the profoundest sense Javanese (or, in their local habitats, Sundanese, Balinese, and Buginese) was isomorphic with the world, as it were glued to it. It was this isomorphism, this inherence, that made for the efficacy of *mantra*. Because words, or particular combinations of them, like kings, krisses, banyan-trees, and sacred images, contained Power, their utterance could unleash that Power directly on, and in, the world.[13] (This is surely one reason why irony is absent from the classical literatures of Indonesia.)

Given the reality of colonial domination, it was inevitable that in the long run local languages such as Javanese would be infiltrated by those of Europe. But for centuries the latter were absorbed slowly, unconsciously, and, above all, piecemeal (typically, concrete nouns for the strange commodities exported from the West were adopted, but not abstract nouns, verbs, adjectives, or adverbs). This situation, however, changed quite abruptly in the last quarter of the nineteenth century as railways, clocks, and newspapers made their mass debut. In the 1890s, the colonial regime for the first time began a sustained effort to turn local elites bi- or trilingual through the institution of government primary and (later) secondary schools. Dutch and *brabbelmaleisch* began to be taught in classrooms by means of primers and dictionaries.[14] The latter proved to be decisive. The ideological grounding of the dictionary is fundamentally secular and democratic. It assumes that languages are translatable and equidistant from the world.[15] For centuries Muslim schools had taught native children how to "read" the Arabic al-Qur'an. But "reading" meant vocalizing correctly the sacred graphic symbols on the page. The youngsters did not "understand" the Qur'an by reading it, but only by listening to the exegeses of local adepts (the *ulama*) by ear, not eye. The study of language was still an esoteric science.

To the "native" children who began attending state schools in the 1890s and 1900s, the Dutch they learned was not a truth-language, cosmologically enthroned above Javanese or Sundanese. Bilingual dictionaries shouted that now all languages were vernaculars. But, precisely as vernaculars, they were understood as mapping *overlapping* universes. The strict coordination-grid of dictionaries said: Javanese has

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[13] Cf. the formulations of C. C. Berg, in, for example, his "The Javanese Picture of the Past," in Soedjatmoko et al., eds., *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), pp. 87–117.

[14] On the proliferation of dictionaries, see Hoffman, "A Colonial Investment;" and, above all, Kenji Tsuchiya's long essay, " Javanology and Ronggawarsita: An Introduction to Nineteenth-Century Javanese Culture," in *Reading Southeast Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, Translation Series, vol. I, 1990), pp. 75–108, especially Part II. The original text appeared in Kenji Tsuchiya and Shiraishi Takashi, eds., *Tonan-Ajia no Seiji no Bunka* [Culture and Politics in Southeast Asia] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppanka, 1984), pp. 71–127.

[15] See my *Imagined Communities*, pp. 71–75, for a fuller discussion of the political implications of nineteenth-century lexicography.

heretofore had no word for *persdelict* (offence against the press laws), *partij* (political party), or *parlement* (parliament); but this lack can immediately be handled by the phonologically-adapted coinages *persdelik, partai,* and *parlemen.* Neological trickle became neological flood, as the sacral walls between languages turned into porous membranes. To put it another way, where Sanskrit had once seemed efficacious, Dutch now appeared as useful.

After 1900 significant numbers of indigenes were becoming genuinely bilingual, and fairly often trilingual, with therefore a variety of languages at their everyday disposal. It is important to stress just how new this quotidian facility was. In earlier times some Javanese might learn foreign languages, but it would be for the specific purpose of communicating with foreigners, or for religious, ceremonial, or court-literary occasions. Now, the spread of Dutch in schools and offices, and of Malay/Indonesian in schools and newspapers, meant that a moderately-educated urban Javanese could well use, each day, all three languages, even to . . . other Javanese. The practice of switching from language to language even in the same sentence fairly quickly moved from daily speech to humor columns in newspapers, and from there to other forms of fiction.[16]

This interlingual intercourse had highly differential impacts on the native speakers of these languages. Native Dutch-speakers were least affected, because they came from a society where language had long been desacralized, and in any event they were perfectly confident that their view of the world fully took into account the worlds encompassed by Malay and Javanese. As for *brabbel-Maleisch*—which was evolving rapidly into "Indonesian"—it did not, until the 1940s, become the mother-language for any large group except some urban Chinese. Almost everywhere it was a second language, and a new language, assets that were in due course to give it an extraordinary dynamism. It was native speakers of Javanese (and other old indigenous languages) who were, so to speak, hardest hit, partly because, after 1900, Javanese was gradually driven to the fringes of the public stage, and more and more confined to oral life; more importantly, bilingualism fatally sapped its cosmological monopoly. This undermining is perfectly exemplified, already in 1914—before "Indonesia" had come to be widely imagined—in a learned philological article published by R. Ng. Poerbotjaroko, a brilliant young Javanese Javanologist,[17] entitled

[16] For early, "naive" examples of this interpenetration, see the seven tales collected and reprinted by Pramoedya Ananta Toer in *Tempo Doeloe* (Jakarta: Hasta Mitra, 1982). Highly sophisticated, often ironical variants emerged only later, for example in Tjalie Robinson [Vincent Mahieu]'s amusing *Piekerans van een straatslijper* [Idle Musings of a Street-Loafer] (Bandung: Masa Baru, 1954), a basically Dutch-language text sprinkled with Malay or Dutchified Malay phrases. (Dutch colonists had brought the Arabic-Malay verb *fikir/pikir* back to the streets of Amsterdam as *piekeren* [to muse, to fret over]; Mahieu, a witty Eurasian, neologized a noun from this, added a Dutch plural -s, and changed the final "e" to an "a" to link his invention back to the Indonesian noun *pikiran* [thoughts]). Compare Mangaradja Onggang Parlindungan's extraordinary *Tuanku Rao* (Jakarta: Tandjung Pengharapan, 1964), a basically Indonesian text jampacked with Dutch, German, English, and Batak. In a more general way, Dutch hypotaxis and preference for active verb-forms began changing the syntax of Malay/Indonesian, while, from the other side, Javanese grammatical forms also influenced the embryonic national language.

[17] Javanology, an invention of nineteenth-century Dutch-colonial administrators and missionary-scholars, encompassed the study of everything Javanese, but especially everything understood as Ur-Javanese. See the amusing and penetrating account given in Kenji Tsuchiya's "Javanology." Real Javanese entered this field only when they had been "professionally trained" by Dutch Javanologists, and Poerbotjaroko was among the first.

"Een pseudo-Padjadjaransche kroniek [A Pseudo-Padjadjaranese Chronicle]."[18] First, the very idea of a "fake" chronicle was almost unimaginable in the old monolingual world, where chronicles (*babad*) were regarded as emanations of royal power. Next, the word *een* (a) calmly reclassified the text within an "entomological" matrix in which hundreds of chronicles from all parts of the colony were assembled taxonomically by age, provenance, genuineness, authorship, and so on. Finally, the Dutch affix *-sche*, casually attached to the name of an ancient kingdom of legendary glory, in effect ripped the kingdom from its traditional eminence and shoved it unceremoniously down into the mundane grid of Dutch grammar. All this done, *nota bene*, by a Javanese.

The endeavor of Poerbotjaroko was, as he saw it, to de-fantasize the world of "classical" literature—to use Dutch and Dutch philology in order to say of this chronicle that *nothing it contained was important* compared to its intra-historical "falsity" as a piece of writing among other pieces of writing. But the unmooring of language after 1900 could also work in the opposite direction, one which is of more direct concern to us here. The year before Poerbotjaroko's article appeared, a twenty-four-year-old Javanese aristocrat named Suwardi Surjaningrat published a celebrated article in Dutch (it was later translated into "Indonesian," but never, perhaps, into Javanese), entitled *Als ik eens Nederlander was* [If I were for the nonce to be a Dutchman].[19] The immediate political, and polemical, purpose of this article does not here concern us;[20] we need here only reflect on the title itself. The key word is *eens* [for the nonce], for it defines a novel fantasizing of the world of contemporary colonial life. The Dutch-reading reader is asked to imagine a Javanese writing in Dutch about a Javanese imagining himself temporarily a Dutchman. The *eens* is the pivot around which the fantasy turns, yet it also reassures us that the imagined newspaper voice is really Javanese. (Needless to stress that this conceit would have been unimaginable even twenty years earlier.)

Suwardi belonged to the group known in all three languages as *journalisten*, whose native segment dominated indigenous intellectual life throughout the last decades of colonial rule. The visibility that he and his comrades enjoyed served to raise, largely inadvertently, new questions about the authority—i.e. the author-ity—of words. For they lived in a transitional period in which the age-old Javanese tag, *sabda pandita ratu* [the sage-king has spoken (and his words may not be reversed)], was speedily yielding to the new Indonesian tag, *koran bilang* [the newspapers say]. In the old times words had power not merely because they were *in* the world (not transverse to it), but because they issued from unambigous, Powerful sources and were, so to speak, monophonic. Famous literary texts were routinely attributed to kings and princes of the blood—not simply out of flattery. It was more from a sense of the indivisibility of Power, i.e. that texts of Power must owe their inner, original impulse to men of Power. The king's "word" could not be reversed, less because he would otherwise lose face and appear indecisive than because his words were *ipso facto* efficacious. Monophony was a natural feature of a world still unaware of Walter

[18] Written in collaboration with C. M. Pleyte, it appeared in the *Tijdschrift van het Bataviaasch Genootschap* [Journal of the Batavian Society] 56 (1914): 257–80.

[19] It was first published in *De Expres* on July 13, 1913. An excellent translation of the text is provided in Appendix I of Savitri Scherer's "Harmony and Dissonance: Early Nationalist Thought in Java" (M.A. Thesis, Cornell University, 1975).

[20] See my *Imagined Communities*, pp. 116–118, for these political ramifications.

Benjamin's age of mechanical reproduction. If a monarch gave an order, it was, as it were, a single speech-act having a single effect. Put more simply, if people obeyed the "same" order in Semarang and Surabaya, it was because it came to them, like sunshine, as an undifferentiated, indivisible emanation of a high Power. There was no conception of multiple, identical replications of parallel commands. Similarly, *mantra* could be written down, but they had always to be "activated" by a single voice in a specific situation. There was no sense that the multiple healings, or killings, produced over time and space by the activation of a single spell constituted a general, comparable "field of operations" generated, Baconian-fashion, from experimental replication.

Newspapers were an utterly different matter. In the first place, they imposed themselves stereophonically. Products of print-capitalism, they were the quintessential commodities of the age of mechanical reproduction. "Circulation"—marvellous word—defined a *horizontal* trajectory (royal orders never "circulated"). It also represented, necessarily in quantitative terms, the (ideally substantial) sale of exactly similar, distinct goods. There they were, on sale in stacks at kiosks; and it made no difference which one you or your fellow-customer purchased. Newspapers also spoke polyphonically—in a hurly-burly of editorialists, cartoonists, news agencies, columnists, *pojok* [corner-column] satirists, speech-makers, and advertisers, *amongst whom* government order-givers had to jostle elbow to elbow. Indeed, the great novelty was that the state always appeared to be speaking in *oratio obliqua*; it was "reported by" the newspaper, which in this way figured a cosmos within which rulers played merely their own segmental part. No wonder that so many of the early newspapers advertised their new-style cosmic reach by including in their titles the word *Doenia* (The World), signalling an unacknowledged succession, in Indonesian, to the *buwono* (universe) claimed for so long, in Javanese, by *Pakubowonos* and *Hamengkubuwonos*. Certainly by the 1920s they had become the most authoritative institutions—recognized as such—for at the least the indigenous urban populace.

Stereophony was also crucial for the journalists. At first they had written in an "artisanal" vein—whether as hawker or homemade hero.[21] But quite soon they understood the implications of "circulation." Purchase by thousands of unknown customers of one's multiply-replicated word-commodities created, by a natural inverse logic, an imagined *representational* function, well before parties or legislatures came into existence. No surprise then that another characteristic, much-loved element in newspaper titles was *Soeara* (voice): *Soeara Merdika* (Voice of Freedom), *Soeara Ra'jat* (Voice of the People), or *Soeara Oemoem* (Voice of the Public). By a curious process of cross-reverberation, journalists who spoke in their own voices found these voices stereophonically reproduced in the silence of the circulation market, and read in the tea leaves of sales whence, ultimately, the authority of those voices derived. From customers yes, but soon "the public," "Islam," "the proletariat," and "the nation."[22] Hence with the founding, in 1914, by the touching and courageous Mas Marco Kartodikromo of the journal *Doenia Bergerak* [The World on the Move] we can see something of immense importance under way. In 1917

[21] See Shiraishi's fine discussion of Mas Marco Kartodikromo's meteoric early journalistic career, in *An Age in Motion*, pp. 79–90. Marco was the lone-voice, homemade hero, *par excellence*.

[22] When, decades later, President Sukarno pronounced himself the Penyambung Lidah Rakyat [Extension of the People's Tongue], he was echoing the characteristic fantasy of the early *journalisten*.

followed *Islam Bergerak* [Islam on the Move], in 1920 *Boeroeh Bergerak* [Workers on the Move], and in 1923 *Ra'jat Bergerak* [The People on the Move].

It was in this epoch that the marvellous "Indonesian" neologism *pergerakan* (Movement, the Movement) was born. Very quickly it came to be the all-encompassing word for the whole body of anticolonial political activity. For all those activists, of whatever stripe, who were born between 1885 and 1915, the highest lifelong badge of honor was to have been a "man of the movement" (*orang pergerakan*).[23] Being a participant in the *pergerakan* meant that one was "conscious" : *sadar* (Indonesian) or *bewust* (Dutch), it made no difference.[24] Consciousness and movement went hand in hand, thanks to the homology of locomotive and newspaper circulation.

In 1920, the unforgettable Communist Muslim notable, Haji Misbach, spoke to a mass rally in the old Javanese royal city of Surakarta in the following terms:

> The present age can rightly be called the *djaman balik boeono* [Javanese: Age of the World-Upside-Down]—for what used to be above is now certainly under. It is said that in the country of Oostenrijk [Dutch: Austria], which used to be headed by a *Radja* [Indonesian: King], there has now been a *balik boeono*. It is now headed by a Republic, and many *ambtenaar* [Dutch: government officials, bureaucrats] have been killed by the Republic. A former *ambtenaar* has only to show his nose for his throat to be cut, and so on. So Brothers, remember! The land belongs to no one other than ourselves. . . .[25]

The language employed here is quite characteristic of the period. For Misbach is absolutely confident of the existence of a country, Oostenrijk (for which his own language has as yet no name) on the other side of the world; and that the downfall of what we know as the Habsburg dynasty is not at all fortuitous or merely exemplary. Rather it is a *political* event occurring within a single synchronic world-time in which colonial Java is just as much a part as Oostenrijk. Both are collectively "on the move" in a single, planetary "age of the world-upside-down." What happens to *radja* and *ambtenaar* in Oostenrijk reverberates with what, he expects, will soon happen in Java. In fact, there is nothing special about Oostenrijk. Misbach was quite aware, from the press he so avidly read, of the fall of the Hohenzollerns, Ottomans, and Romanovs, and could just as easily have referred to them. His awareness of them all as in some profound way *connected* to Java within a single *djaman balik boeono* certainly derived from the simulacrum of global contemporaneity daily presented by the newspapers' format. This is also why it was possible for Misbach to stick with an old Javanese phrase—*djaman balik boeono*—but reverse its meaning from "time of chaos and calamity" to "time of justice," showing its new truth by its simultaneous operation in Oostenrijk. It did not in the least matter that neither he nor his audience had ever been to Oostenrijk or knew much substantive about it.[26]

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[23] Javanese borrowed from Indonesian to form *wong pergerakan*.

[24] For a fuller discussion of the complex meaning of this consciousness, see "A Time of Darkness and a Time of Light: Transposition in Early Indonesian Nationalist Thought," in my *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), chapter 7.

[25] Adapted from the translation in Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion*, p. 193.

[26] On the eve of the Communist insurrections of 1926–27, "in West Sumatra it was said the Russians and Chinese would come with battleships and airplanes, to establish a government like that of Kemalist Turkey; in Bantam it was told that the soldiers and religious leaders had

The fantasy of a single, vast World-on-the-Move in an Upside-Down Age was paralleled by two other, interrelated language-imaginings generated by newspapers and magazines, as well as political pamphlets and brochures. Both had revolutionary implications and sometimes consequences.

The first was a quite new style of *augury*. In very recent "ancient times," the royal courts had their astrologers and fortune-tellers, the villagers their seers and shamans. But the *ramalan* (predictions) of such figures were occasional, esoterically couched, and either personally or cosmologically oriented—your son will die, your kingdom will collapse, so to speak. Moreover, folk wisdom, sensible as always, kept firmly in the mind the counter-image of *bogus* seers, shamans, astrologers, and mediums. But where a chronicle might now be "pseudo-" , a *bogus newspaper* was an impossibility, not least because it was an emanation of Marx's apprentice sorcerer. In a way, its whole *raison d'être* was prediction, even if its language was wholly exoteric. Each day, it warned readers of what was to come: imminent meetings of the League of Nations, election outcomes in France, anticipated verdicts in trials, prospects of wars, projections of taxes, and expected winners in sports.

This predictive habit was by no means exclusively a print-market technique for persuading customers to keep subscribing to a perpetual, if incoherent, world-soap-opera. It also represented the spread of a characteristically twentieth-century, probabilistic style of forecasting. We will get the sharpest sense of the novelty of this kind of fortunetelling if we think of forecasts of the numbers of highway *accidents* over holiday weekends, which are usually amazingly accurate, although no specific "accident" is ever foretold, and no "cause" for the predicted rate is ever offered; of projected death rates (but who specifically will die of cancer this year, and what determines the rate of death?); and of economic recessions (but who specifically will go bankrupt, and what determines the rate of bankruptcy?). It was not at all the case that every newspaper prediction was correct; but the incessant, daily din of multiple, mundane forecasts, most of which were not far off the mark, began to create not merely a new imagining of the future, but a sense of public participation in that future. In the colonial Java of the 1910s and 1920s (especially of the 1920s), the clearest evidence of this sense was the nature of the relationship between newspaper prediction and new forms of political life. From early on newspapers got into the habit of making such predictions as: "Next Friday Mr. X will address a mass rally in Town Z." Doubtless Mr. X had every such hope. But what more than anything else

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gone over to the Communists and that outside aid would come from airplanes sent by Kemal Ataturk," according to Ruth T. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), p. 304. It is possible that she is right in saying that such tales were millenarian, reflecting "the expectation of imminent Armageddon." But sober Dutch security officials also had fantasies of Moscow's spider-web and of world revolution. To me, the striking thing about these expectations is that they came out of newspapers, which since 1918 had run regular reports of a contemporary, real and revolutionary Soviet Union with actual battleships and airplanes at its disposal. Kemal was also a highly visible, "media" figure of the period. Peasant insurrectionaries may have had little idea of the real distance, capacities, and intentions of the Soviet Union, but they were (correctly) sure it belonged in the same World-in-Motion as the Indies, and (correctly) believed their leaders were in some (however chaotic and intermittent) real relationship with the Bolsheviks. In this context one realizes how little attention has been paid to the historical fact that in Java, as elsewhere in the colonial world, the first fantasies of liberation were not at all local, or national, in scope—rather they were planetary. In Java, World Revolution (the Communist Party) and Pan-Islam (parts of the Sarekat Islam) *preceded* nationalism, which represented a sharply scaled-down vision.

made the prophecy come true—i.e., that masses indeed rallied in Town Z next Friday (even if the colonial police had meantime arrested Mr. X)—was that some of these masses read the newspaper prediction and passed the prediction on to others. And when in fact hundreds or thousands did show up for the rally, not knowing each other beforehand, their simultaneous, anonymous presence confirmed the reliability of the newspaper's astrologers, and the truth of its imagined world. No traditional forecasters had ever spoken with such specificity, and none had remotely as good a track-record. In this way, a certain orientation towards print-language developed which offers a further reason why *koran bilang* so rapidly disposed of *sabda pandita ratu*. Newspaper language "leaned into the future," and in so doing drew men into movement that would confirm that future.

The second crucial function of the press and other forms of print-capitalist commodity was *modelling*. The early *pergerakan* newspapers quite often featured columns advertised as "political dictionaries," in which such terms (*istilah* as they were later known) as *vergadering, kongres, afdeling, mogok, voordracht, bestuur, volksraad, nasionalis, vertegenwoordiging, klassenstrijd, machtsvorming, politicus, revolutie, verkiezing,* or *komisaris*, and a hundred others were described and explained. Many were Dutch, but the "Indonesian" ones were just as urgently in need of explication. Such political dictionaries were necessary, first and foremost, in order to comprehend—and thus to want to purchase—the papers themselves, whose pages were sprayed with such *istilah*. But their thrust went much further than that.

Think of it this way. In 1914, no "Indonesian" had ever "seen" a *verkiezing* (election) or a *revolutie* (revolution). The terms *klassenstrijd* (class struggle) and *feodalisme* (feudalism) implied an abstract sociological thought-grid wholly foreign to the traditional mother-tongues of the archipelago. What exactly was a *voordracht* (political address) and how did one "do" one? What kind of self-presentation was required of a *politicus* (politician)? The dictionaries' endeavor was above all an effort at categorization, definition, and description—which helps to explain the unselfconscious ease with which Dutch terms were naturalized by committedly anticolonial activists: *revolutie . . . repolusi; partij . . . partai; actie . . . aksi; socialistisch . . . sosialis.* But the fundamental assumption was that these were all terms for universals, built into the very nature of the World-in-Motion. Javanese communists unselfconsciously addressed one another, in those days, as *broer* and *zus* (Dutch for brother and sister). When Haji Misbach spoke about *Toewan Karl Marx*, he used the respectful Malay-Indonesian *toewan* (honored sir) in a completely supracolonial sense. If his hated adversary, H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto, condemned *kapitalisme jang haram* (forbidden-capitalism), he was widely, and probably correctly, understood as defending the piously Muslim, indigenous petty capitalists who formed his main constituency. But we should not overlook the fact that the Qur'anic category *haram* (forbidden)—as opposed to *halal* (legitimate)—is also universal, and thus supra- or trans-colonial.

It is thus the World-in-Motion universalism that is the most striking feature of the newspaper-led modelling of the 1910s and 1920s. One sees it at every level. To be able to look at a high Javanese court official and reclassify him from "my lord," or *pepatih* (Grand Vizier), or *Kanjeng Pangeran Ario Adipati* to *orang feodal*—a "feudalist"—situated him within an immense world-category. When readers studied how a *vergadering* (political meeting) or a *kongres* should operate, they interpreted these esoterica, without scepticism or nativism, as valid worldwide. When they tried to imagine "concretely" what a "revolutionary" or a "nationalist" was supposed to be

and to do, the last thing that occurred to them was that they were doing something autochthonous.

Naturally, I do not at all mean that in "real life" they failed to be thoroughly rooted in the concreteness of colonial Netherlands Indies society. Old-timers recall that when the *orang pergerakan* began to make speeches at pre-announced public rallies—something utterly new—they took their elocution and gestural repertoire from the popular *stambul* and *bangsawan* theater. These urban, usually lower middle class, theatrical forms were turn-of-the-century polyethnic creations in which stage, costumes, lighting, backdrops, and acting style were freely, and sometimes wildly, adapted from bourgeois dramas and operettas put on by visiting European troupes —while the language was Indonesian or Malay.[27] The borrowing seems quite natural if we reflect that it was for the first time in *stambul* and *bangsawan* that "natives" stood up on stages and addressed large numbers of people they did not know with words more or less fully prepared or memorized beforehand. (Even when the nationalist leader Tjokroaminoto made a breakthrough by patterning his oratory on the diction of the traditional shadow-puppeteer, he was still borrowing from the theater, still speaking in a consciously stylized speech removed from everyday language.)

One might think that this "staginess" was a handicap, but to do so would mean misreading the profound connection between the podium and the stage. It was not simply that people in the *pergerakan* often attended meetings and rallies with the expectation of seeing, even participating in, a spectacle, which, like the theater, opened its doors at preannounced times, charged fees, and was largely divorced from the rhythms of the life cycle or the agricultural seasons. More significantly, the turn-of-the-century urban stage offered a conception of *representation*, which linked it directly to the new world of politics.[28]

One can see this change most clearly from the contrast with the older Javanese shadow-puppet theater, popular and court masked drama, and the like. Their *dramatis personae*, drawn chiefly from the Mahabharata, the Ramayana, and local legends, were understood as completely fixed; their names, costumes, gestures, speech styles, even voice pitches had to be just so. There was only one Arjuna and there was no question at all of "interpreting" him. (Hence the general indifference to the practice of males playing female roles, a practice that had its origins outside the theater in general social mores.) In fact, far from actors "handling" heroes, giants, kings, and gods, it was really the other way around. The tradition of masked drama assumed that the magically Powerful mask of, say, Arjuna, possessed the player. Hence the general absence of scripts for memorization. Paradoxically, the rules

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[27] The best sources on these closely related forms of popular urban drama are Tan Sooi Beng, *Bangsawan: A Social and Stylistic History of Popular Malay Opera* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1993); and A. Th. Manusama, *Komedie Stamboel of de Oost-Indische Opera* (Batavia [Jakarta]: n.p., 1922). Tan emphasizes the extraordinary degree to which *bangsawan* troupes in colonial Malaya used the services of Malays, Chinese, and Indians, drew their plots from the Malay, Arabic, Indian, Chinese, and Western worlds, and exploited musical styles and motifs from Hawaii, Spain, India, China, Java, and Honkytonk. Manusama, while offering less detail, makes a comparable point.

[28] Like Molière's *bourgeois gentilhomme*, who did not realize he had been speaking Prose all his life, the indigenous societies of the Indies now discovered that for centuries they had been involved in *politik*. None had in its inherited vocabulary a word for such an arena of social activity.

governing what Arjuna could possibly say or do were so strict that improvization was the easy order of the day.

Scripts came to the fore with what we can call *representative* interpretation. If a *stambul* troupe put on a Malay version of *The Merchant of Venice*, the actors needed scripts because no one in the cast or audience had any solid idea of who Shylock was, how he should gesture, or what he should say.[29] For one thing, no character in traditional drama had been a Jew or a moneylender. In the event, Shylock could only be played "sociologically," as a representation of intersecting, more or less contemporary, group categories—say, moneylenders, foreign minorities (perhaps *vreemde oosterlingen*), protective fathers of rebellious daughters, etc. The actor had no way to improvise the role, and thus came to depend on a memorized script and the ability to interpret it according to vague standards of social verisimilitude.[30] Shylock "worked" to the extent that his player managed to convince the audience that he was just like, i.e. re-presented (or mechanically reproduced) groups or social types out there in the contemporary real world. In this way the new dramatic forms paralleled the echo effect of the newspaper, conjuring up in the consumer's mind *general categories of similar persons*.

If actors went on stage imagining "vengeful, daughter-doting, *vreemde oosterling* moneylender," so early politicians went on stage imagining *sosialis, pemimpin* (leader), *orang revolusioner* (revolutionary), and so on. In the older imagining, the populace had awaited the eventual appearance of *the* Ratu Adil (Just King), who would save them from oppression. Everyone knew this Ratu Adil, more or less in the way that they knew Arjuna. They knew the signs of his imminent entrance on stage, and in a general way how he should dress, look, speak, and act—his overall iconography. He was one-of-a-kind, without any representational character. But *sosialis, pemimpin,* and *orang revolusioner* were *types*, general categories of real-fictive persons whom anyone, in principle, could "act" if they chose so to do.

Given the times, it was natural that the "scripts" for these roles came less from colonial Java's social realities or inherited traditions than from the voluminous products of print-capitalism—newspapers, pamphlets, and books. For all these commodities spoke in terms of densely packed categories of social persons—Bolsheviks, liberals, imperialists, strikers, feudalists, peasants, and officials. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, popular in the early 1920s, was always a *model* for what a "nationalist," a "progressive Muslim," or a "serious anti-imperialist" should look *like*. (If a Dutch Ratu Adil was unimaginable, an Indonesian Kemal was quite on the cards). And, to re-emphasize a point made earlier on, the reality of these categories and these models was grounded firmly in the age of mechanical reproduction.

From this perspective one can see that it was above all out of the new representational imagining that revolutionary movements were born, in the Netherlands East Indies as elsewhere. In Pramoedya Ananta Toer's extraordinary tale *Dendam* [Revenge], set in the middle of the Revolution of 1945-49, the nameless narrator

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[29] Manusama lists a number of "European" shows put on by *stambul* troupes, including: Genoveva [Genevieve of Brabant], Hamlet, De Koopman van Venetie [The Merchant of Venice], Somnambule [La Somnambula], Richard's Wraak [Richard's Revenge], De Courier van Lyon [The Courier of Lyon??] and so on. *Komedie Stamboel*, pp. 25–26.

[30] Put more sharply, the traditional actor improvised, the new actress interpreted. One had fixed personages to play, the other fixed lines to memorize.

describes his enrollment in the revolutionary armies as follows:[31] "I left for the station in my soldier's uniform . . . I was proud of my rank: private, without stripes or rank . . . and why not? Forever and always men love to show off their superiority. Especially if naked reality is dressed up in a bit of fantasy: I am a revolutionary *pemuda* . . . .And if this heart of mine were lips, without question this fantasy could be heard shouting: 'Look! I too am a patriot!'"

The youngster is proud of his stripeless, rankless rank, because he is dressed up in a uniform and a fantasy. The uniform, *uni-form*, classifies him as a representative of a social (nationalist/military) collectivity. The fantasy, corroborated by the uniform, tells him, by means of the words "I am *a* revolutionary *pemuda*" and "I am *a* patriot," that he is acting out a part conceived in the *stambul*, not the shadow-puppet, manner. Out there in the darkness there are countless other revolutionary *pemuda* and patriots living the same reverberating script, of which the plot and denouement may be obscure, but which they have all committed to memory.

Yet it would have been impossible to write *Dendam* in the 1910s and 1920s. No one was yet positioned to juxtapose "patriot" and "fantasy." As we have seen, the old stable coordinates of the world had been unmoored by locomotive, clock, and print-capitalism. Yet interpenetrating multilingualism—the transparency, the translatability, of Dutch and "Indonesian," and, up to a point, even Javanese—suggested, somewhere out there, a new set of coordinates. A new, unified, cosmos, full of patriots, revolutionaries, reactionaries, capitalists, and Austrias, had come into view. Out of the profound sense that in their interpenetration, languages—not "our" language—were glued to, built into, the world, came a revolutionary impulse that sucked thousands of nameless youths toward strikes, meetings, marches, conspiracies, bombings, rallies, solidarities, sacrifices, and, in the end, disastrous, courageous insurrections.

In 1950, Pramoedya wrote the most celebrated of all his tales, entitled with brilliant double entendre "She Who Gave Up" (*Dia jang menjerah*).[32] The following passage describes how Is, the teenage elder sister of the heroine, came to join, during the Revolution, the radical Socialist Youth of Indonesia (*Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia*, or *Pesindo*.)[33]

> In such times too the tidal-wave rage for politics roared on out of control. Each person felt as though he, she, could not be truly alive without being political, without debating over politics. Truly, it was as though they could stay alive even without rice. Even schoolteachers, who all along had lived 'neutrally,' were infected by the epidemic rage for politics—and, so far as they could, they influenced their pupils with the politics to which they had attached themselves. Each struggled to claim new members for his party. And schools proved to be fertile

[31] The story is contained in the collection of tales entitled *Subuh* (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1950). The passage occurs on pp. 42–43, and the translation is my own, taken from my "Reading 'Revenge' by Pramoedya Ananta Toer (1978–1982)," in A. L. Becker, ed., *Writing on the Tongue* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Michigan Papers on South and Southeast Asia, no. 33, 1989), pp. 13–94, at p. 18.

[32] Published in *Tjerita dari Blora* [Tales of Blora] (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1952). At one level, the young heroine has to "give up" almost everything she loves or owns in the course of Japanese occupation and national revolution. At another, deeper, and Javanese, level, she "gives up" profane desires in a modern ascesis.

[33] Ibid., pp. 279–80.

> battlefields for their struggles. Politics! Politics! No different than rice under the Japanese Occupation. And in due course 'courses' followed. And those who had only just obtained an understanding of capitalism-socialism-communism competed to give lectures in foodstalls, on street corners, and in the buildings which snarled within each of their skulls. And Pesindo too sprang up in the barren, limestone soil of our kampung. By now Is knew the society she was entering. She had found a circle of acquaintances far wider than the circle of her brothers, sisters, and parents. She now occupied a defined position in that society: as a woman, as a typist in a government office, as a free individual. . . . She had now become a new human being, with new understanding, new tales to tell, new perspectives, new attitudes, new interests—a newness she had managed to pluck and assemble from her acquaintance. And all of this proceeded, unscathed, amidst the sufferings of everyday existence.

The passage is characteristic. Nowhere in any of his stories does Pramoedya ever suggest a "sociological" origin or basis for the Revolution (in which, *nota bene*, he took an active part). Invariably people are "swept away" (*terseret*) by the "riptide" (*arus*) of revolution. The source of this riptide is, he intimates, a new way with language. We understand this from seeing how Is, without at all changing her real sociological position, begins to read herself, *stambul*-style, newspaper-style, as *a* woman, *a* government typist, *a* free individual, and *a* new human being. These identities, if we may speak anachronistically, have nothing ancestral about them, and must therefore be "acted out" and "acted upon." So she *acts*, in both good senses of the word, and is thereby "swept away" by her new imaginings into Pesindo, the Revolution, and subsequent catastrophes.

While Pramoedya is the first Indonesian writer to describe real political activity in the language of dream and madness, he does not do so from any conservative position. After all, he is one of the very few Indonesians to have been successively imprisoned, for *political* reasons, by Dutch-colonial, populist-nationalist, and right-wing military regimes. But he is profoundly aware of the slippage between language and the world, a slippage that one can call, according to taste, fantasy or freedom. This, I think, is why, in the opening to his unforgettable story, *Hidup jang tak diharapkan* , he wrote as follows of the terrible famine in his home town at the end of the Japanese Occupation which gave birth to the Revolution.[34] *"It was not only little children who each day sprawled lifeless by the edges of the streets. Adults too, and old people, men and women, and especially, above all, transvestites."*

"Especially, above all, transvestites—*dan terutama sekali orang-orang jang bantji.*" This is phrasing strange and new. The *pergerakan*, the *bangsawan*, and the newspapers had always read the classificatory series (presented by the newly transparent, translatable languages) as immanent in the World-in-Motion. But here one sees language taking upward flight. The series "children-adults-old people-men-women" appears to map the world in the older way. But the series "children-adults-old people-men-women-especially-above-all-transvestites," maps a classificatory delir-ium born from

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[34] In *Tjerita dari Blora*, pp. 147–78, at p. 148. The Indonesian title has a deliberately double meaning. It can be read as both "a life from which nothing was to be expected" and "a life that no one could have expected." The tale ends with a haunting description of the unpleasant main character, Kadjan, which no one in the old colony could have imagined: *pejuang bangsa jang kesasar*—a fighter for his people who lost his way.

the idiom of seriality in itself.[35] It may be that these words form the first sentence in Indonesian that self-consciously underlines the everything-is-possible, anything-may-be-said utopian impulse of the revolutionary imagination. Yet one is also aware that it could not have been written until the Revolution was over.

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[35] There is no reason to think that transvestites were in fact any more likely to succumb to famine than anyone else. Their sudden appearance here marks the author's reckoning with the phantasmagoric side of the Revolution and its historiography.

SJAHRIR AT BOVEN DIGOEL: REFLECTIONS ON EXILE IN THE DUTCH EAST INDIES

Rudolf Mrázek

Tanah Merah ("Red Earth") camp was situated at the upper reaches of Digoel River—hence the name *Boven* (upper) *Digoel*—almost exactly in the center of New Guinea, northeast of today's province of Merauke. The camp was opened in January 1927 to hold "natives" who had rebelled against Dutch authority in the recent so-called Communist uprisings. Five, later seven, platoons of colonial infantry were assigned to the camp, whose highest authority was a *gezaghebber* (administrator) with the rank of captain. The number of internees declined steadily, as repatriation plus deaths exceeded new arrivals, from 2,100 internees at the start to 442 in mid-1935, when Sjahrir arrived.[1] The camp remained forever infamous in Indonesia as the worst of all places of exile.

According to colonial law, the internees in Tanah Merah were not prisoners, for their banishment followed not from a "criminal proceeding" but an "administrative measure." As the relevant instruction explained,

> Inside their place of residence [the internees] enjoy the same rights and are subjected to the same obligations which law under normal circumstances demands from and bestows upon other free persons; Government and its organs shall refrain from doing more in their respect than to keep a vigilant supervision.[2]

Tanah Merah was officially designated neither a "concentration camp" nor a "penal camp," but rather an "*isolatie kolonie*."[3] There were no watch-towers at Tanah Merah and no search lights. The only barbed wire enclosed the quarters of the military and

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[1] Wiarda's *Kwartaal verslag Digoel*, tweede kwartaal 1935; Mailrapport 945*/1935 in Secret Verbaal 6 November 1935 V23, bijlage; staat A.

[2] Gov. general in Secret verbaal Vb 10 January 1928 Q.

[3] Eg. M. van Blankenstein quoted in R. G. Kwantes, ed., *De ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch Indie*, vol. III (1928–1933), (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1981), p. 165.

the civilian staff, to guard these wardens of the camp, and of the system, against the unbound space beyond.[4]

Beyond was a jungle as far as one could imagine, with snow peaks only occasionally visible far in the northeast. What a jungle! It was such as never before seen by Javanese, nor even Sumatrans. Nameless flowers and nameless trees. Savages reputed for cutting off heads and relishing human flesh. And Digoel crocodiles: darker colored inmates consoled themselves that the beasts "reportedly" showed a preference for swimmers and sinkers of lighter complexion. Omnipresent and all-penetrating jungle. Before rain came, falling water was heard from afar, and then, often, the paths as well as the exiles' houses were knee-deep in water. Flying ants attacked the camp at regular intervals, storming the Petromax lamps, inmates, walls and ceilings, blackening everything. Cicadas started their deafening concerts exactly at five.

Twenty attempts at escape were recorded at Boven Digoel between 1927 and 1935. A third of these courageous (or foolish?) men, some of them guided by the pocket *Kleine Bos School Atlas*, got as far as the Australian part of the island, and one or two even to the Thursday Archipelago. But that was the farthest they got. All ended up either eaten by jungle beasts or returned to the camp by friendly authorities of the British Commonwealth.[5]

There were few contacts with the outside world. Her Majesty's Ship "Albatros," a police steamer the internees called the "*kapal poetih*" (white ship) or "taxi kompeni"—referring to the late East India Company—arrived up the Digoel River once a month, bringing censored letters and very rarely, through a sailors' network, uncensored news and rumors.[6] A faltering wireless service was available to camp authorities, but there were no radios in the exiles' houses. Yet this was not the solitude of Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* —"solitude, utter solitude without a policeman [. . .], silence, utter silence where no warming voice of a kind neighbor can be heard whispering of public opinion."[7] Echoes of colonial normality were heard at the camp, omnipresent and all penetrating, truly like the hummings of the jungle around.

The progression of normal time outside reached the camp censored, measured by successive waves of new exiles. It was administered in shocks by the arrival of newcomers thrown into the camp each from a different realm of political and cultural experience. They brought experience that could not be shared: first, the "communist wave" of 1927, then four years later in 1931, and in 1933 again, waves of splinter "PARI-communists," and by spring and summer 1934 the Islamic leaders of Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia and Permi, and thereafter, early in 1935, arrived the exiled leaders of the nationalist Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia, with Sjahrir and

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[4] Interview with Burhanuddin, formerly of the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia, who came to the camp with Sjahrir in 1935 and remained there till 1943 (Jakarta, March 1982); also I. F. M. Ch. Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul: Kamp konsentrasi di Neiuw Guinea—Tempat persamaian kemerdekaan Indonesia* (Jakarta: Bulat Bintang, 1977), p.183.

[5] See eg. H. Thamrin in the Volksraad, August 7, 1935, in *Handelingen Volksraad 1935*, p. 719 and 1026 as in Secret verbaal Vb 20 October 1937 M27; interviews with Burhanuddin and other Boven Digoel internees, Jakarta, March 1982 and December 1987.

[6] Raden Mas Murwoto, *Autobiografi selaku perintis kemerdekaan* (Jakarta: Departemen Sosial Republik Indonesia, 1984), p. 24.

[7] Joseph Conrad, "Heart of Darkness," in J. A. McClure, *Kipling and Conrad: The Colonial Fiction* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 90.

Hatta as the most prominent among them.[8] In the past were failed revolutionaries, and a nostalgia spread with the legends that earlier, in the camp, every man was called *bung* (Indonesian, "brother") and every woman *zus* (Dutch, "sister"). But the vaguely remembered solidarity was past tense; the present tense of the camp was different, the solidarity cracked.

It was hard to resist the camp. The vastness around it, the climate, the diseases as various and exotic as the jungle flowers—filariasis Bancrofti, ulcera tropica, ichthyosis, elephantiasis cruris, elephantiasis genitalis, framboesia tropica, mengitis cerebra spinalis, and, as everywhere, tuberculosis and, of course, the malaria for which Boven Digoel was especially famous. "Men of twenty-seven, after ten years of internment, are grey and broken, stricken in years, wrecks turn out to be men below fifty."[9] In 1930, three years after the camp was opened and five years before Sjahrir arrived, 412 out of 610 Boven Digoel internees were classified by Dutch authorities as harmless enough to be released without posing "any danger for the public order in the colony."[10]

It was an oppressive place, very much, it seems, because of the persisting ties of human beings in the camp to the normality outside, even as this same normality on the outside became increasingly meaningless.

Memories of normal relations, public relations, but the intensely intimate as well, echoed oppressively in the camp. There were males and females in the camp, and so there was some love—new marriages and older ones. Female exiles were rare at Boven Digoel, but spouses were admitted, or rather encouraged, by the colonial authorities to accompany men into exile, and occasionally they did. In June 1935, when Sjahrir was there, there were two female exiles and sixty-eight wives among the 440 men in Tanah Merah.[11] This made a ratio of one-to-six or one-to-seven men to women, not the zero-to-thousand ratio of Nazi concentration camps, of "real" prisons and mental hospitals. Weddings occurred. Those lucky ones among the exiles with wives did not dare to leave their houses "lest blood lead the woman astray." Love charms and amulets were manufactured in the camp as everywhere else in Indonesia, but here, as a rule, a married woman was to be seduced! Polyandry was rumored to exist as a solution, and the rumors heightened the anxieties, stiffened the marriages, and perverted normality still further. Men, fortunately, grew impotent in the climate.[12]

Children were born in the camp; 136 children were at Boven Digoel when Sjahrir came, sixty-seven of them younger than three years, and six babies were born between April and May 1935.[13] Unmarried exiles wrote letters to girls "outside"—most disturbing documents of the epoch—with horrendous lies describing the camp in rosy colors, luring the brides-to-be to travel to New Guinea and to start a family life.

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[8] On the PSII exiles, see T. Abdullah, *Schools and Politics: The Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra (1927–1933)* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indoenesia Project, 1971), p. 206 and *Daulat Ra'jat* IV, 103, July 20, 1934. On the Permi leaders exiled to Boven Digoel see *Daulat Ra'jat* IV, 99, April 20, 1934, and Mailrapport 1108*/1938.

[9] Van der Plas to van Mook, 18 April 1943 in Collection Van der Plas (Alg Rijksarchief, The Hague), Map B-8, no. 17.

[10] Hillen's Digoel Report, 22 July 1930 in Secret verbaal Vb 1 November 1930 K24.

[11] Wiarda, *Kwartaal verslag* VI (1935), bijlage A

[12] Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, pp. 182, 302–303.

[13] Wiarda, *Kwartaal verslag*, and Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, p. 2.

There were spies (called "cockroaches") among the internees, as many and various as in normal colonial life outside. There was a prison in Tanah Merah, with seven prisoners behind bars in May 1935, for instance, three of them serving seven year sentences, the others three-, two-, and one- year terms. The prison guards are remembered as playing cards with the prisoners, the prison gate left open for fresh air.[14] A prison—necessary in any orderly community—was as perverse an institution at Boven Digoel, and in the same sense, as marriage was. Tanah Tinggi ("High Ground"), a penal camp still further and higher in the interior, was for "incorrigibles" from Tanah Merah. It was a hellish place, truly debilitating and fast killing. When Sjahrir arrived at Tanah Merah in 1935, there were about six dozen incorrigible men up at Tanah Tinggi, and women and children too.[15] Normality closed in on the community, indeed, like the jungle. As far outcast as it was possible to be in Tanah Merah, one could still be exiled further.

The Dutch seem to have been obsessed with explaining the camp as a means of re-education. When the Boven Digoel camp was opened, Governor General de Graeff wrote, in a secret order to his subordinates responsible for the camp, that it should become a place where "current political ambitions would be superseded by an interest in matters of more domestic, and of more social nature."[16] Things happened at Boven Digoel that were difficult to imagine happening at Buchenwald. While Sjahrir was there, the camp's *gezaghebber* was sharply reprimanded by higher authorities for forbidding the internees to circulate among themselves and to debate Ramsey Macdonald's "Socialism critical and constructive" and Firmin Riz's "L'energie Americaine" of the "Bibliotheque de philosophie scientifique."[17]

The vision of Dutch officials, encouraging social intercourse rather than moving towards naked suppression, seems rather to have been frozen in the "ethical" mold of the early twentieth century. They appeared to be drawn still to the ideas of "enlightened colonialism," which promised progress for the natives through compassion and censure, education, neatness, and hygiene. There was no fundamental reason for these officials, educated as they were, to see Boven Digoel as outside this framework. De Graeff, who installed the camp, was called "the last ethical Governor General." Ten years after de Graeff, some outstanding Dutch officials were described as "neo-ethical." One of them, visiting Boven Digoel at the very end of its existence, saw and faithfully recorded many of the camp's horrors and—so late, so out of touch with reality, and yet so sincerely—wrote in a letter to a friend, "Tanah Merah, as a place, appeals to me enormously. Spacious official quarters and a pretty village [*"een mooie desa"*] over the great Digoel River."[18]

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[14] Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, pp. 192, 324; "much water shall flow through the Digoel River before there would be a new prison." Also B. J. Haga, *Digoel Verslag II*: "Verslag betreffende den toestand van de interneeringskampen in Boven-Digoel" (medio Mei 1935), in Mailrapport 853*/1935 in Secret Verbaal 6 November 1935 V23, pp. 9–10; Wiarda's *Verslag* VI (1935), Bijlage 3.

[15] Interpolation by Sneevliet of Minister of the Colonies Colijn, *Handelingen Tweede Kamer*, in Secret verbaal Vb 17 October 1935 U21; also in Kwantes, *De ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging*, vol. IV, p. 468–469.

[16] Governor general to govof Moluccas, 5 January 1927 in Secret verbaal Vb 10 January 1928 Q.

[17] Haga, *Digoel Verslag II*, p. 3.

[18] Van der Plas to van Mook, 18 April 1943, in Collection of Van der Plas. In the secret report on the camp from June 1935, the administrator of the camp described Tanah Merah as "trim and neat," the exiles' houses "on the whole as neatly painted," "the good examples

This makes Boven Digoel a place particularly bizarre and, yet, particularly worth remembering. The "ethical" motivation and a continual projection of "ethical values" made the camp largely, if not essentially, what it was. "Perversion" is a fitting word, and in the same register one can speak of "a colonial showcase."

The camp's "Wilhelmina Hospital" had more than forty beds available, a per capita ratio far more favorable at Boven Digoel than in the colony as a whole. Patients, both exiles and staff, were sometimes put together in a common hospital room.[19] The medical staff seemed to be generally friendly; according to Chalid Salim, interned for fifteen years, the Dutch doctors especially talked freely with the patients, trying to be neutral, but often feeling closer to educated exiles than to ignorant and vulgar civilian officials and military guards.[20]

There was, per (native) capita, incomparably more teaching in the camp than outside. Two mission schools existed at Tanah Merah for children of the military and civilian staff—a Catholic school with twenty-one pupils, and a Protestant school with nineteen pupils. For children of the exiles there was a government school, whose principal was a former Communist leader, Soetan Said Ali, with Malay (Indonesian) and Dutch as languages of instruction. In 1935, this school consisted of four grades with five or six children to a class. In addition, twelve internees held official permission then to teach smaller groups of internees' children (from no more than three families at a time). In May 1935, a Dutch official report mentioned "a little communist school at Tanah Tinggi."

When a government-school teacher was dismissed in 1934, it was explained that he had mixed too much politics into his teaching. But the mid-1930s was a time of "wild schools" and dismissals throughout the colony. Boven Digoel schools evidently were not handled with a much different mixture of leniency and control than colonial schools on the outside. The smaller "schools of three families," organized and taught by the exiles themselves, as some officials complained, might be, in keeping with colonial law, controlled even less strictly than larger "free" schools outside the camp.[21]

Athletes might be spotted running around the Boven Digoel camp. The "Kunst en Sport Vereeniging Digoel" (The Digoel Arts and Sports Association) was mainly a soccer club. Two soccer fields were available, one for the exiles, the other for the military, but the civilian staff often played together with the exiles, making either exiles-versus-staff or combined elevens. Tennis courts in the camp were reportedly in bad shape by the time Sjahrir arrived.[22]

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spreading," so that soon many houses, as he wrote, would in future "look even neater." Wiarda, *Kwartaal verslag* VI (1935), p. 1.

[19] Wiarda, *Kwartaal verslag* VI (1935), p. 8, was not quite certain this was as it should be in an internation camp.

[20] Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, p. 279. It was a "shock" for the exiles, Salim remembers, when a doctor published his memoirs, in 1936, without a visibly special concern for former "friends" in the camp, without reflecting on the shared hours and days, views and dreams. L. J. A. Schoonheyt, *Boven Digoel* (Batavia: N. V. Koninklijke Drukkerij de Unie, 1936); Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, p. 487.

[21] Haga's report, August 1934, especially p. 13.

[22] Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, pp. 167, 206; interview with Burhanuddin, Jakarta, March 1982.

"It struck me how widespread Dutch was in the camp," a journalist reported in 1928.[23] As speaking Dutch was long a sign in colonial Indonesia of being modern and civilized, then Boven Digoel was very modern and civilized indeed. Except that so many speakers of it were obviously dissidents. English appeared to play a curious role in the camp. Signboards on the huts advertised "English Teacher" but also "Barbershop," "Hairdresser," or "Laundry." When a very high Dutch official visited the camp during an inspection tour, as the legend goes, he was approached by an exile on the camp's main road with a shockingly British "Good morning, Sir. How do you do?"

At one time or another there was a *wayang orang* traditional dance-theatre group organized by internees, a "Digoel Concert," a jazz orchestra nicknamed "Digoel Busneert" but popular nevertheless, an "Opera Association Orient" for *orkes Melayu* style performances, a Middle East influenced show, and a similar "Music and Opera Association Liberty." Tanah Merah cinema featured Tom Mix and Douglas Fairbanks among others; admission was 7 1/2 cents for men and 2 1/2 cents for women.[24]

A sense of "*tempo doeloe*," of olden times, and of the colony as a tourist trip, so characteristic of the "ethical" Indies, so artificial even in its most normal forms, is brutally caricatured by Boven Digoel's faded photographs with Sunday-clothed internees stiffly posing in front of romantic backdrops. "Photograph Atelier M. Zain" appeared to be most active at one point, but there were several others. Most touching of the ateliers' creations, naturally, are the snapshots with inscriptions like "*Tanda Peringatan Boven Digoel*" (Souvenirs of Boven Digoel) or (this in English) "Farewell-Photo Taken For Departure of Family Barani, Boven Digoel." One often reprinted photograph is that of a catafalque with a simple board on which a short poem is crudely carved: the last resting place of Aliarcham, a communist leader of the 1926 uprising, who died at the Tanah Tinggi camp as one of the uncorrigibles, and who has become a most revered martyr of Boven Digoel. The poem is by the Dutch Socialist Henriette Roland-Holst, a very religious and compassionate woman, called "Tante Henriëtte" by young Indonesians and Dutchmen as well. And naturally, the verses, as the exiles cut them for Aliarcham, are in flawless Dutch.[25]

It is quite possible that, back in 1927, "the last ethical Governor General" had truly imagined that Tanah Merah might become, if managed well, "a pretty village above the great Digoel River." A very "ethical" dream. Besides, the colonization of Eastern Indonesia, New Guinea especially, was a quite fashionable idea among the Dutch and Eurasian community since the beginning of the century.[26] Not wholly out of this fashion, the first wave of unlucky exiles to Boven Digoel was presented in a secret government communication as something short of "pioneers"—the "founda-

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[23] Blankenstein, September 13, 1928, in Kwantes, *De ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging*, vol. III, p. 165.

[24] Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, pp. 168, 179–182; interviews with Burhanuddin and Murwoto, Jakarta, March 1982 and December 1987.

[25] Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, pp. 360, 491.

[26] See, for example, the journals published in Bandung and Semarang: *Kolonisatie Nieuw Guinea nieuws: mededeelingen van de afdeeling Bandoeng* no. 1 (1931)–no. 35 (1935), and *Onze Toekomst: orgaan der Vereeniging kolonisatie Nieuw Guinea*, vol. 1 (1927)–vol. 13 (1939). "Onze Toekomst" is Dutch for "Our Future."

tion of a thorough colonization in these new lands."[27] From the start, with impressive stubbornness on the part of the Dutch, the exiles were encouraged—and told they were good enough for it if only they tried hard—"to open the new land." Those who agreed to play the pioneers game received a government subsidy of about ten guilders a month. (Internees qualified and willing to work as clerks might do so on the same basis for about eighteen to thirty guilders a month.[28]) They were *"werkwilligers"*—exiles "willing to work." Those who "declined to work" were looked down on by the authorities but still taken care of with an allowance "in natura"—hence they were called *"naturalisten"*—besides "pocket money" of about 7 1/2 guilders a month.[29]

In some ways it looked like a village. At Tanah Merah in mid-1935 there were 440 interned men, of whom 120 were *naturalisten*, 209 were *werkwilligers* working as peasants, carpenters, dyers, painters, masons, forgers, sawyers, gravellers, brickmakers; and the rest were invalids and prisoners.[30] As in almost any other village in the colony, there were also shopkeepers, moneylenders, and middlemen, mostly "foreign orientals," the legal category of those neither European nor native, predominantly Chinese. The twenty-three "self-employed" men and women at one point who made money by sticking to the camp were despised and feared there as elsewhere in the colony; the exiles called them *"burdjuis"* [bourgeois] or "parasites."[31]

"Normal village" was the game, a brutal one. It was an open secret that *werkwilligers* who agreed to play "as if" they were normal villagers, were to be handled much more leniently by the authorities; especially so in deciding who among the exiles was fit to be returned home, back to their real home.[32] What could be more perverse in the rural colony! Peasants were produced by the camp, and taught to till the soil—only in order to escape it.[33]

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[27] See P. J. Drooglever, *De Vaderslandsche Club 1939–1942: Totoks en de Indische politiek* (Freneker: T. Wever, 1980), especially pp. 198, 201–208, 349–350. The Eurasian community was particularly active in generating hopes for the eastern territories.

[28] Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, pp. 269–270; the chief of the inmates self-governing body, *"hoofd"* or *"lurah"* Boedisoetjitro, was paid 39 guilders a month, his deputy 36 guilders; the lowest wage for a clerical job, according to resident Haga, was 13.50 guilders. Haga, *Verslag*, medio August 1934, bijlage.

[29] Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*. See also Murwoto, *Autobiografi selaku perintis kemerdekaan*, p. 25.

[30] There were an additional 64 *naturalisten* at Tanah Tinggi. See Haga, *Verslag*, (medio Mei 1935), bijlage A. In early 1930 the ratio was 380 *werkwilliger* to 225 *naturalisten*. Hillen, *Digoel Report*, p. 463.

[31] Ibid. Also Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, p. 157.

[32] The rumors were well founded; in Dutch secret communications related to Tanah Merah, *"naturalisten"* and *"communisten"* or *"extremisten"* categories were almost identical. See e.g. Wiarda's *Kwartaal verslag* VI (1935), p. 5. Murwoto told me about how aware internees were of this Dutch attitude. Jakarta, December 1987.

[33] Dutch officials themselves soon became aware that the red soil around the camp was "highly unfertile" and that the colonization dream could hardly be successful; still, it seems, they often declined to believe what they knew because the whole structure of the colonial concept was built on it. Haga says in May 1935 that "agriculture has not yet succeeded", and van Langen had it that the situation in that sense was not "propitious." Wiarda, significantly, was aware that if the drive to normality failed definitely, the camp would appear as just a *"concentratiekamp."* See Haga's *Digoel Verslag* (medio Mei 1935), p. 8; van Langen's *Verslag* (vierde kwartaal 1934), p. 3; Wiarda's *Verslag* (tweede kwartaal 1935), p. 4. On the "extremely

But the game went beyond "normal colonial village" to "normal colonial universe." There were "peasants" at the camp and "pioneers" too. Better educated exiles were now supposed to remember how much they had learned before in their classrooms— Dutch colonial classrooms, naturally, "ethical" classrooms— about civilizing missions and the stages of savagery, whether in Hume or Kipling, Conrad or Defoe. Imagine these exiles, on cooler evenings, sitting in front of their huts (there were even some easy chairs at the camp!) resting and watching the trees and plants, some nameless, but some which the exiles themselves brought to this otherwise barren land—citruses, pineapples, bananas, papayas, jack fruits. The sound of church bells and a muezzin's voice, as well as the "delicious smell" of a *waroeng* (eating stall) were, believe it or not, part of Boven Digoel genre scenes, along with the sound of music, a "guitar or mandolin and occasionally even a violin."[34] And imagine the moment when the brutes, the savages, the half-naked, uncivilized men of the Kaja-Kaja tribe entered the camp.

The Kaja-Kaja crowd visited rather frequently—"in a close formation, armed," to see movies sometimes, "of which they especially liked the films on Tarzan," an exile says.[35] Often enough these "ghosts of the forest," as the internees also called them, stayed in the camp for some time, from one full moon to the second next, working in the exiles' households, washing their clothes, cooking for the internees. They were paid by their masters, given food "as much as they could eat," and, after two months were over, they received an ax, a shirt, a pair of shorts, a pack of tobacco, or a combination of these items.[36] They learned. Indeed, they were being civilized, as Mohammad Hatta suggests in his humorless way. What they had charged him for moving his sixteen trunks of books from the "Albatros" ship to the camp on his arrival, and what they charged him for roughly the same number of trunks a year later, when he left, differed distinctly, with a very perceptible upward turn.[37]

If sometimes the place had a comforting air, at other times the bottom fell out, but then, with a view to the vastness below, many in the community still clutched, desperately or theatrically or simply out of apathy, to their values as they had learned or remembered them in the normal world outside. There were remarkable, otherwise incomprehensible, scenes at the camp: a school principal, the former communist leader, rebel, instilling in his pupils, other exiles' children, loyalty to Wilhelmina, the mother of us all, Queen of the Netherlands.[38] The "merry time" closed in on the camp, each year, at Wilhelmina's birthday, when children sang "Wilhelmus van Nassauwe," and a melee of exiles presented themselves in their best clothes, some of them "adorned with the Oranje-Nassau colors."[39] "Even the [Dutch] doctors could not understand our good intentions," says Chalid Salim, a camp inhabitant, a former Communist, who participated regularly.[40]

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infertile" soil of Boven Digoel, Van der Plas wrote to van Mook on April 18, 1943, in Collection of Van der Plas.

[34] Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, p. 178; Schoonheyt, *Boven Digoel*, p. 80.

[35] Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, p. 154.

[36] M. Hatta, *Memoir* (Jakarta: Tintamas, 1978), p. 352; M. Hatta: *Indonesian Patriot. Memoirs*, ed. C. L. M. Penders (Singapore: Gunung Augung, 1981), p. 183.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Hatta, *Indonesian Patriot*, p. 36.

[39] Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, p. 288–290.

[40] Ibid., p. 290.

Boven Digoel was a mini-colony—a kind of essential Netherlands East Indies, a melting pot of nationalities, regional cultures, and religions. Chalid Salim, a Minangkabau from Sumatra, complains in his memoirs that the Dutch staff were biased in favor of the Javanese segment in the camp, showing the greatest interest in Javanese traditional art and attending most regularly such performances at the camp's stage:

> Whatever the true motive, we saw in those friendly approaches by the authorities a political tool aimed at stimulation of the feeling of homesickness among the Javanese group and their yearning for their native villages. . . . We encountered here again the concept of Dutchmen who view traditional Javanese culture and art as an instrument for sharpening the contradictions of 'Java' against 'non-Java.'[41]

According to Hatta, also a Minangkabau, "Tanah Merah [was a] pseudo village . . . administered like an ordinary *Javanese* desa, except that the headmen were detainees rather than local residents."[42] About one of the headmen, the *"assisten-wedana"* Soeria Negara, we read in Salim:

> This official apparently still held to feudal customs; whenever he went he demanded that he be followed by an internee obliged to keep a parasol up to shelter [Soeria Negara] against the heat of the sun. Often was I tempted to mock him, to ask him when his parasol would change into a *pajung emas* [golden umbrella] or perhaps *songsong kuning* [golden state umbrella] indicating that a *bupati* [regent] or a man of even a higher rank of nobility was proceeding by.[43]

A few years later, a Dutch official visiting Tanah Merah described the exile-headman of the camp in basically the same way—as almost nothing short of real Javanese *wedana*—"truly a first class man and a prototype of a Soemedang aristocrat."[44]

The first wave of exiles, in 1927, came almost exclusively from Java, where the Communist rebellion started, but the region they came from was not that of the classical "Java" of the central and eastern parts of the island, but rather from the Sundanese West, with its own language and a distinctive cultural animosity towards the ethnic Javanese. These *Pasundan* exiles were as often as not closer to Sumatrans than to Javanese. The next wave of exiles were from Sumatra, where the rebellion broke out a few months later, and largely from the Minangkabau area. The Sumatran trend got stronger by 1930 with the many PARI exiles who came from or traced back to Minangkabau, including such impressive figures as Djamaluddin Tamin. During the next two years, more Sumatrans (mainly Minangkabau) arrived at the camp, among them Iljas Jacoeb, Djalaloeddin Taib, Moechtar Loefti of Permi, Sabilal Rasjad, Hadjo Oedin Rachmany, Datoek Singo Radjo of the PSII. No one of comparable stature or influence came from Central or East Java. Later Hatta and Sjahrir arrived, more Sumatrans of national stature: Minangkabau Sumatrans.

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[41] Ibid., p. 297.

[42] Hatta paraphrased by his biographer, M. Rose, *Indonesia Free: A Political Biography of Mohammad Hatta* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1987), p. 78.

[43] Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, p. 332.

[44] Van der Plas to van Mook, April 18, 1943, in Collection of Van der Plas.

The Sumatra-Java cleavage at Boven Digoel grew out of the ethnic history of the camp. As on the outside, Javanese and Sumatrans dominated the native scene, but on the inside the two cultures were much more crowded together. As outside too, the Javanese were seen by others, including the Dutch, and saw themselves as occupying the center, as essentially inward-looking, aristocratic, feudal, artistic, soft and/or passive. Non-Javanese, Sumatrans especially and Minangkabau Sumatrans above all, in a mirror image of the Javanese, were seen and saw themselves as cruder, dynamic, egalitarian, businesslike, pragmatic, on the margin, and open to the wider world.

The men of Tanah Merah lost their freedom in fighting for "the Indonesian cause," whatever whoever among them might have thought "the Indonesian cause" to be. Now, squeezed into the little Indonesia of the camp, their personal, ethnic, and political visions were "squeezed" too. Essentially unchanged, the world-view of the internees tended towards sub-political, pre-modern or primordial layers.

Early in Tanah Merah's history, the exiles built separate *kampoengs* (quarters or villages)—the "Kampoeng Oedjoeng Soematera" (Sumatra's End) at the northern part of the camp on the riverside, the "Kampoeng Atjeh," the East and Central Javanese "Kampoeng Djawa," the West Javanese "Kampoeng Banten," and another *kampoeng* for Ambonese and Menadonese.[45] "The Minangkabau refused to live together with their partners in distress in a common *kampoeng*," a Dutch report says.[46] According to another Dutch witness, in 1930, "Sumatrans and chiefly the Minangkabaus do keep themselves most separate as a group and do look occasionally down at the others."[47]

A *gamelan* musical ensemble in the camp, and a *wayang* shadow-puppet club, and a *ketoprak* popular theater club, were all exclusively Javanese. There was a "Pentjak Vereeniging" (martial art association), a Sumatran group, almost wholly Minangkabau. "Modern art" did not work to neutralize differences either. From what we know about jazz bands, for instance, they were "very Sumatran." Christians in the camp, almost without exception, were Ambonese and Menadonese.[48] The most prominent Islamic figures in the camp were Minangkabau from West Sumatra. They represented, defined, and led in the Islamic ways of Tanah Merah.

Each group appeared to keep to itself; the primordial, the sub-political, the remembered stuck out awkwardly. And when the frontiers between the groups became less distinct as the 1930s passed, it was generally perceived, by both the Dutch and the internees, not as evidence of a new, higher consciousness among the exiles, but as the manifestation of growing flabbiness and decay.

If Boven Digoel was a perversion of "ethical" normality, then Sjahrir got to the camp in a "natural" way. Born in 1909 to a Minangkabau prosecutor, Sjahrir went through the best and the second best "ethical" schools in the colony. Imbued with the new ideas of compassion, mission, progress, and emancipation of the natives, he became prominent in the Indonesian youth movement during his high school years. He went to Amsterdam to study law, and stayed for a year. While there he was close to some of the Dutch Bohemian and young socialist avant-garde, and to Mohammad Hatta's wing of Perhimpoenan Indonesia, the Indonesian student movement in the Netherlands. Sjahrir went back to Java late in 1931 to establish Pendidikan Nasional

[45] Schoonheyt, *Boven Digoel*, p. 161.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Hillen's *Digoel Report*.

[48] An exception was Ch. Salim, a Minangkabau, who makes it clear that he was the exception.

Indonesia, an association of radicals working for Indonesian freedom through "social paedagogy" and "preparation of cadres." He planned to return to Holland early in 1934 in order to complete a law degree in Leiden. Before he could board ship, the Dutch authorities, interpreting the Pendidikan's doings as a violation of permissible limits, arrested Sjahrir, Hatta, and a few of their friends. After a year in prison, despite the fact that no proof of subversive activity was established, Sjahrir, twenty-six years old, together with Hatta, four others of the Pendidikan, and two of the latters' wives, was exiled for an unspecified term to Digoel.[49]

On January 28, 1935, Sjahrir was led out of Tjipinang prison in Batavia to begin his journey. In a police car which took them to the port, he met with his Pendidikan friends for the first time since their arrests. Three of them, Hatta, Bondan, and Burhanuddin, years afterwards still remembered their surprise: talkative Sjahrir, on the way to the ship, joking, having put on weight in prison, not visibly frustrated by the prospect of the camp and of his life being cut in two.[50]

"Sometimes it even looks like a pleasure outing," Sjahrir wrote in a letter to Maria, his Dutch girlfriend in Holland, after three days at sea.[51] There were worries, naturally—"I've been quite troubled," Sjahrir wrote—about his friends on the ship who were younger, about their wives who went along; and he did a lot of pretending, to laugh, to talk with them.[52] But the pervasive mood of this and his other letters written on the ship, was one of spiritual adventure. As Java grew distant and hazy, Sjahrir wrote to Maria as a man leaving a world made up of distinct, explicit day-to-day events, and entering instead a loosely knit universe, transparent, and surprisingly soothing:

> It goes here on the whole somewhat more kindheartedly than in Java or in Makassar [They passed Makassar on the fourth day out of Java] . . . It is easy to see that we are already in the eastern regions, and actually to all effects secluded. That is clear from the fact that apparently nobody knows about our arrival; also there is nobody who looks inquisitive or evinces that he had ever heard about our banishment. As a policeman who escorted us from Makassar said: 'All that lies east of Makassar is *doesoen dan hoetan* [village and wilderness].' Twice a month a ship to Makassar, the only connection with Java; once a month for Digoel.

Without the slightest change in tone Sjahrir adds: "*Wat is dit Oosten van ons land mooi* [How beautiful the eastern part of our country is]!"—an exclamation so strange to hear from a politician thrown into that "nobody-knows-about-us" land, so incongruent in the context of the paragraph that an American translator of the letter,

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[49] See Secret verbaal Vb, 26 November 1934 L33.

[50] Burhanuddin, "Sjahrir jang saja kenal" in R. Anwar, ed., *Mengenang Sjahrir* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1980), pp. 59–60; Hatta, *Memoir*, p. 349; M. Bondan, "Mengenal Bung Hatta dari dekat" in M. F. Swasono, ed., *Mohammad Hatta: Pribadinja dalam kenangan* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1980), p. 279; on the trip see also Murwoto, *Autobiografi selaku perintis kemerdekaan*, p. 23ff.

[51] Letter of January 30, 1935. I am using the first Dutch edition of the letters, Sjahrazad, *Indonesische overpeinzingen* (Amsterdam: Bezige Bij, 1945). I also consulted and profited from an English translation of some of the letters by Charles Wolff in *Out of Exile* (New York: Day, 1949).

[52] *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, January 30, 1935

fourteen years later, felt compelled to "correct" the sentence: "*And yet,* how beautiful the eastern part of our country is!"[53]

As the exiles traveled on, there were letters about a "splendidly blue sea" all around :

> sometimes light and translucent, like mother of pearl, sometimes deep-dark blue, always purely beautiful . . . the white and green petit islands which, so finely couched, rest in the blue of the sea, and bathe in the golden, sometimes silver light of the sun.[54]

As he contrasts this new landscape with the overcultivated world of colonial failure left behind, a virginal promise, hopefully non-capitalist prospects of a possibly healthy colonization of the vacuous East, glimmers at least once in Sjahrir's letters.[55] Buru Island (thirty years before it become as famous as Digoel) "looks like a fairy-tale land."[56] Banda Island (to which he would return to spend six years in exile) appears in one letter untouched and whispering dreamily:

> forsaken . . . there is a view of an old fortress of the East-India Company . . . but there are almost nowhere humans to be seen. . . . This all, again, has passed away; nothing here reminds one of the bloody times, even the old fortress on the hill has nothing bloody about herself any more, watches us peacefully and harmonises with her surrounding.[57]

People appear to Sjahrir to be natural and pure—natural and pure again:

> In this part of Indonesia, it is nature which dominates everything. That is all one splendor of nature, and man is more a piece of the nature than a product of society. Involuntarily you perceive him from that point of view and judge him only by his physis, his racial phenomena, and in connection with the natural beauty. It does not trouble you that he is retarded in civilization, he prompts your mind into no social queries.[58]

A port, a lighthouse of civilization, a trafficking of mankind, some actuality is noted. But it is passed over quickly.

> By sunset, we left the bay. . . . On the sea, full of life, sailed many boats, glittering and slim, fast and full of animal spirit [*levenslust*] playing just as the waves did, with the dreamy blue mountains as silent watchmen in the background . . . millions of magic lights on the sea. The mountains lose their gloom, and become again friendly in their dream. I sat in front, at the ship's stern, leaning against the

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[53] Ibid, February 11, 1935; compare S. Sjahrir, *Out of Exile*, p. 44, emphasis mine.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid., February 21, 1935.

[56] Ibid., February.11, 1935.

[57] Ibid., February 21, 1935.

[58] Ibid.

> flagstaff; I did not think, I did not even feel, I forgot where I was, I forgot myself, I lost myself in this beautiful universe.[59]

A book of adventure; a pioneer's story, a Defoe-like tale. Travels off the current of time and against the time were described in letters to a woman on the other side of the world. On February 20, the exiles sailed into the mouth of Digoel River.

In the following discussion readers should bear in mind that, among the Pendidikan exiles, Sjahrir and Hatta were eligible for special treatment. They belonged to a separate and exclusive colonial category of Indonesians, "wholly or partially academically formed," which included those "natives" who passed through some years of Western-style university education. (Not an Islamic education, however high it might have been.) As far as I know, throughout the 1930s Sjahrir and Hatta were the only exiles at Tanah Merah in this category.

As "intellectuals" they had a right to and were given second-class tickets on the ship which took them to the East. In spite of the fact that they spent "most of their time," as Sjahrir wrote, on the deck and among the non-academic friends, the privilege was there and was certainly felt, if only as a possibility to retire occasionally into a comfort reserved otherwise only to the colony's well-off and/or white.[60] It was also a matter to be noted by other Tanah Merah internees. This was how the news reached the camp: "Drs. Mohammad Hatta and Soetan Sjahrir just arrived at Tanah Merah. *They came as second-class passengers.*"[61]

There was a privileged welcome, too. The ship with Hatta and Sjahrir was arranged to arrive at night, and other precautions were taken by the authorities to keep their arrival secret—in fear, it is said, of demonstrations that might await the two leaders. The news was not kept secret. There were no demonstrations, but a special "Reception Committee" was formed by exiles to receive the two VIPs at the camp, and, on the same night, a "banquet" was organized by the Committee in their honor.[62]

Already at the banquet, the issue of "the normal peasants game," the problem of *naturalisten* (those unwilling to work on camp projects) and *werkwilligers* (those willing to work) was debated—and quickly resolved. Both Hatta and Sjahrir decided to join the ranks of *naturalisten*.[63] Certainly, this fitted the well-established nationalist principle of non-cooperation with colonial authority. But the reasoning why neither Sjahrir nor Hatta should become *werkwilligers* appears to have had additional undertones. According to a member of the Reception Committee, "Bung [Brother] Hatta and Sjahrir thought, in my view correctly, that as academicians they were not

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[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid., January 30, 1935, written "in de salon van de tweede klasse."

[61] Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, p. 305; emphasis mine. The Drs. (doctorandus) degree is roughly equivalent to an MA.

[62] Ibid., pp. 145, 306, 346; Hatta, *Memoir*, pp. 346, 350–351.

[63] Others in the Pendidikan group also chose to become *naturalisten*. Only Murwoto later changed his mind. See van Langen's *Verslag* (1-e kwartaal 1935, p. 1–2). Murwoto began to work "voluntarily" for family reasons—his wife and baby were expected to stay with him in the camp—which, it seems, the others accepted. Hatta, *Indonesian Patriot*, p. 184; Murwoto, 1984; interview with Murwoto, Jakarta, October 1987.

ready, as werkwilligers, to hoe the fields."[64] "If I wanted to join the werkwillig group," Hatta himself remembered,

> I would have been *werkwillig* in Jakarta where several Government jobs were offered to me. . . . There I could certainly have become a *tuan besar* [a big man]; there would have been no need to go to Digoel to become a coolie at wages of 40 cents per day.[65]

According to Sjahrir, writing from the camp:

> For us the choice truly was not difficult. The attraction of doing coolie-work during the best part of the day, and for forty cents, was not too appealing and we could hardly hesitate. All those day-labourers, after they work from seven in the morning till noon —which is the coolest part of the day—are no more in condition to do any other, I mean mental, work.[66]

In the perverted normality of Boven Digoel, the two men remained intellectuals, academicians, members of an elite. While exiles ordinarily were expected to construct their own shelter, Hatta and Sjahrir found houses prepared for them upon arrival. Hatta's place was big enough for him to take in, for the first few weeks, three of the new Pendidikan arrivals who had nowhere to stay.[67] There was a kitchen in the house, a bedroom, "a spacious room for library," for Hatta had his sixteen trunks of books with him, and "also a reception room."[68]

Hatta's house, it seems, had originally been prepared for both of the "academicians," but Sjahrir chose to live his own way, separately from Hatta.[69] Sjahrir moved in with three younger exiles, but in a few weeks found an empty house which he made into his own, and which he described in his letters alternately as "a nice little house," a "box made of zinc" ("when the sun begins to shine truly fiercely one can not stand it inside"), a place "most charmingly situated high above the river," with a panoramic view of the jungle on the other side, and "the green little garden plots" that the other exiles had built on the steep riverside below the house. "Each morning," Sjahrir wrote after five months at the camp, "I think it more beautiful to watch the river, the trees and the plots."

Neither Sjahrir nor Hatta complained about having to think much about their material subsistence. Hatta was clearly better off, but Sjahrir was the poorer of the two to some extent, apparently, by his own decision. Both were permitted to write articles for Indonesian and Dutch journals of their own choice, and thus to make some additional pocket money; Hatta used the opportunity amply, but Sjahrir never

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[64] Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, p. 307.

[65] Hatta, *Memoir*, p. 358, quoted and commented on in Rose, *Indonesia Free*, pp. 78–79.

[66] *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, March 7, 1935

[67] Murwoto, *Autobiografi selaku perintis kemerdekaan*, p. 25.

[68] Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, p. 307; Hatta, *Indonesian Patriot*, p. 183.

[69] Sjahrir says in one of his letters that the house "was given to Hatta for free." *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, March 7, 1935.

did.[70] Hatta was well-off enough to pay Kaja-Kaja servants, and constantly had at least one Kaja-Kaja helper in his house; Sjahrir, as far as we know, took care of his household himself. Both received some money from the outside, though how much is not clear; Sjahrir's aunt from Batavia, sister from Bandung, and girlfriend from Holland sent some guilders, but, as they themselves admit, only irregularly, and altogether a very small sum reached Sjahrir.[71] The food rations which Hatta and Sjahrir received as *naturalisten* were sufficient—except for salted fish, Hatta says, and for peas as a source of vitamins. Hatta remembers, too, that, during their stay in the camp, he had always enough rice for himself and even some to give away to whoever asked for it.[72] Sjahrir did not mention food very much in his letters.

Hatta and Sjahrir were no doubt better sheltered than others at the camp, but not well enough to fend off the strangeness of the place. Sjahrir resisted for ten months, but then fell ill with malaria. He suffered above average because he was allergic to quinine, the only medication available.[73] For other internees, as well as for the authorities, Sjahrir and Hatta were clearly the elite at the camp, yet not elite enough to float above the oppressiveness of the jungle and of the people encaged by it. Sjahrir once referred with worried affection to the other Pendidikan exiles who came with him to Boven Digoel as "*slappe stadkinderen*," soft town-children.[74] The same term, however, might well fit him too. Neither he nor Hatta were physically prepared for that sort of life. Some advantage was clearly on the side of those simpler and less "privileged" among the Boven Digoel exiles.

Better educated, having attended colonial schools longer, Sjahrir and Hatta had bonds to the colonial normality that were subtler and thus more pervasive, embracing, and burdensome. These two men, when they dreamed and suffered, thought in scales and looked in a direction different from those of the "ordinary" exiles. When, for instance, some further privilege was offered to them one day in the camp, Hatta reacted:

> If you want to give me extra, why don't you give me the same allowances other educated internees are receiving in other places, like Dr. Tjipto and Mr. [LLB] Kusuma Sumantri in Banda Neira or Ir. [Engineer] Sukarno in Endah??[75]

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[70] *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, May 30, 1935; Hatta wrote for *Pemandangan* for fifty guilders a month, according to Burhanuddin, "Sjahrir jang saja kenal," p. 316; Hatta, *Indonesian Patriot*, p. 182, says he was getting five guilders for a column.

[71] Interview with Sjahrizad (Sjahrir's sister), Hazil Tanzil (son of the Sjahrir's aunt) in Bandung and Jakarta, March 1983 and October 1987, and with Maria Duchateau in Lorgues, February 1988. The aunt's family in Batavia was not in a very good position to help an exile; one son of the family, Djohan Sjahroezah, was at that time in prison too, and there was very little money in the house. Sjahrir's sister was married to a well-off doctor, who supported Sjahrir through his studies but became rather unresponsive when he embarked on the "Bohemian and rebel" path. Sjahrir's intimate friend Maria Duchateau was still married at the time, with two children, and working as a secretary on very low wages.

[72] Hatta, *Indonesian Patriot*, pp. 183, 185.

[73] *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, July 24 and October 18, 1935; Bondan, "Mengenal Bung Hatta dari dekat," p. 283; interview with Murwoto, Jakarta, December 1987.

[74] *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, December 24, 1936.

[75] Hatta, *Indonesian Patriot*, p. 186.

Hatta and Sjahrir were elite in a perverse way, for the more elite-like they were treated, the more exiled they felt.

Still, on the ship that carried them to New Guinea, one of the Pendidikan exiles, evidently in a moment of despair, approached the more educated Hatta for advice and comfort. The man remembered later that Hatta told him: "When the broad world is narrowed for us by others, build the universe in the bosom of yourself." Confused slightly, so the exile says, he went to the other intellectual on the ship, Sjahrir, later in the day, and asked him what Hatta might have meant. Sjahrir explained: "Do not feel remorse, and do not lose hope. Remorse is the most heavy punishment, and a lost hope is a heavy pressure on our soul."[76]

No remorse or lost hope is apparent in Sjahrir at Digoel—at least in the Sjahrir of his own letters and the Sjahrir remembered by other exiles. In the letters and in the memories, Sjahrir appears in the middle of the camp's life, wherever there was some life left. The first few weeks of his exile were almost fully spent with a group of other exiles, planning and building a house for a new arrival expecting a wife and their baby.[77] Soon Sjahrir became a star soccer player in the camp, the fast-as-lightning center forward of the Soetji Hati ("Pure Heart") team, "The Arts and Sport Association Boven Digoel."[78] Perhaps he played tennis. He swam regularly, first in the Digoel river and then, because of the crocodiles, in the safer and smaller Bening River nearby.[79] There is his own delightful and lively description of his expedition to the Kaja-Kaja lands upstream. Paddling alone in his small canoe (so he wrote to Maria) he met the savages, saw their huts, exchanged some tobacco for "a substantial quantity of sago," and did not give his ax for a piglet. This was a trip clearly made as much for improving a monotonous camp diet as for the pure pleasure of the adventure.[80]

Hatta arranged his time in Tanah Merah with a punctuality worthy of a scholar: "7 am, heat the stove; 8 am, Sombart; 10 am, collect the firewood."[81] It was the subject of jokes among fellow exiles sometimes. Nevertheless, Hatta's will-power was impressive amidst the debility and flabbiness of the camp. Sjahrir's time, in contrast, ran erratically. Some say that there were women in Sjahrir's camp life—a highly unsettling business, no doubt, given the state of erotic and marital matters there. Sjahrir kept moving—visiting people at all possible and impossible hours of the day and night, borrowing sugar, coconut oil, a banana or simply talking, "cheerful and joking," ready for a game of chess or checkers or a word game, giving a helping hand in the kitchen, and then leaving as he came, never sticking to any

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[76] Burhanuddin, "Sjahrir jang saja kenal," p. 61; interview with Burhanuddin, Jakarta, March 1983.

[77] Murwoto, *Autobiografi selaku perintis kemerdekaan*, p. 25.

[78] The Pendidikan crowd appears as quite an addition to Tanah Merah soccer history: Hatta and Burhanoeddin played backs and Murwoto was goalie. Ibid., p. 26; Bondan, "Mengenal Bung Hatta dari dekat," p. 282.

[79] Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, p. 311; Murwoto, *Autobiografi selaku perintis kemerdekaan*, p. 26, writes that soccer was the only organized sport available when they reached the camp.

[80] *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, October 7, 1935.

[81] Hatta, *Memoir*, pp. 357, 371; Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, p. 307; Bondan, "Mengenal Bung Hatta dark dekat," p. 264; interview with Burhanuddin, Jakarta, March 1983.

place. He earned a nickname, *kelana djenaka* ("droll roamer").[82] He moved fast, apparently, to touch everything in the camp, and to ward off everything, the routine, serious friendship, anything in particular, and, consequently to remain secure—not unlike Hatta—in his own universe.

Sjahrir explained to others in the camp, when they asked, that the running, the vitality, the physical exercise, was a way for him "to keep spiritually healthy."[83] To Maria, he wrote:

> Now, still less than when I was in prison, I can submit myself to distress. I need all my energy to beat the climate, nature, disease, and particularly the demoralizing influence of the life in an exile community with all the pettiness, cliquishness and psychic deviations.[84]

With a similar purpose in mind, clearly, Sjahrir tried to restrict his connections with the outside world. "Political writing"—Sjahrir had been a prolific "political" writer until then, and political writing had been his primary contact with the world—was cut off completely.[85] While both Hatta and Sjahrir were permitted to write for outside publishers, and Hatta used this opportunity extensively, Sjahrir did not "write politics" at all. "I am firmly resolved," he wrote in a letter,

> the first year to publish nothing. Political articles I shall in no case write not only because of the danger that they would not pass censorship, which is naturally much greater than in case of other publications, but first of all because I am determined to be silent just in that field *for a couple of years*.[86]

He did some writing, though. Every week he finished a long letter to Maria, and each month packed four or five of the letters into a big envelope ready for the "Albatros" when it came up the Digoel to pick up the mail.[87] This effort evidently was extremely important to Sjahrir, so important that, in contrast to Hatta, for example, after few months in the camp Sjahrir agreed to sign a sort of "political non-activity declaration." As a result, other *naturalisten* accused him of surrendering to the government,

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[82] Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, p. 311; interviews with Burhanuddin and Murwoto, Jakarta, March 1983 and December 1987.

[83] Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, p. 311.

[84] *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, March 15, 1935.

[85] He wrote for the *Pemoeda Indonesia* journal in Bandung in 1928 and 1929; when he was in Holland his articles appeared in the Amsterdam journals *De Socialist* and *De Nieuwe Weg;* in 1934 Sjahrir published a brochure on the Indonesian trade-union movement, *Pergerakan Sekerdja* (Batavia: Daulat Ra'jat, 1934); and from 1931 through 1934 he regularly contributed extensive essays in the Pendidikan journals, especially the theoretical *Daulat Ra'jat* and the Pendidikan press organ, *Kedaulatan Ra'jat.*

[86] *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, May 30, 1935; emphasis mine.

[87] Interview with Maria Duchateu, Lorgues, February 1988; Hatta, *Memoir*, p. 360. Sjahrir apparently corresponded very little. There were only one or two letters to his close political associate and friend in Holland, Sal Tas, none to others like J. de Kadt or G. J. Riekerk. Some letters were reportedly written to Djohan Sjahroezah in Batavia and to Sjahrir's younger brother in Medan, Soetan Mahroezar; all are evidently lost. Interview with Judith Tas, Jos Meier (de Kadt's friend and secretary), G. J. Riekerk, Hazil Tanzil (brother of Djohan), Violeta Sjahroezah and Sjahrizad (Sjahrir's sister) in The Hague, Utrecht, Jakarta and Bandung, March 1983, October 1985, and October 1987.

Hatta says. The tensions lasted only a couple of weeks and then subsided, according to Hatta, because everybody knew that Sjahrir's purpose was to raise his monthly pocket-money allowance from the government (from 2.60 to 7.50 guilders) "to make up for the costs of the correspondence with [Maria] in Holland."[88]

Political matters were mentioned in nearly every letter. In a sense, they were love letters. Yet, it hardly does justice to these hundreds of pages filled with tiny script to label them either political or erotic. Rather, it is fitting to see them as Maria did when in 1945 she decided to publish a selection from her correspondence with Sjahrir: *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, "Indonesian meditations."[89] Or, better still, they were letters written by Sjahrir for himself in order to remain himself and to keep to himself.

Sjahrir's way through Boven Digoel, as we follow it with the help of the letters, was very much within himself. They also led—curiously enough for this socialist and passionately modern man—towards the past.

Textbooks and classrooms appear with growing prominence as Sjahrir progresses along his route. "[I do not feel well amidst] my people," he wrote to Maria after four months in the camp, and "for the time being, for a great part of a day, I travel [*ik trek*] back into my books." At that moment it was a book by John Stuart Mill. "I am prepared to consider this not to be ordinary literature," Sjahrir wrote. It is so good, Sjahrir says, it "may be still used *even as a textbook.*"[90] If, amidst the "droll roaming," there was a truly felt connection between Sjahrir and "the others," it was in teaching. Hatta organized a kind of a Tanah Merah "night school" out of his spacious house, and there he lectured regularly, usually on economics. Sjahrir, however, though less consistently, is also remembered as a teacher—of English, sociology, history, law, and most importantly perhaps, for teaching by reading aloud to selected groups of internees from the "meditations" he was about to send with the next ship to Holland.[91]

Sjahrir was often described by those who knew him at Boven Digoel as "boyish" or even "childlike." Curiously enough, this was virtually never with the depreciating connotation one might expect. Sjahrir's "boyishness" or "childishness" seems to have been perceived, and was remembered, as an integral part of Sjahrir's personality, altogether impressive.[92]

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[88] Sjahrir declared that he did not intend "to overthrow the existing social order by violent means." On the incident see Hatta, *Memoir*, pp. 360–361, and Hatta *Indonesian Patriot*, pp. 186–187; emphasis mine. Also on the declaration see Sjahrir's *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, May 30, 1935; Sjahrir writes "we," meaning himself and Hatta, signed the declaration.

[89] I am grateful to Mrs. Duchateau-Sjahrir for introducing me to the letters' background, a history of their editing and publication, and for letting me see some of the surviving unpublished letters. For another source on *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, see R. F. Roegholt, *Di Geschiedenis van De Bezige Bij, 1942–1972* (Amsterdam: Bezige Bij, 1972) in which a chapter is devoted to *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, first published in the Bezige Bij publishing house.

[90] *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, May 11, 1935; compare Sjahrir, *Out of Exile.*

[91] Burhanuddin, "Sjahrir jang saja kenal," p. 63; interview with Burhanuddin and Murwoto, Jakarta, March 1983 and December 1987.

[92] This emerges from my interview with Burhanuddin and Murwoto as well as from various places in Hatta's memoirs and in his much later speech at Sjahrir's funeral Hatta quoted in L. Salim, ed., *Bung Sjahrir: Pahlawan Nasional* (Medan: Masa Depan, 1966), p. 63.

Perhaps never, from the time Sjahrir left Medan as a boy of seventeen, and never even after his mother's death when he was twelve, had he allowed himself to be so engrossed in quiet, intense talking to a woman about everything, as if talking to himself. What did it matter that this woman was Dutch, that the conversation was in letters sent once a month, and that the letters had to travel over half the globe? Perhaps never before did old songs come back to him so clearly as in the camp: for instance, a song that he could have learned either at a student café in Bandung or Amsterdam, or from his music loving mother, and she in turn from one of the wayward Germans in Natal where she was born. Some remember Sjahrir having sung during evenings in the camp:

> Das gibt's nur einmal, das kommt nie wieder,
> das ist zu schoen um wahr zu sein."[93]

So many ideas on which Sjahrir had relied since Sumatra and Medan, in Bandung, Amsterdam, and Java again—communism, social democracy, political struggle, party organization—at Boven Digoel seemed pitifully irrelevant. This must have been a nightmare, surely, to any young socialist: the world around became sub-political or pre-political, biological, primordial. Half-forgotten notions from the "time before," which might explain this, textbooks (and adventure stories), lectures and theories—"civilizational," "cultural," "ethical"—pushed to the surface together with his students' or his mother's songs. Echoes of affinities between Sjahrir's perceptions at Boven Digoel, and the perceptions of his colonial jailors, the similarities in culture—in the outlook of the last resort—were bizarre, pathetic, and tragic, but not accidental.

Sjahrir wrote in a letter dated March 1935, in almost the same words as the "neo-ethical" official we quoted at the beginning of this essay, "[Tanah Merah] is to all appearance like an ordinary *desa* [village], little different from a normal village [*behoorlijke desa*] on Java or Sumatra. The so-called government site may well go for a European quarter in one or another Javanese town."[94] In a letter sent a month later, Sjahrir wrote: "All layers of our people are represented here, and I have noticed that just here their souls stand out more nakedly than they ever could back at home." And, in the same letter: "I have here, at Digoel, an opportunity to penetrate deeper into a psycho-physical construction of our people."[95]

Also for Sjahrir, the camp was a sort of little Indonesia, the colony in essence. And the internees were "the people." In a truly dark letter, Sjahrir wrote to Maria:

> At the first moment I came here and saw the men of this place as, in greatest part, mental ruins, I told myself: 'So far I will never let it go. When I truly will have no hope in the future and feel I am about to be spiritually starved, then I will make an end to it.'[96]

This was putting things on the "ethical" scale. Sjahrir did find, for the exiles, words as harsh as "ballast." (The "ethical" Dutchman, not as fatefully involved as Sjahrir,

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[93] Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, p. 311.

[94] *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, March 7, 1935; emphasis mine.

[95] *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, April 6, 1935.

[96] *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, also March 7, April 10 and May 11, 1935.

would probably never have dared go that far.) And Sjahrir wondered "why only few of [the exiles], at most, thought of that solution," meaning suicide. Sjahrir saw that "little Indonesia" population as having a "primitive nature" and a "primitive or half-civilized psychology." This was what had been "hidden behind," he wrote, and what now appeared, in the camp, "naked," as when the "mask" fell off:

> a facade [of] acquired, 'new-fashioned' habits and hopefully 'modern' shiny propaganda words and phrases, mostly not understood but still so handy and well handled that they often mislead one.[97]

Colonial officials from Governor General de Graeff onwards wanted to make Boven Digoel a place where colonial normality could be saved. Especially the "ethici" among them wanted to build a bridge, to be the bridge themselves—with Kaja-Kaja savages and the un- or half-civilized "natives" on one side and the modern world of progress, schools and antiseptic care on the other. Boven Digoel—the "colony," the "little Indonesia"—was a place where the bridge might be tested under extreme conditions. A similar myth attracted such Indonesian intellectuals as Sjahrir and Hatta. Boven Digoel, we read in Pendidikan journals of the early 1930s, might become "a Mecca" of the Indonesian progressive movement, a training ground for exiles to become leaders of a new type, a boiling pot where parochial and undeveloped regionalisms might become a modern nationalism.[98]

Sjahrir and Hatta had also regarded themselves as building a bridge, as indeed being a bridge. And now, when Boven Digoel truly happened to them—not unlike the way it happened to "ethical" colonial officials at the same time—Sjahrir and Hatta found themselves between opposite shores shockingly apart, their bridge on the verge of collapse. The most disturbing lines written by Sjahrir during his time in the camp—"I do not understand them yet"—he wrote about men and women, "the people," with whom he was squeezed into the forced immediacy of the crazy experiment. I am not able to find out, he writes, "what is hidden behind their words and actions;" "perhaps it is my mistake of looking for things in their lives of which they themselves had never been conscious." [99] Goethe, strangely, appears. Goethe might solve that. Goethe had a capacity to penetrate into the psychology even of criminals. Criminals? "And yet, this is my people."[100]

> Did I became a stranger amidst my people? Why am I dejected by things which fill their lives, and to which they warm, why do I feel as largely meaningless and ugly what for them is beautiful, and by what they are touched?[101]

This appeared to be a trembling bridge, indeed, and the more so because Sjahrir, educated, modern, civilized (and no Goethe), should, or rather *must* naturally also be supra-regional, supra-religious, national, Indonesian.

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[97] Ibid.

[98] See e.g. Hatta's "Diatas segala lapangan Tanah Air akoe hidoep akoe gembira" in *Daulat Ra'jat* IV, 85 (January 20, 1934).

[99] *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, May 11, 1935.

[100] Ibid.

[101] *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, June 20, 1935.

Nothing explicitly Minangkabau can be found in Sjahrir's letters from Boven Digoel. The word "Minangkabau" was used by Sjahrir in the letters only once or twice. This was in spite of the fact that, as we know from many hints, in the camp Sjahrir actually moved largely in Minangkabau or, more broadly, Sumatran, or broader still, non-Javanese company: with the Minangkabau Hatta and Burhanuddin of the Pendidikan inner circle; with Chalid Salim of Kota Gedang,[102] the Batak Hamid Loebis of Medan.[103] He consorted with a Batak, a Menadonese, a Minangkabau, but never, as far as we know, is a Javanese mentioned in Sjahrir's letters with respect or affection. One is tempted to note here that an author as Jewish as Franz Kafka never wrote "Jew" in *The Castle*, *The Trial*, or *Village Doctor*.

As a Minangkabau Sjahrir might be expected to have been a devout Moslem. But in matters of religion, Islam too, Sjahrir was *arif*, "sophisticated," "pragmatic," "scientific."[104] He even occasionally acted "anti-Islam." But then he consistently qualified the kind of "bad Islam" he had in mind. He was "anti" that Islam, he wrote, which had been practiced and taught by "self-proclaimed *kwakzalvers* [quacks]," against that Islam which injected into the people "hazy and coarse religious notions." He was against "primitive" Islamic culture.[105] For him, all possibly Moslem things should be, must be, non-explicit; and they were, as a memory, half dimmed and half suppressed. When they did surface, it was as an uncertainty and as a question:

> I ask myself whether Islam with regard to Hinduism does not play the same role as Protestantism did as opposed to Catholicism in Europe, viz., being a bourgeois view of life as against the feudal one. As far as I know, the question has never been studied, and yet, it is of importance. For such a study one may, perhaps, take as an object, the whole of Asian society: a sociology of the Islam and of the Hinduism."[106]

All this might easily suggest "regionalism" as against modern and united Indonesia. Yet only in a roundabout way could Sjahrir allow this kind of memory to work in his mind: not "Minangkabau-ness" or "Islam-ness," but quite strongly and freely (very Minangkabau and very Moslem) a distaste for things "Hindu" and "Buddhist" and "Indian" and "Javanese" especially:

> The eastern philosophy of death is exactly *the* eastern philosophy, and is not limited to Buddhism only. The not-be as highest ideal is a sort of general view of life in this passive East . . . Easterner does not work in trade, does not fight. Think of the non-violence and satyagraha of Gandhi, who attempted to change this passivity into a means of struggle.[107]

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[102] Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, p. 306. Chalid Salim was a brother of Hadji Agoes Salim. Kota Gedang was also the birth place of Sjahrir's father.

[103] *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, April 21 and July 24, 1935; interview with Burhanuddin, Jakarta, March 1982.

[104] Hatta, in contrast, was known as a *ta'at* (devout) Moslem. Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, p. 309; interviews with Burhanuddin and Murwoto, Jakarta, March 1982 and December 1987.

[105] *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, September 10 and June 20, 1935; emphasis mine.

[106] *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, February 14, 1935.

[107] *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, November 24, 1935.

> Here ['the passive East'], for centuries there has been no spiritual life, no cultural life, or advancement. There are the famous eastern art manifestations—but what are they but rudiments of a feudal culture where we, men of the twentieth century, could not possibly find any basis for ourselves? What has the *wayang* and the plain symbolic and mystics—parallel to the European allegories of the Middle Ages —still to offer to us, intellectuals or just cultural men? Practically nothing. . . . Culturally we stand closer to Europe and America than to Boroboedoer or the Mahabharata. . . .[108]

We can only speculate how much Sjahrir was aware of the extent to which he used not just "modern" and "cultured" but colonial and "ethical" visions—*clichés* indeed, of "the passive East," "the feudal East," "the mystical East,"of the "East" that "does not work in trade, does not fight." The fact that Sjahrir's letters are written in Dutch (and Sjahrir often could hardly find Indonesian equivalents for the words he used) makes Sjahrir's "ethical" affinities all the more striking. The cliches are all familiar terms and notions of the time—the Hindu-Buddhist, Javanese (*wajang*-Mahabharata) *"zachtere gevoelens"* (soft feelings) and *"passiviteit"* (passivity), *"mystiek,"* and (if there was a move at all) *"fanatisme"*—this posited by contrast, *en bloc,* against the *non*-Javanese, the Sumatran Minangkabau in particular, *"wilskracht"* (will-power), *"dynamisch," "zakelijkheid"* (matter-of-factness), *"nuchterheid"* (soberness). These concepts frequent Sjahrir's letters as much as they do the writing and thinking of "ethical" officials, intellectuals of that time, and teachers of his youth.

Sjahrir acted anti-"ethical." Naturally, and sincerely, so. As deep as consciousness may go. He vehemently censured the internees who took part in the government-sponsored fêtes mentioned earlier, who agreed to wear the Oranje-Nassau colors, who sang the "Wilhelmus."[109] Repeatedly he expressed, and no doubt deeply felt, disgust at the *"samenwerking"* (cooperation) he saw between Indonesians and the Dutch in the camp. Sjahrir rejected the "cooperation" between the internees and the authorities at Boven Digoel because, as he put it, it could only be "a 'cooperation' with morally crippled men," a bond between "morally defective and half insane creatures." In Sjahrir's text "cooperation" was in quotation marks. Cripples were on both sides. At least once, Sjahrir referred to the place itself as "a [mental?] hospital."[110] But, then, what might "normality" be?

For Sjahrir, the camp was a perversity defining normality—making a normality imaginable, and cooperation imaginable, too, *without* quotation marks. For Sjahrir the camp's cause and essence was in *misunderstanding.* The scale of what one dreamed of and suffered for was to him still the measurement that allowed one to distinguish between guilt and innocence. "Heaven may know," he exclaimed, looking at some of the exiles, "what might lead one to send these boys into exile!"[111]

Sjahrir attacked the "cooperation" in the way that one laments missed opportunity. "I can still see him, sitting before his hut or working on his garden," Sjahrir wrote to Maria about a friend he had lost in the camp:

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[108] *Indonesische overpeinzingen,* June 20, 1935.

[109] *Indonesische overpeinzingen,* October 1936; also February 9, 1937.

[110] *Indonesische overpeinzingen,* October 31, 1936.

[111] *Indonesische overpeinzingen,* April 21, 1935.

> A splendid fellow and a civilized, well developed man. His great humanity grew out of Christian ethics; he was a Menadonese by origin and a Christian. Besides, he was one of the first Indonesian socialists around at the time of Sneevliet and Baars, and he was a member of Douwes Dekker's Indische Partij. What happened to him was dreadful. Two years before his interneering he left the movement, but they arrested him and exiled him anyway, in 1926, just when he was about to marry. He was then a landowner in Menado; he comes from a well-off family. Also all of his married sisters are well situated and one of them, a younger sister, is now a student at the Rechtshogeschool [the law faculty in Batavia].[112]

Sjahrir wrote to Maria how disturbed he was when he was told that their exile was simply an "administrative 'punishment.'" This, he wrote, "appeared to me as something contradictory to all my juridical wisdom, a fallacy, a misconstruction."[113] He was taken aback when he found out at Tanah Merah that, contrary to what he had read and expected, the cinema, the ice factory, and the power station were inefficient, not working as they should, or at a time reserved for wardens only. He was appalled by what he saw as overbearing and insensitive behavior of the staff towards the internees, by the wardens' pretensions of racial and civilizational superiority.[114] The values by which Sjahrir judged Boven Digoel were essentially "ethical." He drew a comparison with the director of the prison in Tjipinang, where he spent the year before Boven Digoel:

> . . . often, in contrast [to Boven Digoel], [he] sees his task as that of a principal of a social educational institution; he can entertain the idea that he in fact has to care for socially derailed, psychically unbalanced, asocial people: so-called criminals. There is some reason for them to accept his task as a positive one.[115]

Throughout his Digoel time, Sjahrir stubbornly, courageously, and heroically kept to his search for a normality elsewhere. "From our talks," as Chalid Salim remembered the camp,

> it became clear that Sjahrir was truly a Hollandophile . . . the student life in Leiden clearly left a mark of Dutch-ness on him . . . and also Sjahrir's [love affair] with a Dutch woman broadened his world of thinking which was tainted Dutch. During our discussions I have often thought 'Truly stupid of those Dutchmen to exile those two intellectuals [Sjahrir and Hatta] of so European a disposition, and to such a rotten exile place! Truly un-clever and retarded!'[116]

This was a trembling bridge, indeed. Few values could be expressed unambiguously and in full voice. Pillars of an Indonesian idea, as Sjahrir saw it, could easily be subverted. Few names appeared in Sjahrir's letters whom he did not merely pass by quickly. They were his true consociates, so to speak.

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[112] *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, October 31, 1936

[113] *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, March 7, 1935.

[114] Ibid.

[115] *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, April 24, 1936.

[116] Salim, *Limabelas Tahun Digul*, p. 313.

Sjahrir wrote about them as men with a capacity to "rise above themselves, their surroundings, their time," "[above] ideas and ideals of their own land . . . racial cultures and civilizational differences which are relative and temporary."[117] They were: "Those timeless, above-time (*boventijdelijke*) and universally human" men—Goethe, Beethoven, Shakespeare, Dante and Plato. "After Dante comes d'Anunzio?" Sjahrir exclaimed in horror in a letter written after six months in the New Guinea camp.[118] They were the "classici," into whose company Sjahrir could, without hesitation and uncertainty, wander (*trek*), into their ideas, into their world, into their books, because of their "objectivity"and "broadmindedness;" because of their position "above petty matters, above definite schools or explicit school principles." "The great from the past," Sjahrir writes—and we do not find it a paradox at all—"our spiritual kindred, *our contemporaries.*"[119]

"Das gibt's nur einmal, das kommt nie wieder. Das ist zu schoen um wahr zu sein." One can see the portraits on the wall. This might be another occasion when a structure becomes most impressive in ruins, and reality truly powerful in memory. As for Sjahrir, never before did he appear to us so real, so pathetic. So human.

For a long time, indeed from the moment Hatta and Sjahrir were arrested in 1934, there was uncertainty among Dutch authorities about how to handle the two men. Doubts were repeatedly expressed by the Governor General's Adviser for Native Affairs about whether the Boven Digoel exile was not "too harsh and, besides, provoking unnecessary criticism [of the government]."[120] The implication was that Boven Digoel was not suitable "for intellectuals."[121] Early in December 1935 the Director of Justice in Batavia argued in a letter to the Governor General that as "to be put in Boven Digoel means much heavier suffering for an intellectual than for an illiterate, the academically trained leaders should be put in a camp different from that to which their uneducated followers were being exiled."[122] A plan to establish a special camp or secluded place for "educated" exiles was considered throughout the period.

There were special meetings on Hatta and Sjahrir at the Governor General's office in September and again in October 1935, when again all the uncertainties were expressed.[123] On January 2, 1936, in the highest offices in the colony, the Council of the Indies and the office of the Governor General, a final decision was made. Colonial authorities in the Moluccas were ordered to find a more suitable place for both exiles, and to provide for their transfer.[124]

Despite several months of persistent rumors, the news came to Tanah Merah quite suddenly. (Hatta says one boat had to leave without them because the packing

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[117] *Indonesische overpeinzingen*, July 20, 1935

[118] Ibid.

[119] Ibid., emphasis mine.

[120] Documents of the Volksraad and the Advisor's office of June 29 and June 24 respectively in Mailrapport 785*/1935 and 12*/1936, Bijlage

[121] Ibid.

[122] Dir van Justitie to Gouv.-Gen., December 4, 1935 in Mailrapport 12*/1936, Bijlage.

[123] "Interneering van Mohammad Hatta en Soetan Sjahrir elders dan te Boven Digoel," Proc gen. document in Mailrapport 12*/1936, Bijlage.

[124] Documents of the Raad van NI. in Mailrapport 12*/1936.

of his books took very long time.[125]) The two men made a last round of visits through the camp. The last snapshot of the Pendidikan group together was taken at a local studio. "Not much was said during the parting," Burhanuddin remembers, "with Sjahrir only uttering "*hou je taai*! (Keep your pecker up)!"[126] Then, it did not take long before Sjahrir and Hatta boarded the police ship, and before the ship itself disappeared from the exiles' view behind the first turn of the Digoel River.

There is no conclusion to this story. Sjahrir had six more years in another "place of restricted residence," this time shared only with the "academically formed," an incomparably more comfortable place in the beautiful Banda Neira Islands—but no less an exile, no less a perverted normality. Sjahrir lived another quarter of a century and accumulated a long record as a nationalist leader. He was one of the very few who did not cooperate with the Japanese during the Pacific War, and on this a legend was built (mostly by others) of him as an anti-fascist resistance hero. He served three times as the prime minister of the independent Indonesian Republic after it was proclaimed in 1945, and at crucial moments in the Indonesian Revolution he was its second or third top ranking representative. He became internationally known as Indonesia's chief negotiator with the Dutch between 1945 and 1947. He was the brain and the spirit of one of the principal Indonesian political parties of the post-war period. In 1961, Sjahrir was arrested again on trumped-up charges of anti-government activities. After being moved through various prisons during next four years, he fell seriously ill and was granted permission to go abroad. "Not to Holland!" He died in spring 1966 at a Zurich hospital, still a prisoner legally, or more precisely, an exile.

A myth and a cult grew around Sjahrir, as it did around only one or two other Indonesian leaders of the time—Sukarno and Tan Malaka perhaps. This myth and cult were to all appearances principally inspired (and a study should be written about it) by the ambiguous and suggestive distance Sjahrir kept throughout those years to actual politics and to almost everything actual and public; by Sjahrir's flagrant strangeness to the Indonesian scene (combined so weirdly with an equally visible and continuous suffering by Sjahrir in the Indonesian cause), by Sjahrir's marginality, evidently self-imposed, by his aloofness, and striking uncertainty whenever it came to a political action; by Sjahrir's hesitation to express himself even to his closest associates except in cryptic messages, in unspoken words; by his communicating a feeling of many paths being blocked, and many memories being suppressed. Those were myth-making and power-making qualities without a doubt, possibly because they echoed to others in Sjahrir's generation, and because, perhaps, what we call today "modern Indonesia" was largely built the Sjahririan way.

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[125] Hatta, *Indonesian Patriot*, p. 187; Hatta says the first date might be November, but that can hardly be so because the decision was not taken before January 2.

[126] Burhanuddin, "Sjahrir jang saja kenal," pp. 63–64.

DIPLOMACY AND ARMED STRUGGLE IN THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL REVOLUTION: CHOICE AND CONSTRAINT IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Barbara S. Harvey*

All studies of the Indonesian national revolution have built on George McT. Kahin's classic study, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, based as it is on the author's presence in Indonesia during the revolution, his close association with Indonesian revolutionary leaders and spokesmen, and his sympathetic insight into the background of the revolution and the conflicting strains within it. One of the most provocative and fascinating works to build on—and in some ways to contradict—Kahin's study is Benedict Anderson's *Java in a Time of Revolution*.[1] Looking more closely at divisions within the revolutionary leadership during the initial stages of the revolution, Anderson argues that the suppression of spontaneous social revolution in Indonesia in 1945-46 can be attributed largely to the "logic" of the policy of diplomacy followed by the government of the Republic of Indonesia.

This conclusion is less convincing when the Indonesian revolution is examined in comparative perspective, particularly in comparison with the Vietnamese revolution, one with similar beginnings and a very different outcome. It is apparent that during the same period as the Indonesian revolution, Vietnamese leaders also relied

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[1] Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution* (Ithaca, N.Y. and London: Cornell University Press, 1972).

primarily on a policy of negotiation, and followed moderate social policies, rather than relying on armed struggle. At its Sixth and Eighth plenums in 1940 and 1941, the Indochinese Communist Party decided to give primacy to the goal of national liberation, postponing the social/agrarian revolution.[2] Moderate policies were followed for the next ten years in order to build an alliance of anti-French forces. Only in 1951 were more radical agrarian policies instituted, in order to win peasant support, and only in 1955, after the conclusion of the anti-French war of liberation, was class origin considered in the selection of lower-level party/Viet Minh cadre.[3]

To explain the different outcomes of the Indonesian and Vietnamese revolutions, then, factors other than reliance on diplomacy or armed struggle must be examined. Several differences between the Indonesian and Vietnamese situations are clear enough to require little detail:

a. The geographic and ethnic diversity of Indonesia complicated the development of nationalism, the creation of a revolutionary movement, and the construction of a post-revolutionary society, while Viet Nam had the advantage of relative homogeneity, though its own regional problem in the south was intensified by foreign involvement.[4]
b. The tougher repression of the Vietnamese nationalist movement by French colonial authorities left the Communist Party in a position of supremacy, while Dutch policy in the Indies permitted moderate "cooperative" nationalist parties and left the nationalist movement fragmented among several weak competing parties.
c. Sizeable Japanese military forces occupied Indonesia following the capitulation of the Dutch in 1942, compared with smaller Japanese troop deployments in Viet Nam, where the occupation relied on a collaborating Vichy French regime until March 1945.
d. By 1946 the developing Cold War influenced the French, and the Americans, to view the Vietnamese struggle not as a war of national liberation but as part of an international Communist threat, and thus to write off the Viet Minh, while the suppression of the Indonesian Communist Party following the Madiun affair in 1948 led the Americans to press the Dutch towards a negotiated settlement of Indonesian independence.[5]

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[2] *History of the August Revolution* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1972), pp. 14–15, 24–30; also discussed in William J. Duiker, "Building the United Front: The Rise of Communism in Vietnam, 1925–1954," in Joseph J. Zasloff and MacAlister Brown, eds., *Communism in Indochina* (Lexington, Ma: D.C. Heath, 1975), pp. 14–15.

[3] William J. Duiker, *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 136, 153–54; Duiker, "United Front," pp. 18–23; William S. Turley, "The Political Role and Development of the People's Army of Vietnam," in Zasloff and Brown, eds., *Communism in Indochina*, p. 140.

[4] On the diversity of the revolutionary experience in Indonesia, see Audrey R. Kahin, ed., *Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985).

[5] For a detailed analysis of this aspect of the two revolutions, see George McT. Kahin, "The United States and the Anticolonial Revolutions in Southeast Asia, 1945–50," in Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye, eds., *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977), pp. 338–361.

The geo-strategic positions of the two states must also be borne in mind when analyzing the decisions made by the Vietnamese and Indonesian leaders. Wary of its northern neighbor, Viet Nam was initially concerned that the nationalist Chinese forces, who were to take the Japanese surrender north of the sixteenth parallel, might negotiate a deal with the French to the Viet Minh's disadvantage. It was in part to avoid such a deal that Ho Chi Minh favored direct negotiations between the Viet Minh and the French. Nonetheless, southern China provided a potential refuge for the Viet Minh because it was war-lord country, and both the KMT and Communists were so preoccupied with their own struggle for control of China that Viet Nam remained a peripheral concern. After 1950, of course, China was a friendly presence on the northern border. The Vietnamese consequently never had to worry about being surrounded by hostile forces, cut off from support, should they elect or were forced into armed struggle.

Indonesian leaders, by contrast, had no secure base area to which they could retreat and were vulnerable to blockade. This vulnerability intensified the pressures on them to negotiate. At the same time, the Dutch were pressured by the British, and eventually the Americans, to negotiate. The British forces, which had landed in September to accept the Japanese surrender in Java and Sumatra, faced unexpectedly strong resistance against the reimposition of colonial rule. Not relishing a fight after years of war, and recognizing the inability of the war-ravaged Netherlands quickly to reassert control for themselves, the British urged the Dutch to negotiate with the nascent Indonesian republic. As a great power, France was less subject to Allied pressure. Moreover, having suffered less under the Vichy regime than the Dutch did under German occupation, France was able to return to British-controlled southern Viet Nam by late September 1945, but it took considerably more time for the French to reach an agreement with the Chinese in the north. The Viet Minh were able to use the interval both to strengthen their political position there and to negotiate their own agreement with the French.[6]

In 1945 all the main actors were weak: the Indonesian and Vietnamese revolutionaries, the just-defeated Japanese, and the French, but especially the Dutch, dreaming of reclaiming their colony. It was the awareness of their own weaknesses that inclined the revolutionaries and their former rulers, with an occasional push from the disengaging British, to pursue a policy of negotiation.

Compared to the overall situation of their Vietnamese counterparts, the state apparatus and military force which Indonesian revolutionaries faced were stronger, their own resources weaker, and their potential for garnering international support if they followed moderate policies greater. Disunity within the Indonesian nationalist movement was a major source of weakness. Splits within nationalist—including Marxist—groups during the revolution undoubtedly affected the ideological commitment and coherence of the vision of post-revolutionary society among Indonesian leaders. They also diverted leaders' energy into building national level coalitions on the basis of compromise and maneuver, and affected the leadership's ability to forge organizational links with the mass of the people.

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[6] Evelyn Colbert, *Southeast Asia in International Politics, 1941–1956* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 60–67; Ellen J. Hammer, *The Struggle for Indochina 1940–1955* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966, revised ed.); Anthony J. S. Reid, *The Indonesian National Revolution 1945–1950* (Hawthorne, Victoria: Longman, 1974), pp. 43–49.

If motivation, vision, and commitment are crucial to a successful social revolution, organizational capacity is no less so. Anderson argued that the logic of diplomacy required "that spontaneous revolutionary action among the people be suppressed," but he also acknowledged that the inability of nationalist leaders to provide organization and direction to the revolutionary impulse of Indonesian youth resulted in a failure to transform that impulse into "a coherent, *politically* revolutionary force."[7] It is these problems of organization and direction on which I intend to focus in this essay. I am particularly concerned with three aspects: the relationship of nationalist/revolutionary leaders to traditional elite groups and to the traditional leaders of rural social protest, notably village teachers; the development of organizational ties between revolutionary leaders and the people in the course of the nationalist movement and during the Japanese Occupation; and the revolutionary leaders' control over military forces.

Class Relations and the Nationalist Movement

Dutch colonial adminstration turned the Javanese ruling class into a bureaucratic elite. By the late nineteenth century the *priyayi* elite were salaried officials, not local chiefs whose power derived from extensive land holdings. Although *priyayi* families identified with particular local areas continued to dominate the colonial civil service, especially at the senior level of *bupati*, this elite was no longer a feudal aristocracy whose grip on rural society would have to be broken for the revolution to succeed.[8] Despite their service in the colonial bureaucracy, the *priyayi* were, in a sense, professional civil servants who could and did quite easily transfer their allegiance to a new master. Doing so enabled them to keep their relatively privileged positions, to guard their own interests, and to thwart or moderate initiatives for reform or change.

In Viet Nam, historically, the same link existed between land ownership and bureaucratic position as in China, for only the wealthy had the leisure to study for the examinations, and in an agrarian society land was the basis of wealth. Viet Nam, however, had a strong tradition of communal land within the village, particularly in the longer settled northern and central areas. During the colonial period, both mandarins and village notables became large land owners. In some areas village notables seized communal land, and, especially in the southern colony, Cochin China, the French colonial government gave large private land grants to French settlers and to Vietnamese in the colonial civil service. At least in part because of their continuing link to the land, neither mandarins nor village notables were transformed completely into colonial bureaucrats.[9] At the same time, with the abolition of the Confucian civil service examination by 1919, the mandarinate gradually lost much of its residual prestige, and appeared finally as a mere creature of the French.

The traditional Vietnamese elite, both national and local, was more closely tied to land ownership than comparable groups in Java. Because of the fragmentation of land holdings in Java, even village officials controlled relatively small parcels, and this land was not owned personally but went with the office. Their connection with land made the elites of Viet Nam socially conservative, unable to transfer allegiance

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[7] Anderson, *Java*, pp. 307–308, 407–408.

[8] Heather Sutherland, *The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite* (Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books [Asia] Ltd., 1979); especially pp. 19–20, and 153 on the *priyayi*'s local ties.

[9] Christine K. Pelzer White, "Agrarian Reform and National Liberation in the Vietnamese Revolution: 1920–1957" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1981), pp. 26–28, 30–31, 38.

easily to new masters who were committed to land reform and the social transformation of the countryside. Although some Vietnamese notables and mandarins joined the Viet Minh in opposing the French, thus complicating the party's later implementation of land reform, most recognized the obvious threat to their position from the party's stated policies and sided with the French, providing much of the support for the rival state established in Saigon in June 1946.

In both Indonesia and Viet Nam the lower ranks of the traditional elite were active in the nationalist movements. Those who opposed the imposition of colonial rule, or who, unlike their more privileged cousins, had no opportunity to join the colonial elite, resented foreign domination and their own loss of status. As literates in largely illiterate societies, they often provided necessary services to nationalist parties and organizations. In both countries nationalist movements also drew on the new classes that emerged during the colonial period: medical and legal professionals, journalists, teachers, and plantation, mine and railroad workers.[10] Teachers, traditionally key figures in rural protest movements, played significant roles as links between the villages and the nationalist movement and as participants in the revolution.

The Village Teacher

Paul Mus and his students have called attention to the autonomy of Vietnamese villages and the limits on the reach of the Emperor and his law.[11] Outside the bureaucratic structure, however, a link between elite and villagers existed in the person of the Confucian scholar, either a retired mandarin or someone who had failed his examinations, resident in the village. These scholars provided instruction for the young, but also often provided leadership in protests against excessive exactions by the bureaucracy. Scholars and mandarins who had resigned or were fired because of their opposition to French rule led much of the initial resistance to the French.[12] In the traditional pattern, according to Nguyen Khac Vien, during the 1930s unemployed teachers—few as they were, their number exceeded the available jobs—returned to the villages, where they shared the "misery, fear of unemployment, and humiliation" of ordinary peasants under French colonial rule. Village teachers—"pencil-holding coolies" in Nguyen Khac Vien's imaginative phrase—were among the first Marxist cadres to work at the village level.[13] Thus there was no break in the traditional role of the village teachers in Viet Nam as mediators with the outside world and as leaders of protest against an inequitable order.

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[10] Christine Pelzer White, "The Vietnamese Revolutionary Alliance: Intellectuals, Workers, and Peasants," in John W. Lewis, ed., *Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974) and Robert van Niel, *The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite* (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1970).

[11] Paul Mus, *Viet-Nam: Sociologie d'une Guerre* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952); John T. McAlister and Paul Mus, *The Vietnamese and Their Revolution* (New York; Harper and Row, 1970); Frances Fitzgerald, *Fire in the Lake* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972).

[12] Nguyen Khac Vien, "Confucianism and Marxism in Vietnam," in *Tradition and Revolution in Vietnam* (Berkeley: Indochina Resource Center, 1974), pp. 22–26, 39–43; David G. Marr, *Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885–1925* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 52–53, 77–79, 82–83; Alexander B. Woodside, *Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), pp. 130–131.

[13] Nguyen Khac Vien, "Confucianism and Marxism," pp. 45–46.

Village teachers in Indonesia traditionally had also served as leaders of rural protest, but their links with the larger society were weaker than those of their counterparts in Viet Nam. Although village teachers played similar roles in pre-Islamic Java (as *ajar*) as well as in Aceh and the Minangkabau area of West Sumatra, the analysis here is confined largely to the rural *kiai* and *ulama* in Java.[14] In his study of rural protest in Java, Sartono Kartodirdjo notes that such protest took a religious form not only because "traditional society is suffused with the idea of the sacred," but because "in colonial society no alternative channels of protest were available to the peasantry."[15] He also notes the importance of Islam in providing institutions such as the village schools, *pesantren*, with their special bond between teacher and student through which protest movements could be mobilized.[16]

Two institutional aspects of the *pesantren* are particularly important for this discussion. First, the *pesantren* is a village institution, not a branch of an outside organization imposed on or introduced into the village by strangers. In Indonesia, or Java, it is one of the few institutions that is an organic part of rural life. Second, because Islam is an essentially non-hierarchical religion, no superstructure connects the village religious schools to a national educational or religious entity. Although the *kiai* and *ulama* are important local figures, and some have reputations far beyond their villages, they are linked to others by personal bonds, not organizational structures. The protests they have led have consequently been largely confined to local areas. Indeed, it is difficult to incorporate them into any national movement.

Some *kiai* were drawn into the nationalist movement and established local branches of the Sarekat Islam, especially in Banten, where their role is well known. The early success and rapid expansion of the Sarekat Islam has been attributed to the local efficacy of the *kiai* and *ulama*.[17] At the local level, as at the national level, however, the Sarekat Islam typically mobilized the peasantry through rallies with charismatic speeches, but did not forge organizational links between the members or branches.[18] Moreover, the relationship between the local and national leaders remained difficult and problematic. As the national Sarekat Islam came increasingly under the domination of Western educated intellectuals, and was more and more influenced by the modernist Islamic social organization Muhammadiyah, it retained less in common with the traditionalist rural *kiai*. Van Niel suggests that after 1919 the Sarekat Islam lost popularity with its peasant membership because of its increasingly "revolutionary tinge."[19] But it may have been that the real source of disappointment was that Sarekat Islam's rhetoric outran its action. In his study of Banten, Michael Williams found that it was in part "the Sarekat Islam's growing concern to avoid

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[14] Teachers in the secular schools were also drawn into the nationalist movement, many becoming cadre of the Indonesian Communist Party, but neither their numbers nor their influence at the local level was as great as that of the Islamic teachers.

[15] Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Protest Movements in Rural Java* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 12, 19.

[16] Sartono, *Protest Movements*, pp. 69–70. Professor Sartono also mentions the the *tarekat* (Sufi brotherhoods) as rural Islamic institutions that have traditionally played a role in social protest movements; conceivably they served a function similar to that of secret societies in Vietnam.

[17] Van Niel, *Indonesian Elite*, pp. 114–15; Sartono, *Protest Movements*, pp. 137, 165–76; Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun* (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1958), pp. 40–43.

[18] I am indebted to Takashi Shiraishi for this point.

[19] Van Niel, *Indonesian Elite*, p. 149.

radicalism which met with disapproval in Banten," and this disillusionment provided a fertile basis for subsequent PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) activity.[20]

When the PKI was forced out of the Sarekat Islam in 1921, many Sarekat Islam branches followed and became known as the Sarekat Rakjat. Religious teachers and *hajis* also joined the PKI as the membership of the party expanded during the early 1920s.[21] By 1924 , however, the PKI found the large Sarekat Rakjat membership unreliable, lacking both discipline and knowledge of Marxism, and decided to intensify its work among the proletariat.[22] The Sarekat Rakyat was left to wither away gradually. Nonetheless, Sarekat Rakyat members were nearly as prominent as PKI members in the abortive 1926–27 revolts in Banten and West Sumatra, if arrest records are an accurate indication of involvement.[23] *Kiai* played a notable role as leaders of the rebellions in both areas.[24]

Yet, as leaders of social protest and rebellion, rural Islamic teachers were essentially conservative, in the sense that the protests they led were against unwanted social change and the intervention of outside forces in village life.[25] Javanese peasants, like peasants elsewhere, could be roused to rebellion in order to protect—or return to—a traditional way of life threatened by disruptive change.[26] To convert that impulse into support for revolutionary change was a task that tested the capabilities of all nationalist leaders—secular, Islamic, or Marxist.

Cultural/Religious Divisions in Society

It is generally accepted that Viet Nam is a less internally divided society than Indonesia. Viet Nam's small Roman Catholic minority was largely created by and identified with the colonial rulers. Mountain dwellers played a largely marginal role, although an important one in the early days of the revolution when they provided a secure base area for the Viet Minh. Only in the south, where the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai sects were resistant to Communism, did cultural/religious cleavage within Vietnamese society pose real problems for the Viet Minh.

Indonesia is an altogether different story. Even apart from the geographic and ethnic diversity of the entire country, in the Javanese heartland itself there is significant social, cultural, and religious cleavage. Most obvious is that between devout

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[20] Michael C. Williams, *Sickle and Crescent: the Communist Revolt of 1926 in Banten* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1982), pp. 7, 8–33.

[21] Ruth T. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), pp. 184–86. McVey treats the relationship of the SI and the PKI, and the PKI and the Sarekat Rakyat, in considerable detail throughout her book.

[22] Interestingly, at the same time the PKI abandoned democratic centralism as an organizational principle, thus weakening its ability to impose discipline within its own ranks. See McVey, *Indonesian Communism*, pp. 261–64, 270–77.

[23] Van Niel, *Indonesian Elite*, pp. 233, 283–284; McVey, *Indonesian Communism*, pp. 184–85, 429–30; both cite W. M. F. Mnsvelt, "Onderwijs en Communism," *Koloniale Studien*, XII (1928), Part I, pp. 203–225.

[24] Harry J. Benda and Ruth T. McVey, eds., *The Communist Uprisings of 1926–1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1960), pp. xv–xvi.

[25] Sartono, *Protest Movements*, p. 67; Benda, *Crescent*, p. 43.

[26] James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), makes this point with reference to peasant norms of subsistence and reciprocity, especially pp. 33–34, 184–92.

Muslims, the *santri* or *putihan*, and the syncretic *priyayi* elite and *kampung abangan*.[27] This division only became formalized during the 1920s, however, and was probably not much felt in village Indonesia until the end of that decade. The emphasis of reform Islam on strict adherence to religious prescriptions and ritual tended to sharpen divisions between more and less outwardly devout Muslims; and when given organizational expression the differences tended to polarize into two communities, *santri* and *abangan*.

During the 1920s *kiais* and Communists worked together, perhaps with greater ease than either did with the modernist Muslims who came to dominate the Sarekat Islam and the political leadership of the urban Islamic community. In 1926 orthodox *ulama* in East Java formed the Nahdatul Ulama (Council of Muslim Scholars) to counter the urban based modernists of Muhammadiyah and Ahmadiyah, while reformist Muslims were primarily responsible for pushing PKI members out of the Sarekat Islam. McVey has observed that the split in Sarekat Islam tended to follow the *santri-abangan* cleavage, the *abangan* aligning with the PKI.[28] The bitterness of the struggle for the loyalty of the SI branches certainly contributed to an estrangement between the adherents of Islam and Communism. Even so, during the 1920s the Communist leader Tan Malaka was a "personal proponent of alliance between Communism and revolutionary Islam," and he and the communist Muslim leader Haji Misbach stressed the similarity of Marxist and Islamic teachings.[29]

Because reformist Islam was, at least initially, primarily city based, the modernist-orthodox dichotomy reflected an urban-rural difference. Both urban and rural *santri* leaders, however, came from prosperous "middle class" groups in society: urban merchants and traders, rural landowners. Wertheim suggests that this increasing identification of Islam with the bourgeoisie made it a conservative force in society, rendering an alliance with radical communism an unlikely prospect for the future.[30]

It is also possible that as Islamic leaders came to understand Marxism more fully, they realized the incompatibility of its atheistic beliefs with their own deeply religious views.[31] In his study of the *Tiga Daerah* affair, Anton Lucas notes that in the early months of the revolution "Moslem teachers and non-religious radicals worked actively together in local revolutionary movements." By December 1945, however, local Islamic groups felt threatened by a PKI leader's call to "put aside" religion in

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[27] The classic discussion is in the writings of Clifford Geertz, especially his *The Religion of Java* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960).

[28] McVey, *Indonesian Communism*, pp. 170–171; Benda, *Crescent*, p. 50.

[29] McVey, *Indonesian Communism*, p. 161; see also pp. 114–116, 160–162, 172–173; and Rex Mortimer, "Traditional Modes and Communist Movements: Change and Protest in Indonesia," in Lewis, ed., *Peasant Rebellion*, especially pp. 106–108.

[30] W. F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition* (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1969), pp. 220–224.

[31] Mitsuo Nakamura, in his study of the Muhammadiyah in Kotagede, near Yogyakarta, states that the antagonism between the Muhammadiyah and the PKI that developed there was based on religious conviction, although there were also differences over modes of political action and involvement From his interviews with Muhammadiyah leaders Nakamura concluded that they believed that "Islam and Communism were incompatible," quoting one such leader to the effect that "Muslims . . . should never accept Communism, for it is opposed to Islam in principle." This, Nakamura believes, was more important in the estrangement than the PKI call for direct political action to overthrow colonialism, in contrast with the Muhammadiyah emphasis on individual religious enlightenment as the primary task.

the interests of the revolution, and subsequently cooperated with the Republican army in arresting PKI and Popular Front members.[32] Certainly by the time of the Madiun Affair in 1948 the antagonism between Islamic and Marxist groups was clear.

Building an Infrastructure

Whatever links the PKI or Sarekat Islam had forged with the rural *kiai* in the 1920s withered as the SI declined into schism and relative ineffectiveness, and the PKI was decimated following the 1926–27 rebellions. As was mentioned earlier, the Sarekat Islam's ties with its rural following had been more emotional than organizational. Although the PKI had begun training cadres in 1923–24, many were in exile or among the thousands of persons arrested after the 1926–27 rebellion. The history of the PKI in the 1930s has not yet been written; Kahin suggests that two small and relatively weak underground organizations continued to function, probably in Jakarta (Batavia) and Surabaya.[33] Whatever lessons had been learned from the 1926–27 debacle, the necessity of unified leadership was not among them. During the Japanese occupation the only serious attempt to form an anti-fascist underground was made by a young Communist, Amir Sjarifuddin, who was soon captured and saved from execution only by the intervention of Sukarno and Hatta.[34] Tan Malaka returned to Indonesia in 1942, but did not reveal his identity nor contact any of his old associates until a week after the proclamation of independence.[35]

During the 1930s nationalist leaders capable of forging links with the people, either by means of education and organization (Hatta and Sjahrir) or charismatic appeal (Sukarno), were imprisoned or exiled. Although these leaders were released by the Japanese in 1942, and Sukarno and Hatta were confirmed as the principal spokesmen of the nationalist movement through their leadership of a series of Japanese sponsored mass movements, they still had little opportunity to build an organizational network linking urban based national headquarters with local branches. The Djawa Hokokai, the last of these organizations, did penetrate to the village level through neighborhood associations, but at the regional and local levels were controlled by the *priyayi* of the official bureaucracy. Thus it was not nationalist leaders but bureaucrats who had direct connections with the villages. Nationalist leaders shared only the blame for the harsh policies of forced labor and required food deliveries which the Hokokai was required to implement.[36] Nonetheless, through the medium of radio, Sukarno's compelling voice became known throughout the archipelago as the preeminent symbol of Indonesian nationalism, even if his addresses were at least nominally on behalf of the Japanese.

Although Muslim leaders, like the secular nationalists, were given concessions to induce their cooperation in mobilizing the population for the occupation's purposes,

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[32] Anton Lucas, "The Tiga Daerah Affair: Social Revolution or Rebellion?," in Audrey Kahin, *Regional Dynamies of the Indonesian Revolution*, pp. 22–53.

[33] George McT. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 85–87.

[34] Kahin, *Nationalism*, pp. 111–112; Anderson, *Java*, pp. 37–38.

[35] Anderson, *Java*, pp. 275–277.

[36] Kahin, *Nationalism*, p. 110; Benda, *Crescent*, pp. 153–155; Anderson makes this point explicitly in "Japan: 'The Light of Asia,'" in Josef Silverstein, ed., *Southeast Asia in World War II: Four Essays* (New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 1966), pp. 18, 29.

they too were essentially denied organizational links with the rural population. Japanese authorities banned Islamic political parties; forced the NU and reformist Muhammadiyah to cooperate in a non-political federation, Masjumi; and carefully controlled contacts between urban Muslim leaders and rural *kiai*. Recognizing the important role of the *kiai* and *ulama* in Java, the Japanese established training courses for them directly under the Religious Affairs Office, not through existing Islamic organizations. Individual *kiai* and *ulama* were allowed to join Masjumi, but only with the consent of the Religious Affairs Office.[37] Despite Japanese cultivation of Islamic support, it was a rural *kiai* who in February 1944 led the most significant rebellion against Japanese exactions.[38] Cooperation with the Japanese did provide a few new opportunities to the Indonesian elite—*priyayi*, Muslim, and secular nationalist—but gave them little in the way of organizational ties with the people or control over the bureaucracy, and left them tainted in the eyes of the suffering peasants and the victorious Allies.

The situation in Viet Nam in the period leading up to the August Revolution was quite different, even though the nationalist and Communist movements there had been even more severely repressed after the 1930 uprisings than was the case in Indonesia. Although the nationalists seem never to have recovered, by 1936 the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) was able to take advantage of the existence of a Popular Front Government in France to work toward a united front, and to push for the formation of "action committees" in factories and villages. Although these activities had little practical result, they did lend the party "visibility and prestige."[39] Of perhaps greater significance was the effect of renewed French repression at the end of the Popular Front period in 1939. As a result, the ICP "abandoned its urban base and its fundamentally urban strategy and retreated to the countryside where covert operations were easier to carry on."[40]

From 1940 on, the ICP began to work among minority groups in the northern mountain areas; by the time the Viet Minh was formed in May 1941, this area formed a secure revolutionary base from which they made the political and military preparations to launch a war of national liberation. It was at this time that the ICP decided "to concentrate forces on the task of struggling against the imperialist war and for national independence" and "that the slogan of *agrarian revolution* be temporarily withdrawn."[41] Despite the continuation of repressive policies by the Vichy administration, the party carried on political work, training cadres, forming associations of peasants, workers, women, and youth, and organizing village militia units. When the Japanese ousted the French in March 1945, but were themselves unable to replace the French administration in the Vietnamese countryside, particularly Tonkin, the Viet Minh was prepared to fill the vacuum. People's Committees, under Viet Minh control, replaced the Councils of Notables in the villages. By June 1945 the Viet Minh had at least nominal control of six provinces in northern Viet Nam. By August, when

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[37] Although Benda at one point writes that the Japanese forged links between "the Islamic elite and its rural following" (*Crescent*, p. 110), later in his discussion he indicates that the Japanese "bypassed the Islamic urban leadership of Jakarta" (p. 135). On the training courses and Masjumi, see pp. 132–136, 146–152, 156.

[38] Benda, *Crescent*, pp. 160–161.

[39] Duiker, *Communist Road*, pp. 52–55 and "United Front," pp. 10–12.

[40] Duiker, *Communist Road*, p. 59 and "United Front," p. 13.

[41] *History of the August Revolution*, pp. 14–15; Duiker, *Communist Road*, p. 60.

the Japanese surrendered to the Allies, the Viet Minh had not only expanded their grip over much of the countryside, but were able by the end of the month to organize massive demonstrations in the cities of Hanoi, Hue, and Saigon. Except for some areas in the south, where the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects were powerful competitors for the loyalty of the rural population, the Viet Minh had some degree of control over much of the country by the time of the proclamation of the Provisional Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRV) on August 29 and the Declaration of Independence on September 2, 1945.[42]

The situation was quite different when the Indonesian nationalist leaders, Sukarno and Hatta, proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1945. Neither then, nor indeed at the conclusion of the revolution, did they control as much of their country as did Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh of theirs before they proclaimed independence. With the surrender of the Japanese and the delayed return of the Allies, there was a political vacuum throughout Indonesia that the Republican government was unable to fill. The legitimacy of the government was widely accepted, even outside Java, although the means by which it was to govern were problematic. In the weeks following the declaration of independence, a formal governmental structure was established in Jakarta, the incorporation of the existing civil service into the new government was announced, and national committees (KNI) were established down to the sub-district level.[43] However, there were no trained and loyal cadres, comparable to those of the Viet Minh, to give life to these structures, or on whom Sukarno and Hatta—or for that matter rival leaders such as Sjahrir or Tan Malaka—could rely. Further, the civilian government gained only tenuous control over the national army, which had begun to form almost by itself, and the army central staff had similarly tenuous control over the armed units on which it would have to rely to carry out a policy of armed struggle.

Into the political vacuum flowed the *pemuda*, the youth of whom Anderson has written so eloquently, and the *kiai*, who led their *santri* pupils out of the *pesantren* to do battle with the infidel Japanese and the Dutch and even the *priyayi* officials who had cooperated with them.[44] Nationalist leaders, largely secular and urban, feared the fanaticism of the rural masses whom the *kiai* had shown in the past they could arouse. Although a number of *kiai* were members of the sub-district branches of the national committees (KNI), the government had as little control over their actions as it did over the *pemuda*. Determined as the DRV was at the same time to negotiate with the Allies for recognition of their independence, the Republican government considered it essential to demonstrate that it was in effective control of the country. This was apparent in the Tiga Daerah affair, in which the Republican government and military put down what is widely considered a genuine social revolution,

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[42] Duiker, *Communist Road*, pp. 82–105; Ellen J. Hammer, *The Struggle for Indochina 1940–1955* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, revised ed., 1966), pp. 9, 95–105; *History of the August Revolution*, pp. 56–138.

[43] Many of the local committees were established spontaneously by local leaders, and were only gradually brought into the official structure proclaimed from Jakarta. See Kahin, *Nationalism*, pp. 138–140; Anderson, *Java*, pp. 87–91, 110–117; for a succinct treatment of the situation and of the lack of coordination among different groups and levels, see Anthony J. S. Reid, *The Indonesian National Revolution 1945–1950* (Hawthorne, Victoria: Longman, 1974), pp. 30–34.

[44] Anderson, *Java*, p. 222; John R. W. Smail, *Bandung in the Early Revolution, 1945–1946* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1964), pp. 91–93.

because of the threat local action posed to the position of the new government and its ability to deal with the British and Japanese forces in nearby Semarang.[45] The Indonesian government had no means to channel the revolutionary impulse of its people—even had it had the vision to do so—and when this impulse took the form of a challenge to established authority (Japanese, Allied, Republican or *priyayi*), the government resorted to suppression.

Faced with a similar situation, the DRV was able through the Viet Minh to engage the energies of the people in production and literacy campaigns, which had the added benefit of demonstrating that the Viet Minh were sincerely interested in the welfare of the people, and could carry out programs of practical benefit. The official history of The August Revolution attributes the mobilization of millions of people who were drawn into the revoltionary struggle to the campaign against famine, in particular the seizure of stored stocks of rice.[46] According to Duiker, "the famine issue permitted the Party to ride the crest of rural unrest without being forced to draw up a radical program that might have alienated moderate nationalist elements in the cities."[47]

Military Forces

In order to pursue a revolutionary policy of armed struggle it is, of course, essential to have adequate and reliable military forces. The lack of such forces was a principal consideration in the initial decision of both Vietnamese and Indonesian leaders to try to negotiate with the Allies and the former colonial powers. At the time of the proclamation of independence in Viet Nam, a small but well trained and reasonably well armed military force under the command of a trusted member of the Viet Minh (and ICP) had been in existence for some eight months. The People's Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) was established on December 22, 1944, based on a small "Viet Nam Propaganda Unit" which Vo Nguyen Giap had formed earlier that year. By August the army still had only a few thousand men, but possessed a stock of weapons captured from the Japanese or dropped by the OSS. Perhaps more important, a system of political control of the army had been worked out, with political officers assigned at every level down to two-hundred-man companies. A Political Directorate under the Central Committee administered this parallel command structure, in which the political officer had authority superior to that of the military officer at each level. This system, as well as the fact that top military commanders were trusted revolutionaries and members of the ICP, ensured that the army was a reliable instrument of the political leadership. Because the army had been in existence prior to the proclamation of independence, and indeed was engaged in political work and expansion throughout the countryside for some months, young people who wanted to take part in the war of liberation joined the PAVN or self-defense units under its aegis, rather than creating irregular armed groups outside the formal military structure.[48]

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[45] Anton Lucas, "Tiga Daerah."

[46] *History of the August Revolution*, pp. 88–95.

[47] Duiker, *Communist Road*, p. 103.

[48] Turley, "People's Army," pp. 135–141; Vo Nguyen Giap, *The Military Art of People's War* (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1970), pp. 64–73, 107–108. OSS arms are mentioned, rather indirectly, by Archimedes L. A. Patti, *Why Viet Nam?* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 129. For the situation in southern Viet Nam, where the Viet Minh was very much weaker than in the north, because of strong local rivals, and where it was repressed following an abortive uprising in November 1945, see Carlyle A. Thayer, "Southern

The situation in Indonesia during the same period is strikingly different. Although an estimated 150,000 youths with some military training and weapons for one hundred infantry battalions were available, yet it was nearly two months after the proclamation of independence before either a ministry of defense or an army was established.[49] Even then, as a number of writers have pointed out, the formal structure was largely symbolic, for the man designated as minister of defense and commander of the army, Suprijadi, was widely believed to have been killed in a revolt against the Japanese in February 1945.

In the meantime, and in the absence of government directives, the "army created itself."[50] The principal group trained during the occupation, the PETA, was disbanded by the Japanese, with little or no protest from nationalist leaders, on August 19 and 20. The PETA had in any case been organized only to the battalion level, with no central command structure. Only in October did the government begin to try to impose some order on the welter of military groups that had sprung up around the country. A Body to Maintain Order (BKR) was set up in August, drawing on former members of the Dutch colonial army (KNIL) and PETA officers and men; in October the BKR was transformed into an army (TKR, later TNI). Other PETA officers, youth group activists, local religious leaders—anyone who could grab a gun and gather a following—formed themselves into "struggle bodies" (*badan perjuangan*) and militia (*laskar*). The availability of weapons, largely seized from or handed over by sympathetic Japanese, helps to explain why and how many of these irregular groups flourished initially. Because decisions on both sides were made locally, those groups that obtained weapons were quite autonomous and could proclaim themselves freedom fighters.

The membership of these organizations was often fluid, and some of them—like some army units as well—were ephemeral, "names imposed on effervescent reality," as John Smail put it.[51] Some groups that persisted were incorporated into the army as it began to take shape in late 1945, but some of them retained considerable autonomy, and others never were meaningfully related to the central army command. It was these units, usually known by the name of their battalion commanders, which were the "real" organic elements of the army, not the hierarchy which the army command and the government tried to superimpose throughout the revolution.

In a very real sense the Indonesian army was a "people's army," built from the bottom up. Even its commander, General Sudirman, was elected at a conference of senior officers, many of whom had themselves been elected by the units they led.

Vietnamese Revolutionary Organizations and the Vietnam Workers' Party: Continuity and Change, 1954–1974," in Zasloff and Brown, eds., *Communism in Indochina*, pp. 27–33.

[49] The figures are given by General A. H. Nasution in *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, Vol. I (Jakarta: Seruling Masa, revised ed., 1970), pp. 168, 174. Nasution's three-volume work on the Indonesian army (Jakarta: Seruling Masa, 1970, 1968, and 1971) provides valuable information on this period, as do his books *Sedjarah Perdjuangan Nasional dibidang Bersendjata* (Jakarta: Mega Bookstore, 1966) and *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare* (Jakarta: Seruling Masa, 2nd ed., 1970). Also useful in presenting the TNI's view of its origins is Nugroho Notosusanto, *The PETA-Army in Indonesia 1943–1945* (Jakarta: Department of Defense and Security, Centre for Armed Forces History, 1971). In this discussion I have also relied on Anderson, *Java*, especially pp. 125–166 and 232–268; and Smail, *Bandung*, which gives an excellent picture of the formation of armed units at the local level in West Java.

[50] Smail, *Bandung*, pp. 77–78.

[51] Smail, *Bandung*, p. 76.

Although the government managed to impose its choice for minister of defense on the army, it was forced to accede to the army's choice of Sudirman as commander-in-chief. The government also had to abandon an attempt to appoint political officers within the army, in the face of opposition from Sudirman (and most officers) to turning the army into an instrument of a political party, or even an instrument of the state. From its inception, the Indonesian army saw itself as the creator of the Indonesian state, not its servant.

Conclusion

The decision to abandon a policy of diplomacy in favor of armed struggle was forced on the Vietnamese by the intransigence of the French, although the incompatibility of the two antagonistic visions of the future of Viet Nam may have doomed negotiation from the start. It seems clear that the long period of armed struggle in Viet Nam served to forge ties between the Viet Minh and the people, and proved to the intellectual elite of the party that they could learn from the peasants as well as teach them.[52] Years of depending on the villages provided a populist underpinning to the disciplined, hierarchical organization of the revolutionary party, an organization so essential to victory in the war of national liberation. And this victory was a prerequisite to carrying out an agrarian social revolution in the interest of the people in whose name the party had fought. At the same time, the long duration of the struggle, and the development of antagonistic class interests embodied in the separate state created in the south, left a legacy of bitterness still unresolved.

With the help of international pressure on the Dutch, the Indonesians eventually won their independence more through negotiation than armed struggle. But even if a policy of armed struggle been followed consistently, as the army vocally advocated, it is doubtful that the outcome of the Indonesian war of national liberation would have been internal social revolution. It is true that in the brief period of guerrilla warfare from December 1948 through June 1949, some military and civilian officials for the first time "saw the realities of village life with their own eyes."[53] Yet the experience of that period, when so few Republican leaders joined the soldiers in the villages, also served to harden the army's suspicions of and distaste for civilian politicians.[54] The legacy was an army that saw politics as destructive of the unity of the nation, and politicians as the selfish and weak-willed instruments of that

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[52] Mark Selden, "Revolution and Third World Development: People's War and the Transformation of Peasant Society," in Norman Miller and Roderick Aya, eds., *National Liberation* (New York: The Free Press, 1971), especially pp. 225–231. See also Vo Nguyen Giap, "People's War, People's Army," in *The Military Art of People's War*, pp. 101–116; this last piece is a condensed version of the original *People's War, People's Army* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961).

[53] Nugroho Notosusanto, *Some Effects of the Guerrilla on Armed Forces and Society in Indonesia 1948–1949* (Jakarta: Department of Defense and Security, Centre for Armed Forces History, 1974), p. 7; see also pp. 18–22, and T. B. Simatupang, *Report from Banaran* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1972).

[54] Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir—and half the cabinet—were, it is true, captured by the Dutch, although some army people seem to believe they could have escaped. A number of other civilian leaders fled to or remained in Dutch occupied cities rather than join the guerrillas in the jungle. On the capture of Sukarno et al., see Kahin, *Nationalism*, pp. 337–338. On the army's attitudes, see Simatupang, *Banaran*, pp. 19–27, and Nasution, *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, III. Other information on army views comes from discussions with several army officers during field research in Indonesia in 1971–1972.

destruction. Although the army saw itself as the creator and preserver of the state, however, it had no clear vision of the society of which the state was a formal expression.

The focus of this discussion has been on the organizational weakness of Indonesian revolutionary leaders, and the constraints it imposed on their actions. My conclusion is that the lack of organizational links between nationalist leaders—of whatever ideological or religious complexion—and the people in the villages was a crucial factor in the failure of that leadership to harness and direct popular energy toward the fulfillment of revolutionary goals.

This weakness was compounded by the lack of government control over the national army, which deprived political leaders of reliable political and military instruments. Recognition of these weaknesses was indeed one reason why all Republican governments in 1945–49 followed a policy of diplomacy more than armed struggle against the reimposition of Dutch colonial rule. Moreover, with limited ability to control or direct local forces of social protest, and fearing that this would deny them the credibility that a policy of negotiation required, Indonesian governments saw no alternative to suppressing anti-colonial mobilization. However, it was not so much the "logic of diplomacy" that led to this result as the inability of nationalist leaders to channel popular energy, a consequence of the weakness of their links with the people and the fragility of their relationship with the bureaucracy and the army. Without organization and discipline, spontaneity may impede the possibility of achieving revolutionary change, whatever its role in providing the impulse necessary to attaining it.

When We Were Young: The Exile of the Republic's Leaders in Bangka, 1949

Mary Somers Heidhues

> I think there are two sources of international politics at the moment—the U.N. and Bangka.
>
> —chief secretary to the President Abdul Gafar Pringgodigdo, commenting on negotiations among the Republic, the Netherlands and members of the UN Good Offices Committee in Mentok, Bangka in 1949.[1]

The wry humor of "A. G." Pringgodigdo's must have been sorely tried in the weeks before he made this remark. With other leaders of the Indonesian Republic, he had been captured and exiled to the island of Bangka during the second Dutch "Police Action" at the end of 1948. In a rapid and initially apparently successful action on December 19, Dutch troops overran Yogyakarta and captured President Sukarno and Vice-President Hatta, who was also Prime Minister, along with most of the cabinet. In Dutch eyes, the Republic had been wiped out, but guerilla resistance and effective diplomatic initiatives in the international arena brought the formal Transfer of Sovereignty to an independent Indonesia twelve months later. For nearly half of this time, the Republic's leadership was in captivity, most of them on Bangka, a small island between Jakarta and Singapore, known since the eighteenth century for its tin mines. In that century, Bangka had been a dependency of Palembang; from the early nineteenth century onwards, because of its economic importance, it was directly ruled from Batavia, and the mines were state enterprises.[2]

Of course, Pringgodigdo's words exaggerate Bangka's role. The town of Mentok, where the captives were held, was hardly the axis of world events, or even of Dutch-

[1] Quoted in Mohammad Hatta, *Memoir* (Jakarta: Penerbit Tintamas, 1979), p. 549: "Aku merasa ada dua sumber percaturan Internasional di dunia ini, yaitu United Nations dan Bangka."

[2] For an overview of Bangka's history, see Mary F. Somers Heidhues, *Bangka Tin and Mentok Pepper: Chinese Settlement on an Indonesian Island* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992). Information in this article, when not otherwise cited, is taken from that study.

Indonesian negotiations, in the late months of the Revolution. Yet the outcome of the leaders' capture and internment demonstrated the futility of Dutch attempts to isolate them—or the Republic. If the Indonesian Revolution was a blending of *perjuangan* (struggle) and *diplomasi* (diplomacy), the presence of these leaders brought *diplomasi* to Bangka. They succeeded in exploiting their situation to enhance the position of the Republic at the bargaining table. At the same time, they showed that "Federal" politics could not win popular support against concerted Republican efforts.

Capture of the Republican Leaders

George Kahin, who was an eyewitness, and others have described the Dutch attack on Yogyakarta and the effects of the Second Police Action.[3] On December 19, 1948, Dutch paratroopers took the airport of Maguwo in Yogyakarta and quickly overran the city. Republican troops, outnumbered and weakened by blockade and internal strife, offered little resistance, the main force quickly evacuating the town in accordance with their plan to continue guerilla war in the countryside. The leaders of the Republic were soon in Dutch hands; they had decided not to flee. That President Sukarno, Vice-President and Prime Minister Hatta, former Prime Minister Sjahrir and most members of the cabinet could be taken prisoner so easily seemed to promise the Dutch that resistance would soon collapse. But the Republic managed to name an emergency government in West Sumatra near Bukittinggi, one of the few territories left to its control, and issued a call to carry on. Meanwhile, military units in the countryside kept up guerilla resistance, *perjuangan*.

While Sukarno, Sjahrir, and Foreign Minister Haji Agus Salim were interned at first at Prapat on Lake Toba (Sumatra), other prisoners were taken to Bangka, the flight to the island lasting about an hour and a half. With Hatta and Pringgodigdo were Assaat (Chairman of the Working Committee of Parliament, *Badan Pekerdja Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat*) and Air Commodore Suryadarma. Later, on December 31, Mohamad Roem, head of the team negotiating with the Dutch, and Ali Sastroamidjojo, a Nationalist Party leader, joined them.[4]

Dutch strategists seem to have expected that the population of Bangka would remain indifferent to the presence of the Republicans and that the island would be far enough from Java to isolate the internees from international politics and from the press. In both cases, they misjudged the situation.

Bangka in 1946

Armed Indonesian opposition and British caution had held the Dutch back from an early return to Java and Sumatra at the end of World War II, but Dutch forces decided to re-establish control of Bangka in early 1946. Their assessment of Bangka's situation led them to expect reoccupation to be quick and easy.

For one thing, Bangka's ethnic composition gave them some grounds for this assumption. About one-third of the population were ethnic Chinese, either coolies in the state-owned tin mines or their local-born descendants, usually called *peranakan*, most of whom were small farmers who grew pepper and other cash crops, fisher-

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[3] George McT. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 337ff; these events are also recounted in the memoirs of participants cited here.

[4] Mohamad Roem, *Bunga rampai dari sejarah*, Jilid I (Jakarta: Penerbit Bulan Bintang, 1972), p. 104.

men, or holders of supervisory or clerical posts in the mines.[5] Unlike East Sumatra's plantations, where contract laborers recruited in Java had replaced most Chinese by 1930, in Bangka mine laborers were almost exclusively ethnic Chinese immigrants who remained quite isolated from the rest of the population. They had shown themselves to be highly political, rebelling against Dutch rule more than once. In 1945-46, however, the coolies welcomed an end to the sufferings of the Japanese Occupation and were even relieved to see the Dutch land.[6] More than half the ethnic Chinese were local-born *peranakans;* but they, too, had taken little interest in Indonesian nationalism in prewar times.

Before World War II relatively few of the indigenous people of Bangka worked in mining; those who did were mostly in auxiliary activities or in mechanized installations. Only in the late 1930's did the proportion of "native" workers increase noticeably, mainly with immigrants from Java. Most Bangkanese were still villagers, smallholder pepper and rubber farmers; among the townspeople were immigrants from Palembang, Lampung, West Sumatra and else-where, most of them traders and pious Muslims. Some Javanese worked for the mine administration, for example as doctors. Again, this contrasted with the situation in East Sumatra, where immigrants from Java and elsewhere outnumbered local people in the plantation districts.

Because the tin mines were so important to the colonial treasury, authorities had kept a careful watch on the island's inhabitants. The last native rebellion had been suppressed in the 1850s and the population brought under careful control. Unrest or nationalist activity was quickly put down.[7] In 1946, colonial officials hoped above all to put the tin mines back to work quickly, in order to take advantage of high postwar demand for the metal to earn needed foreign exchange.

Effects of the Japanese Occupation

Little is known about how the Japanese Occupation affected Bangka. A Japanese firm (Mitsubishi) took over the mines, but production fell to a trickle. Food imports, a necessity for an island which was not self-supporting, disappeared and smuggling became a means to survive. Coolies suffered especially and many ex-miners resorted to "squatting" to produce some food, mostly cassava as the terrain was not suitable for other food crops. Politically, the Japanese laid meagre foundations for independence and often depended on former colonial employees. The Syu (or *Shu*) Sangikai was a local "representative" council; its vice-chairman, Masjarif Datuk Bendaharo Lelo, had served as secretary of the residency in the 1930s.[8] The Japanese also formed

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[5] *Peranakan* in Java, in addition to being local-born, usually spoke Malay or another local language. In Bangka, most *peranakans* spoke a local version of Hakka Chinese.

[6] Husnial Husin Abdullah, *Sejarah perjuangan kemerdekaan RI di Bangka Belitung* (Jakarta: PT Karya Unipress, 1983), p. 62.

[7] In 1933–34, the Partai Indonesia, Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, and PNI had attracted thousands of members, but the arrest of major leaders quickly deflated the movement. Harry A. Poeze, ed., *Politiek-Politioneele Overzichten van Nederlandsch-Indië*, vol. I (Dordrecht: Foris, 1988), pp. 236, 279, 386.

[8] Abdullah, *Sejarah perjuangan kemerdekaan RI di Bangka Belitung*, p. 48; the Regeeringsalmanak, 1932 through 1935, lists Masjarif as "Commies," clerk: he appears to have been the highest "native" officer in the residency. In an interview with George Kahin in April 1949, M. Jusuf (Rasidi) denied that Masjarif had been a member of the Syu Sangikai (Kahin 1949), but from Abdullah's account, it appears that he was its principal Indonesian member. The residency, from 1933 to 1942, was called "Banka en Onderhorigheden" and included Belitung.

paramilitary units of young men, the Giyugun (in Sumatra, similar to the paramilitary *Peta* on Java) and the Heiho, an auxiliary force. As happened elsewhere in Indonesia in late 1945, these two groups, administrators like Masjarif and the *pemuda* (youth) forces, became rivals in the brief Republican interim, from August 1945 to February 1946.

With independence, the former Syu Sangikai became the local KNI, Komite Nasional Indonesia. Masjarif was its chairman and also Resident of Bangka and Belitung; with four others, he formed an executive which was in touch with the Republic in Jakarta and with the Governor of Sumatra. Meanwhile, young people from the Giyugun and Heiho took the initiative. Some fifty youths, several of whom had undergone training near Palembang during the Occupation, styled themselves the Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia, API (Indonesian Youth Generation). Others formed a Barisan Keamanan Rakjat, or People's Security Force. Both began to search for arms.

When the Republican government finally established the Tentara Keamanan Rakjat (People's Security Army) as a national army, a certain Major F. Manusama was sent from Palembang (on October 20, 1945) to reorganize Bangka's armed forces as a TKR.[9] Masjarif, probably more interested in keeping order than in staging a revolution, favored not a military unit but a civilian police corps. The TKR however overruled the civilian politicians, who had neither money nor arms, forcing them to recognize it as responsible for keeping the peace. In late October, TKR units under Manusama moved south to prepare to attack Belitung, already in Dutch hands, but the incident ended badly for the Indonesian forces.

A delegation from the Allies dropped in on the island in November 1945, meeting with Masjarif and his colleagues, which probably made that group suspect in the eyes of the armed *pemuda*. The Allies also reminded the remaining thousand or so Japanese troops of their responsibility for maintaining security; and the Japanese, until then lax about resisting the TKR, now began disarming the local units. When Japanese troops had to gather in Mentok in January 1946 to prepare for evacuation, however, Manusama took the opportunity to "kidnap" Resident Masjarif, who was left without protection in Pangkalpinang, in a final demonstration of where Republican power on Bangka really lay.[10]

The Dutch returned to Bangka on February 11, 1946, sending a detachment of troops across the island from Mentok to Pangkalpinang. Armed resistance was short-lived but more than expected. The troops were ambushed repeatedly on their way to Pangkalpinang, but Bangka's Republican forces had too few weapons and too little experience to resist effectively, and the terrain was unsuitable for guerilla warfare. Indonesian forces suffered the greater number of casualties in encounters with the

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[9] ARA Rapp. Indon. 533; Abdullah, *Sejarah perjuangan kemerdekaan RI di Bangka Belitung*, pp. 53–59, 71–3. The TKR changed its name during the Revolution to TRI, Tentara Rakyat Indonesia [Indonesian People's Army] and, finally, to TNI, Tentara Nasional Indonesia [Indonesian National Army]. Manusama was killed under mysterious circumstances in South Sumatra, where he had fled, in 1946 or 1947. ARA Rapp. Indon. 538; Abdullah, *Sejarah perjuangan kemerdekaan RI di Bangka Belitung*, p. 133. It is not clear why Manusama, who must have been Ambonese, was chosen to go to Bangka. Items cited in the notes as "ARA Rapp. Indon." are a series of political (PV), economic and police (Sitrap) reports in the Second Section of the Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, filed as *Rapportage Indonesië*; those dealing with Bangka from 1946 to 1949 are under numbers 533–550.

[10] Abdullah, *Sejarah perjuangan kemerdekaan RI di Bangka Belitung*, p. 75. It was not unusual for *pemuda* to kidnap administrative officials in late 1945 and early 1946—or worse.

Dutch. Finally, many retreated to South Sumatra, where they had a chance of continuing the struggle. The year 1946 also saw a number of incidents of violence against ethnic Chinese. Isolated skirmishes persisted in 1947, but on the whole the island remained secure.[11]

Much of the local population, however, was apathetic and uncooperative. Masjarif himself, freed from captivity in March 1946, was prepared to work with the Dutch. Time, and the discriminate use of food and textile supplies, won the cooperation, if not support, of wider elements of the population. The fact that as early as April 1946 family members could join the Europeans working for the mines and for the government shows that conditions were "secure".[12] By June 1946 the initial "shock" troops had left the island and only the armed police and two KNIL (Royal Netherlands Indies Army) detachments remained.

Opposition to the Dutch now moved cautiously, sometimes surfacing in the form of labor disputes in the mines, in which ethnic Chinese and Indonesians joined forces. Although Bangka was linked closely by geography, history and economics to Sumatra and Java, the Republic had no de facto authority on the island, which was soon incorporated into the Van Mook "Federal" system.[13] By October 1947 Dutch officials felt sure that most Bangkans saw Indonesian independence as something to be achieved, not through the Republic, but in cooperation with the Netherlands.

Still, peddlers offered Sukarno's photograph for sale and youth groups posted it publicly; people listened clandestinely to Republican radio and read the pro-Republican press. Although it was strictly forbidden, school children sang the line *Merdeka, merdeka* (free, independent) instead of *Mulia, mulia* (noble, great) in the anthem "Indonesia Raya"—and that on August 31, Queen Wilhelmina's birthday![14] There were ways of evading the prohibition on flying the Republican *merah-putih* (red-white) flag, too. In 1948, authorities discovered matchboxes with a label which could be removed to reveal a red and white flag. Even the red-and-white flower bouquets on sale in the market made the authorities uneasy.[15]

Economic Rehabilitation

Economic rehabilitation, although it had top priority, got off to a slow start. The mines were at a standstill; neglect, theft and abuse had ruined much of the equipment. Workers, mostly Chinese coolies who had welcomed liberation from

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[11] ARA Rapp. Indon. 533, 538; Abdullah, *Sejarah perjuangan kemerdekaan RI di Bangka Belitung*, pp. 85–95, 124, 138.

[12] ARA Rapp. Indon. 534. Their movements, however, were still restricted.

[13] Saleh Ahmad, then Demang (native head) of Mentok, was a delegate to the Malino Conference on Federal organization of the islands outside Java. He surprised his hearers by suggesting a union of Bangka with Sumatra, which under the terms of the 1946 Linggarjati agreement would have put Bangka under Republican and not Dutch authority. See ARA Rapp. Indon. 538 (PV 1–15.6.46, 1–15.8.46); Abdullah, *Sejarah perjuangan kemerdekaan RI di Bangka Belitung*, p. 143. Compare Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *'Renville' als keerpunt in de Nederlands-Indonesische onderhandelingen* (Alphen aan den Rijn: A. W. Sijthoff, 1980), p. 182. In 1946, the Linggarjati agreement between the Republic and the Dutch had recognized *de facto* Republican authority over Java and Sumatra. See below for more on Acting Governor-General Van Mook's Federal policy.

[14] ARA Rapp. Indon. 538 (PV, 15–30.9.46; ARA Rapp. Indon. 539 (PV 1–14.4.47 and 15–31.5.47;) and especially ARA Rapp. Indon. 539 (PV 1–14.9.47).

[15] ARA Rapp. Indon. 540.

Japanese rule, were in poor health and restless, many eager to leave for China. Smuggling, now endemic, threatened rehabilitation of export crops, especially pepper and rubber. Local people, especially Chinese traders, could obtain higher prices in Singapore for these commodities, which the official export monopolies attempted to purchase at controlled, below-market prices.

The Indonesian Revolution had given smuggling—Bangka was a strategic location for it—a political dimension as well. The small islands off southern Bangka were probably waystations for the weapons trade between Singapore and Republican-controlled Banten. To the Dutch this was "smuggling," to the Indonesians "barter"; not only did it furnish military goods, it kept the economy going in Republican controlled territories despite the Netherlands' blockade. Some ethnic Chinese from Bangka excelled in contraband trade during the Revolution; for the most part they were smuggling on a national scale, and only using Bangka as a waystation between Java or Sumatra and Singapore.[16]

Tin production did recover during the Revolution. Only five months after the Dutch returned, some twenty-one mines were operating, as against fifty-one in 1941. By October 1947, the number of workers reached 14,000, about the number employed in the 1980s. Frequent strikes and smaller scale labor disputes muddied the rosy picture of recovery.[17]

Federal Policy

Acting Governor-General Van Mook formulated his Federal Policy to create territories which would act as a counterweight to the Republic and its demand for immediate and complete independence from the Netherlands.[18] The Federal base was in the economically valuable areas outside Republican control. On Bangka, federal policy tended to preempt other political activity after late 1946. Many previously pro-Republican politicians on the island appeared inclined to cooperate with the Dutch, who held most of the cards, as they controlled government and mine employment. Masjarif, for example, chose to be a "realist," as a report characterized him. He became secretary of the Residency and played an growing role in Federal politics, in the end as Chairman of the Federalist Council of Bangka, the Dewan Bangka or Bangka Raad.[19]

According to a member of the Bangka Raad who spoke with George Kahin in April 1949, all members of the Republican administration of the island had been jailed by the Dutch, but those who wanted to cooperate were released to do so, as

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[16] Twang Peck Yang, *Indonesian Chinese Business Communities in Transformation, 1940–50* (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Australian National University, Canberra, 1987), p. 235, mentions Tony Wen and Lie Kwet Tjang. Wen [Boen Kim To], a popular soccer player in his youth, was later a member of Parliament for the Indonesian Nationalist Party [PNI]. He was arrested in Singapore and charged with drug trafficking during the Revolution, having participated in the Republic's exchanges of opium for weapons.

[17] ARA Rapp. Indon. 538, 546. There is as yet no detailed study of labor activity on Bangka and Belitung in these years, but the unions there included both ethnic Chinese and Indonesians, a rare case of non-ethnically divided organization. It would be important to place these labor organizations in the context of post-independence Indonesian politics.

[18] For a recent history of the Federal policy, see Yong Mun Cheong, *H. J. van Mook and Indonesian Independence: A Study of his Role in Dutch-Indonesian Relations, 1945–48* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982).

[19] ARA Rapp. Indon. 533, 539. See also Abdullah, *Sejarah perjuangan kemerdekaan RI di Bangka Belitung*, pp. 48–49.

was Masjarif. Some freed politicians quickly organized secret pro-Republican activities and a secret Komite Nasional, within days of their release from Dutch detention. Members of the Council were at first appointed but subsequently chosen by indirect elections in September 1947. The administration hoped elections would shift power away from the immigrant Indonesian population of the towns to the "Bangkanese," who were thought to be less pro-Republican.[20] The peaceful implementation of elections led the Dutch to believe that this was happening in late 1947, although some Council members still sympathized openly with the Republic.

Recollections of Captivity

Hatta in his memoirs recalls the flight from Yogya: on December 22, 1948, seven Republican prisoners were flown westward over Java, landing finally in Pangkalpinang, then capital of the residency of Bangka, where Hatta and three others (Pringgodigdo, Assaat, Suryadarma) were told to disembark. After a three hour trip by car, they reached the rest house belonging to the tin company, the state-owned Banka Tinwinning, on Mount Menumbing, several hundred meters above the town of Mentok. The four had a common "salon," a smaller room for sleeping, and access to a radio.

At first the exiles had no contact with the local people. A former KNIL corporal looked after their cooking and other daily needs; the *Demang* (native head) of Mentok, Kemas Zainal Abidin, visited occasionally. After five days, an employee of the mines appeared and began fencing off their quarters with wire, working on the chore until January 2. When the "cage" was nearly finished, two additional prisoners, Roem and Sastroamidjojo, joined the party, making conditions all the more crowded; now six slept in a single room. For some reason, the door had been removed.[21]

In welcoming Roem, Hatta could not resist making a jibe: Sjahrir, as head of the Republican negotiating team in Linggarjati, had won a promise of *merdeka*, independence, for Indonesia by January 1, 1949. That day had arrived, but Roem, the head of the current negotiating team, was now just the opposite of *merdeka*. At that ironic twist, "We all laughed out loud."[22]

The exiles refused to succumb to their situation. Pringgodigdo was deputized to listen to the radio news, so that the group would be informed of developments. Hatta, taking the lead, insisted that all maintain discipline in appearance and behavior. "He emphasized that even though we were in exile we had to continue to regard ourselves as officials of the Republic of Indonesia, and our bearing towards our guards should be in keeping with our position. He hoped that we would be neatly dressed whenever we left the bedroom . . . "[23]

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[20] ARA Rapp. Indon. 538 (PV 1–15.9.46); ARA Rapp. Indon. 539 (PV –15.6.47); George McT. Kahin, handwritten notes of a visit to Bangka, April 1949, based on interview with M. Jusuf.

[21] Alastair M. Taylor, *Indonesian Independence and the United Nations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 186; *Merdeka*, January 17, 1949.

[22] Roem , *Bunga rampai dari sejarah*, p. 104; and Hatta, *Memoir*, pp. 544–546.

[23] C. M. Penders, ed., *Milestones on my Journey: The Memoirs of Ali Sastroamijoyo* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1979), p. 173. Rose quotes this with approval. With Roem, she believes that Hatta's discipline in confining quarters helped prevent the kind of bickering which ended in an irreparable break between Sukarno and Sjahrir during their internment in Prapat. Mavis Rose, *Indonesia Free: A Political Biography of Mohammad Hatta* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Monograph Series, 1987), p. 155.

International Reaction

The first official visitors to Menumbing were representatives of the Netherlands' government, on January 10. They told the internees that they no longer recognized the Republic's de facto authority anywhere, but they invited Hatta to meet the Dutch Prime Minister, Drees, in Jakarta. Hatta refused to budge; he would not go to Jakarta, nor would he abstain from political activity in exchange for freedom of movement within Bangka.[24]

Meanwhile, at the United Nations on January 7, 1949, the Netherlands' delegate Van Royen told the Security Council that Republican leaders had already been released from "enforced residence," proof of the "generous and liberal attitude" of the Netherlands' government, although they were still restricted to the island of Bangka itself. Misinformed, he was soon to regret his words. The UN reaction to the Dutch attack on the Republic, which had set in swiftly, was exacerbated by this incorrect information about the treatment of the internees.

That the Republican prisoners did not have freedom of movement was confirmed by the first visit from the UN Good Offices Committee a few days later. Critchley, the Australian member of the Committee, found that the men had been placed in cramped, spartan quarters encircled with wire. Although some of the fencing had been removed on January 12, the prisoners remained confined to a small area with guards nearby. The GOC demanded that the detainees be allowed freedom of movement. It would not be possible for the Netherlands' colonial government to treat these men as political prisoners: they were officials of a government recognized—de facto—by the United Nations. Members of the Committee remarked that Hatta behaved just as he had while in power in Yogya.[25]

Van Royen's report that the internees were being well treated and had freedom of movement throughout the island, "an area of over 4,500 square miles," tickled Pringgodigdo's sense of humor again. The diplomat had made a slip of the tongue, he suggested, and, looking at the floor of their quarters, he quipped, "He must have meant 4,500 square *tiles*."[26] After the report of the Good Offices Committee reached Lake Success, Van Royen apologized to the UN for the misinformation; he promised amends. He had even erred in saying that Sukarno was on Bangka; the President was still in Prapat.[27]

UN protests had their effects. The Hague expressed its regrets and promised to discipline those who had treated the Indonesian leaders as common prisoners. The captives soon had freedom of movement and were allowed to receive visitors, and each received a small stipend for daily needs, while the group had use of a car and driver.[28] Taylor, in his study of the UN role in Indonesian independence, notes that

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[24] Hatta, *Memoir*, pp. 546–548. Brouwer, the official who approached Hatta, had been Resident of Bangka from 1939 to 1942.

[25] Taylor, *Indonesian Independence*, pp. 185–187; compare Hatta, *Memoir*, p. 546. The GOC also went to Prapat to see the other prisoners. See also *Merdeka*, January 17, 1949.

[26] Roem, *Bunga rampai dari sejarah*, p. 104. Sastroamidjojo mentions the pun, but not who said it,. Ali Sastroamidjojo, *Milestones on my Journey: The Memoirs of Ali Sastroamidjojo* (St. Lucia, Q: University of Queensland Press, 1979), pp. 174–175.

[27] Taylor, *Indonesian Independence*, p. 187, note. As will be seen, Sukarno only arrived the following month.

[28] *Merdeka*, January 18, 1949. Demang Abidin paid out their pocket money. Hatta mentions that the chauffeur was a *peranakan* Chinese who was "delighted to be our driver." Hatta, *Memoir*, p. 546.

the tables were now turned, thanks to UN pressure: "On January 28, 1949, although a prisoner on Bangka, Hatta was in a far stronger bargaining position than he had been as Prime Minister in Central Java on December 13."[29]

As negotiations with the Dutch were to continue during their captivity, the Republican internees for their part insisted that they be brought together at one place so that they could exchange views and consult with Republican officials in Jakarta. They considered both possibilities, Hatta to Prapat or Sukarno to Bangka, but the choice fell to Bangka. Bangka made it impossible to isolate the Republicans, as they might have been in Sumatra.[30] On February 5, 1949 Sukarno and Haji Agus Salim arrived in Bangka (Sjahrir was released to Jakarta on January 19 because he was not then an official of the Republic). The resulting stream of visitors made the island seem, briefly, like a center of world affairs. Sukarno, Haji Agus Salim, Roem, and Sastroamidjojo now moved into another tin company guest house in Mentok, while Hatta and the others remained on Mt. Menumbing.[31] The two groups met frequently.

Years later, Roem reminisced about the discussions, not just about politics, among the Republican leaders on Bangka. They were about everything, all aspects of life, and if the conversation turned to women and sex, Sukarno would become noticeably more enthusiastic, while Hatta would be rather cool.[32]

Opportunity: The Federalists

Bangka was also a meeting place for Republican leaders in exile with members of the Federal states and with journalists anxious to tell Indonesia's story. A delegation of Federalists arrived on February 5, the day of Sukarno's arrival, in a plane belonging to the Good Offices Committee. Also on board were four Republican leaders who had been in Jakarta in December 1948 but had not been imprisoned.

Leading the Federalist delegation was Anak Agung Gde Agung, Prime Minister of the State of East Indonesia (*Negara Indonesia Timur*, NIT). His entire cabinet had resigned from office on December 19, 1948 in protest against the Dutch attack on the Republic. He had formed a new cabinet with the express purpose of reaching

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[29] Taylor, *Indonesian Independence*, p. 195. January 28 is the date of a UN resolution on the situation in Indonesia.

[30] Prapat is on a narrow peninsula jutting into Lake Toba and it is much farther from Jakarta than Bangka is. When asked where the leaders should be assembled, H. A. Salim told the Dutch official Brouwer that they wanted to be together and he preferred Prapat (he was in bad health at the time); however, it didn't matter. Brouwer, in a report dated January 12, 1949, favored Prapat, as there were more suitable quarters and it would be possible to allow the prisoners freedom of movement on the peninsula only (it was a military area), but for some reason, Bangka won out. See ARA Rapp. Indon. 536.

[31] Hatta, *Memoir*, p. 548–549 (compare C. M. Penders, ed., *Mohammad Hatta, Indonesian Patriot: Memoirs* (Singapore: Gunung Agung, 1981), an English translation of Hatta, *Memoir*, at pp. 295–308.) See also ARA Rapp. Indon. 536, and Sastroamidjojo, *Milestones on my Journey*, pp. 172–176, 181–197. According to Ali Sastroamidjojo, Sukarno did not want to stay on Mt. Menumbing, because it was too chilly, so he occupied quarters in Mentok with the other three. The two groups, Mentok and Menumbing, met frequently. In April, according to George Kahin, Sukarno received him on Menumbing.

[32] M. Roem, *Peladjaran dari Sedjarah* (Surabaja: Documenta Surabaja, 1970), p. 24. "Diskusi2 mengenai segala persoalan hidup, termasuk djuga tentang wanita dan sex. Kalau pembitjaraan sudah sampai kepada wanita dan sex, maka kelihatannja Sukarno mendjadi lebih bersemangat, sedang Hatta mendjadi agak dingin." Roem adds that Haji Agus Salim was an expert on all subjects.

agreement with the Republic on negotiations toward independence, the participation of the Republic in such negotiations with the Dutch being a *sine qua non*.[33]

This was not the first contact between the Federalists and the Republic. In early 1948, when Amir Sjarifuddin was still Prime Minister, the Republic had exchanged notes with the NIT. In December 1947 NIT had adopted a policy of *perpaduan* (synthesis) with the Republic.[34] Masjarif of the Bangka Raad had himself been a member of a commission established to discuss with the Republic the effects of the Renville agreement in that same month, but even then his attitude toward the Republic had vacillated. In early December 1947, he took a public stand against the Republic.[35]

During 1948, the Federalists had also sent a mission to Yogya to meet with Prime Minister Hatta. At the time of the attack on Yogyakarta in December 1948, a delegation of Republicans led by Sartono was flying from Jakarta to Makassar, the capital of NIT, for consultations. Their plane was in the air for forty-five minutes before it was forced to return to the airfield because of what was probably diplomatic "engine trouble," since the Dutch attack on Yogyakarta took place a few hours later.[36] The contacts now resumed on Bangka.

The meetings between Republicans and Federalists would help them formulate a common policy on the transition to an independent but federally organized Indonesia with the Republic as a constituent state. A Federal group returned to Bangka (Pangkalpinang) for more talks in early March and again in April.[37] In the meantime, Dutch representatives reopened contacts with Sukarno in late February, inviting the Republic to participate in a Round Table Conference on independence.[38] They also stopped referring to Republican leaders as "prominent persons" and began again to speak of Sukarno as President of the Republic. The return of the leaders to Yogya was now a possibility. The Republic insisted that its government be reestablished there before a cease-fire and the opening of negotiations on the transfer of sovereignty; the Federalists supported their position.

Clearly, Republicans and Federalists were able to exchange views in a more relaxed atmosphere and at a higher level (Sukarno and Hatta participated personally in the discussions) than would have been the case in Yogya. Rose, in her biography of Hatta, notes that "Anak Agung was impressed by Hatta; a strong and lasting

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[33] Agung, *'Renville' als keerpunt*, pp. 213, 240–241; Agung, *Dari Negara Indonesia Timur ke Republik Indonesia Serikat* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1985), pp. 356, 360, 451.

[34] Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy, 1945–1965* (The Hague: Mouton, 1973), p. 42; Agung, *Dari Negara Indonesia Timur ke Republik Indonesia Serikat*, pp. 360–362. The NIT had been formed before the Linggarjati agreement was signed in 1946, giving it a stronger position than the Federal states set up later in Java and Sumatra, in areas which had been recognized as de facto Republican territory by that agreement.

[35] Agung, *'Renville' als keerpunt*, p. 62; ARA Rapp. Indon. 539. The report for the second half of December 1947, on the other hand, says Masjarif's prestige was weakened by his activities in Batavia, perhaps his behavior was too pro-Republican (from the colonial administration's point of view) at the meeting with Republican representatives.

[36] Agung, *Dari Negara Indonesia Timur ke Republik Indonesia Serikat*, p. 373–375.

[37] Indonesia was a federation from the Transfer of Sovereignty in December 1949 until August 17, 1950, when the last Federal states were dissolved and a unitary Republic was proclaimed. On the March–April talks, see Agung 1980, pp. 252–253; see photographs on pp. 258, 263, 267, 273. Compare Hatta's account, 1979, p. 549–550.

[38] Agung, *'Renville' als keerpunt*, pp. 260–61.

friendship developed between the two men."[39] Further Federal-Republican contacts on Bangka in April paved the way for the Inter-Indonesian Conference, held in Yogya, July 19–22, after the return of the Republican government there, and in Jakarta in a second session from July 31 to August 2, 1949.[40] This conference was a final step in forming an "all-Indonesian" policy for the Round Table Conference negotiations that led to the Transfer of Sovereignty on December 27, 1949.

International Opportunity

Foreign newsmen also made their way to the island; the short flight from Jakarta made a visit relatively easy. Many prominent Indonesian politicians also wanted to consult with the Bangkan internees. From the time in February when talks with van Royen began (culminating in the Roem-van Royen agreement and the return to Yogya) Roem made the round trip several times, and in April Hatta himself flew to Jakarta for consultations.[41]

Harold Isaacs, then a journalist for *Newsweek*, interviewed Sukarno, Haji Agus Salim, and Mohamad Roem shortly after Sukarno arrived in Mentok in early February. Hatta told Isaacs that his anger about being deceived and attacked by the Dutch had abated when he learned how the world supported the Republic's position. He also took the opportunity to remind the Dutch that the Republic was now getting support from the Federalists as well.[42]

George Kahin, identifying himself as a journalist, arrived from Java for a few days in April. Sukarno and Hatta, freed from the pressures of day-to-day politics, had more time for interviews "with an American graduate student," as he later said. Fifteen American journalists arrived in Bangka on June 21. Sukarno, Haji Agus Salim and Hatta expertly fielded their questions, most of which—given the situation in China at that time—were about the "Communist threat" to Indonesia and how the Republic would react. In fact, Sukarno quite charmed representatives of the US press, undoing the efforts of the Dutch Information Service, which had sponsored their trip and was eager to present him as a dangerous radical.[43]

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[39] Rose, *Indonesia Free*, p. 157.

[40] Agung, *'Renville' als keerpunt*, pp. 300–302; Hatta, *Memoir*, p. 556, 550.

[41] ARA Rapp. Indon. 540: *Merdeka*, various issues. The Roem-van Royen agreement was concluded in Jakarta on May 7, 1949. The plane at the disposal of the Good Offices Committee, now called the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, was available for most of this travel. GOC members also continued to go back and forth.

[42] Sitrap 7, ARA Rapp. Indon. 536.

[43] *Album Perjuangan Kemerdekaan 1945–1950. Dari negara kesatuan ke negara kesatuan* (Jakarta: Badan Pimpinan Harian Pusat Korps Cacad Veteran R.I. dan Badan Penerbit ALDA, n.d.), p. 272. A recent (1985) Dutch documentary on the Dutch-Indonesian conflict refers to this visit. The Dutch had invited a group of "important" American journalists to visit Indonesia, hoping to discredit the Republic. After listening to the Dutch side of the conflict, the newsmen flew to Bangka, where they met Sukarno. (At first he refused to receive them, because they were there at the invitation of the Dutch information service). Jan Bosdriesz and Gerard Soeteman, *Ons Indië voor de Indonesiërs: De oorlog, de chaos, de vrijheid* (s'Gravenhage: Moesson en Franeker, T. Wever, 1985), p. 121–123. A photo of Sukarno greeting the newsmen is on p. 122. Some of the foreign news stories are quoted in *Merdeka*, June 23, 27, 1949; they do not seem to be overly pro-Indonesian, but Dutch authorities clearly felt they had lost their case.

Local Contacts

Perhaps even more dramatic was the effect of the internment on the people of Bangka. The arrival of the Republican leaders aroused enthusiasm and sympathy from all quarters, including members of the Bangka Raad, and probably explains the dramatic weakening of the council's Federalist sympathies in early 1949.

> With the arrival of the Republicans (Sukarno, Hatta, et al.) on the island, the opposition group in the council became stronger—more left (pro-Republic) and anti-Dutch.
>
> –from an interview with a Dutch official, Bangka, 1949.[44]

Official reports from 1949 agree that as soon as the first internees were able to leave Mt. Menumbing, they attracted popular sympathy. When Hatta, accompanied by Masjarif, visited the market in Pangkalpinang, cries of *"merdeka"* were heard. People clamored to meet him. Greeting committees were formed and money collected for the prisoners' use.[45] Hatta recalled that they soon began to receive delegations of local people. He soon noticed how responsive they were to Republican ideas, while the Federal concept seemed to have no influence. When they traveled from Mentok to Pangkalpinang in February, for example, "many people had gathered beside the road shouting *"merdeka,"* as if Bangka were part of the Republic of Indonesia and not occupied by the Dutch."[46]

Sukarno's arrival on the island was a personal triumph. Once the news was broadcast, on February 5, that he was on his way, crowds gathered along the airport road in Pangkalpinang, some arriving in busses. Disappointed when the plane that landed turned out to be the GOC plane from Jakarta carrying the Republican and Federalist delegations, some two thousand persons then swarmed to the harbor to await an amphibious craft.[47] A car (Masjarif's official vehicle) sent to pick up the President barely made its way through to the harbor, but Sukarno chose to go on foot. Crying *"merdeka,"* members of the crowd lifted Sukarno to their shoulders. Then, seeing that it was no use getting into the car, Sukarno stood on the running board and, finally, sat on the hood, which made the onlookers even more enthusiastic. They pushed the stalled vehicle, Sukarno and all, through the streets.[48] Someone called *"sekali merdeka"* (once free) and the crowd replied *"tetap merdeka"* (forever free), whereupon Sukarno added *"mudah-mudahan"* (let's hope so), and Haji Agus Salim murmured *"Alhamdulillah"* (praise God). More crowd scenes followed before the group finally reached Mentok, where so many visitors wanted to meet the newly arrived leaders that they had to be let in to the guest house three at a time.[49]

A few days later, on February 9, the rumor circulated that Sukarno would return to Pangkalpinang. A band was organized to receive him, but, fortunately for the

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[44] Quoted here from Kahin, 1949. Parentheses in original.

[45] Police report of January 22, 1949 in ARA Rapp. Indon. 536.

[46] Quoted in translation from Penders, *Mohammad Hatta, Indonesian Patriot*, p. 302.

[47] Estimates of crowd sizes are taken from police reports. From the descriptions in these reports, however, the crowds must have been even larger.

[48] A photograph of Sukarno sitting on the hood of the car is in Abdullah, *Sejarah perjuangan kemerdekaan RI di Bangka Belitung*, p. 169. See also "Sambutan Rakjat Bangka sangat mengharukan," *Merdeka*, February 9, 1949, followed by a photograph, February 10.

[49] Sitrap 5, ARA Rapp. Indon. (dated February 8 1949), and Sitrap 7, ARA Rapp. Indon. 536.

police who feared they could not cope with the masses, Sukarno did not appear. In fact he was not allowed to go. When he did return there on February 12, the crowds were smaller, partly because of their disappointment earlier and partly because the police were very careful, keeping many people indoors.[50]

Official reports betray mounting anxiety that popular enthusiasm for the Republic could break out of control at any minute. Sukarno asked a schoolgirl who he was: "*Bapak* [father] is the father of the Republic of Indonesia." He spoke openly of "*musuh kita*," our enemy. He visited a soccer match, an orphanage, a harvest feast where three thousand persons had gathered; often he stopped at the local mosque. Invited to an Islamic school in Pangkalpinang and accompanied by Haji Agus Salim, Assaat and Masjarif, he appeared in English class. Sukarno wrote in English, "The Indonesian people desire freedom" on the blackboard and asked the children to write essays on that topic. He addressed crowds from one end of the island to another, in Sungailiat, Sungaiselan, Toboali, Koba. In Blinyu he met with labor leaders. The authorities wondered if the Republicans were behind a rash of strikes in the mines in April 1949. If the crowds were small by Javanese standards, they were large by Bangka's (the population at the time was less than 300,000). "*Merdeka*," Sukarno assured all who could hear, would come before the sun rose on the year 1950.[51]

On April 2, 1949, Abang M. Jusuf Rasidi, a member of the Bangka Raad who sympathized with the Republic, asked Haji Agus Salim to officiate at his wedding. To the delight of the company, Sukarno, Roem, and Sastroamidjojo attended as well, making it a high point among the public occasions the leaders attended.[52] On June 6, Sukarno celebrated his birthday, surrounded by local children; he said they reminded him of his own son.[53] The detainees also received a stream of local visitors in their quarters, including visitors from Bangkan political organizations, Islamic groups, schools, and a women's organization. Guests came from nearby Belitung as well. Roem recalls that they had so many invitations to dinner, Hatta finally put a limit on them.

Local visitors included representatives of the Chinese community and the Consul of the Republic of China; the Chinese Consul-General also dropped in from Jakarta. Many ethnic Chinese responded warmly to the presence of the Republican leaders, which impressed Jakarta reporters. Their attitude to Federal politics had been lukewarm, at best, and most Chinese were probably more concerned about the civil war in China than about Indonesian independence. But dropping their reserve, they too turned out to see Sukarno. When he and others attended a meeting at the headquarters of the Bangka Raad in late April, they found Bangka's Chinese closer to

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[50] Sitrap 6, ARA Rapp. Indon. 536 and Sitrap 8, ARA Rapp. Indon. 536: *Merdeka*, February 14, 1949. According to the Indonesian sources, the Resident of Bangka (Lion Cachet) had forbidden Sukarno to go to Pangkalpinang because of the danger of demonstrations. Lion Cachet said he feared demonstrations—and possible violence—which might have a bad effect on Dutch-Indonesian negotiations. Abdullah gives the date as February 9.

[51] ARA Rapp. Indon. 536, various reports; compare Abdullah, *Sejarah perjuangan kemerdekaan RI di Bangka Belitung*, pp. 166–177. Although *merdeka* had been promised before earlier "sunrises," this time Sukarno's prophecy was fulfilled.

[52] Abdullah, *Sejarah perjuangan kemerdekaan RI di Bangka Belitung*, pp. 173–174. Photograph of the wedding party, p. 160; see also Sitrap 14, ARA Rapp. Indon. 536. *Abang* is used as a title for descendants of the noble family which founded Mentok: women were called *Yang*.

[53] *Merdeka*, photograph, June 13, 1949.

and more understanding of the Republic's cause than Chinese elsewhere.[54] The Chinese appeared to have overcome their distrust of the Republic, especially because developments (toward independence) were moving so quickly. When the Republican leaders arrived on Bangka, Chinese on the island were collecting funds to aid victims of violence—mostly involving Republican units (its scorched earth policy had taken a large toll of Chinese lives and property in Java and Sumatra)—during the Second Police Action. The Chinese Consul General, during his visit, appealed to Sukarno to speak out against this violence, but in vain. Now, local ethnic Chinese organizations sought out the Republican leaders; some donated money. When the ex-prisoners left Pangkalpinang for Yogya on July 5, they received a contribution of 90,000 guilders. An estimated three thousand persons attended the farewell party.[55]

Their Bangkan exile had shown—if proof was necessary—how effective Republican leaders were in "selling" *Indonesia merdeka* to the common people. When Sukarno, Hatta, and the others finally departed Bangka for Yogyakarta on July 6, 1949, they left behind a population more Republican than ever.[56] Masjarif, for example, who had changed sides more than once, displayed more and more sympathy for the Republic after the leaders came, appearing publicly with them and meeting with them in his home in the evenings.[57] Those already pro-Republican expressed their sympathies more openly. Before leaving Bangka, Sukarno, addressing farewell crowds, found a final slogan for the people of the island, *"Pangkal Pinang mulai pangkal kemenangan"*—Pangkalpinang was the beginning of victory.[58]

The rapid absorption of Bangka into the unitary Republic of Indonesia after the Transfer of Sovereignty was probably an after-effect of the Republican leaders' stay on the island. The Dewan Bangka lasted only until April 1950, when the island became a *Kabupaten* (administrative district) in the Republic. When Masjarif died in May 1949, the Dewan Bangka had already grown noticably cooler toward Federalist politics.[59]

Memories

Recollections of the time in Bangka are not all so light hearted. Ali Sastroamidjojo received the news of the death of a son while there.[60] Roem recalls the difficulty of being separated for months from his family; but he immediately adds that the leaders' determination to continue the struggle was made easier by the support of

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[54] "Mendekati dan mengerti." See *Merdeka*, April 26, 1949.

[55] ARA Rapp. Indon. 540. A plan was mentioned in May to collect fl 200,000 for the leaders. Apparently this goal was not achieved. On the Chinese, see also *Merdeka*, April 2 and 26, 1949.

[56] Abdullah, *Sejarah perjuangan kemerdekaan RI di Bangka Belitung*, especially pp. 157–183. ARA Rapp. Indon. 540 (PV 15.–30). November 1949. Compare police reports in ARA Rapp. Indon. 536.

[57] Notes Kahin, 1949; Hatta, *Memoir*, p. 549; ARA Rapp. Indon. 536.

[58] Abdullah, *Sejarah perjuangan kemerdekaan RI di Bangka Belitung*. *Pangkal* means beginning, starting point; on Bangka, it refers to the place where one leaves a boat to travel overland, a harbor or landing place.

[59] Ibid., pp. 152–153. Masjarif's death is reported in *Merdeka*, May 30, 1949. He was 49 years old and an Officier in the Orde van Oranje Nassau. At this time, Bangka and Belitung refused to support a meeting of all Sumatran Federalists which was clearly meant to weaken the Republic's position. *Merdeka*, May 24, 1949.

[60] Sastroamidjojo, *Milestones on my Journey*, p. 185.

the people of Bangka. Hatta, perhaps typically, seems especially reluctant to describe his personal trials and discomforts.

Perhaps the light notes and the happy outcome mean that the memories of Bangka are happy ones, too. Getting away from the strains of Yogyakarta under Dutch blockade must have seemed, at times, a relief. Bangka also played the role of neutral ground on which Republicans and Federalists could meet. Once negotiations with the Dutch were underway, Bangka offered a base easily reached from Jakarta (about one hour by plane) yet far enough for the Republican negotiators to withdraw and consult in peace.

Roem, in an anecdote, applies an afterglow to the Bangkan interlude. He recalls the lyrics of a song Sukarno loved to sing in the bath, so often, and with such gusto, that Roem learned it by heart. He attributes the song to Johann Strauss:

> One day when we were young
> One beautiful morning in May
> You told me you loved me
> When we were young one day.[61]

The Bangka exile was a small but significant incident in the history of the revolution. For Republican leaders, after the bitter experience of the capture of Yogya, in Bangka their achievement of independence came within grasp. And, often forgotten, the event brought the people of Bangka irreversibly into the Republic.

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[61] His contribution, "Dwi Tunggal di Bangka," in Abdullah, *Sejarah perjuangan kemerdekaan RI di Bangka Belitung*, pp. 184–186. Roem quotes the text in English, but wouldn't Sukarno have sung a song by Strauss in German or Dutch?

NATIONALISM, REVOLUTION, AND ORGANIZATION IN INDONESIAN COMMUNISM

Ruth McVey

In the fifteen years that followed the Indonesian revolution, the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) grew from a motley sect of a few thousand to be the largest non-ruling Communist party in the world. It claimed three million members and twenty-two million in its mass organizations. Its displays of disciplined support were so impressive that many were persuaded that the sheer weight of its presence might bring it to power. And if, in that heyday before the 1965 coup, you had asked the secret of the party's success, you would very likely have received a similar answer from both Communists and their opponents: the PKI knew how to organize.

Why organization? What was it in the post-revolutionary years that made a bureaucratic principle seem the source of social dynamism and political success? And what did the PKI's organizing really consist of? After all, the party collapsed utterly in the face of military repression following the 1965 coup, and attempts to revive it underground were a signal failure—small testimony to its organizational skills.

ORGANIZATION AS THE KEY TO MODERNITY

At the most basic level organization is order, and we are never totally without it. Usually, however, order is subsumed by custom and the principles of religion; it appears as right and natural conduct, inevitable structure, not as something voluntaristic and set apart from morality. Only since the advent of capitalism, secularism, and mass society has social organization emerged as something in and of itself, a pattern of relationships chosen for its efficacy in achieving material ends. Fundamental to this new construction are two metaphors: man as the center and shaper of his world, and the machine as the expression of perfect functioning. For over two centuries modernizing optimism has assumed that man will not lose but gain control by arranging his relationships to approximate the workings of a machine. This proper—"rational"—organization has been seen as the key to scientific advance, economic prosperity, and military might. Politically, it was believed to be the way in which the weak but numerous could become strong. "Don't mourn me, organize!"

was the labor martyr's slogan and the hope on which socialists based their challenge to bourgeois rule.

Indonesians, faced from the nineteenth century onward with the bitter consequences of European hegemony, were confronted with the question of organization in two ways: first as a need for civilizational reordering, and second as the world's new secret of success. Old structures of belief and sources of authority collapsed or decayed under the impact of colonial dominion and development; new claimants to leadership rose with the extension of European-style education and employment. Gradually, first among the coopted Javanese bureaucratic aristocracy and then among broader and lower ranks of the population, there spread a sense of civilizational crisis. From it grew a consensus that Indonesian society must be restructured on principles introduced from the West: it would be "modern," and this became a primary socio-political goal.

What Javanese (and Indonesians elsewhere whose societies were shaken by colonial change) sought from the mass movements to which they flocked early in the century was the ability to achieve justice—that is, to be able to deal effectively with the Dutch—through mastery of modern modes of action. The first of these movements, Sarekat Islam, seemed to promise such a reward, with its bush-lawyers and political spokesmen. It lost popular favor when, unable to win concessions from the government, it abandoned political confrontation for a more clearly religious course. After the mid-1920s mass political participation was suppressed, but the erosion of old ideas continued, becoming an avalanche of shattered assumptions under the pressure of the Japanese occupation and the war of independence. By the 1950s Javanese society could be described as culturally hollowed out, preserving forms that had long been emptied of meaning. Into this "post-traditional" vacuum political parties rushed, resulting in an extraordinary politicization of cultural, class, local and personal rivalries.[1]

In these circumstances, people were ready for a radical reinterpretation of their world. Neither Islam nor nationalism offered really satisfactory solutions. Political Islam was divided between modernists and traditionalists, Javanese and Outer Islanders. Its leaders were for the most part secular personalities, politicians who acted as Islam's advocates in the capital but who themselves had no particular religious standing or message. The religious parties generally relied on reinforcing the boundaries between existing communities of belief, assisting the division of Indonesian society into the political-cultural compartmentalization of *aliran* (literally, currents) that characterized the nation in the 1950s and 1960s.[2] In particular, Islam offered no acceptable solution for the very large *abangan* population of Central and East Java, where Islam was heavily admixed with earlier beliefs.

Nor did nationalism seem to possess a sufficient answer. Once independence was won, no real agreement existed on what course the country should take, and patriotic fervor soon gave way to getting the best position one could in the post-revolutionary pecking order. The principal nationalist party, the PNI (Partai

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[1] See Clifford Geertz, "The Javanese Village," in G. William Skinner, ed., *Local, Ethnic, and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia* (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1959), pp. 34–41; Clifford Geertz, *The Social History of an Indonesian Town* (Cambridge Ma: The MIT Press, 1965).

[2] For the concept of *aliran*, see Geertz, *Social History*, pp. 124–152; W. F. Wertheim, *Societal Patterns in the Sukarno Era* (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, ZZOA, Working Paper no. 37, 1984).

Nasional Indonesia) emerged as the political expression of the bureaucratic elite, and as a result usually reflected social conservatism in spite of its leaders' continuing anti-imperialist rhetoric. That this was not enough to keep popular affection became evident when the PKI, having emerged as the fourth largest political force (after the PNI and modernist and traditionalist Islamic parties) in the general elections of 1955, proceeeded to take much of the PNI's *abangan* following in regional polls two years later.

One reason for the PKI's advance among the *abangan* peasantry was that it stood more clearly for the common man at a time of still considerable popular expectation of change. But a plethora of parties, some of them with distinguished radical leaders, also made bids for this constituency in the 1950s. At the beginning of that decade the PKI was smaller than many of these parties; and its strength lay mainly in the plantation areas of West Java and Sumatra rather than the *abangan* heartland. Nor did it pay particular attention to rural concerns in those years, labor unions remaining its main organizational focus until the 1960s. Yet peasants turned to the PKI because, more than other movements, it appeared to hold the key that would open the gate to the just and prosperous society—the modern Indonesia promised by the revolution.

Marxism-Leninism played no small role as evidence of the PKI's particular grasp of modernity. For one thing, the ideology then seemed incontrovertibly modern—newer, and thereby arguably more efficacious than bourgeois ideologies. It constituted a way of mastering the conquerors' art without aping them. Moreover, Lenin's theory of imperialism provided an emotionally satisfying as well as programmatically practical line of response to colonial rule. As a result, a good deal of Marxist-Leninist terminology and assumptions had entered into Indonesian nationalist vocabulary, allowing PKI leaders to argue that they were merely carrying to their logical conclusion ideas on which all good patriots agreed. This did not eliminate the problem of the doctrine's alien origins—Indonesianizing Marxism-Leninism was a major party project of the period—but it did mean that its language was recognizable to a substantial part of the politically engaged population.

Marxism was also "scientific" and so (given modern assumptions) superior to theories that could not make that claim. In addition, the Indonesian word for science, *ilmu*, is also the word for mystical knowledge, and had the resonance of recondite truth. The difficulty of Marxist philosophy, the need for study and for submission to a leadership adept in the thought, was something that could be accepted by people of strong mystical traditions. Hence, what seem on the surface to be among the most forbidding aspects of Marxism-Leninism actually made it more recognizable and powerful.[3]

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[3] Indonesian distinguishes between *ilmu* and *pengetahuan* as words for knowledge The latter is simply knowledge resulting from the accumulation of information, while the former implies deeper understanding and therefore control. Javanese *ngelmu*, Indonesian *ilmu* derives from the Arabic *'ilm*, meaning gnosis. It implies a penetration through layers of understanding to the Truth. Piet Zoetmulder S. J., "Die Hochreligionen Indonesiens," in Waldemar Stöhr and Piet Zoetmulder, *Die Religionen Indonesiens* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1965); Paul Stange, "The Logic of Rasa in Java," *Indonesia* 38 (October 1984): 114. *Ilmu* is thus science in the sense of mastery of recondite knowledge, of being able to penetrate beneath appearances; applying *ilmu* one can accomplish extraordinary things. For example, see Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960), pp. 88–89. The importance of the West's *ilmu* as the key to modernity and the right to rule was already evident at the turn of the century; see Barbara Andaya, "From Rūm to Tokyo: the Search for Anticolonial Allies by the Rulers of Riau, 1899–1914," *Indonesia* 24 (October 1977): 141, 156.

Moreover, Communism was an international movement which raised the question of foreign allegiances but also implied that it was capable of dealing with the wider world in which twentieth-century Indonesia must survive. The Dutch, the Japanese, and later the Americans all showed themselves particularly concerned with the danger Communism posed to their hegemony, concerns which suggested the movement possessed power. When D. N. Aidit and his colleagues took charge of the party in 1951, Stalin was not yet dead and (except for Tito's Yugoslavia, obscure enough to be ignored) no crack disturbed the facade of Communist unity. Communist institutions were portrayed even (indeed especially) by their enemies as possessing an "organizational weapon" which rendered them monolithic, disciplined, and oriented unswervingly toward the accumulation of power. In that way, what appeared to be a mere sect might well be capable of controlling the destiny of a nation.

Cadre Formation: The Centrality of Marginality

Such considerations were generally well beyond the horizon of most PKI supporters, but they were crucial in convincing the people who became the movement's cadre. In turn this army of party workers was critical to the Communist effort to translate a general promise of modernity/justice/prosperity into a visible means of achieving this goal. To be effective in Indonesian conditions, the party cadre had to consist of people who could convey radically novel concepts to a largely illiterate and rural population. They had to be able to transmit ideas which ordinary folk could accept as a more valid interpretation of their familiar world. Perforce, such leaders were marginal men, living in two cultural worlds; but rather than contenting themselves with a place on the fringes of society they aimed at creating a new ideological center, of which they—through their movement—composed the core.

Cadres of such mettle were hard to come by, as the PKI's early history demonstrated. By and large, Communist leaders of the 1920s had known how to appeal to a mass following but were little more successful than the Sarekat Islam in developing a modern organization or a strategy appropriate to confronting a modern state. As they came under pressure they had turned to more traditional appeals and forms of association, finally embarking on rebellions with a distinctly messianic mark. The principal leftist leaders of 1945–48 had been of the opposite ilk, for their higher education and Western experience encouraged them to impose European-derived policies in a typical "returned student" fashion.

By the end of the revolution it was still relatively rare to find political leaders who were locally rooted but possessed sufficient education and expertise to attract the population with promises of modernity. With the right connections—membership in the old elite and thus a good education, the patronage of a successful political leader, service with a military commander who was taken up into the regular army—an ambitious young person could rise rapidly in the new republic. Many, however, did not have this good fortune, or did not retain it long in the turbulent post-revolutionary years. They, and those who came of age after the revolution, had little hope of gaining a foothold in the governmental edifice that was rising from the rubble of Dutch rule. One route, though, was through the mass organizations that, from early in the 1950s, the Communists made the center of their struggle for power.

Working one's way up as a cadre might eventually result in a full-time political career; more immediately, it provided a set of supportive relationships and activities with both economic and psychological value. Organizational work was seen to be

modern, hence more respectable and efficacious than the "*bapakist*" patron-client ties which characterized postrevolutionary institutions generally and which were widely blamed for the Republic's corruption and drift. PKI organizations were seen to represent the common man and as likely to press the claims of those outside the post-revolutionary establishment, no small consideration for young people still imbued with the ideals of the revolution and conscious of their roots in the popular mass. At the same time, party organizations were in a sense—a very real sense, by the mid-1960s—an alternative to the bureaucracy, then Indonesia's only effective source of non-agricultural employment and prestige. Party work was an attractive choice for modern-minded, ambitious, idealistic, but unconnected young people.

The PKI did not attract the well-educated, however. Even in its later days, when it seemed to many the wave of the future, the party recruited few university students and had scant support among intellectuals. The few Indonesians fortunate enough to have had tertiary education at that time were concerned for the expansion of the rights of the individual rather than the fate of the masses, in spite of the populist rhetoric of the day. They hardly needed the PKI as a vehicle, and it threatened them economically and ideologically. Communist cadres consisted instead of the half-educated and self-educated, commoners who only rarely had connections to the social elite. But neither did they come from the ranks of the poor: few workers or ordinary peasants had the kind of education and experience that would enable them to assume the role of cultural middleman required of a party organizer. The PKI apparatus was, as the party chairman himself noted, overwhelmingly petty bourgeois.[4] This class (which in the PKI's usage included middling peasants), though ideologically unglamorous, was an excellent source of the cultural duality and social connections that were essential for communicating modern ideas to common folk.

Failure to attract the well-educated hampered PKI efforts to improve its standing with the post-revolutionary elite—a factor increasingly important in its later years—and frustrated its attempts to gain intellectual predominance in Indonesia. However, its failure to recruit an intelligentsia probably insulated it from the schisms and sectarianism that dogged Communist movements in which intellectuals played a major role. It also meant that PKI cadres, having no source of prestige other than their positions in the organization, devoted themselves to it more wholeheartedly than did those party leaders for whom political affiliation was but one source of status.

Organization as Environment

The Communists' ideological emphasis on the virtues of correct organization, and the visible fact that PKI leaders commanded political influence not because of their individual connections but because they headed a massive organization, helped to keep the PKI's public image one of an impersonal, rationally functioning machine, in contrast to the tangle of patronage relationships most other parties presented. As a

[4] Aidit, speech of September 1, 1964, carried in *Harian Rakjat*, February 7, 1965. A membership survey made for the 1962 party congress indicated that 28 percent of PKI members were from the proletariat and 72 percent from the petty bourgeoisie. Peasants were placed in the latter category, but we can be sure that not many of these were poor peasants as 31.5 percent of party members had primary education, 41 percent secondary, and 24.5 percent some tertiary education, though only 2.5 percent were university graduates. P. Pardede, "Laporan komisi mandat kepada Kongres Nasional ke VII (luarbiasa) PKI," in *Madju Terus!*, 1 *Bintang Merah*, nomor spesial (Jakarta: Pembaruan, 1963), p. 168.

result, the PKI's ideology and practice showed relatively great congruence, which enhanced its claims to effectiveness.

There was also a very practical reason for party leadership to emphasize organization. It could not rely for support on what has been called "primordial sentiment"; it could not count on the fact that many people would have absorbed, during their primary socialization as children, an identification of themselves as Communists. They could not be expected to back the party as, say, a believing Muslim or Christian might automatically endorse one of the religious parties. The PKI had to keep itself visible through activity in order to attract the mass clientele that was essential to its ambition of becoming a major party. The Bolshevik alternative—creating a small but tightly disciplined underground that would lay the groundwork for future revolution—was rejected by the Aidit leadership as inappropriate to Indonesia's current circumstances. Nationalism was still too powerful and class boundaries too inchoate, they argued; instead, the PKI must take advantage of the legality offered it to attract and transform mass loyalties.[5]

At the same time, the party needed to create a milieu comprehensive enough to engage a great part of its followers' lives and make their commitment secure. The aim was to move Communist adherents to think of themselves as a natural grouping, with the PKI as their spokesman, and to internalize the values put forward by party leadership, so that the movement was as much of a piece as possible. Success in this effort was important for the party's future because it would help to make participation in the movement more controllable, avoiding intense enthusiasm followed by acute disillusionment. That pattern had bedeviled Indonesia's political movements and labor unions early in the century; and as mass organization had only been permitted fitfully since that time, organizers in the 1950s were not dealing with a public grown used to steady participation and incremental gains.

If people could be persuaded to look to the party as the natural focus of their loyalties, an ultimate rather than immediate salvation, the roller coaster pattern of participation could be leveled. Party leaders would then be relieved of the need to maintain a constant high level of public activity, with the problems this entailed for the allocation of attention and resources and the strain it placed on relations with the authorities. Those who were successfully socialized into the movement might be expected to lose their loyalty only gradually in the face of setbacks, much as West European proletarians continued to vote Labour or Communist out of a feeling that there was no other direction in which a worker's vote could properly go.

Of course, success in this matter had another side: insofar as the PKI was assured of a "natural" following, there would be less incentive for sustained effort on the part of its cadres and greater likelihood that, like the more established parties, it would rely on existing patron-client networks for support. Something of this could be seen in the PKI of the mid-1960s, but by and large the party remained too much a political and social outsider, and its heyday was too brief, for its image to change significantly.

Finally, the primordialization of the PKI's support would help to ensure the party's survival as a movement, if not as a formal organization, in times of

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[5] For the concept of primordial sentiments see Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution; Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1963), pp. 105–157. For an illustration of the problem as it confronted the PKI in North Sumatra, see William Liddle, *Ethnicity, Party, and National Integration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), especially pp. 98–156.

persecution, for people would feel it was a basic part of their way of life. The value of this pattern had already been demonstrated for the PKI, which had seen two previous periods of legal existence ended by disaster—an initial development as part of the broad anti-colonial movement that had ended in Communist-led rebellions in 1926–27, and a second when the party had participated in a leftist coalition that dominated the Republic's government for much of the revolution but had suffered first parliamentary and then military defeat in 1948. Each time the party revived it had been able to draw on earlier sources of support to swell its new incarnation, although each new stage brought quite different circumstances and leaderships.

Expansion and Cooptation

Initially what Aidit and his colleagues had by way of functioning organization and cadres was largely restricted to labor unions and concentrated on the plantations of West Java and North Sumatra. These areas, having been occupied by the Dutch in 1948, did not experience the decimation and demoralization of Communist cadres that followed the PKI's disastrous challenge to the republican government known as the Madiun Affair. Welcome as these resources were at first, they were too independent to be easily controlled by new leaders from Jakarta, and once the Aidit group had consolidated its power in the capital it launched a series of purges and visitations which eliminated all but the most amenable of local labor chiefs. Many of the more colorful and locally influential leftist leaders were lost, but to party heads they represented the kind of unstable and personality-oriented allegiance that had brought ruin before. In their view, a more anonymous and disciplined—a more modern—apparatus was needed in independent Indonesia. People seemed to agree, for in cases where purges resulted in competing unions, those recognized by the central leadership won out.[6]

The Jakarta leadership could be fairly confident of its ability to secure a labor following with cadres of its own choice, but village Indonesia, vital to any mass movement, was not so available. Consequently, PKI leaders did not look too closely at the social origins of their rural recruits. Frequently they belonged to the village elite, were attracted by the party's modernizing profession, and understood its socialist claims to mean support for commoners of all economic condition. In the rush to attract rural support before the 1950s elections, the party tacitly encouraged an overlap between village social-economic leadership and local Peasant Front (BTI, Barisan Tani Indonesia) or PKI command. It made for more solidly Communist communities—a higher vote, less likelihood of persecution or disfunctional local violence, preservation of culturally valued harmony, and an opportunity for party activists to spread the PKI's teachings. Well-to-do party leaders could be counted on to bring with them a following, and were relatively immune to reprisal by unsympathetic government officials.

This tactic did indeed contribute to an impressive PKI presence in rural East and Central Java, but it relied heavily on relationships of economic and social dependence which the party was dedicated in principle to eliminate. Party leaders were

[6] The process of central takeover can be traced particularly well in the plantation workers' union journal, *Warta Sarbupri*; see especially the issues for 1953. For the general context of these struggles, see Ann Laura Stoler, *Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra's Plantation Belt, 1870–1979* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 132–157; and Stoler, "Working the Revolution: Plantation Laborers and the People's Militia in North Sumatra," *Journal of Asian Studies* 17, 2 (May 1988), pp. 227–247.

uncomfortable with it, the more so because of the current prestige of the Maoist formula of victory through agrarian struggle. In 1957 the BTI decided that it must get rid of the landlords and rich peasants in its ranks, but little was done about this policy, and regional and local heads of the movement were especially disinclined to implement it. In the early 1960s the question became acute as the ending of electoral politics and the difficulty of preserving labor union militancy in enterprises largely under army control made it seem important to establish a reliable rural base. In 1964, as the party embarked on a land reform campaign designed to establish itself as the champion of the rural poor, Communist notables in the villages finally realized that their party and their interests were opposed. Quite a number of local leaders deserted to the rival PNI, taking their clients with them. Even so, in 1965 there were still landlords in the rural party ranks.[7]

On the whole, perhaps, the PKI did not lose greatly by its initial opportunism in rural Java—by no means unique in the history of Communist efforts to expand support—for it facilitated the party's rural penetration, which later defections hardly cancelled. As rich peasant leaders occupied positions of prominence only in their own communities, their departure did not disrupt the party apparatus.

Less easily dealt with were the consequences of the PKI recruitment of notables in the Outer Islands. Elections in the 1950s had underlined the fact that the party's appeal was largely limited to the Javanese: save in the plantation areas of North Sumatra, it had hardly any significant following beyond the central island. As separatism grew into a serious threat to Indonesian unity, and Java seemed clearly unviable on its own, it was essential to the party's ambitions to acquire a respectable representation throughout the archipelago. It pursued this end primarily by recruiting members of local elites. The reasons were much the same as in rural Java: notables had local prestige and relative immunity to hassling by unfriendly military and civilian officials. Once such leaders had gained tolerance for the PKI's existence, Communist strategists calculated, propagandists and literature might be introduced from the party center, making clear the wider aims of the movement, especially with regard to class struggle. Eventually a "contradiction" would arise within the local following, which (with central encouragement) would bring the replacement of the pioneer notables by more progressive and reliable cadres.[8]

By the 1960s, at least, obtaining a toehold in local elites was not difficult. Notables were rarely attracted by the party's image as defender of the poor, but were drawn by its claim to be the paragon of modernity, an up-and-coming organization that might well give one access to political power at the national level. Often enough the Outer Island bureaucratic apparatus was in the hands of Javanese; and the military, following the regional rebellions of the late 1950s, was always under control by units from Java. Otherwise, official power was likely to be concentrated in the hands of one local ethnic group at the expense of others. As the PNI was heavily Javanese

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[7] *Warta Bhakti*, June 2, 1965. Citing a speech by Nyoto on May 30, 1965 calling for the party to be purged of "thieves, landlords, and other such elements," Hadisubeno (the Central Java PNI chief) stressed the advantage gained by his party from the desertion of wealthy villagers and their clienteles as a result of disillusionment with the PKI in the land reform campaign. Interview January 1965; and see J. Eliseo Rocamora "The Partai Nasional Indonesia 1963–1965," *Indonesia* 10 (October 1970): 161–164. For a general discussion of the PKI's land reform campaign see Rex Mortimer, *The Indonesian Communist Party and Land Reform, 1959–1965* (Melbourne: Monash University, 1972).

[8] Nyoto, interview February 1965.

and woven into the bureaucracy, and other secular parties were insignificant, the PKI offered a unique opportunity. As the party's national influence grew, moreover, elite families began to include it as a target for infiltrating their members into potential sources of power, a standard aristocratic strategy for survival in troubled times.

But once such leaders were in place they were not so easily dislodged. In the first place, they were often given local and even regional leadership posts in the party itself. Under the Guided Democracy system of the 1960s, political party representatives were appointed to various official and semi-official bodies; the PKI needed to provide credible members for such organizations, and a prominent local would enhance its respectability and influence. Once notables were placed in such institutions, which wielded considerable influence, it was exceedingly difficult for the party to get rid of them. Anti-Communist bureaucrats and military officials (who constituted the bulk of local power even in the most radical phases of Guided Democracy) would be certain to use the "contradiction" to their own advantage. Moreover, departing notables would take their followers with them, which could have disastrous effects on the PKI presence, both because traditional bonds were more intact in Outer Island societies and because these leaders were often seen as champions of their locality or ethnic group. In short, Outer Island notables recruited by the PKI had strong sources of support of their own. Far from being shoved aside, they were a significant force behind growing demands within the party for the central command to pay more attention to regional opinion. So insistent were their voices, and so strong their position, that it became necessary for the central leadership to promise greater heed to the party periphery.

Both in the PKI's Java heartland and in more distant areas, mass organizations reflected the same duality of orientation as the party itself: on the one hand, they took the part of the poor; on the other, they represented upward-striving modernity. Those who assumed local leadership roles generally were among the better-off and better-educated and tended to stress the latter orientation, which at times created conflicts of purpose. Thus (as was recounted of a Javanese village in the mid-1950s) the ladies of Gerwani, the party-backed women's organization, attempted to end traditional *selamatan* feast-giving, arguing that it was unmodern, but also thinking to relieve demands on their pocket-books; while the poor, for whom it was a rare opportunity to eat well, were dismayed that the custom might end.[9]

The village poor were also not entirely confident in the PKI leaders' constancy on their behalf, observing their unwillingness (and inability) to face down the holders of power. Consequently, when the party did mount a challenge to the domestic status quo, villagers were ambivalent. A major reason for the failure of the 1964 land reform campaign was that many peasants did not join in the "unilateral actions" through which the PKI sought to force implementation of the land reform law, for they reckoned the party would not protect them against reprisals by local landowners and bureaucrats. Others, calculating that the way to commit the party firmly was to adopt an even more militant response than had been called for, created local crises which severely compromised the efforts of PKI leadership to gain entrance to the governing elite. Thus, in spite of the generally high and constant level of mass

[9]Robert R. Jay, *Javanese Villagers* (Cambridge Ma: The MIT Press, 1969), pp. 444–449. This problem was not peculiar to the PKI, for the Italian Communist Party, presenting itself as the voice of modernization in "feudal" southern Italy, also found itself supporting capitalist development. See Sidney Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 263.

participation which marked the Aidit PKI, it did not liberate Indonesian Communism from oscillation between turbulent participation and mass apathy when it came to challenging the existing social order.

Community and Conversion

The party placed great stress on the importance of organizations, of being properly organized, of being able to accomplish things efficiently through organization; but the associations it controlled, and in many respects the party itself, did not really constitute a machine (in the sense of units functioning in obedience to a chain of command) let alone the "organizational weapon" that so exercised cold war observers. Rather, they resembled a community, and their discipline owed much more to shared conviction than to orchestration. This emotional bond tapped energies that might not have been available to a more bureaucratic-rational structure, but it also meant that action was not automatic and that the line of command from the central party leadership to the mass participants was relatively weak. In the land reform campaign, senior PKI leaders themselves had to journey to major sites of rural action to persuade hot-heads to tone things down; local cadres had either been ignored or joined the radicals, while middle-rank leaders did not have adequate clout.

Let us look again at PKI cadres, in order to elucidate the party's character as community rather than machine. Formally, a party recruit was supposed to pass, if not through ordinary membership in PKI-associated mass organizations, then at least through a period of party candidacy, in which he would become more thoroughly acquainted with its principles and discipline and would be tested for suitability by those already inside. But the farther one was from Jakarta and from the centers of labor union militancy, the less came of such standard Communist requirements. Not even the ability to read was obligatory; given the extremely low rate of literacy at the time of independence, that requirement in itself would have been enough to keep the PKI a sect. In fact, the only real criterion for selection was whether a recruit was perceived as having "the right attitude."[10]

This demand, so vague on the surface, provides the key to the purpose of organization in the post-revolutionary PKI. It was not to train a disciplined cadre of activists, Bolshevik-style, in order to guide social forces towards class struggle, but rather to nurture a group of right-minded people to serve as a model for action and as a source of knowledge for society as a whole. In other words, the PKI was to serve as an arena for spiritual conversion. The discipline and energy of its cadres were obtained not by subordination to a hierarchy but from the enthusiasm of belief.

Such fervor was to be found among those who saw in Communism the means of reconstructing a world that had fallen apart. To those who had been cast adrift on Indonesia's civilizational upheaval and whose social and economic place was far from secure, discipline in a cause provided a welcome anchor. As party leaders saw it, the model PKI cadre was to be a "new man," someone who had been reborn into the faith. In this experience, no boundary divided political and personal life: the discipline the party member accepted was assumed to encompass personal morality. Communism taught you not only how to act but how to be; your life was to be an imitation of the values the party sought to realize in society. Not surprisingly, given the social composition of PKI leadership, the standards for personal conduct were

[10]Nyoto, interview February 1965.

petty bourgeois. These lace curtain conventions were sufficiently internalized and enforced among party members so as to produce recognizably different behavior in the PKI compared to other secular political groups.[11] The puritanism of the party and its youth organization were matters of considerable awe (and occasional alarm) to those outside the movement. Perhaps for this reason one of the earliest postcoup anti-Communist propaganda efforts was to construct an image of PKI members as licentious and hypocritical.

Some peculiarities of the PKI's approach to organization and recruitment become clearer if we compare them to the process of religious conversion. The targeting of Outer Island notables as potential party cadres, however unorthodox it may seem ideologically, is characteristic of the initial penetration of new religions, not least Islam in Indonesia. Much the same reasons moved Muslim merchants and preachers to seek the conversion of harbor princes as impelled Communist leaders to recruit notables in new areas of penetration. The choice was essentially a political one, for protection and patronage in the early stages of spreading the faith, an opportunism that did not reflect any real dilution of purpose. In that phase, the need was to open people's minds to the new message; hence, it had to be packaged as familiarly and unthreateningly as possible, while still making clear its claims to represent a reality totally different from things as they had until then appeared.

Once people's minds were opened to the new ideas, the problem was to absorb them fully in the new way of life; and, finally, minds had to be closed again, eliminating alternatives to and reinterpretations of the faith. For most of the Outer Islands, the PKI was still in the first stage of this process. In large cities, among plantation workers, and in much of Java it had reached the second stage. Not holding state power, it was hard for the party to attempt to close off other alternatives, though in the later years of Guided Democracy the increasing influence of PKI leaders on state ideology gave them an opportunity to shape officially imposed belief in their direction. Mostly their efforts were bent on creating organizational milieus sufficiently encompassing and overlapping that their followers did not need to step outside the movement.

Where possible the good PKI man would lead his life within the Communist *aliran*; when he dealt with folk outside it he would be conscious of their status as "other." His vocabulary, his morality, and his ambitions would be shaped by the party as the guardian and vehicle of the faith. He would inevitably be set apart from the rest of society, with all the consequences this implied. It could make him pariah or hero—which would depend on the acknowledgement of his belief by the larger society, to which his own moral example, activity, and obedience would contribute.

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[11] The report of the party control commission to the 1962 PKI congress declared that: "To attempt with all one's might to become an example in everyday life means that every Communist must do his best to see that in his daily existence he does not exploit another person, does not enrich himself, is not corrupt, does not engage in immoral acts, does not gamble, does not get drunk, is simple in manner, thrifty, and so on. Married Communists must not divorce unless there are reasons which have been thoroughly weighed and can be fully justified as Communist [applause]. Just as every Communist must love and respect his party he must love his spouse and preserve the good name of a Communist family both as spouse and as parent. Nowadays Communist households are facing difficulties making ends meet. In responding to these problems Communists must not behave stupidly, must not sit around talking of disaster, must not lose faith and hope, but instead must struggle optimistically towards a brilliant future, joyfully striving to make their families useful to society." Peris Pardede, "Kembangkan moral Komunis!," *Madju terus*, 1, 219.

Psychological need, ambition, and moral conviction combined into a powerful motive for participation in the party world. As with sects generally, the PKI's level of discipline and activity was high, but because it hoped to convert the greater part of Indonesian society it did not try to seal off its boundaries in a truly sectarian manner. A delicate balance had to be maintained between the exclusiveness that ensured that people stayed within the movement and the openness that brought new converts.

Spreading the Word

Communism as a faith reflected the way in which PKI leaders perceived their party's role; and it explains certain contradictions in the way they pursued power. Central to this faith was their understanding of Communism as the perfect expression of modernity. Modernity, not class struggle, was the primary goal of the PKI, whose leaders declared that the party's essential purpose was to bring the twentieth century to Indonesia's villages.[12]

Of course, this stand was partly a matter of political tactics, for PKI leaders of that day did not see the Indonesian masses as ready for class warfare. But it also sprang from their conviction of the appropriateness of Communism for all Indonesians save a small segment of alien or truly "feudal" social elements. Children of the revolution, they could not fathom the older leftist generation's failure to understand that Communism was not the competitor but the logical conclusion of the nationalist struggle. The generational gap was small in terms of actual years, a spread between the young and the very young, but for the latter this meant, crucially, coming of age in wartime and revolutionary Indonesia; and it involved as well a gap between the well-born, European-educated and the locally educated, lower status youths, many of them from families long involved with the PKI or radical nationalism. To the younger generation of party leaders, national and social revolution were of a piece: Indonesia would only be truly free, truly itself, when it had undergone both.

The Aidit leadership saw its principal task as repairing the ideological damage committed by its predecessor's misconceptions, opening people's eyes to Communism as the solution to Indonesia's post-revolutionary crisis. The national revolution, Aidit argued, was not yet finished: it had not totally failed, but it had been blocked in both its national and social aspects, leaving Indonesia in a "semi-colonial and semi-feudal" limbo. Agitation was a way of making people see this, but more broadly, in the PKI leaders' eyes, it was a matter of education. Party and mass organization activities therefore had a strong didactic element, teaching people first of all to think in a modern way (which was of course the party's way). Collecting union dues, for example, was upheld as important not for the little money it brought in but for its value in instructing people that steady, positive, small contributions played an essential role. Party and mass organization meetings were supposed to inculcate in people modern ways of debate and decision, fixing an appropriate vocabulary and categories of thought.

Essential to this purpose was a need to make the party's message intelligible at a very basic level, so that followers would not simply be exposed to Marxism-

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12 Thus the PKI's ideological spokesman, Nyoto, declared that "the PKI wishes to bring Indonesian villages into the twentieth century, make them modern and in so doing overcome their hampering of productive forces. To modernize the villages means to bring about a democratic revolution in them. Therefore we must possess a modern organization, must organize [the villagers] in a modern manner, stressing efficiency and striving to overcome bureaucratism." *Harian Rakjat*, May 18, 1965.

Leninism as a mystery but would also feel they could use it to interpret their world. In addition, they needed to have tangible proof that it worked. The first requirement was met by radically simplifying the Communist message and "Indonesianizing" it, by relating it directly to Indonesian national experience. This did not mean putting it into an indigenous frame of discourse: the Indonesian nation-state was the referent, not the archipelago's traditional cultures. Indigenous modes of ideological communication might be used to help spread the word—the PKI paid much attention to cultivating *wayang, ludruk, ketoprak* and other popular art forms that could be used to convey a political message—but this effort was clearly auxiliary to the party's presentation of itself through the modern forms of meetings, campaigns, demonstrations, and publications. As the party was to provide a model of modernity, not just preach it, it was appropriate for its language and presentation to be unambiguously modern, the embodiment of that goal culture to which the Indonesian people should aspire.

The efficacy of the Communist approach could be shown readily enough during the parliamentary period of the 1950s through elections, strikes, and demonstrations, whereby the party could legally display its power and secure change. Even then, however, PKI cadres were urged to pursue small-scale and local projects that would give ordinary people the sense that they themselves were accomplishing something when they acted in a party context. "Small but successful" was the slogan, which became especially important when Guided Democracy closed down most of the possibilities for party political action. Typically, the objects of such campaigns were overtly non-political: they might, for example, concern ways of calculating a family budget or raising backyard vegetables to overcome malnutrition.[13] Their purpose was to raise morale, make people feel they could take control if only they understood how to go about it, make them feel the party was a caring and knowing community. A good deal was expected of party cadres in pursuing this goal: ideally they had to be part politician, part missionary, part teacher, and part extension agent. Needless to say, few were so versatile; but conviction carried one a long way, and the contrast with other sources of leadership was sufficiently great as to heighten their effect.

Changing the Rules

This approach flourished best in the era of constitutional democracy, when post-revolutionary letdown, deadlocked politicians, increasing corruption, particularism, and economic decline provided the ideal brew for Communist organizations. They

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[13] For some early examples of the "small but successful" [*kecil hasil*] activities which were mostly implemented via labor unions, see Warsosoekarto, "Apa jang harus kita kerdjakan untuk terlaksanakan keputusan Kongres ke IV," *Warta Sarbupri* 7, 11 (1956): 216; *Dokumentasi kongres ke-IV Serikat Buruh Kereta Apa (SBKA)* (Djakarta: Pimpinan Pusat SBKA, 1957), pp. 33–34. The most elaborate expression of the approach was the "1001 Movement" initiated in early 1962. The politburo resolution inaugurating it listed in great detail projects for raising chickens, improving irrigation, and so on, arguing that PKI members could thus patriotically contribute to overcoming the national food shortage (*Harian Rakjat*, February 9, 1962); "Tempuh 1001 matjam djalan untuk menaikkan produksi bahan makanan," *Madjalah PKI Surabaja* 3, 3 (1962): 4–11. Councils for implementing the movement were set up under the peasant association BTI, though in fact the campaign was more successful in backyard farming in and around cities rather than the countryside. In 1965 another major 1001 effort was launched, specifically emphasizing the cities and suburbs; typically, a plethora of recommendations for saving seed and growing tomatoes in tin cans were combined with elaborate instructions for organizing the campaign. *Harian Rakjat*, April 30, 1965.

provided a sense of direction and community, a *pegangan*, something one could believe in. Strongly religious people remained impervious to the party's charms, for they already had their own *pegangan*, their organizations, and a valid community in the *ummat*. The PKI leadership under Aidit was of a notably rationalist temperament and ill-equipped to make the kind of appeal which, in other times and places, had bridged the ideological gap between Marxism and Islam.[14] Even so, the PKI's following not only increased in *abangan* Java, but also grew rapidly elsewhere. The PKI's opponents began to fear that in the general elections scheduled for 1960 the Communists would emerge as the largest single party.[15]

In these circumstances, why hold elections at all? The Communist advance could be made irrelevant simply by changing the rules of the political game. Non-Communists still held power, after all; the PKI had neither arms nor administrative control. Indeed, this alternative had been predicted by the older party leaders from whom Aidit and his colleagues seized power in 1951. If ever the PKI was seen to pose a real challenge, they warned, its enemies would unite against it. The reprisals that followed the Madiun Affair were a reminder of how severe the reaction might be. For some time to come, they thought, Indonesian Communism should keep its light well under the bushel of a broader left, seeking influence but not presenting a challenge on its own. Aidit felt differently, as we have seen, and—after a false start in which the PKI took on Sukarno and the Nationalists as well as the right—he had maintained political leeway by taking advantage of the numerous divisions among the party's antagonists.

By the end of the decade, however, this line had played out. Economic ruin, regional rebellion, and foreign intervention provided reason not only for Communist florescence but also for ending a deadlocked parliamentary system. In 1959 Indonesia came under a new dispensation, Guided Democracy, in which political organizations and ideologies were subordinated to the needs of the nation as defined by its president, Sukarno. What was more, the army formed the alternative pole of power. Martial law, proclaimed in early 1957 to deal with the regional crisis, gave the army immense power at all levels of government. Territorial commanders used it to discourage political agitation generally and Communists particularly.

An accommodation between military leadership and the Communists was unlikely. Leftist sympathizers in the revolutionary army had been weeded out by the Madiun Affair and the "rationalization" of military personnel that preceded it. After 1950 the army commander, A. H. Nasution, discarded the mass of revolutionary fighters and their often charismatic, but ill-disciplined, leaders in favor of a relatively small, professional, but politically self-conscious corps led by a well-trained officer

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[14] For instances in which Communist and Islamic appeals were combined see Takashi Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java 1912–1926* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), especially pp. 248–298; B. F. O. Schrieke, "The Causes and Effects of Communism on the West Coast of Sumatra," in *Indonesian Sociological Studies* (The Hague/Bandung: Van Hoeve, 1955); the Schrieke and Banten reports in Harry J. Benda and Ruth T. McVey, eds., *Documents Relating to the Indonesian Communist Uprisings of 1926/27* (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1958); Michael Williams, *Sickle and Crescent: The Communist Revolt of 1926 in Banten* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1982); and Michael Williams, "Banten: Rice Debts Will Be Repaid with Rice, Blood Debts with Blood," in Audrey R. Kahin, ed., *Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), pp. 55–82.

[15] See Daniel S. Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1966), especially pp. 164–172.

elite. (Indeed, Nasution's attitude toward organization was a good deal more Leninist that Aidit's.[16]) The result was a force relatively impervious to penetration by outside ideologies, officered by men whose social background and ideas ill-disposed them to the PKI. The party tried to keep a toehold in the military world by involving itself with veterans' organizations, home guard units, and volunteer militia, but none of these gave it any real influence among the military or access to arms.

Some PKI leaders were persuaded that under the ideological and organizational constraints promised by Guided Democracy there could be little chance for an above-ground Communist movement. In their view, a political system centered on Sukarno and the army would very likely end in fascism, discrediting or destroying the party. Better refuse to endorse it, giving up a legal existence if need be (as in fact the PKI's arch-enemy, the Masyumi party, had done) and wait for better times.[17]

But it was not easy to trade public favor for revolutionary obscurity. The PKI's hitherto successful strategy had created an enormous vested interest in legality; and what was to become of those who had openly identified with, let alone led, the party? They would at the very least be accused of opposing the national interest. A rupture with Sukarno and radical nationalism would be inevitable, wrecking the identification of Communism with the consummation of the national revolution, on which Aidit and his colleagues had based their maneuverings and in which they profoundly believed. In their view, such a course would be to avert disaster by committing suicide. Did it not make more sense to see the possibilities in the situation? After all, it was the rightist Masyumi and the pro-Western Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) that were most discomfited by the prospect of Guided Democracy. That the parliamentary system had failed was a sign that bourgeois power in Indonesia was weakening, that the inapplicability of Western-derived institutions had become apparent. The country had broken with the Dutch and was at odds with the Americans, whose hand in the regional rebellion was all too visible. On the other side, relations with the socialist countries were improving rapidly, to the point where even Nasution had made a pilgrimage to Moscow to procure arms. Indonesian socialism was the professed goal of Guided Democracy, and Sukarno at least had assured the PKI of a part in it.

There were, in other words, distinct possibilities—or so it seemed to Aidit and his allies—the more so in that Sukarno, to balance off the military's monopoly of arms and penetration of the bureaucracy, needed to be able to demonstrate that he had the masses behind him and was not to be defied. To rally the people he needed mass organizations, which the PKI possessed. True, popular organizations were now to be subordinated to state-controlled bodies, and the army was doing its best to sponsor organizations of its own, especially in competition with Communist-controlled unions. But, the Aidit group could hope, the rivalry between Sukarno and the military leaders could be played on to retain some room for maneuver, and it would soon become evident that the PKI and not the official bodies had the real loyalty of the masses. What was important was to remain flexible and keep the

[16] I owe this observation to David Anderson.

[17] For the party leadership's defense of its position, in which the arguments against it are evident, see Sakirman, "Apa arti sokongan PKI kepada UUD 1945 dan Demokrasi Terpimpin," *Bintang Merah* 16 (May–June 1960): 194–219, and 17 (July–August 1960): 320–328. See also Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951–1963* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 273–274; Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 68–76.

party's enemies divided, to preserve the PKI's popularity, and above all to bolster the general assumption that Indonesia's revolution was continuing and that it depended on the energy of the masses.

They succeeded in realizing quite a few of these hopes. From the nadir of 1960—when PKI activity was banned by army commanders in three regions and Aidit and other top party leaders were repeatedly called in for interrogation—the PKI became a mainstay of Guided Democracy. Under the official slogan of NASAKOM (the union of Nationalist, Religious, and Communist principles) the party seemed guaranteed a role in decision-making, and its representatives sat in a wide range of official organs. PKI-sponsored mass organizations not only survived subordination to state-sponsored groupings, they either dominated them or reduced them to irrelevance. The military's efforts to supplant Communist power in the labor unions had failed, even in foreign-owned plantations which had been taken under army management. In 1963 martial law was ended, greatly reducing the army's official role in political life and laying the ground for a major dispute within the military as to its future rule. Sukarno, now styled Great Leader of the Revolution, was ever more visibly dominant, and the PKI seemed increasingly a vital component of his success.

Central to the PKI's strategy under Guided Democracy was the perception that the way to power lay in persuading the country's leaders—above all Sukarno—that Communism was Indonesia's future. Its advance therefore had to seem irreversible; and as power was seen in those days to stem from popular support, the summoning and display of ever greater mass backing was essential. This could not be done on the basis of demands which alarmed and united PKI opponents, however; as the land reform campaign showed, to do so would only point up the fact that, with no significant control over weapons or the state bureaucracy, Communist power was a matter of perception, a political emperor's clothes. Instead, the party concentrated on demonstrating itself to be the popular backbone of Guided Democracy, its campaigns and mass demonstrations bolstering the regime, carrying it further to the left, strengthening the position of those political leaders and officials who were willing to accept it and pressing to exclude ("retool") those who remained opposed. With the increasing economic disorder and social tensions of the latter years of Guided Democracy, cracks appeared to be developing in elite resistance to the PKI, the more so as presidential favor smiled upon it. The Communists' hope was that if their momentum could be maintained, their enemies would be sufficiently divided and disheartened that they would be unable to stop the PKI from sharing and then controlling the levers of state command.

Organization was essential to this effort, and yet also peripheral, for its purpose was largely theatrical, a matter of seeming rather than accomplishing. It was the symbolism of mass power that was important: the PKI had the most disciplined and imposing parades, the most militant demonstrations, the largest number of volunteers for state campaigns, the most numerous posters, flags, rallies. If important dignitaries were expected to drive to the presidential retreat at Bogor, all the tree trunks along the route might be daubed overnight with hammers and sickles. Less and less attention was paid to ideological discipline and the vetting of members; anyone could join in. The effort was to convey an image of massiveness, of irresistible and inevitable expansion. Faith and enthusiasm rather than democratic centralism would be the glue that kept the movement together as it approached closer to power.

Even such a concrete project as the promotion of a People's school system, to supplement the rapidly decaying public educational sector, shared this characteristic. True, the schools supplied a much needed service for a part of the population that was the PKI's main source of mass support, and the involvement of ordinary people in the organization and financing of classes helped give them confidence that, with the party's advice, they could deal with their environment. But this was secondary to the consideration that they would impress Indonesia's elite with the competence and public-spiritedness of the PKI. As such projects would show, Indonesia's current disorder was the result of excluding Communist energy and above all Communist organizational ability. It was not too late: the revolution's goals of modernization and prosperity might yet be achieved without bloody class conflict, by acknowledging the superior scientific knowledge, energy, and managerial abilities of the PKI.

This "public service" aspect of the PKI's appeal was given special prominence in 1964 and 1965, following the debacle of the land reform campaign. The latter effort had been the outcome of the party's decision early in the Guided Democracy period to move its organizational emphasis from labor to peasantry, both in recognition of the country's overwhelmingly rural character and because union activity now meant confrontation with army-run management in enterprises seized from foreigners. Rural agitation seemed less controversial, the more so since a land reform law had been passed in 1960, and the party needed merely to insist on its implementation. But, as we have seen, PKI leaders were confronted both by vehement and often violent local reactions and by the indiscipline of their own following. What they had hoped would be relatively uncontroversial issues among the national elite, given the lack of great landowners and the traditional identification of power with bureaucratic position, turned into a rallying point for the PKI's enemies. Better, then, to avoid issues that implied social strife, and to concentrate on those which set Indonesians against foreigners or demonstrated Communism's general national usefulness.

In a sense this strategy was simply an application of the principles applied by the Aidit leadership with such apparent success in the parliamentary period, which no doubt encouraged its easy acceptance by party workers. Under Guided Democracy, however, not only were demands for conformity to government guidelines much greater and socio-economic strains more severe, but the policy did nothing to remove the party's basic weakness, its inability to oppose those in power. Or rather, the party *did* challenge the post-revolutionary order, for it never abjured its intention to bring about a radical reordering of society, but it continued to lack access to arms and (since it identified thoroughly with Sukarnoism in order to secure that leader's protection) ideological grounds on which to claim support should it find itself at odds with radical nationalism. Consequently, as Indonesia moved towards economic collapse and international conflict under Guided Democracy, the danger grew that the PKI's constituency would lose patience with its leaders' collaborationist course, or conversely, that its growth would alarm the ruling elite into uniting to destroy it.

The latter danger seemed most pressing, particularly in the light of the reaction to the land reform campaign, which (with army support) had mobilized the Muslim devout under the slogan "Islam in danger." Consequently the final year of Guided Democracy saw the PKI's attention focused on "public service" projects. Perhaps the most striking effort in this direction was the attempt, launched in 1965, to turn part of Central Java into a "model area," which would demonstrate the superiority of the PKI approach to development. By rallying and focusing popular energies for the

purpose of community improvement, the party hoped to demonstrate a substantial rise in the living standards of a poor region. The aim was to impress both government leaders and peasant supporters. And it had a psychological purpose for the party leadership as well: the Central Java area was to be a sort of spiritual Yenan. The party could not establish a physical liberated area to which people could look for hope, but it could form a cultural one approximating the social model proposed by the PKI. So solid was the support this would bring forth, party leaders hoped, that no force would dare crush it.

The model area would be one in which the party's presence was so overwhelming and its benefits so evident that it would not have to share the ideological stage. In point of fact, the districts concerned had a significant and militant minority of devout Muslims who were unlikely to accept PKI hegemony. Party leaders believed, however, that this was a function of ignorance, a false consciousness encouraged by the removable group of landlords, merchants, and moneylenders. Once the Communist example and assistance were to hand, this attachment would melt as had popular faith in the "feudal" leadership of the old aristocracy. The area would thus demonstrate both the PKI's developmental talents and its ability to provide shelter to masses of differing cultural-ideological background.

PKI leaders displayed great ingenuity and energy in appealing simultaneously to Indonesia's rulers and ruled. But the constantly narrowing base of decision-making under Guided Democracy eventually reduced the effective political arena to the presidential palace, in whose circles top PKI figures played more and more prominent roles. Increasingly, PKI leaders acted with an eye to cutting a good figure as participants in rule. As the party apparatus grew, moreover, and as more party workers participated in the official organs of Guided Democracy, the PKI bureaucracy began to develop a momentum of its own, in which bourgeois respectability, the legitimation of the party in the eyes of the social elite, and the augmentation of offices became increasingly obvious goals.

Party leaders were aware of the dangers these tendencies posed for losing touch with their mass clientele—which was, after all, their ticket to inclusion at the palace. They evolved a number of elaborate research schemes to keep themselves abreast of attitudes in the countryside, and, taking a leaf from the Maoist notebook, launched a program of periodic "going down" by PKI leaders to lower levels of party activity in order to see at first hand what was happening among the rank and file.[18] But these were the efforts of people at the top who felt in need of outreach to keep in touch with conditions underneath. It was oddly distanced from the turbulence in the countryside, the growing social tensions and spiraling inflation.

Aidit responded with some impatience to growing unrest among the party's original source of stength, the labor unions, increasingly unhappy at a policy that urged them to put national interests above class in order to smooth party relations with those in power. SOBSI was showing evidence of "trade unionism," he charged,

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[18] For the program of research in the countryside see *Harian Rakjat*, August 1, 1964, reporting a speech by Aidit on July 28, 1964, and D. N. Aidit, *Kaum tani mengganjang setan2 desa* (Jakarta: Pembaruan, 1964). For a defense of the "going down" [*turba*] program in the face of party workers' indifference, see Aidit's speech in *Harian Rakjat*, February 7, 1965. Most of the high party officials were out of Jakarta on "going-down" expeditions at the time of the October 1965 coup, which was one reason for the party's disorganized response to the crisis.

an unfortunate insistence on seeing a class aspect to the patriotic struggle.[19] Such arguments did little to persuade members of the women's organization Gerwani, who protested against PKI-led municipal authorities in Surabaya in 1965 for their failure to relieve food shortages and inflation. Nor were they able to guarantee the discipline of Pemuda Rakyat (Peoples' Youth) members, some of whom vented their frustration by engaging in violent confrontation with Nationalist and Islamic youth gangs.

Axing the Organization

For all the problems posed by its strategy, the PKI had not lost momentum by 1965.[20] On the contrary, in that year Indonesia left the United Nations, was engaged in armed confrontation with the British over Malaysia, and approached a rupture with the United States. Sukarno proclaimed Indonesia's dedication to the overthrow of the "Old Established Forces" of world imperialism. To a Communist leadership persuaded that the primary hindrance to socialism in Indonesia was continuing Western influence, the defeat of the right seemed near. What mattered now more than ever was organization as a source of mass pressure, militancy, a sense of momentum and unstoppability. At the same time the emphasis on public service projects was continued, indeed strengthened in an effort to show that PKI organization could overcome Indonesia's mounting internal chaos. The schizophrenic character of the party's appeal was thus stressed, in an effort to demoralize the party's enemies and persuade the undecided in the elite.

Best of all, from the PKI's viewpoint, Sukarno now favored the party more clearly than before, and various civilian and even military officials began to seek Communist patronage. The anti-Malaysia campaign gave occasion for planning a "Fifth [Armed] Force" of militia who, it was clear, would be largely supplied by Communist mass organizations. Though the army was to officer the new service, which would hardly be capable of posing a military threat to the regulars, the military leadership would both lose its monopoly of arms and suffer from the centrifugal pull on the loyalties of its personnel seconded to the new force. Thus the one thing that seemed to limit the leftward impetus of Guided Democracy, the united opposition of the army, began to seem less certain. General Nasution, the armed forces chief of staff, remained implacably opposed to the Communist advance, but he was also reluctant to put himself in a position of confrontation with Sukarno (remembering, perhaps, the disastrous consequences of his having done so in 1952). General Yani, commander of the army, had achieved his post with Sukarno's patronage and, while he was too friendly to the Americans for the PKI's taste, he seemed unlikely to choose against the president. The longer the army leadership dithered, the less credible it would seem as an alternative center of power and the more difficult it

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[19] Aidit, lecture to the central SOBSI school on May 2, 1965, reported in *Harian Rakjat*, May 4, 1965; and see also his speech of May 4, 1965, in *Harian Rakjat*, May 6, 1965. The issue had also arisen earlier: see *Kedaulatan Rakjat*, January 15, 1963, reporting a lecture by Aidit in Cipanas. In the European experience "trade unionism" was classically a revisionist, rightist sin, but it was also possible there to find Communist labor unions chafing at the party's desire for good relations with those in power at the expense of their members' economic demands: see Tarrow, *Peasant Communism*, p. 154

[20] For a contemporary analysis which saw the PKI about to assume power, see Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia: the PKI's 'Road to Power,"' in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *The Communist Revolution in Asia* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 256–289.

would be to assert the chain of command over Sukarnoist loyalties in the army. The president himself hinted pointedly that military leaders would no longer be allowed to obstruct the revolution, and the PKI suggested that certain officers were profitting not only from the perquisites of position but also from foreign pay. The frustrations of the anti-Malaysia campaign and the extreme difficulty of financing military units did nothing to improve the army's morale or reputation.

In this context, on October 1, a group of middle-rank officers kidnapped and slew six key members of the military leadership, whom they claimed had been plotting with the CIA to overthrow Sukarno. They proclaimed a Revolutionary Council that was to assist the president in realizing the completion of the revolution. Their move was promptly thwarted by General Suharto, head of the Army Strategic Command, whose expeditious reaction was doubtless facilitated by the fact that the coup leaders had consulted him on the eve of their adventure.[21] The deaths of the generals provided the shock needed to rally army unity and mobilize the right; and Suharto, who proved as adept at outmaneuvering Sukarno politically as he had militarily, was able to immobilize the president and effectively seize political power.

A few days after the coup the new military leadership proclaimed that a Communist plot had been behind the affair. Sukarno, attempting to gain some leeway in his dealings with the army and yet rescue the leftward course of his revolution, criticized but refused to condemn the PKI, which neither impressed military opinion nor protected the Communists. PKI leadership, suddenly faced with the worst of all possible scenarios, attempted to reverse events by denying them: it called on party organizations to maintain legality and support Sukarno's efforts to regain the initiative. As there was no chance for a PKI-led rising which would appear to be against both Sukarno and the army, this posture was perhaps the only hope, but it left the Communist following without any protection, physical or psychological, for what ensued.

For some time the more anti-Communist military leaders had been persuaded that the one thing that would prevent the PKI from demonstrating anew its ability to recover from repression was a thorough-going elimination of the party cadre. This, in the next months, they proceeded to do, with the US embassy helpfully providing hit lists of the PKI hierarchy to ensure completeness of coverage. Massacres of the general Communist following were also carried out, usually after the introduction of special troops into the area. Local civilians were recruited to help with the task on the basis of religious or class sentiment, or from fear of themselves being compromised. How many died remains a matter of controversy: the official total was set at 78,000,

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[21] Col. Latief, who was the military brains of the coup group, met with Suharto a few days before the coup and again at midnight on the eve of the action, just after the final decision to launch the operation. See Arnold Brackman, *The Communist Collapse in Indonesia* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969); *Trouw*, August 4, 1978; W. F. Wertheim, "Whose Plot—New Light on the 1965 Events," and "The Latief Case: Suharto's Involvement Revealed," both in the *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 9, 2 (1979): 197–215 and 248–251; Memori banding R. Sawito Kartowibowo (photocopy of typescript), pp. 174–180. For a reconstruction of the coup made before I was aware of the extent of Suharto's involvement, see McVey, "Indonesian Communism and China," in Tang Tsou, ed., *China in Crisis* 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 378–388. Most of the numerous analyses of the affair have been made on the early information available; for reviews of the major arguments see Rex Mortimer, "Unresolved Problems of the Indonesian Coup," *Australian Outlook* 25, 1 (October 1971): 94–101; Justus van der Kroef, "Origins of the 1965 Coup in Indonesia: Probabilities and Alternatives," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 3, 2 (1971): 277–298.

but later 200,000 was conceded, and often half a million. An army sponsored survey employing academic researchers, which was undertaken shortly after the massacres in order to provide an estimate for Java and Bali gave the figure of around a million.[22]

No resistance to this holocaust was mounted by PKI organizations. The party leaders' initial (and last) post-coup order had been for them to keep still, but in addition they were totally unprepared for sudden illegality, for a separation of their fate from the nation's. In some localities Pemuda Rakyat members tried to resist the pogroms, but with no real access to arms and no idea what to do, they were soon disposed of. The PKI leaders' advice to sit tight had prevented those cadres who might have escaped from doing so in time. Those who did manage to slip through the net found that fear and disillusionment had destroyed the sense of community among the broader PKI following. People felt betrayed; nothing that Aidit and his colleagues told them had prepared them for this. In their deep disillusionment it was quite possible to believe the army's claims that party leadership had ignored its own teachings and its followers' interests for the sake of a half-baked army putsch. Within a few weeks the paragon of organization had disintegrated utterly, shattered by its enemies and deserted by those who had lost faith.

Once the terror passed and surviving leftists could begin to analyze what had happened to them, various self-criticisms were issued by underground groups bent on charting a new course. In their view the mistakes of the previous leaders seemed all too clear: they should have realized that with the end of the war against the Dutch, the national revolution was over, and that power lay in the hands of a bourgeoisie that would not yield it peacefully. They should have known that building vast, public, organizational structures would only expose their following and make the class enemy conscious of the threat to its interests. They should have known that Indonesia was no exception to Mao's dictum that all power springs from the barrel of a gun. But the failure of their own efforts to create the basis for an armed class struggle indicates that the matter was not so simple.

The Aidit approach is not likely to be attempted again. It was very much the product of a particular generation and time, the creation of those who came of age in the national revolution and saw in Communism the fulfillment of the Indonesian nation-state. They regarded the post-revolutionary period not as a new phase of struggle but as the moment after the explosion of independence, in which it was still not apparent in what pattern the pieces of a shattered colonial society would descend. The party was acting in the midst of that continuing upheaval, seeking to channel it so that the eventual order was the one it sought. Whether or not this moment existed—whether the 1950-65 period was post-revolutionary in the sense of following after and deriving its meaning from the revolution—remains a question. In retrospect it is easy to conclude, in accord with later party self-criticisms, that the

[22] For statistics on the killings obtained from the army survey, see *The Economist*, August 20, 1966: 727–728; and see Brackman, *The Communist Collapse*, p. 114. It is quite possible the army figure is on the high side, as at that time village officials were eager to emphasize their compliance with demands to eliminate the Communists. For analyses of the social bases for the killings in Central and East Java, see Mortimer, *The Indonesian Communist Party and Land Reform*, chapter 7, and Margot L. Lyon, "Politics and Religious Identity: Genesis of a Javanese Hindu Movement in Rural Central Java" (Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1977), pp. 37–39. For the US embassy's role see Kathy Kaldane, "U.S. Officials' Lists Aided Indonesian Bloodbath in '60s," *Washington Post*, May 21, 1990.

period saw on the surface a continuation of revolutionary symbols but underneath a consolidation of bourgeois power and consciousness, centered on the military and bureaucracy. In any event, the 1965 coup and the establishment of the New Order was final proof that the national revolution was over, and from then on Indonesia, and with it any future PKI leadership, would follow a very different course.

THE POST-COUP MASSACRE IN BALI

Geoffrey Robinson

"Of course I remember 1965. There were heads lying around in the street out there. Sometimes the heads of people you knew."

Elderly woman, Denpasar, 1986.

INTRODUCTION

The Indonesian military coup of October 1, 1965 was the prelude to one of the largest massacres of this century. In less than a year, between 500,000 and one million people—most of them alleged members of the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) or one of its affiliated organizations—were killed.[1] The worst of the killing occurred in the provinces of Central Java, East Java, and Bali. In terms of the proportion of the population killed, however, Bali was arguably the province hardest hit. There, between December 1965 and early 1966, an estimated 80,000 people—or roughly 5 percent of the population of under two million—were shot, knifed, hacked, or clubbed to death.[2]

[1] No one really knows for sure how many died in the massacres. Estimates range from 100,000 (far too low) to about 1 million. For a review of the estimates, see Robert Cribb, ed., *The Indonesian Killings of 1965–1966: Studies From Java and Bali* (Clayton, Vic: Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, no. 21, 1990), p. 12.

[2] Estimates of the numbers killed in Bali range from a low figure of 40,000 to a high of about 100,000. Soe Hok Gie cites 80,000 dead as "the most conservative estimate." See "The Mass Killings in Bali," in Cribb, *The Indonesian Killings of 1965–1966.* Wertheim refers to police records from Bali which indicate that at least 100,000 died. See, Wertheim, "De dood van de communisten," *De Groene Amsterdammer,* October 8, 1966. An official Army history, which almost certainly under-reports the level of killing, gives a figure of 40,000. See Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Dinas Sejarah KODAM XVI/Udayana, *Komando Daerah Militer XVI/Udayana Dalam Lintasan Sejarah,* Denpasar. Some Balinese with access to military and provincial government records at that time consider the figure of 50,000 dead as "obviously far too low," and 100,000 as "possible." Personal interview, I Dewa Made Dhana (former Vice-Head of DPRD-Buleleng 1961–1966), October 10, 1986, Singaraja.

In percentage terms, these figures are comparable to losses suffered in Cambodia, over a much longer time period, under the regime of Pol Pot. Yet, in contrast to the scholarly and popular attention paid to the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge—and to those of other notoriously repressive regimes in this century—the post-coup massacre in Bali has been all but ignored by the academic community and, after a flurry of media attention in 1966 and 1967, it has ceased to be a subject of popular interest.[3] Indeed, far from stimulating a serious reconsideration of the prevailing image of Bali as a wordly paradise, the massacre has been construed either as evidence of Bali's presumed exoticism or as an unfortunate anomaly, an historical aberration which casts no doubt on such images. Three decades later, we still have no adequate factual account of the killings, and there have been few serious efforts to answer even the most basic questions: Why was there a massacre at all on Bali? Why did it occur when it did? Who was responsible for the killing? Who were the victims and how did they die?

This essay is an attempt to provide preliminary answers to such questions and to fill some of the more conspicuous gaps in our factual knowledge about the post-coup violence in Bali. It begins with a critical discussion of existing accounts of the massacre in Bali, and suggests what may be a more satisfactory explanation. In contrast to standard interpretations—which focus on certain presumed features of Balinese character and culture in explaining the massacre—this account stresses the interaction of political and historical processes at local, national, and international levels, paying special attention to the role of military and political authorities in encouraging and accelerating the dynamic of enmity and mass violence against the PKI.

I do not mean that cultural forces in Bali were unimportant in generating mass violence, but that their significance was shaped and circumscribed both by political and historical context and by the conscious decisions of important actors shortly before and after the coup. The rise of General Suharto and other anti-Communist elements in the military, their active encouragement of violence against the PKI, and the acquiescence of the United States and its powerful allies, were especially important in creating the preconditions for widespread killing. The massacre in Bali, then, was not the unavoidable outcome of mysterious cultural forces or religious passion but largely the tragic and predictable consequence of human agency.

Massacre as Culture: A Critique

Most Balinese have been afraid to talk or write about the coup and its bloody aftermath, for those who do so, honestly, risk inviting severe retribution from the regime of President Suharto. Consequently, the contemporary accounts of western journalists are among the few sources available about the massacre. The information they provide about particular incidents of murder, patterns of violence and the attitudes of Balinese are valuable, particularly where they can be corroborated by evidence gathered from other sources. Still, these accounts offer only partial, sometimes very misleading, *explanations* of the causes and nature of the massacre. Most suggest—for none provides a fully developed argument—that the massacre is best understood in

[3] A handful of brief articles touching on the massacre in Bali appeared in the press in 1966 and 1967. The killings in Bali are also mentioned, though usually only in passing, in more general works about the coup and the massacre. More recent works on the issue include R. A. F. Paul Webb, "The Sickle and The Cross; Christians and Communists in Bali, Flores, Sumba and Timor, 1965–67," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 17, 1 (March 1986), pp. 94–112; and the "Editor's Introduction" in Cribb, *The Indonesian Killings of 1965–1966*, pp. 241–258.

terms of certain essential features of Balinese "character," culture and religion. At the same time they tend to ignore, or to misconstrue the significance of, the contexts of the killings. Despite these shortcomings, the accounts of western journalists still form the core of conventional wisdom about the massacre on Bali, and the basis for the small number of scholarly works which touch on it.[4] As much as their descriptions provide useful information about the killings, then, a reassessment of the explanations they offer is long overdue.

A common theme in existing accounts of the post-coup period in Bali (and Java), is that the extreme violence against the PKI was a reaction to the Party's disruption of the harmony, order, and equilibrium of Balinese culture and religion. Explaining why "these people of grace and charm" had embarked upon "so frenzied a massacre," for example, Hughes writes:

> Obviously the catalyst was the sudden boiling over of resentment toward the Communists, who had been busy beneath the placid surface of Bali but had made the serious mistake of deriding and attempting to undermine not only the island's religious values but its deep-seated cultural traditions as well.[5]

The same theme recurs, with reference to both Bali and Java, in several studies by US scholars and officials published since 1966. Buttressed by selective references to the ideas of reputable Indonesia experts, these studies accept uncritically, even enthusiastically, the dubious premise that harmony and order are the core values of Javanese and Balinese village life. They assert that these cultural values exercised such a powerful influence in Java and Bali in 1965–1966 people were led to commit acts of the most extraordinary collective violence. A 1968 article by Guy Pauker, of the Rand Corporation, is a case in point. Drawing on the work of Clifford Geertz, he claims that the "local custom" in Java—and, he implies, in Bali too—is to "do all things quietly, subtly, politely, and communally—even starve." By acting in "stark contrast with local custom," he argues, the PKI and BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia) in Java and Bali:

> . . . made themselves not just enemies of the more prosperous elements in the village . . . but enemies of the community as a whole, whose ancient ways they were disrupting. These considerations, more than genuinely ideological controversies, may have been the decisive factor behind the killings, which were as widespread in Bali . . . as in East and Central Java.[6]

In a recently published memoir, the US Ambassador to Indonesia at the time of the coup, Marshall Green, has made virtually the same argument. Summarizing most of the familiar myths about the "harmonious" nature of both Javanese and Balinese

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[4] Cribb notes that John Hughes' account, in *Indonesian Upheaval* (New York: David McKay Coo, 1967), chapter 15, "outlines a story repeated by many later authorities." Cribb, *The Indonesian Killings of 1965–1966*, pp. 241–243.

[5] John Hughes, *Indonesian Upheaval*, p. 175. In a similar effort to reconcile the facts of the massacre with the conventional picture of an idyllic Bali, Donald Kirk concluded that "Communism" had " . . . upset the equilibrium of Balinese society." Kirk, "Bali Exorcises an Evil Spirit," *The Reporter*, December 15, 1966, p. 43.

[6] Guy Pauker, "Political Consequences of Rural Development Programs in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs* XLI, 3 (Fall 1968): 390.

society, Green manages, like Pauker, to lay responsibility for the massacre squarely upon those who were killed and imprisoned. "In the last analysis," he writes:

> . . . the bloodbath visited on Indonesia can be largely attributed to the fact that communism, with its atheism and talk of class warfare, was abhorrent to the way of life of rural Indonesia, especially in Java and Bali, whose cultures place great stress on tolerance, social harmony, mutual assistance, . . . and resolving controversy through talking issues out in order to achieve an acceptable consensus solution.[7]

There are several obvious problems with this analysis. First, it does not explain why, within a society which ostensibly prizes harmony, tolerance, and consensus, the sanction applied to those accused of breaking the rules of social conduct should necessarily be massive violence. The logical connection between the infringement of "local custom" and violent retribution appears to rest solely on an unstated assumption that Balinese (and Javanese) are prone to behave in wild and irrational ways if they are pushed beyond certain unspecified limits. This is far from an adequate explanation of the massacre. Second, the historical evidence simply does not support the image of harmonious village life and the cultural values upon which it rests. I have argued elsewhere that, at least in the past century, Balinese society has *not* been characterized by equilibrium, and that not all Balinese (or Javanese) have valued harmony and order above all else.[8] The strength of support for the militant and combative PKI and BTI, the prolonged and bitter fighting among Balinese during the National Revolution (1945–1949), and the evidence of caste conflict even before the war, all suggest that such ideals of harmony were not shared by all Balinese. Rather, the historical evidence suggests that there has been ample room for—and possibly even a robust tradition of—disagreement and conflict within Balinese society. What has been portrayed as a "traditional" belief in harmony shared by all "Balinese" appears instead to represent a social ideal espoused by a particular segment of the population—and by their supporters at home and abroad—in the name of the collectivity. Third, this sort of analysis cannot plausibly explain the timing of the massacre: why the mass killing did not begin until early December, a full two months after the Untung coup. If a desire for retribution against the PKI for disrupting village harmony really were the "catalyst" for the massacre, why then did this not have effect immediately after the coup? The simple answer is that political and military circumstances were not yet conducive to a campaign of mass violence in Bali until early December 1965.

Another argument commonly found in accounts of the massacre in Bali is that the violence against the PKI was motivated by deep and mysterious religio-cultural passions and, more specifically, that the killing was carried out in a spirit of a religious "exorcism" or "purification."[9] In a passage typical of the genre, Moser writes:

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[7] Marshall Green, *Indonesia: Crisis and Transformation, 1965–1968* (Washington: The Compass Press, 1990), pp. 59–60.

[8] See Geoffrey Robinson, *The Politics of Violence in Modern Bali, 1882–1966* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).

[9] Hughes writes, for example, that " . . . the action against the Communists may have been a mass self-purification for the island . . . " and cites an unidentified Balinese as saying that the massacre was " . . . a kind of purging of the land from evil." Hughes, *Indonesian Upheaval*, pp. 177, 182. Also Donald Kirk, "Bali Exorcises an Evil Spirit."

> From the very beginning the political upheaval had an air of irrationality about it, a touch of madness even. Nowhere but on these weird and lovely islands . . . could affairs have erupted so unpredictably, so violently, tinged not only with fanaticism but with blood-lust and something like witch-craft.[10]

Overcome by their religious passion, this argument has it, Balinese erupted *spontaneously* into a wild and "frenzied" purge of "Communists." Stressing the alleged unpredictability of the violence—and conveying the impression that it sprang spontaneously from within the mysterious collective psyche of the Balinese—Hughes writes, for example, that Bali "continued its way of life" until December 1965 when suddenly it " . . . erupted in a frenzy of savagery worse than Java's."[11]

There is just enough truth in this interpretation to make it seem plausible. Undoubtedly many Balinese did perceive the campaign against the PKI as necessary to exorcise the island of evil or purge it of atheists. Furthermore, as anthropologists have noted since colonial times, "frenzied" behavior does occur in Balinese culture, particularly during trance. Reliable first-hand accounts of particular incidents of murder in the post-coup period suggest that this behavior played some role in the dynamic of mass killing. Drinking the blood of victims was not unheard of as a guarantee against subsequent guilt or madness.[12] And, according to certain Balinese who survived encounters with them, anti-PKI vigilantes appeared to be in a trance-like state, eyes glazed, bodies taut, and evidently unconcerned about the niceties of normal Balinese social interaction.[13]

Yet, the picture is seriously misleading. For if the religious and cultural passion of Balinese can help us to understand the intensity of the violence once it had begun, it cannot plausibly explain how the idea of annihilating the PKI developed, how the mass violence started, and why it started when it did. Arguments about religious passion and "frenzy" give the impression that the causes of the violence are as exotic and mysterious as the people of Bali are reputed to be and simply not decipherable or amenable to rational explanation. Yet the weight of historical evidence suggests that such factors were important in accelerating the violence principally to the extent that they converged with, and were reinforced by, political and military developments in Bali, in Indonesia, and beyond. Especially important was the active role played by military, political party, and religious authorities in shaping and encouraging a popular discourse of violent anti-communism based on existing religious ideas and cultural analogies. That massive violence could somehow be justified, or plausibly portrayed, in terms of Balinese religious beliefs or cultural analogues undoubtedly contributed to the dynamic of killing. But this point should not be permitted to obscure the fact that the victimization and physical annihilation of the PKI were *not* simply, nor even primarily, the consequence of a spontaneous or

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[10] Don Moser, "Where the rivers ran crimson from butchery," *Life*, July 1, 1966, pp. 6–27.

[11] Hughes, *Indonesian Upheaval*, p. 175. This unpredictable, and irrational passion, often described as "frenzy," is invoked repeatedly to explain the killings. See Don Moser, "Where the rivers ran crimson from butchery," p. 28; and Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 123.

[12] Personal interview, Ida Bagus Rama (Lecturer in History, Udayana University, Denpasar), March 6, 1986.

[13] Personal interview, Dr. Made Djelantik, September 4, 1986; Personal interview, Jan Mancia, September 24, 1986.

natural religious impulse, but emphatically the product of political and historical processes in which human agency played a central part.

The deep religious belief of Balinese has also been used to explain the alleged willingness and calm resignation with which many Balinese faced death in 1965–1966. By this view, many of Bali's Communists allowed themselves to be killed without a fight because they accepted that "the Gods" had so willed it and because they recognized their own guilt. Citing unidentified "Balinese intellectuals," Hughes writes that many Balinese

> . . . faced death calmly, even submissively . . . , [and] . . . party members, knowing their fate, dressed in white ceremonial burial robes and marched calmly with policemen or village officials to their places of execution.[14]

Hughes suggests further that PKI members sought to "cleanse both themselves and the island."[15] This image of Balinese, dressed in ceremonial white robes, facing death with dignity and serenity, has been easily incorporated into both popular and scholarly forms of the Bali myth.[16] Placed alongside the royal *puputan* mounted against the Dutch in 1906 and 1908—which Hughes sees as expressions of a "mass joyful death-wish"—it fits well with the image of an exotic and romantic culture. But it does not square with the historical evidence.

It is simply untrue that most Balinese went gently to their deaths dressed in ceremonial costume and according to cultural and religious custom. The vast majority were rounded up, without warning, from field and home, often in the middle of the night, transported to execution centers and unceremoniously shot, stabbed, or decapitated, sometimes after being badly mutilated. Few received a proper burial and cremation in accordance with Balinese traditions. The corpses of tens of thousands of Balinese were thrown into mass graves or dumped into the sea or rivers. Nor is it true that Balinese did not resist death. As will be shown later in this discussion, some PKI members put up quite a fight, while others fled or hid from the death squads. Finally, it is far from clear that those who did face death with resignation did so out of religiously-based fatalism or a sense of guilt. Many who were arrested in rural areas in October and November—some of whom were later killed—apparently did not fully anticipate the consequences they faced for belonging to such groups as the BTI, which had, after all, been legal organizations only a few weeks earlier. And by December 1965, real or alleged Communists faced an almost unfathomable political, military, and psychological impasse. Many must have felt that it would be futile to resist.

Existing accounts of the massacre in Bali, then, do not on the whole offer satisfactory, or entirely plausible, explanations of its origins, intensity, or timing. Instead, they divert serious attention from broader political and historical processes, limiting rather than deepening our understanding of what happened. Above all, they obscure the critical role of military, political, and religious leaders in fomenting animosity

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[14] Hughes, *Indonesian Upheaval*, p. 181.

[15] Ibid., p. 181.

[16] Commenting on the "meekness with which PKI members are often believed to have gone to the slaughter" in Indonesia as a whole, Cribb writes: "Perhaps the strongest image we have of the massacre is of PKI members in Bali lining up, dressed in their white funeral clothes, to be executed methodically." Cribb, *The Indonesian Killings of 1965–1966*, p. 20.

toward the PKI and consciously encouraging massive violence against its members. By diminishing or obscuring the centrality of human agency—and political manipulation—such interpretations serve not only to absolve the New Order regime of President Suharto from direct responsibility for the massacre, but also to exonerate foreign governments, including the United States, from complicity and acquiescence in the massacre.

The National and International Setting

The "coup" of October 1, 1965 is better understood as two coups: the Untung coup, later called the G-30-S/PKI, and the Suharto counter-coup.[17] The first, led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung, involved the execution of six generals of the Army High Command and formation of a "Revolutionary Council." The second, spearheaded by Major General (later President) Suharto—Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve, KOSTRAD—crushed the Untung action and established the dominance of anti-Communist military officers under Suharto's own leadership. Although the Untung coup appears to have had its roots in intra-military conflict, the Suharto forces soon portrayed it as a treacherous plot against the nation led by the PKI.[18] This contention founded and justified the subsequent campaign to destroy the Communist Party. It also lies at the heart of the current regime's claim to political legitimacy.

Military forces loyal to President Suharto played a leading role in the annihilation of the PKI, both in direct military action and through a variety of political maneuvers in the immediate post-coup period. Starting in October, troops of the West Java-based Siliwangi Division, and of the Army Paracommando Regiment, RPKAD (Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat), were deployed through Central and East Java with the explicit objective of helping to wipe out the PKI. By the end of November, they had killed, or incited civilians to kill, several hundred thousands of alleged PKI members and overseen the detention of at least that many more. In early December 1965, RPKAD troops, together with units of the East Javanese Brawijaya Division, landed in Bali to continue the operation. The campaign was accelerated by a well-coordinated nation-wide propaganda blitz, depicting PKI members as traitors, barbarians, and atheists, and explicitly inciting acts of violence against them.[19] Religious groups, student organizations, and an assortment of vigilante-style "action commands" were encouraged to take a hand in the massacres. With the close cooperation of anti-communist political parties, mass organizations and religious leaders, the military swiftly turned the tide against the PKI, while more gradually undermining the authority of President Sukarno.

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[17] G-30-S is an acronym from the Indonesian *"Gerakan Tiga-puluh September,"* (Thirtieth of September Movement), the name given to the unsuccessful Untung coup attempt

[18] A good sense of the genesis of the Army's interpretation of the coup can be had by perusing the Army-controlled press of the post-coup period Especially revealing are *Angkatan Bersendjata, Duta Masjarakat,* and *Api Pancasila.*

[19] Articles in the post-coup Army-controlled press are thick with references to the "holy" task of the Army and its civilian allies in destroying the PKI. On October 8, *Angkatan Bersendjata* seemed to be calling for a "holy war." "The sword cannot be met by the Koran . . . but must be met by the sword. The Koran itself says that whoever opposes you should be opposed as they oppose you. . . . "

Much of the debate concerning the October 1 coup has focused on the question of PKI complicity.[20] There is no need here to plunge deeply into this argument, but it must be pointed out that there is little evidence that the PKI orchestrated the Untung coup. If the party was involved, it was most likely as a relatively minor actor; only a very small number of PKI leaders, let alone members, seem to have known anything about it. There is good reason, however, to believe that the Untung coup was more or less what its leaders claimed it to be: a move by middle-ranking Sukarnoist officers and their allies to save the President and "the Revolution" from a rumored coup by a corrupt, CIA-backed "Council of Generals." The evidence of PKI responsibility for the coup, in other words, appears to have been fabricated or deliberately inflated in order to justify military reprisals against the Party. There is persuasive evidence, moreover, that Suharto himself had foreknowledge of the Untung coup and allowed it to go ahead, presumably in order that he might then intervene.

US Complicity?

The allegations of PKI responsibility for the Untung coup have served to legitimize the violent means by which the current regime came to power thirty years ago. They have also deflected attention from the possible complicity of another important actor, the government of the United States, in the counter-coup and massacre. It is easy to speculate about but difficult to prove foreign covert intervention. Yet, in view of the well established record of US covert intervention in the affairs of foreign states—particularly those with leftist or anti-American inclinations—and of the US government's attempt just seven years earlier to topple the Sukarno government and to destroy the PKI, the possibility of US involvement in the coup and the massacre must be taken seriously. To the extent that the US was involved in the Suharto coup and the anti-PKI campaign which followed, it also shares responsibility for the murderous consequences in 1965–1966.

Even if it is not possible to establish definitively the extent of US complicity, it can be demonstrated that US policy contributed substantially to the seizure of power by the military under Suharto and to the massacre which ensued.[21] Both inadvertently and consciously, the US influenced domestic Indonesian politics in ways that made a military coup more likely. At least as early as 1957, US policy deliberately exploited and encouraged internal political cleavages in Indonesia with the intention

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[20] Among the most important contributions to this debate are: Benedict R. O'G. Anderson and Ruth McVey, *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971); W. F. Wertheim, "Suharto and the Untung Coup—The Missing Link," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 1 (Winter 1970); Daniel S. Lev, "Indonesia 1965: The Year of the Coup," *Asian Survey*, (February 1966); Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno; Ideology and Politics 1959–1965* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974); Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), especially chapter 4. The closest thing to an official Army version of the coup is Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, *The Coup Attempt of the "September 30 Movement" in Indonesia*, (Jakarta: n.p. 1968). Surprisingly, the Central Intelligence Agency has also published an account of the October coup, entitled *The Coup That Backfired*, Intelligence Report, December 1968.

[21] Geoffrey Robinson, "Some Arguments Concerning US Influence and Complicity in the Indonesian 'Coup' of October 1, 1965," unpublished, 1984. Peter Dale Scott makes a strong case for US complicity in "The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965–1967," *Pacific Affairs*, 58 (Summer 1985): 239–264. The opposite case is made by H. W. Brands in "The Limits of Manipulation: How the United States Didn't Topple Sukarno," *The Journal of American History* 76 (December 1989): 785–808.

of bringing down the established government. In the late 1950s, this effort took the form of support for rebellions in Sulawesi (Permesta) and Sumatra (PRRI). Later the US supported a variety of anti-Communist and anti-Sukarnoist elements within the High Command of the Armed Forces as well as national-level political parties. By 1965 there were significant domestic forces, both military and civilian, whose interests were congruent with, if not always identical to, those of the US. Evidence from declassified government documents makes it clear that agents of the US, as well as some of its allies, did what they could to provide such interests a convenient opportunity to act against the PKI and Sukarno in 1965, with assurances that they might do so with impunity.

The United States also helped out significantly in the consolidation of the Suharto regime and in the annihilation of the PKI after October 1, 1965. Its contributions took essentially three forms: i) an almost immediate de facto recognition of Suharto, disguised by a policy of "silence" and "non-intervention" with respect to the counter-coup and the massacre; ii) token—but politically and psychologically important—covert military and economic aid carefully designed to bolster the new regime while undermining Sukarno and the PKI; and iii) propaganda and information assistance in support of the anti-communist campaign after October 1.

In the weeks and months following the coup, though Sukarno officially remained President, the US increasingly bent its ear to the concerns and demands of Suharto and the Army, lending Suharto an important advantage in a time of political flux and encouraging the massacre of alleged PKI members in Java, Bali, and elsewhere. US government agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, made every effort to assure Suharto and the Army that America applauded their actions. After receiving private word of US support early in October, General Nasution's Aide reportedly told US Embassy officials:

> This was just what was needed by way of assurances that we [the Army] weren't going to be hit from all angles as we moved to straighten things out here.[22]

There were even occasional expressions of US concern that the Army might not go far enough in its efforts to destroy the PKI.[23] High US officials were fully aware of the violent means directed against the PKI within days of the coup. On October 5, the CIA in Jakarta reported to the White House that troops of the Siliwangi Division, under Major General Adjie, had already killed about 150 alleged PKI members.[24] A few days later, the CIA told the White House about an October 5 meeting of Army Generals, organized by Suharto and Nasution, at which it had been agreed to "implement plans to crush the PKI."[25] As the killing accelerated in the following weeks, US officials in Jakarta were undoubtedly kept informed by their contacts in the Indonesian Army. The US administration also knew early on of Army plans to

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[22] Telegram from US. Embassy Jakarta to Department of State, October 14, 1965.

[23] In a cable to the White House just days after the coup, the CIA in Jakarta wrote: " . . . the Army must act quickly if it is to *exploit its opportunity* to move against the PKI" (emphasis added). CIA report to the White House, October 5, 1965. Two days later, the CIA cabled the White House: "The U.S. Embassy comments that there is *danger* the Army may settle for action against those directly involved in the murder of the Generals. . . . " (emphasis added). CIA report to the White House, October 7, 1965.

[24] CIA Report No. 14 to the White House, October 5, 1965.

[25] CIA report No. 22 to the White House, October 8, 1965.

incite civilians to violence against Communists. On October 9, for example, the US Embassy reported to the State Department that, on instructions from Nasution and Suharto, the Army was " . . . encouraging religious groups to take political actions which Army will support."[26] Early in November, the information about Army tactics was even more explicit:

> In Central Java, Army (RPKAD) is training Moslem Youth and supplying them with weapons and will keep them out in front against the PKI. Army will try to avoid as much it can safely do so, direct confrontation with the PKI . . . . Army is letting groups other than Army discredit them [the PKI] and demand their punishment.[27]

US officials, then, fully aware of the bloodshed in Java, had good reason to suppose the same would happen elsewhere. They had two full months to prevent a full scale massacre in Bali, but made no effort whatsoever to do so.

The Johnson Administration, though delighted at the "break" in political developments, put on a public show of tolerant non-interference in Indonesia's "internal affairs." US officials, however, " . . . made clear [to the Army] that Embassy and US G[overnment] generally *sympathetic with and admiring of what Army doing*" (emphasis added).[28] United States allies, too, sat back and watched the grotesque, and avoidable, tragedy of the post-coup killing.

US interest in "refraining from any apparent interference in events taking place" was the result of widespread anti-Americanism in Indonesia.[29] For the same reason, any association with the US was thought to be a serious political danger for Suharto and the Army. Consequently, economic and other assistance to the Suharto junta flowed through covert channels. A 1966 document from the Department of State explained that: "Until late March 1966, our major policy on developments in Indonesia was silence . . . "

> . . . while continuing this public position we have throughout made it privately clear that we were ready, at the right time, to begin making limited material contributions to help the new leaders get established.[30]

How much is unclear, but there is no question that some such aid was provided, including tens of thousands of tons of rice and textiles, or that its objective was explicitly political.[31]

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[26] US Embassy Jakarta cable to Department of State, October 9, 1965.

[27] US Embassy Jakarta cable to Department of State, November 4, 1965.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Report from US Embassy Jakarta, Political Unit, to Department of State, December 21, 1965.

[30] Department of State, Post Mortem of the 1965 Coup, 1966.

[31] In a cable to the State Department in November the embassy wrote that the Indonesian military had requested 200,000 tons of rice and discussed ways of supplying it without drawing undue attention to US involvement. The cable explained that ". . . availability of additional rice could be crucially important in . . . maintaining position of those seeking to bring New Order to Indonesia." US Embassy Jakarta to Department of State, November 28, 1965. On December 3, 1965, as RPKAD troops wound up their campaign of terror in East Java and prepared to land in Bali, the Embassy recommended increases in covert economic assistance to the Army in order to "tip the balance" in favor of Suharto's anti-Communist

Though difficult to prove, there are also indications of external involvement in the coordinated anti-Communist media blitz in the immediate post-coup period. At least since 1960, US strategists suggested the tactic of discrediting the PKI politically before resorting to a naked show of force.[32] The emergence of the extraordinarily sensationalistic newspaper, *Api Pancasila*, only days after the coup, and its sudden disappearance after the slaughter of half a million souls, has raised questions about possible CIA involvement in conducting the campaign.[33] So has the puzzle of the peculiar editorial published on October 2, 1965 in *Harian Rakjat*, the PKI daily, which became the single piece of documentary evidence available to the Army to implicate the PKI in the coup.[34] Finally, there is the public admission of a US embassy official that he supplied lists of PKI members to the army.[35] Indonesian army intelligence hardly needed them, but the real significance of such assistance, together with the other initiatives mentioned above, was to demonstrate unequivocal US support for the Army's violent campaign against the PKI.

Bali after the October Coup

The coup and counter-coup of October 1, and the subsequent campaign against the PKI, had a profound impact on the balance of political forces in Bali. While the transformation of national politics did not lead immediately to widespread political violence in Bali, it did produce an important realignment of political forces by the end of November. Renewed cooperation between the local military command and the PNI put Bali's Governor Sutedja, the PKI, and other parties of the left on the defensive for the first time in years. This change was one structural precondition for

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forces. US Embassy Jakarta cable to Department of State, December 3, 1965. A few days later, the State Department cabled the Embassy in Jakarta regarding a proposal for $10 million in aid, noting that such aid would have to be designed to benefit the Army and not Sukarno. Department of State (Bundy and Rush) to U.S. Embassy Jakarta, December 8, 1965.

[32] In a letter to the President in 1960, the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, James Lay, wrote that the US should: " . . . give priority treatment to programs which offer opportunities to isolate the PKI, to drive it into positions of open confrontation with the Indonesian Government, thereby creating the grounds for repressive measures, politically justifiable in terms of the Indonesian national interest." National Security Council, "US Policy on Indonesia," December 19, 1960. For further evidence see Geoffrey Robinson, "Some Arguments Concerning US Complicity in the Indonesian 'Coup' of October 1, 1965."

[33] Anderson has argued that the sophistication of the media campaign was beyond the capabilities of a disorganized Army editorial board. Personal Communication, Benedict Anderson, October 1983.

[34] A key passage of the self-incriminating editorial, entitled "In Support of the 30 September Movement," ran as follows: " . . . we who are conscious of politics and of the duties of the revolution are convinced of the validity of the action carried out by the 30th of September Movement to safeguard the revolution and the people. The support and the hearts of the people are certainly on the side of the 30th September Movement. . . . " *Harian Rakjat*, October 2, 1965. Translation from *US-JPRS Translations on Southeast Asia*, no. 105.

[35] A US Embassy official admitted to the journalist Kathy Kadane that he provided the Indonesian military with lists naming at least 5,000 PKI officials, some of whom were later arrested or executed. See "US Officials' Lists Aided Indonesian Bloodbath in '60s," *The Washington Post*, May 21, 1990. For skeptical evaluations of her story, see Michael Vatikiotis and Mike Fonte, "Rustle of Ghosts," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 2, 1990; and Michael Wines, "CIA Tie Asserted in Indonesia Purge," *New York Times*, July 12, 1990. Kathy Kadane's rebuttal of Wines' critique—including transcripts of her interviews with U.S. officials—has been published in *Indonesia News Service*, nos. 300–303, June 22, 1991.

the massacre which began in December, but it was insufficient, on its own, to give rise to widespread killing. Indeed, prior to the arrival of crack troops from Java, political violence in Bali was still constrained to some extent by a tense stalemate between competing local political forces.

During the first few days after the Suharto counter-coup, when its full political implications remained unclear, all groups in Bali cautiously confirmed their loyalty to Sukarno and "the Revolution," a safe term which by now meant everything and nothing. But while the joint statement of Governor Sutedja, PKI and National Front leader Ketut Kandel, and Pangdam (Regional Military Commander) Sjafiuddin, issued on October 3, called on Balinese to await further instructions from *Sukarno*, the PNI-Bali (Partai Nasional Indonesia-Bali) on October 1 explicitly awaited instructions from the national PNI leadership (DPP-PNI).[36] The discrepancy indicated that key political groups in Bali were already taking their signals from different sources at the center; in the next few weeks, this became an increasingly important determinant of political developments on Bali.

Political party organizations in Bali responded to initiatives taken by their national party leaderships, either ignoring or superceding instructions from the local executive and military apparatus.[37] As early as October 5, PNI and Muhammadijah statements made increasingly aggressive references to the task of "restoring order" and "crushing the G-30-S traitors," although there was as yet no request from local military authorities for action.[38] Within a few days the political parties had mobilized armed patrols to "maintain order and vigilance." They were active in hamlets around the town of Gianyar, and no doubt elsewhere, as early as October 8.[39] As news of possible PKI complicity in the coup began to filter through from Java, along with press reports about events there, Bali's party organizations fell into step, demanding the immediate banning of the PKI and its mass organizations.[40]

Despite these pressures, through October the Armed Forces in Bali did little by way of rounding up suspected G-30-S "traitors." In fact, efforts were made to restrict the activities of emerging anti-Communist vigilante groups. In an instruction dated October 13, the Second Assistant of the civilian auxiliary defence force, Sumarno, prohibited patrols by armed gangs linked with mass organizations.[41] In a subsequent public statement, Sumarno stressed the fight against Malaysia and *Nekolim*, downplaying the importance of the G-30-S. Similarly, the attitude of the Regional Police Commander remained ambiguous until the end of October, while Pangdam Sjafiuddin maintained an almost complete silence throughout October, fueling

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[36] See the PNI-Bali instructions and the announcement from Sutedja et al. in *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, October 3, 1965.

[37] The most aggressive were the PNI, NU, IPKI, Parkindo and Partai Katholik.

[38] See, for example, the statement by Muhammadijah-Bali in *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, October 6, 1965: "Assist all military forces in guarding public order and peace." A PNI announcement of the same sort appeared the following day, and on October 12, the GSNI (*Gerakan Siswa Nasional Indonesia*) called on all members to ". . . work together with ABRI, and provide concrete assistance to ABRI in annihilating the G-30-S."

[39] See *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, October 9, 1965

[40] The first clear mention of PKI complicity in the local press was in *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, October 7, 1965. The article described the demand by NU in Java that the PKI be banned.

[41] The defense force was known as the *Hansip/Hanra XVIII-Bali Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, October 18, 1965.

suspicion that he had secretly supported the G-30-S.[42] His inaction became conspicuous after several neighboring Regional Military Commanders issued orders banning or "freezing" the PKI and its mass organizations.[43] In late October, moreover, when there were reports that even PKI leaders had admitted their complicity in the coup, and that PKI and mass organization branches had begun to dissolve "voluntarily" in many parts of Java and Sumatra, Sjafiuddin still had not moved. It was only in early November, when it was quite clear where the wind was blowing, and after he had been appointed as Kopkamtib Commander for KODAM XVI by Suharto, that Sjafiuddin publicly condemned the PKI and began to issue instructions meant to wipe it out.[44]

Governor Sutedja also made virtually no public statements and appeared only rarely at public ceremonies and gatherings during the month of October. In an effort, apparently, to create political breathing room, he imposed a ban on local media coverage of G-30-S-related developments on Bali.[45] Sutedja's silence and efforts to limit public discussion were taken by his opponents as signs of complicity in the G-30-S and an attempt to muzzle the PNI; all the more so as the major newspaper in Bali, *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, was PNI-affiliated. In the final week of October, Sutedja was summoned to Jakarta by Sukarno, who was evidently aware of the governor's increasingly precarious position.[46]

Taking advantage of Sutedja's absence, the PNI demanded action against the PKI and, for the first time, openly suspected that Sutedja and Sjafiuddin were deliberately dragging their feet. PNI organizations dominated the October 28 "Youth Day" mass rally in Denpasar, attended by an estimated 15,000 people.[47] In the keynote speech, PNI leader (and later Governor) I Gusti Putu Merta called on President Sukarno to order Sutedja to "cleanse" the local government of all G-30-S/PKI elements. Why was it, Merta asked rhetorically, that while the rest of the country had begun to take decisive action against the PKI, in Bali not yet? Let us hope, he went on, that the authorities in Bali will not continue to act as though Bali were a separate country.[48]

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[42] It was alleged that Sjafiuddin's wife was a Gerwani activist, and it was rumored that Sjafiuddin too was sympathetic to the Party

[43] The banning orders reported in the local media included those issued by: Pangdam XIV (Makassar), October 21; Pangdam VII/Diponegoro (Central Java), October 25; Pangdam Brawidjaja (East Java), October 22. See *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, October 21, 22, 25, 1965.

[44] Kopkamtib is the acronym for *Komandan Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban*–Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order Sjafiuddin was appointed Kopkamtib Commander on or about November 1, 1965. The Commander of KOREM 163 was appointed by Sjafiuddin as Kopkamtib Commander for Bali on November 29, 1965. See *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, November 30, 1965.

[45] Published in *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, October 13, 1965. According to the instruction, "... newspapers published in Bali and Radio Republic Indonesia may not print/broadcast statements or information of any kind pertaining to the G-30-S Affair in Bali."

[46] According to Sjafiuddin's account of this meeting, the President asked Sutedja if he had the courage to return to Bali, and Sutedja replied emphatically, "I have the courage, Sir." *Suara Indonesia (Denapasar)*, December 4, 1965.

[47] For an account of the rally and the various speeches given, see *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, October 29, 1965.

[48] On October 31, at a rally in Kesiman Timur, outside of Denpasar, Merta again complained that Bali was far behind the rest of Indonesia in taking action against the PKI. See *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, November 2, 1965.

Returning on October 29, 1965, Sutedja promptly met with Sjafiuddin, presumably to discuss recent developments in Jakarta and to relay Sukarno's advice. On November 1 he issued an order "freezing" a few PKI-affiliated mass organizations, emphasizing that "freezing" did *not* mean killing or even arresting members, but that the normal activities of the organizations should temporarily cease.[49] Only on November 3 did Sutedja finally "freeze" the PKI and its major mass organizations.[50] In the same instruction leaders of the affected organizations, at all levels, were ordered to report to the police.[51]

In a second instruction on November 1, Sutedja established an "Inspection Team" to investigate G-30-S involvement in Bali. It was led by the Head of the Judicial Inspectorate for KODAM XVI, I Gusti Putu Raka, who was to work closely with the Chief of Police Intelligence, Drs. R. Sujono, and the Regional Chief of Military Police, Major R. Susilotomo.[52] The instruction stressed, however, that local authorities and political organizations should take no *a priori* action against G-30-S suspects and that all should await a political solution from Sukarno. *A priori* action, however, was precisely what PNI-affiliated groups had in mind.

Only at the end of October did the the police and Army commands begin to take clear positions. On October 28, Bali's Police Commander Major Ismono Ismakoen indicated that his force now contemplated violence against the PKI:

> . . . if there are still waverers in the economic, political, cultural and social spheres, the Police will not hesitate to take strong measures against them and, if necessary, to shoot them.[53]

Pangdam Sjafiuddin, too, signaled that he was finally ready to move against the PKI. On November 1 he revealed that there had been considerable support for the Untung coup within KODAM XVI and, further, that a high-ranking officer had tried to convince him to join the rebels.[54] Now, exactly one month after the coup, Sjiafuddin was established an internal Inspection Team of his own to "cleanse" KODAM XVI of "traitors."[55]

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[49] Organizations "frozen" included the CGMI, SBKP, SBPP, SEPDA and PPDI The text of this decision was published in *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, November 4, 1965. It is possible that this partial "freeze" was announced in an effort to alert other PKI organizations to the danger which awaited them and to give them an opportunity to take refuge.

[50] Those "frozen" with this instruction included the PR, BTI, Gerwani, Lekra, HSI, SOBSI, PGRI nonvak sentral, and IPPI. See *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, November 4, 1965.

[51] On the same day, two newspapers said to have PKI and/or Partindo affiliation, *Fadjar* and *Bali Dwipa*, were banned. *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, November 5, 1965. Baperki and PPI were "frozen" on November 8, 1965. *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, November 12, 1965.

[52] The text of the instruction and the full list of Inspection Team members was published in *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, November 4, 1965.

[53] *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, October 29, 1965.

[54] It was later alleged that this had been Captain Trenggono of the Tjakrabirawa Battalion, the Presidential Guard which had been implicated in the coup, and which had units stationed at the President's retreat in Tampaksiring, Bali. See *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, December 2, 1965.

[55] See *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, November 2, 5, 1965. Significantly, the General Supervisor of the team was the Chief of Army Intelligence for KODAM XVI, Alex Soetadji, though the team was nominally headed by Major (CPM) Soesilotomo (*Ka PomDam XVI/Udayana*). It was rumored that Soetadji had been active in organizing an informal PKI network within KODAM XVI, and that he had been sympathetic to the Untung coup. If these rumors were true, his

On November 11, 1965, Governor Sutedja again left for Jakarta to meet the President. Four days later, on Sukarno's order, he was replaced as *Pepelrada* by Sjafiuddin.[56] Sutedja officially remained Governor until December 8, but after mid-November effectively ceased to exercise any authority.[57] With Sutedja gone and the local military shifting its support from Sukarno to Suharto, two important preconditions had been met for the joint mobilization of forces against the PKI by military and party leaders. The title of a *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)* editorial—"Now it is clear who is friend and who is foe"—ominously presaged the conflict about to begin.

Political Violence before the Massacre

Despite serious political tension, the anti-PKI campaign did not result in widespread killing in Bali through October and most of November. The striking thing about the pattern of political conflict in Bali until late November is that, by contrast with Central and East Java, it did not degenerate rapidly into indiscriminate mass murder. The massacre itself did not begin until December, after the alignment of national and local political and military forces had shifted more decisively against the PKI.

In October and the first half of November, the assault on the PKI in Bali mainly took the form of political purges in government offices, universities, and political organizations.[58] Apart from losing their jobs, the victims of these purges were obliged to report to the military authorities, with the possibility of detention without formal charge or trial. Those who reported were also required to bring lists of other PKI and mass organization members, thus providing the means for a more systematic decimation of the organization later. A limited number of direct, sometimes violent, attacks against PKI members began in early November. According to Pangdam Sjafiuddin's own account, *"aksi2 polisionil"* began on November 6, 1965. The houses of people accused of affiliation with the PKI were burned, their possessions stolen, and their families intimidated. Chinese were similarly targeted, particularly if they had been associated with the pro-PKI, ethnic Chinese political party, Baperki. Yet, according to available reports, remarkably few people had been killed by the end of November.

Such violence as there was in early November took the form of armed clashes between various mass organizations, resulting in a few casualties on both sides and some arrests.[59] Local police and military units were involved in some of these

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appointment as as General Supervisor may have been part of an effort to cover the trail of PKI sympathizers, or at least pro-Untung rebels, within KODAM XVI.

[56] *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, November 12 and 18, 1965

[57] *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, December 17, 1965. In the last two weeks of November, Sutedja was openly accused of supporting the PKI and the coup. Almost every major political organization and all eight of Bali's *Bupati*, joined in calling for his ouster as Governor, as Head of the Front Nasional, Head of the provincial parliament, and as Member of the Board of Directors of Nitour. The parties supporting the call were the PNI, NU, IPKI, Partai Katholik, and Parkindo. See *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, November 21, 1965.

[58] Udayana University, for example, summarily fired staff belonging to some twenty organizations deemed to be PKI-linked The language of the "revolution" was almost always used to justify such purges. For example: ". . . as a tool of the revolution, Udayana University must cleanse itself of all counter-revolutionary elements. . . ." See *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, November 6, 1965.

[59] In the village of Gerokgak (in west-Buleleng), for example, a confrontation on November 11, 1965, between Pemuda Rakjat (PKI), Ansor (NU) and PNI members, left four Pemuda Rakjat, two Ansor and one PNI dead, with several more wounded. *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*,

clashes, but apparently did not initiate or encourage them. Nor were the police and military organized at this stage to deploy overwhelming force against the PKI. In fact, accounts of political confrontations in November do not differ substantially from reports of violent clashes in the two years before the coup.[60]

There was violence enough through November, but with nothing approaching the scale and intensity of events beginning in December. Scattered evidence indicates that in certain areas PKI members acted from a position of strength and confidence, and certainly were not simply slaughtered or led without complaint to their graves.[61] As late as mid-November, the balance of local political forces still prevented political tension from escalating into mass murder.

Laying the Foundations of Mass Violence

The political and military situation in Bali began to change dramatically in the latter half of November. Local military forces, under pressure to act in line with developments on Java—and, perhaps, eager to disguise their own complicity in the Untung coup—assumed an increasingly aggressive posture towards the alleged perpetrators of the coup, particularly the PKI. Governor Sutedja's departure made it much easier. Local military initiatives in November included: i) the compilation of lists and other documentation to "prove" the complicity of the PKI in the G-30-S coup; ii) the deliberate portrayal of PKI members as morally depraved and anti-religious; and iii) the use of psychological warfare techniques designed to force ordinary people to choose between the enemy and state authorities. In different circumstances these actions might not have have contributed significantly to mass violence. In post-coup Bali, however, they converged with and served to exacerbate long-standing political and social tensions, shaping another of the essential preconditions for a massacre.

In November military and police authorities began to resort to the language and techniques developed by national military and party propagandists to inflame passions against the PKI. Following the example set in Java, they claimed to have discovered documents proving PKI-Bali plans to stage a local G-30-S coup and indicating a sizeable unofficial PKI organization within KODAM XVI.[62] A list of

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November 15, 1965. The BTI in Gerokgak had a reputation for militancy because it had initiated several *aksi sepihak* in the pre-coup period.

[60] On November 12, 1965, for example, there were reports from Desa Bungkulan (in east Buleleng) of two armed confrontations between PKI and PNI "masses" which bore many similarities to pre-coup conflicts. In one a PKI band of about forty reportedly surrounded the home of a PNI member with the intention of burning it. The Head of the Sawan District PNI branch responded by mobilizing local PNI mass organizations and calling the police. In short order, a force of two police squads and more than 500 PNI members gathered to confront the PKI group. Apparently expecting support from surrounding hamlets, the PKI band stayed and fought. Earlier in the day, police patrolling in Banjar Kubu Kelod (Desa Bungkulan) were reportedly confronted by a PKI band, armed with bamboo spears and knives. The newspaper report of the clash stated that the band of about forty men had attacked. "Because it was still dark, and they were far outnumbered by the PKI gang, the police were forced to fire. . . . After the arrival of reinforcements, the police continued to fire, while surrounding the village. Eventually, the entire gang surrendered and was taken to Bungkulan to be interrogated." *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, November 21, 1965.

[61] In Banjar Loloan Barat, in the town of Negara (Jembrana), PKI activists were said to have painted the words "Live" or "Die" on houses of allies and enemies respectively. Personal interview by author with the family of I Wayan Reken, October 4, 1986, Negara.

[62] Those familiar with the style of Indonesian Army Intelligence operations treat these "discoveries" of documentary evidence with circumspection

seventy-five names of Army men—all of lower to middle rank—involved in this underground PKI was said to have been found at the home of a certain Pudjo Prasetio, named as the main G-30-S/PKI organizer in KODAM XVI.[63]

Along with a "hit-list" of prominent local government and military figures, the documents included details of alleged PKI plans to commit a variety of depraved acts. Leading political figures, for example, were to be humiliated by being undressed before a mass rally to be held on October 2, 1965.[64] Later investigations purportedly revealed that Gerwani members in Bali had been instructed to "sell" themselves to ABRI men in order to obtain weapons for the PKI, and having done so, to murder and castrate the soldiers they had seduced. Like the fabricated stories about Gerwani women performing a naked dance while castrating and gouging the eyes of the captured generals in Jakarta on October 1, these revelations served to make PKI members appear not merely political traitors, but immoral, debauched, and inhuman. It made the delegitimation of the Party, and the murder of its members, much easier than it might otherwise have been.[65]

Another factor building towards anti-PKI violence was the campaign, launched under Kopkamtib auspices, to make it impossible for ordinary people to remain politically neutral, a technique of psychological warfare later employed by Indonesian forces in Aceh and East Timor. Beginning in mid-November, propaganda teams (Team Penerangan Operasi Mental, or TOM) toured rural areas pressing the logic of non-neutrality.

> It was stressed that there are only two possible alternatives; to be on the side of the G-30-S or to stand behind the government in crushing the G-30-S. There is no such thing as a neutral position.[66]

If one was not unequivocally *against* the G-30-S, one was necessarily for it. To escape arrest or death everyone, and especially former PKI members, had to show that they fully rejected the Party, that they condemned the treacherous G-30-S, and that they would cooperate fully in whatever official plan was initiated to destroy it.

At first a written declaration (*surat pernjataan*) renouncing involvement in, or support for, the PKI and the G-30-S seemed to be sufficient. The first of the *surat pernjataan*, from the workers at the textile factory (Balitex) outside of Denpasar, appeared in *Suara Indonesia* on November 11, 1965, but by December the classified advertisement section of the paper was crowded with similar statements from all over the island. Disavowal and self-criticism after the fact, however, turned out to be no guarantee of safety, for the attack on the party was based not on the presumption

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[63] Personal interview with former PSI-Bali leader, July 30, 1986, Denpasar. At the end of November, the Army reported that seventy-six men from KODAM XVI had been arrested for suspected involvement in the coup plot. See *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, November 28, 1965. Pudjo Prasetio was tried and sentenced to life imprisonment for subversion. In 1993 he was still in jail in Denpasar.

[64] *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, November 5, 1965.

[65] The local newspaper commented: "It is clear from these revelations how base and depraved PKI plans were After scraping as much profit as possible from their shameless sexual activities, Gerwani members were supposed to murder and at the same time cut off the genitals of their victims." See *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, November 21 and 30, 1965.

[66] *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, November 18, 1965.

of actual complicity, but rather on the logic of *associative* guilt and the need for collective retribution.[67]

By late November, it was clear that more definitive evidence of political reliability was required by the authorities. At an official ceremony marking the banning of the PKI in Kerambitan (Tabanan), the District (KODIM) Military Commander, Capt. S. Paidi, announced that he wanted:

> . . . concrete proof of ex-PKI members' loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia and to Pancasila, because making a written testimony is very easy; what matters most is real proof.[68]

Similar language began to appear in the speeches and pronouncements of political leaders at about this time. In mid-November, two days after the removal of Gianyar's pro-PKI Bupati, the acting Bupati, Made Kembar Kerepun, minced no words at a "Hero's Day" rally. Drawing heavily on the rhetoric developed by national military and party leaders, he told a crowd estimated at 100,000 that: "Those who are not prepared to repent and who remain obstinate must be cut down to the very roots."[69] The most effective way of proving one's rejection of the PKI, and so of saving one's own skin, was to take an active role in the campaign to destroy the Party politically and physically.[70] The deadly logic of non-neutrality, together with an interest in survival, compelled not only the genuinely neutral, but even former PKI members, to join in the attack on the PKI.[71] It was a time for moving with the flow.

The concerted anti-PKI offensive that began in early December built upon the rhetoric and animosity cultivated earlier. By the end of November, PKI members stood completely alone against the combined power of the Army, the police, anti-Communist mass organizations and their vigilante shock troops. Not only was Sutedja gone, but influential local leaders had fled or been arrested.[72] Demoralized by the repeated allegations of PKI wrong-doing, abandoned by their leaders, hopelessly overpowered and unable to live safely even within their own communities, ordinary PKI members must have sensed that resistance would be quite pointless. The stage was finally set for wholesale massacre.

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[67] This logic apparently penetrated rather deeply into the political consciousness of Balinese. A night-market vendor in Kintamani (Bangli) was killed after the coup on the evidence that once, during a power outage, he had provided a storm lantern to allow a PKI rally to continue. His murder was justified *not* on the grounds that he personally had done anything wrong, but that he was associated with an organization which had.

[68] *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, December 1, 1965.

[69] *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, November 11, 1965.

[70] Soe Hok Gie, writing in 1967, noted that "Survival is a very strong motive for action. To succeed, one has to cover one's tracks and leave no traces. Killing is the easiest and safest way to do this, because dead people don't speak." See Soe Hok Gie, "The Mass Killings in Bali."

[71] The increasingly aggressive campaign by local military commanders to inculpate and punish the PKI in connection with the coup, starting in November, may have been an effort to deflect attention from the degree of support for the Untung coup within the local military command itself.

[72] The PKI Bupati of Gianyar I Made Suyoga, for example, was removed from office on November 8. Early in November the Head of Pemuda Rakjat in Jembrana, A. A. Nyoman Dhenia, was arrested in Banyuwangi.

Organizing the Massacre

The incident said to have sparked the massacre in Bali was the killing of an army officer and two Ansor youths by PKI members in Desa Tegalbadeng, Jembrana, on November 30.[73] According to conventional wisdom, anti-PKI violence spread *spontaneously* throughout the island afterwards, rapidly becoming so "frenzied" that when troops of the RPKAD and TON Panser Zipur of KODAM VIII/Brawijaya arrived from Java on December 7–8, their main task was "to stop it before irreparable damage was done to the social structure."[74] Very little evidence actually supports this view. Rather, virtually all of the evidence indicates that military forces, both local and Java-based, together with political party leadership, orchestrated and incited the violence in Bali, as they did in Java.[75] It is probably no coincidence that several generals, including Major General Suharto, visited Bali on the day after the RPKAD landing.[76] Before examining in more detail the pattern of the killing, it is important to deal with the influence of the military in it.

The notion that troops from Java helped to put a stop to the massacre on Bali is based principally on the often-quoted remarks of RPKAD Commander Colonel Sarwo Edhie. Speaking to journalists some time in December 1965, he is reported to have said: "In Java we had to egg the people on to kill Communists. In Bali we have to restrain them. . . . "[77] These remarks imply, correctly, that violent conflict had begun in Bali by the time RPKAD troops arrived. For the rest, however, the implication that the worst of the violence had begun before RPKAD troops arrived to put an end to it deserves to be treated skeptically.

First, it is unlikely that several tens of thousands of people could have been killed in the seven days between the November 30 incident in Jembrana and the arrival of troops from Java on December 7–8.[78] Killing may indeed have begun immediately after November 30, but a great deal more must have occurred *after* the troops landed from Java, and in all probability took place under their supervision.

Second, it is doubtful that the November 30 incident, on its own, sparked killings on such a massive scale. Several previous clashes of the same kind resulted in casualties on both sides, but none led to widespread anti-PKI violence even remotely comparable to the events begun in December. In the circumstances, it is hard to believe that the popular reaction to the Jembrana incident was wholly spontaneous. But if the incident by itself cannot explain the fundamental change in the quality of political violence after November 30, it seems reasonable to suggest that the RPKAD—arriving so soon after—had a hand in it.

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[73] See *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, December 10, 1965.

[74] May, *The Indonesian Tragedy*, p. 123.

[75] Cribb has also expressed some skepticism about the conventional wisdom He notes that ". . . a number of stories make it clear that it was the arrival of army units with death lists which played a key role in prompting the killings in many cases." Cribb, *The Indonesian Killings of 1965–1966*, p. 247.

[76] Others in the group were Brigadiers General Soemitro, Dharsono, Hartono, Wahju Hargono and Soedirgo. Although the precise purpose of the visit is not clear, it may have been intended to ensure the full cooperation of the local military authorities—particularly Pangdam Sjafiuddin—who were still not regarded as politically reliable. See *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, December 10, 1965.

[77] Quoted in John Hughes, *Indonesian Upheaval*, p. 181.

[78] Hughes claims that "the worst was over" before the paracommandos arrived. *Indonesian Upheaval*, p. 181.

Third, there is some doubt whether Colonel Sarwo Edhie actually spoke the words attributed to him. The probable source for his reported remarks is a December 1965 interview, conducted by a journalist of the Armed Forces Information Service, published in 1966.[79] But the text of remarks resembles more nearly the comments made by the journalist (or possibly the author of the book in which they appeared) in his introduction to the transcript of the interview.[80] Colonel Sarwo Edhie's own statement in the transcript is considerably more ambiguous:

> The situation in Bali is different from the situation in Central Java. Whereas in Central Java I was concerned to encourage the people to crush the Gestapu, [in Bali] on the other hand, the people were already eager to crush the Gestapu to its roots. The important thing was not to let that enthusiasm be misused by certain people, leading to anarchy. That is what we had to prevent.[81]

This comment, along with that of another RPKAD officer, Major Djasmin, can be read to mean the RPKAD was not so much concerned to end the anti-PKI violence as to bring it under Army control. According to a local press account, Major Djasmin said that:

> . . . the actions to annihilate the G-30-S are at present extremely confused, with the result that it is difficult to distinguish which is the movement of the revolutionary masses and which is the G-30-S. For this reason . . . the annihilation of the G-30-S must be carefully led and channeled in order to prevent the eruption of chaos and violence which has no limits.[82]

Here it seems that in the view of the officers from Java, the campaign against the PKI on Bali was not yet properly conducted. They may have suspected that local military forces, while claiming to take anti-PKI actions, were mainly trying to cover their own tracks. They may also have been concerned that the violence was not overwhelmingly one-sided, but still involved armed clashes between pro- and anti-PKI forces.

"Leading" and "channeling" the destruction of the PKI, then, did not mean that Communists were no longer to be killed, but that the killing was thereafter to be done in a more orderly fashion, with the military controlling the action.[83] Thus, an official army history of this period notes that in Bali:

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[79] The interview was published with the title "Kegagalan Gestapu/PKI Terletak Pada Rentjananja Jang Serba Wishful thinking," in Dharmawan Tjondronegoro, *Ledakan Fitnah Subversi G-30-S* (Jakarta: Matoa, 1966).

[80] The relevant passage from the introduction reads: " . . . while in Central Java, the spirit of the people had to be raised in order to fight the Gestapu, according to Colonel Sarwo, in Bali their spirit was already overflowing, so that it only had to be controlled, in order that it would not be misused by a certain group." Dharmawan Tjondronegoro, *Ledakan Fitnah Subversi G-30-S*, p. 158.

[81] Ibid., p. 165.

[82] *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, December 12, 24, and 29, 1965.

[83] Hughes, *Indonesian Upheaval*, p. 181.

> . . . after January 1, 1966 the actions to destroy the members of the G-30-S no longer involved mass actions. By that time, ABRI officers had brought a degree of order to the methods used.[84]

Bringing "order" to the campaign meant ensuring that only PKI members were killed, and that it was done systematically.

The Logistics of Mass Murder

One means by which the army controlled the execution of suspected Communists was through the provision of logistical support—weapons, ammunition, trucks, communications and detention facilities. In some cases, mass executions could not have been carried out otherwise. In Negara, Jembrana, for example, where the Java-based troops landed in early December, eyewitnesses reported that dozens of army trucks loaded with alleged Communists picked up from surrounding villages formed a slow and orderly procession down the main street for several days. The trucks rumbled toward a large warehouse where, one by one, hands bound, captives were taken inside and shot with automatic weapons. I Wayan Reken, a local historian now deceased, described the operation:

> Through the month of December, the Army with angry people of the Front Pancasila destroyed the communists in the most horrible massacre. It was a river of blood in which several thousands were killed in Jembrana alone, a tragic summary of the history of Jembrana.[85]

During three days in December, an estimated 6,000 were killed.[86] Most of the corpses were dumped either into the sea or large mass graves.

Logistical support provided by the military was of considerable importance in the annihilation of the PKI in other parts of Bali as well. An article in the local newspaper from the second week of December 1965 noted:

> . . . they don't even need to see the red beret [of the RPKAD], it is enough simply to hear the roar of a truck, and the hearts of the big-shot G-30-S types begin to beat wildly with fear. . . . [87]

Similarly, a resident of Denpasar, who lived near one of the detention camps in the southern part of the town (Sanglah), recalls the endless roar of military truck engines, the unloading of their human cargo, which she observed from a window, and the constant popping of automatic weapons-fire.[88] A Dutch journalist who visited Bali in 1966 also recorded military and police assistance in operations in west Gianyar:

> Riding in police trucks, the militant Balinese entered villages where communists lived. The communists were rounded up and taken by truck to another village

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[84] Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Dinas Sejarah KODAM XVI/Udayana, *Komando Daerah Militer XVI/Udayana Dalam Lintasan Sejarah*, Denpasar, p. 192.

[85] I Wayan Reken, "A History of Djembrana From the 18th Century," (Manuscript).

[86] Personal interview, anonymous eyewitness, October 4, 1986, Negara

[87] *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, December 9, 1965

[88] Personal interview, anonymous, September 24, 1986, Denpasar.

> where they were slaughtered with knives (*klewang*) or shot dead in police prisons. In order to prevent later acts of revenge, in most cases, the entire family, or even the extended family were killed.[89]

As these observations suggest, the killing involved substantial "civil-military cooperation." Hughes wrote that after the arrival of troops from Java, ". . . the military and police got together with civilian authorities and made sure the right people were being executed. People were . . . arrested and, usually, shot by the soldiers."[90] In other cases, according to Hughes, military authorities instructed village communities to carry out the executions:

> Sometimes villages were specifically assigned to purge themselves of their Communists. Then took place communal executions as the village gathered its Communists together and clubbed or knifed them to death. Sometimes the army handed back to a village Communist Party members it had already arrested. The village as a whole was instructed to execute them.[91]

The massacre was accelerated by the manipulation of institutions of community obligation. In some cases community leaders simply ordered people to kill. In one reported case, a number of young boys—temple attendants at Pura Besakih—apparently killed three local PKI members near the temple. When asked why they had done so, one of the boys reportedly replied: "Some authorities just came by one day and said to get rid of them . . . and so we did."[92] Some village and hamlet authorities exploited the "traditional" institutions of communal responsibility and labor in order to annihilate the PKI:

> One man would stab a victim while another would hit him on the head with a rock. 'I couldn't believe it,' a foreigner who witnessed the blood bath told me. 'One Balinese never killed another alone. It was all community work. The whole village was instructed.'[93]

Although not all did so by any means, religious authorities, including *pedanda* (Brahmana priests), *pemangku* (lay priests), and *balian* (soothe sayers), were in a position to stoke a sense of outrage against the PKI, contributing to the violence. Their advice was sought on such questions as the permissibility of taking human life or the whereabouts of particular PKI members. Sometimes out of genuine religious conviction, but often for narrowly political reasons, religious leaders justified the killing of Communists on the grounds that the PKI was "anti-religious." Donald Kirk quotes a "priest," for example: "Our religion teaches us not to kill or hurt . . . but we felt we had to crush whoever tried to disgrace God."[94]

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[89] Paul van 't Veer, "Bali zuivert zich zelf na gruwelijke moordgolf," *Vrij Uit*, December 17, 1965.

[90] Hughes incongruously concludes this passage by saying: "But the mayhem in the villages was at an end." Hughes, *Indonesian Upheaval*, p. 181.

[91] Ibid., p. 180.

[92] Moser, "Where the rivers ran crimson from butchery," p. 28.

[93] Kirk, "Bali Exorcises an Evil Spirit," p. 42.

[94] Ibid.

As in Java, military authorities encouraged the PNI and other parties to destroy the PKI.[95] Party figures proved willing accomplices, inciting and organizing violence against alleged PKI members. Certain individuals were deliberately singled out for execution by the PNI.[96] One of those targeted was Sutedja's close associate, the former *pemuda* leader, Gde Puger. According to reports that are difficult to confirm, Puger was tortured and dismembered before his captors killed him. One such report claims that pieces of his flesh were sliced from his body while he was still alive. Another target of PNI wrath were the extended family of Governor Sutedja. The royal *puri* in Jembrana was burned to the ground and family members were either killed or taken prisoner.

The military also encouraged armed anti-PKI vigilante gangs. The most prominent and feared of them were the PNI-backed *Tameng Marhaenis*, bands of eight or ten men who roamed about dressed in black, armed with knives, spears and firearms.[97] In Buleleng, where the killing continued until December 1966, there were reports of slightly larger gangs (fifteen or twenty men) armed with automatic weapons, presumably supplied by the military.[98] NU- affiliated Ansor youth gangs were also active in Bali. As in Java, Ansor groups, backed by the army, took part in arrest and execution operations.[99] Like their predecessors in the Revolution and the 1950s, the vigilantes of 1965–1966 were primarily young men, eager to demonstrate their "courage" and their sense of "revolutionary" commitment. Many, too, were *pencak silat* (martial arts) adepts, which leant them special status and an aura of power. It was military officers and party leaders, however, who identified their targets and gave them license to kill.

The parties, in particular the PNI, fostered the idea that the campaign against the PKI was a "holy war," masking the political opportunism and revenge involved. Writing in 1967, PNI-activist E. Utrecht observed that:

> The killing of PKI-members and sympathizers was not seen by the killers themselves as a criminal deed, or a political act. If one asks a Balinese what made him join in the killing, the answer will always be the same: the fulfillment of a *religious* obligation to purify the land.[100]

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[95] Ibid.

[96] According to Moser, one of Bali's Bupati was detained by the military and executed in custody. Later the same day, one of the soldiers involved was seen with a paper parcel containing the ears and fingers of the dead Bupati. Dismemberment and decapitation figure prominently in reports about killings in Bali. Describing the murder of a BTI official, by his friend, on a beach in Klungkung, Moser writes: "Then Ali took his *parang*—a short sword-like knife used for chopping in the fields—and cut off his friend's left ear, then his right ear, then his nose. Finally he raised his *parang* high and chopped his friend's head off. Moser, "Where the rivers ran crimson from butchery," p. 26.

[97] Personal interviews with Dr A. A. Made Djelantik, September 4, 1986; I Gusti Putu Arimbawa, December 20, 1986. Hughes and Cribb refer to them as *Tamin*, but local newspaper reports and informants used *Tameng*, which means shield.

[98] Personal interview with I Dewa Made Dhana, October 7, 1986. Dhana's own house was surrounded by such gangs on several occasions.

[99] Pluvier, among others, notes that some of the killings in the western part of Bali were actually carried out by Ansor gangs which had come across the Bali Strait from Banyuwangi Jan Pluvier, *Indonesie, kolonialisme, onafhankelijkheid, neokolonialisme: een politieke geschiedenis van 1940 tot heden* (Nijmegen: Socialistische Uitgeverij, 1978), p. 270.

[100] E. Utrecht, "Het bloedbad op Bali," *De Groene Amsterdammer*, January 14, 1967.

According to Soe Hok Gie, however, PNI leaders in Bali " . . . incited people to violence by saying that God approved of the killing of PKI people, and that the law would not condemn those who did this."[101] In a public address, Drs. Ida Bagus Oka made precisely this case, that truly religious Hindu-Balinese should be in the vanguard of the movement to wipe out the G-30-S traitors. "There can be no doubt," he said,

> . . . that the enemies of our revolution are also the cruelest enemies of religion which must be eliminated and destroyed down to the roots. . . . [102]

A clear example of how religious and cultural precepts were manipulated by enemies of the PKI was the conscious encouragement of the practice of *nyupat*, or what amounted to voluntary execution. Utrecht mentions a comment by the new PNI Bupati of Gianyar, who insisted that:

> . . . one should not speak of murder, but rather of *nyupat*, that is the shortening of someone's life in order to free them from their suffering, and to give them the chance of being reincarnated as a better person, just as in the *Barong* the witch Rangda, symbol of evil, asks Sudewa to end her life.[103]

Balinese eyewitnesses confirm that victims were sometimes given a choice prior to execution—to die willingly (to *nyupat*) or simply be shot. To *nyupat*, it was said, signified repentance and provided a kind of guarantee against a hellish afterlife or rebirth. The man in charge of the executions—usually a military officer—would shout, "Who wants to *nyupat*?" Thereafter, however, not much distinguished *nyupat* from murder. Those who came forward were sent to a different part of the execution area, where they were either shot, beheaded or stabbed like the others.[104] Few received a proper burial or cremation according to Balinese custom.[105]

The manipulation of cultural and religious symbols was critical to the dynamic of the massacre. For while the PKI was in some respects iconoclastic, it was not self-

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[101] Soe Hok Gie, "The Mass Killing in Bali."

[102] *Suara Indonesia (Denpasar)*, October 7, 1965.

[103] E. Utrecht, "Het bloedbad op Bali." The PNI was responsible for spreading the story that Governor Sutedja had chosen to *nyupat*, ostensibly in recognition of his personal responsibility for the cosmic imbalance in Bali. According to this story, a PNI delegation went to Jakarta some time in December 1965 to dispose of Sutedja. After a brief meeting, he reportedly expressed his wish to *nyupat* in the hope that this gesture would bring an end to the mass violence in Bali. Then, dressed in white, he was reportedly taken to a nearby wood or plantation and killed with a *keris*. PNI officials consulted a *balian* somewhere near Singaraja in early 1966 to confirm that Sutedja had indeed been killed. At a seance organized by the *balian*, the image of Sutedja was said to have appeared. According to one of the PNI officials in attendance, he was dressed in white garments which were marked with small circles of blood where, presumably, he had been stabbed.

[104] Execution spots were located either within military encampments or in hamlets with a solid and militant PNI base. One of the more notorious rural killing centers was the village of Kapal, on the road between Denpasar and Tabanan. There is no way of knowing how many died at Kapal, but it would appear operations continued there for at least two months.

[105] Moser mentions a beach in Klungkung where 1,500 were said to be buried. Moser, "Where the rivers ran crimson from butchery," p. 29. Hughes notes that in Jembrana corpses were buried in mass graves or were dumped at sea. Hughes, *Indonesian Upheaval*, p. 180.

evidently atheistic, nor was it obviously responsible for the island's economic and social problems, or for the apparent cosmic imbalance. These notions about the PKI's culpability had to be, and were, nourished as the foundation of mass collective action. The view that cosmic imbalance or impurity would be resolved by mass murder did not emerge naturally from precepts of Balinese Hinduism, but originated, rather, with Indonesian military leadership. They were consciously developed and disseminated with the assistance of political party and religious leaders eager for the demise of the PKI at any cost.

Conclusions

The consequences of the coups of October 1, 1965 made clear the extent to which Balinese politics responded to signals from the center. Just as the absence of a strong and cohesive central state in the revolutionary period (1945–1949) contributed to political turmoil, so in 1965 disintegration and conflict at the center led ultimately to political chaos in Bali. But the widespread killing which started in December was not merely the result of a political "vacuum" within which antagonistic social and political forces ran wild. Rather, the massacre started after, and *because*, instruments of the state itself—particularly local and national military commands—in alliance with powerful civilian political forces and with the support of key international actors, consciously sanctioned and encouraged the annihilation of a substantial segment of the population.

In October, with the continuing confidence of Sukarno in Jakarta, and as yet not seriously challenged by local military or police authorities, Sutedja and the PKI were able to resist the demands of the local PNI and other political parties. The balance changed rapidly in November. As Sukarno's authority weakened nationally, Sutedja's in Bali became increasingly tenuous. And as Suharto's forces consolidated their power in Java, the military command in Bali shifted its allegiance from Sutedja (and Sukarno) toward Suharto and the anti-Communist forces under his command. With the removal of Sutedja to Jakarta in late November, the stage was set for a violent assault on the PKI.

The massive, organized killing of alleged Communists did not begin in earnest until early December, however, when troops arrived from Java to bring "order" to the campaign against the G-30-S and the PKI. The massacre which began then was not an unavoidable tragedy, caused by the spontaneous outpouring of religious fervor, a shared desire to preserve the balance and harmony of village life, or a cultural predilection for slipping into trance and "running amok." It was largely the result of deliberate efforts by military and civilian leadership to destroy the PKI.

These efforts had two related dimensions, physical and rhetorical. Providing logistical support to local vigilante groups and mass organizations, the military ensured that the decimation of the PKI, begun in Java in October, would be carried to a successful conclusion in Bali. The idea of killing all members of the PKI did not emerge spontaneously in Bali, but was deliberately cultivated and made to appear both natural and morally acceptable. The rhetoric articulated nationally and locally helped to create an atmosphere in which the killing of one's enemy appeared not only morally justifiable, but a patriotic and religious obligation. In this context of cultivated anti-Communist hysteria, the fuses of Bali's historical conflicts over land, politics, religion, and culture, were easily ignited.

Without the orchestrated campaigns to render the PKI evil, and without the conscious encouragement, in principle and in practice, of the physical annihilation

the PKI, it is unlikely that any of Bali's long-standing political and economic tensions, or any predisposition toward revenge or violence that may have existed in Balinese culture, would have given rise to a massacre of such staggering brutality.

BETWEEN STATE AND SOCIETY: PROFESSIONAL LAWYERS AND REFORM IN INDONESIA

Daniel S. Lev

In few discussions of fundamental change in Indonesia are lawyers likely to win much attention as agents of it.[1] The neglect is understandable, for until recently lawyers have had relatively little influence on anything, let alone fundamental change. Moreover, their peculiar ideological vision—the "law state," *rechtsstaat*, rule of law, or *negara hukum* in the Indonesian variant of the idea—is no match for the glamour of such more obvious revolutionary claims as those of Communism or Islam or even "development." Yet, in the Indonesian setting, the *negora hukum* idea is at least equally ambitious and nearly as radical.

Gradually, during the last thirty years of New Order change, private lawyers have grown more conspicuous as the interests they represent have become more salient, the audience for *negara hukum* appeals has expanded, and the government has found it more and more difficult to ignore demands for reform. To explain why a relatively small group of reform lawyers has exerted quite so much influence is the purpose of this essay. I will trace the recent history of the professional advocacy, the tension between reform lawyers and the state over *negara hukum* issues, and the response of officialdom to the challenge posed by the advocacy.

LAWYERS IN INDONESIAN SOCIETY

In Indonesia's legal system there are five types of assistance on which individuals or groups rely in dealing with one another or the state bureaucracy: informal intermediaries, bush-lawyers (*pokrol-bambu*), notaries, advocates, and legal aid. The most pervasive form of representation is informal mediation, useful everywhere more or less in proportion to the legitimacy, accessibility, and reliability of formal institutional procedures. In Indonesia informal patterns of transaction, involving kin, ethnic, religious, friendship, or associational ties, generally supersede formal ones. Only a few points need to be made here about the process. First, informal mediation reinforces existing patterns of informal authority and influence. Second, those

[1] An earlier, much truncated version of this essay, delivered as a lecture, was published as Working Paper no. 2 (November 1992) by the Law Department of the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London.

without much influence to begin with have limited resources of informal assistance. The higher one's standing, the more influential relationships one has. For those with influence, informal connections offer special advantage, which helps to explain why reformers often emphasize the need for formal procedures and controls. Third, informal mediation is the primary competition of formal representational roles.

These latter—notaries, bush-lawyers (*pokrol-bambu*), advocates, and legal aid—differ in function and status. The notariat is only tangentially relevant to our concerns, for it has never been politically salient. In Indonesia (like other civil law countries) notaries make up a quiet center of lawyerly gravity. Responsible for the essential documentary work of private law, their work is usually secure and steady, for "authentic documents" are always necessary. The size of the notariat is restricted by regulation of the Ministry of Justice, with quotas for each major city. Because of their number, which they campaign constantly to restrict, and the inescapable need for their services, notaries occupy comfortable and prosperous economic-legal space. Concentrated in major cities, their services drop off precipitately at the edge of urban commercial activity. Since the New Order economic boom, from the late 1960s on, when notarial activity and income rose dramatically, the notariat has come under pressure for reform—its governing legislation dates from 1860—but little has yet been done about it.

Unlike notaries, who have nothing directly to do with courts, *pokrol-bambu* and advocates are basically litigators, fundamentally alike but also quite different. *Pokrol-bambu*, bush-lawyers, are more closely related to advocates than barefoot doctors are to trained physicians.[2] Few advocates ever admit it, but *pokrol-bambu* are simply low-status advocates. What distinguishes the two roles are formal education and, generally, the kinds of clients whom they represent. Formal procedural rules do not require trained counsel; anyone at all may appear in court. It is difficult to estimate just how many *pokrol-bambu* there are, however, as they come in many shapes, from the legally incompetent influential who merely accompanies friends in court, often as a show of force, to the experienced attorney, perhaps a former court clerk, who knows his way through procedure as well as most trained counsel.

Pokrol-bambu survive in part because their genetic kin, advocates, have never been influential enough to eradicate them. There have never been enough advocates to go around, but in any case *pokrol-bambu* represent clients whom advocates do not serve. Advocates and *pokrol-bambu* share an overlapping market for legal services primarily in the cities and to some extent among well-off farmers. Beneath a vague stratificatory boundary, however, advocates seldom drift and clients do not seek them out. Here *pokrol-bambu* have consistently represented poorer but not destitute clients. For villagers who singly or collectively can afford some payment or an attractive contingency fee, up through better-off landholders, traders, and the urban commercial and bureaucratic petite bourgeoisie, *pokrol-bambu* offer the advantages of lower charges and accessibility.

Yet there are distinct limits to what *pokrol-bambu* can do in and beyond litigation. Lacking training and degrees, status, social legitimacy, confidence, contacts in the government or the press, and an ideological conception of their professional role,

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[2] On *pokrol-bambu* see Daniel S. Lev, *Bush-lawyers in Indonesia: Stratification, Representation, and Brokerage* (Berkeley: Center for the Study of Law and Society, Working Paper no. 1, 1973). *Pokrol-bambu* is a pejorative term but more commonly used and recognized than others that have appeared.

pokrol-bambu do not speak or are not heard, on the social conditions and interests of their clients, who are "clients" rather than "a clientele." They have no say on institutional issues within the legal system and do not count in questions of legal reform.

By contrast with the steady existence in this century of informal mediation, the notariat, and *pokrol-bambu*, none of which has evolved all that much, the advocacy is a study in disequilibrium. Unlike the others, which enjoy a constant market for their services, the demand for advocates has always been elastic. Economic factors count for a great deal in the history of the advocacy since the revolution, but while the profession has always been responsive to economic change, many advocates have been equally sensitive to the political and institutional settings of their work.

From their beginning in the colony, during the 1920s, Indonesian advocates made up a small new group of accomplished, independent professionals. Politically nationalist by and large, they were also committed to the idea of a modern state rid of colonial administration but built around the Dutch legal institutions and codes in which they made their ways.[3] With independence, as Dutch lawyers left during the early 1950s, the reach of local advocates extended upwards into the corporate economy, but not much lower into the rest of society. The profession then was neither substantial nor exceedingly well-off, but reasonably secure, prestigious, and confident. After 1959, however, under Guided Democracy, the advocacy's sources of economic and political support dried up. Growing emaciated as the economy sank underground, the advocacy was also disengaged politically and ideologically from the Sukarno regime.

These conditions changed dramatically in the years following the coup of 1965, when economic growth in the New Order startled the advocacy awake. Foreign investors especially required legal assistance and advice, and increased foreign and domestic commerce meant increased commercial negotiation, conflict, and litigation. Having nearly starved, the profession now saw a huge feast spread before it. It fattened, multiplied, and mutated. Until the mid-1960s the number of advocates in Indonesia had probably never risen above 250 or so, about the same as in the last years of the colony. Between 1966 and 1970 the size of the advocacy at least doubled. From 1971 through late 1984, according to the Ministry of Justice rolls, a total of 1,075 new advocates registered. Twice that number, perhaps, did not bother to register, which saved them trouble and did not prevent them from practicing. By the early 1990s uncertain estimates of the number of legally educated private practitioners, both registered and unregistered, ranged from three to six thousand or more nationwide.[4] Sometime during this period of expansion the ratio of advocates to population

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[3] Daniel S. Lev, "Origins of the Indonesian advocacy," *Indonesia* 21 (April 1976): 135–169. By 1941, the last year of the colony, of a total of 206 advocates in the colony, 81 were Indonesian, divided almost evenly between ethnic Indonesian and ethnic Chinese lawyers. *Regeerings Almanac*, 1941/II, pp. 156–159. Although ethnic Indonesian lawyers have been politically more active and outspoken than ethnic Chinese lawyers, with striking exceptions, ideologically there is relatively little difference between them.

[4] That many practicing lawyers did not bother to register as advocates reflects the disarray into which the profession fell during the Guided Democracy years. Until the 1980s the government was not interested in regulating the advocacy, and voluntary registration, often an expensive inconvenience, bestowed no obvious advantages. Consequently, it is hard to ascertain precisely how many lawyers are actually in private practice at any time. The figures I have given are approximated from information in the Ministry of Justice and the membership lists of PERADIN, the advocates' association, for 1977. See *Album Kongres V PERADIN*

surpassed that in the colony, about one per 350,000 at best, and now may be in the vicinity of one per 60,000 or better.

At the same time, other dimensions of the profession began to change radically. Once the advocacy began to grow during the late 1960s, its average age declined as experienced seniors retired and younger lawyers took up private practice. Moreover, for the first time in its history the profession attracted lateral recruits from the ranks of retired judges, prosecutors, and other civil servants, who introduced new elements and consequent tension over style, ethics, and ideology. Economic change also triggered a structural metamorphosis in the profession. For most of its history the advocacy had been a relatively homogeneous order of specialists in litigation, similar to the European model. But in the New Order, private lawyers diversified, specialized, and stratified along lines of new economic opportunity. The features of private lawyering were redefined by the emergence of a stratum of non-litigators, "consulting lawyers," specializing in commercial legal counselling and negotiation. A new breed of solicitors or office lawyers who are not notaries but do not fit the traditional mold of advocates, the most successful of them inhabit new multi-member law firms established in Jakarta since the late 1960s. Many consulting lawyers did not register with the Ministry of Justice until they were compelled to do so in the 1980s. Nor did they join the most prominent professional association, PERADIN (Persatuan Advokat Indonesia. Indonesian Advocates Association) some of whose members did not, in any case, recognize them as advocates. But their income and status have promoted them to the elite ranks of the private legal profession.

These changes naturally affected the social and political outlook of the profession. The most prosperous private lawyers generally have disengaged from common issues of Indonesian state and society. Financially successful attorneys prefer to attend exclusively to their professional work. Consulting lawyers (and a few advocates) exist in a busy, lucrative, and comfortable commercial stratosphere—often suitably located in new tower offices—well insulated from the everyday miseries of the courts and of clients who have to deal with them. While they may sympathize with reformers, they also tend to detached or cynical views that excuse uninvolvement and justify political quiescence. Many feel indebted to the New Order for their prosperity, moreover, and see no reason to raise extraneous non-professional issues. And some, particularly former judges and prosecutors who rely on government contacts, are disinclined to imperil these advantages through critical activism of any sort, whatever their views otherwise. In 1978, when PERADIN proclaimed itself to be a "struggle organization" dedicated to reform, a few members were uneasy enough to help establish a counter-organization.[5]

Yet the new prosperity and public recognition of the advocacy also supported the reform efforts of legal activists for whom the *negara hukum* amalgamated professional necessity, political ideology, and social program. Their most important creation was the legal aid movement, which began with the Legal Aid Institute (Lembaga

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(Privately published, 1978?), pp. 131–148. PERADIN's membership was restricted to registered advocates, but not all registered advocates joined PERADIN.

[5] *Album Kongres V PERADIN*, p. 98. On the new organization of attorneys, the *Himpuan Penasehat Hukum Indonesia* [Indonesian Legal Counselors Association. HPHI], see *Tempo* 21 (April 1979): 17. Other associations of private lawyers that emerged during the next several years recruited both certified advocates and unregistered practitioners. See Abdurrahman S. H., *Aspek-Aspek Bantuan Hukum di Indonesia* [Aspects of Legal Assistance in Indonesia] (Jakarta: Cendana Press, 1980), pp. 265ff.

Bantuan Hukum. LBH) of Jakarta. Founded with PERADIN sponsorship in 1970, the LBH institutionalized the political vision of reform advocates. It will not be dealt with at length in this essay, whose focus is the advocacy proper.[6] In brief, however, the LBH provides legal assistance to the poor but also has become Indonesia's most prominent center of social-legal and political-legal reform activity.

Advocates and the Negara Hukum

Like the modern Indonesian state itself, the *negara hukum* (a literal translation of the Dutch *rechtsstaat*) is an imported concept, but (also like the state) its significance can only be understood in an Indonesian context. Although various groups have supported an Indonesian rule of law, professional advocates have been its most articulate and generally most liberal spokesmen.[7] Their commitment to the *negara hukum* is best understood in related terms of professional interest and ideological orientation, which can be traced most clearly against the background of their professional evolution.

Earlier than most nationalists in the colony, advocates knew what kind of independent state they wanted. The colonial legal system distinguished unequi-vocally between European and colonial-Indonesian conceptions of political and social order, creating a striking contrast for attentive lawyers.[8] On the European side, the symbolic focus of the legal system was the judiciary, staffed by well-trained, respected public and private lawyers, including Indonesian advocates themselves. The written codes were rigorous, precise, and enforceable. Governmental authority was limited by written rules, which also accorded individuals well-defined and actionable rights. All this was predicated on normative values of legal equality, certainty, and predictability, and it applied only to those with European legal status.

On the Indonesian side, symbolic (and real) political-legal authority vested not in courts but in the administrative bureaucracy, particularly the *pangreh praja* (now the *pamong praja*), local arm of the Ministry of Interior.[9] Unlike the European codes of civil and criminal procedure, the Revised Indonesian Regulation (HIR). for Indonesians was relatively loose, with less stringent controls over the exercise of official authority and fewer protections for individuals. Substantively, Indonesians were subject to the diverse rules of local customary (*adat*) law, applied in several areas outside of Java by customary courts governed by their own procedural norms. What was certain and predictable in this, from the advocate's point of view, were the prerogatives of patrimonial authority, refined and shored up for the purposes of

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[6] On the LBH see Daniel S. Lev, *Legal Aid in Indonesia* (Monash University Southeast Asian Studies, Working Paper no. 44, 1987) and the sources cited there.

[7] See Daniel S. Lev, "Judicial Authority and the Struggle for an Indonesian Rechtsstaat," *Law and Society Review* 13, 4 (Winter 1978).

[8] In the complex legal system of the Netherlands East Indies, the Indonesian side was no less a Dutch creation then the European side, but worked by different principles. Not only were there distinct courts and procedural codes, but equally distinct substantive law regimes, with catchment areas of uniformity or connection where it suited various interests. Under indirect rule, Indonesian elites were allowed considerable local authority enforced by colonial administrative power. On colonial legal structure, see *inter alia* J. H. Carpentier Alting, *Grondslagen der Rechtsbedeeling in Nederlandsch-Indie* (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1926); B. ter Harr, *Adat Law in Indonesia* (New York: IPR, 1948). The discussion that follows draws on my "Colonial Law and the Genesis of the Indonesian State," *Indonesia* 40 (Oct. 1985): 57–75.

[9] See Heather Sutherland, *The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite* (Singapore: Heinemann, 1979).

colonial administration but resting still on a "traditional" social order for which the lawyers had little sympathy. Its primary attributes had to do not with legal equality, but social and political hierarchy, not individual rights of citizens, but the discretionary privileges of officials. Here there was room for informal intermediaries and supplicants, but not for lawyers, for whom clear rules and justiciable rights were minimal requirements of their role.

That advocates leaned to the "European" concept is not surprising. They made that choice in part by joining the advocacy instead of the public bureaucracy, the preferred calling of the Javanese aristocracy which supplied the first Indonesian lawyers. Their professional advantage lay in retaining the structure of the European, not the Indonesian, side of the legal system, but this also implied an ideological interest in refashioning Indonesian social and political values to suit a state basically liberal in design. Advocates joined, or helped found, those parties that promised such change. They applauded the Japanese decision, during the wartime occupation, to eliminate the plural colonial judiciary in favor of unified courts, but regretted the retention of the weaker courts for Indonesians rather than the stronger courts for Europeans. During and after the revolution, they consistently pressed institutional reforms that favored limited government, procedural uniformity, and legal equality. Early in the revolution, however, the government followed the Japanese example, adopting the colonial procedural code for Indonesians instead of the more elaborate codes for Europeans. It was an omen of things to come. In positions of authority, advocates fairly consistently undertook to abolish traditional local privileges, to eliminate *adat* courts, to create a nationally unified judiciary, and to strengthen the courts against executive aggression, but the political odds were heavily against them.[10]

Although advocates were disproportionately influential as part of a small educated elite, they were still hopelessly outnumbered, and they lacked the middle class support their vision required. Even among the miniscule group of legally trained Indonesians—about four hundred when the Japanese army arrived—advocates were a minority. Most indigenous lawyers had joined the colonial government as judges in the Landraad (superior court for Indonesians), admin-istrators, and scholars; and their experience on the Indonesian side of the colonial legal system promoted an ideological perspective that favored a powerful state in control of a submissive society.

The spread between the two political-legal orientations was made acutely clear in July 1945, when Indonesia's first constitution was drafted, in a debate between Mohammad Yamin and Raden Supomo. The West Sumatran Yamin made the most elaborate case for the kind of state professional advocates generally preferred. He proposed a constitutional bill of rights, a supreme court with powers of judicial review, and clearly separated legislative, judicial, and executive functions. Drawn from the United States model, his ideas departed radically from the institutional experience of the colony; and the premises on which they rested—a sharp distinction between state and society, recognition of individual interests and rights, limited government, and institutional controls over political authority—challenged all the

[10] Lev, "Origins of the Indonesian Advocacy," and Daniel S. Lev, "Judicial Unification in Post-Colonial Indonesia," *Indonesia* 16 (October 1973): 1–39.

constructs of political authority that underlay the administration of Indonesian society as it was most fully developed in colonial Java.[11]

The Javanese Supomo was the colony's most prominent Indonesian legal scholar. Closely associated with the conservative *adatrechtpolitiek* conceived in Leiden, during the 1930s he worked in the Department of Justice and then served as legal adviser to the Japanese occupation administration. The most influential legal technician in the independence preparatory commissions of 1945, Supomo was chiefly responsible for drafting the document that became the constitution of 1945. If some nationalist leaders accepted the institututional heritage of the colony simply because it was easier and required no political imagination, Supomo understood it intimately and consciously preferred it.

He dismissed Yamin's proposals out of hand, arguing that Indonesian jurists had no experience with the system Yamin wanted. The alternative model of Continental civil law, equally prestigious in the world outside, was already in place, already adapted to Indonesian conditions, and already known by the political leaders and officials who would have to staff the independent state.

Supomo's political agenda was more interesting than mere administrative conservatism. Committed to preserving not only the existing legal order but the authority of the *priyayi* aristocracy on which colonial administration in Java had depended, his line of argument flowed smoothly from the ideology of colonial-Javanese patrimonialism.[12] Liberal individualism was out of the question, he insisted, for the state is conceived as a family, and the good of the family must supersede that of the individual member. The constitutional rights Yamin wanted were unnecessary, for such rights were against the state. On this point Supomo was right, but he assumed state and society to be indivisible, led by an ascriptive elite responsible for ascertaining and defending the interests of state-society. The evident superiority of this elite, and the totality of its responsibility, rendered external control not only superfluous but obtrusive and even subversive.[13]

Yamin's proposals were voted down in 1945, but Supomo's were not fully endorsed either. Following the revolution, the parliamentary regime of independent Indonesia rather vindicated the views of the advocates, though not entirely to their satisfaction. The elegant Dutch procedural codes were supplanted by the simpler HIR, and new national courts descended from the colonial *Landraden* for Indonesians rather than the European *Raden van Justitie*. But it was not a bad time for the pro-

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[11] Muh. Yamin, *Naskah-Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945* [Preparatory Documents of the 1945 Constitution] (Jakarta: Prapantja, 1959), pp. 330–337. While Yamin, who practiced as an advocate for only a short time in the 1930s, represented well the political ideas of the profession, his proposals probably went further than most advocates at the time were willing to go. It may be that he also spoke for Sumatran worries about the inevitable domination of independent Indonesia by the Javanese heartland. One can read his ideas as promoting control either over the Indonesian state or over a Javanese dominated Indonesian state.

[12] See Soemarsaid Moertono, *State and Statecraft in Old Java* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, 1968), but also Sutherland, *The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite.*

[13] Unlike the federal constitution of 1949 and the provisional constitution of 1950, the 1945 Constitution provides few institutional controls over executive authority and no constitutionally stipulated political rights. For Supomo's arguments see Yamin, *Naskah*, 337ff, and for an English translation, Feith and Castles, *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945–1965* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 188–192.

fession, and advocates remember it as a period of great promise.[14] The ideological symbols were right: constitutionalism, parliamentarism, and the *negara hukum.* During the 1950s many advocates were in the government and active in political parties, depleting the profession, especially of ethnic Indonesian lawyers. Those who still practiced were complacent. Despite the turmoil of the parliamentary years, they had reason to suppose that their professional livings were secure, that the legal system would continue to honor them, that public legal institutions would eventually catch up to the advocates' own high standards, and that Indonesian society would become progressively more "law-minded." Shaky as the parliamentary *rechtsstaat* seems in hindsight, private lawyers thought it natural and inevitable. The *negara hukum,* though beset by evolutionary problems, was to their minds an accomplished fact, secured by the provisional parliamentary Constitution of 1950.

But the *negara hukum* proved to be even more provisional than the 1950 Constitution. As Guided Democracy took form from 1957, all the supports advocates had taken for granted—a legitimate private economy, autonomous and effective legal process, and constitutionalism—collapsed. Beneath the new regime's surface radicalism lay essentially reactionary administrative premises drawn self-consciously from the myths of the classical Javanese state and less openly, but more profoundly, from the memory of colonial practice. Sukarno's emphases on revolutionary movement (including "revolutionary law") and a patrimonially conceived populism ("the message of the people's suffering") endowed political and bureaucratic leadership with maximum discretionary authority, much as Supomo had originally intended. Legal process was rendered ritually peripheral to political and administrative prerogative freed of institutional controls.

Sukarno treated the liberal *negara hukum* as a weak challenge to his own vision of a self-realized Indonesian nation-state, the instrument of conservative elements bent on surrendering Indonesian creativity to European political fashion. He dealt with the lawyers mercilessly, making their prized constitutionalist ideas a special target of his contempt. In two crowning legislative gestures, politically pointless by that time but symbolically cutting, Sukarno tossed out the principles of separation of powers and judicial independence.[15]

The Guided Democracy years edified few lawyers of any sort, but advocates suffered most professionally and ideologically. Public lawyers—particularly judges, but prosecutors too—felt the loss of institutional autonomy, yet retained the advantages of official status at a time of rising bureaucratic authority. As compensation for their loss of independence, courts and prosecution, like the rest of the bureaucracy, were relieved of controls and became increasingly corrupt, self-serving, and unaccountable. As judges, prosecutors, and police were drawn into explicit cooperation with local administrative and security officials (the *Caturtunggal*), advocates, nakedly unofficial, lost procedural leverage, and their clients suffered for it. Professional satisfaction evaporated even faster than professional work. During the Guided Democracy period, on the whole, the advocacy was stunned and stagnant, with few new recruits. As if to demonstrate that the profession still hung on, despite everything a

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[14] See Jamaluddin Dt. Singo Mangkuto, "Masa Depan Professi Advokat di Indonesi" [The future of the profession of advocacy in Indonesia] in *Penataran Pengacara Muda se-Indonesia,* Mimeo, the report of a workshop for young advocates sponsored by the Legal Aid Institute of Jakarta in April 1973, pp. 34–48, at pp. 37–38.

[15] Law 19/1964 on judicial authority and Law 13/1965 on the organization of the civil judiciary.

dozen or so senior advocates finally organized a national association, PERADIN, in March 1963.

When Guided Democracy capsized in a sea of blood following the coup of October 1965, advocates were prominent among the enthusiastic crowd who cheered and tried optimistically to shape a successor regime. At no previous time were private lawyers, as a group, so politically engaged and in public view as they became during the early New Order. PERADIN seniors and a few new recruits involved themselves ardently in the political and ideological issues. They were active in reform efforts in and out of the legal system, in public meetings and seminars, in parliamentary hearings, and in the press.[16] As fierce holdouts against Sukarno's bandwagon, most advocates had unassailable political credentials, but in addition many of the key issues of New Order politics were their issues—restoring legal process, institutional reform, constitutionalism, and human rights. Because of the experience of Guided Democracy, but also because fundamental features of Guided Democracy survived into the New Order, the advocates' perspective on the state acquired support among a wider and more critically interested audience than ever before. Not in any formal sense and not exclusively, yet quite clearly, advocates spoke to and for this audience.

Sukarno's explicit rejection of *rechtsstaat* symbols had paved the way for their revival. Demands for reform after 1965 were framed partly by the reaction against Guided Democracy's abuses, conveniently though simplistically represented as failures of legal principle. Rhetorically, at least, all the major forces behind the New Order favored the *negara hukum*, but there were profound differences over what it meant. At odds were two antithetical images of the proper relationship between law and public authority rooted in quite different conceptions of the relationship between state and society.

The principal protagonists were the army and state bureaucracy on the one hand and a growing universe of self-consciously private, non-governmental groups on the other. To the extent that the Government conception did not simply mask the actuality of military force and political privilege, its impulse was fundamentally bureaucratic and took for granted the priority of state interests. The other *negara hukum* was parliamentary and judicial in institutional conception and favored a better balance between state and private interests. While advocates and like-minded groups sought legal predictability, protection of private social interests, and constitutional limits on state power, army leaders sought stability, fuller control over a diverse society, expansion of state power, and consolidation of the army's special claim to leadership.

It was hardly a match. Once General Suharto had succeeded Sukarno as President in 1967–1968, army leadership was not likely to concede institutionalized controls over political and bureaucratic authority. Who could possibly man such controls? Not military officers, obviously, for this would threaten armed forces unity, and not civilian political interests, which, in Suharto's contemptuous assessment, had had their chance and failed. By this view, legal process could not serve as an autonomous instrument of social and political management, for any measure of institutional independence must proportionately diminish the responsibilities (and prerogatives)

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[16] See, for example, Suardi Tasrif, longtime chairman of PERADIN, *Menegakkan Rule of Law dibawah Orde Baru* [Consolidating the rule of law under the New Order] (Jakarta: PERADIN, 1971). In 1968 the famous Yap affair, in which police and prosecution officials tried to intimidate the civil rights attorney Yap Thiam Hien by detaining him in jail, helped to raise important symbolic legal issues around the advocacy.

of political leadership.[17] Despite occasional public assurances to the contrary, the legal system was conceived to be subordinate to the prior claims of political and bureaucratic authority.

This line of reasoning, never made explicit but commonly understood, traces back through Guided Democracy and Supomo's exposition in 1945 to the principles of colonial administration on the Indonesian side.[18] In effect, the regime trumpeted constitutionalism and legal process, but had the resources necessary to behave as it wished. Confidence in this reality justified the creation of an elaborate security apparatus, staffed and run by the military, whose extra-legal procedures paralleled and, at will, either superseded or subordinated conventional legal process. Legal officials generally accepted their submerged role as a matter of course. Even judges took it for granted that they were bound, like the rest of the bureaucracy, to the purposes of executive leadership. Any other view endangered their careers and violated the solidary bureaucratic ethos of the New Order administration. Acceptance was rewarded with bureaucratic privilege and insulation.

Consequently, while concessions were made to demands for administrative and judicial probity, they could not be enforced for lack of effective institutional machinery or useful political recourse. Assurances of improvements in judicial procedure—the Cibogo agreements of the late 1960s and early 1970s—did not hold for long.[19] The Government deflected an effort, led by judges and advocates but with wider support, to allow the Supreme Court (*Mahkamah Agung*) powers of judicial review over legislative and executive acts.[20] Complaints against judicial corruption and

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[17] To put the argument differently, at its best, the government's monopoly of responsibility for political and social order could not be realistically subjected to limits imposed by law, for "law" is fundamentally an instrument of the regime, within which, it followed, no effective institutional recourse could exist without fragmenting public authority. Anderson traces the Javanese sources of this worry about dispersing authority in "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in Claire Holt, ed., *Culture and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1972), pp. 1–71. A compelling but worrisome analysis, it has the disadvantage of distracting us from a straightforward understanding of the interests of the regime in rejecting controls.

[18] As New Order tensions grew, the lines of debate established in 1945 between Supomo and Yamin re-emerged. The Government revived the authoritarian "integralist" position of Supomo in service to a corporatist ideology, while critics dug deeply into the constitutional debates of 1945 in search both of a constitutionalist foundation and a fuller understanding of the ideological sources of the Government's case. See Marsillam Simanjuntak, *Unsur Hegelian dalam Pandangan Negara Integralistik* [Hegelian elements in the integralistic view of the state] (Thesis submitted to the University of Indonesia Faculty of Law, 1989); Adnan Buyung Nasution, *The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia: A Socio-legal Study of the Indonesian Konstituante 1956–1959* , a dissertation at the University of Utrecht Faculty of Law (The Hague, 1992); Todung Mulya Lubis, *In Search of Human Rights: Legal-Political Dilemmas of Indonesia's New Order, 1966–1990* (Jakarta: Gramedia, SPES, 1993).

[19] *Album Kongres V*, p. 101. Cibogo was the site of three meetings, in 1967, 1970, and 1973, among officials of the Ministry of Justice, judiciary, prosecution, and police to bring some order, efficiency, and fairness to criminal trial process especially. Advocates were particularly concerned with the difficulties of obtaining case records from the courts, seeing their clients in good time, speeding up trials and reducing their costs, and other problems that obstructed adequate legal representation. See also Abdurrahman, *Aspek-Aspek Bantuan Hukum di Indonesia*, pp. 89ff, 174ff.

[20] Lev, "Judicial Authority," p. 56ff. In this quest advocates supported the demands of the judicial corps, but their purposes were different. While most judges wanted to enhance their institutional stature in bureaucratic terms, advocates sought a stronger and more effective judiciary that would distance itself from the bureaucracy and impose legal controls over

prosecutorial abuses, as routine in the New Order as under Guided Democracy, went essentially unanswered. Sporadic promises by the Government to control corruption also consistently came to nothing. A new statute on judicial organization (Law 14/1970) provided for legal representation of accused persons from the time of arrest, but the implementing legislation it required was not forthcoming.[21] Each of these reforms was intended to impose restrictions on bureaucratic privilege, discretion, and prerogative, diminutions of public authority conceded on paper but rejected as long as possible in practice.

The same reform issues illuminate the other *negara hukum*, which increasingly emphasized the legitimacy of private interests, assuming the separation of state and society and the necessity of an autonomous legal order that transcended both. The interests at stake in this evolving ideology belonged predominantly to a growing intellectual, professional, and commercial middle class and to religious and ethnic minorities: whoever lacked consistently dependable influence in the administration. The lesson of Guided Democracy, confirmed in the New Order, was that if you could not share in the power of the state, you needed protection against it. In this view, state and society had parted ways and now confronted one another.

Unlike the parliamentary period, when *negara hukum* principles and issues were rarely discussed seriously, they now became common fare in the press and in professional, academic, and intellectual circles. Key questions revolved persistently around the related problems of confining executive authority and protecting private citizens and interests. Without inside influence or organized power, groups outside the Government sought routine institutional access and redress within it. The judiciary, for lack of anything better, became the symbolic focus of this ambition. Advocates had a special interest in the courts, but for nearly all groups with weak links to power an independent judiciary had some appeal. From early 1966 onwards there were widespread demands to restore the separation of powers, assure judicial independence, erect institutional (i.e., judicial) controls over executive-bureaucratic authority, and surround the entire political system with a fence of legal process. A new literature on private rights developed around the problem of protecting citizens from official abuse.

These ideas became mainstays of protest against the New Order regime from the late 1960's through the 1990's. Professional advocates embraced them most enthusiastically and consistently. Stimulated by their own activism and public visibility but also frustrated by the absence of change and no longer optimistic, PERADIN seniors adopted them as a program. In late 1977, at a PERADIN congress dedicated to "The Role of Advocates in the development of a *Negara Hukum*," chairman Suardi Tasrif and his colleagues pushed through this resolution:

1. that the corps of advocates as one element of the *penegak hukum* [maintainers of the law] shares responsibility with lawyers in other fields and with society generally for developing an Indonesian *negara hukum*, as affirmed in the elucidation of the 1945 Constitution.

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executive authority. The brief and shaky alliance did not alleviate the considerable hostility between judges and advocates.

[21] The same law provided for administrative courts, which finally came into being only twenty years later, in 1991. It is too early to ascertain their effect, but it is likely that these administrative tribunals (PTUN) will be subjected to contradictory pressures to serve state and private interests in their jurisdiction.

2. that the Indonesian *negara hukum* is responsible for guaranteeing and respecting fundamental human rights for all citizens both in their political and in their social life, so that a Just and Prosperous Society based on the Pancasila is achieved for all the Indonesian people.
3. that to attain these goals PERADIN is obliged to intensify its role so as to become a struggle-organization [*organisasi perjuangan*] in its essential commitment to establish Truth, Justice, and Law.

Later a new charter-oath (IKRAR PERADIN) pledged advocates: to defend human rights; to pursue the struggle to establish truth, justice, and law; to promote democracy, clean government, and an independent judiciary based on the Pancasila; to fight for representative bodies that truly serve the people's interests; to obey the advocates' code of ethics, to defend the weak and the poor, to oppose all arbitrariness and oppression, and to be open to criticism and correction from any quarter.[22] The two documents, unabashedly idealist, are also unashamedly disre-garded by most private lawyers. Yet they represent authentically the professional and political values to which advocates lay claim.

For most advocates, professional interests and experience defined issues of reform. Litigating lawyers especially perceived the failings of the regime most acutely in the conditions under which they represented their clients. It is largely for this reason that litigating attorneys, not consulting lawyers, have always been in the forefront of reform efforts. In court their troubles multiplied if they insisted on legal correctness. It was not simply a matter of judicial corruption, in which some advocates came to participate more or less equitably in the so-called "judicial mafia" of collusive prosecutors, judges, and private lawyers. Rather the problem was (and remains) that these were just about the only terms on which advocates could claim something more than pro-forma membership in the judicial system. For the most part they were kept at a distance, as outsiders, for which they and their clients suffered. Most (not all) judges resented advocates as well-off, self-serving, unofficial, private intruders upon public authority. Not only were the courts inefficient and expensive, because of extraordinary fees, and execution of judgments highly uncertain, but advocates were often treated contemptuously, ignored by judges, obstructed, and occasionally even forbidden to enter courtrooms.

Although civil litigation was difficult enough, so that some advocates avoided it if at all possible, and others gave it up altogether in favor of office practice, criminal process incurred the most serious adversities. Criminal defense was treacherous, filled with abusive police, corrupt and extortionate prosecutors, bureaucratically minded judges who favored prosecutors as colleagues and regarded defense attorneys as interlopers.[23] Advocates raised a perpetual din over these problems on

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[22] *Album Kongres V*, pp. 97–98, for the resolution and the oath.

[23] In a society in which advantage inheres in official status many advocates have long been troubled by their lack of it. Their solution to the problems of advocacy is official recognition, through a law, and at least semi-official status. See, for example, Sastrayuddha, "Hambatan-hambatan bagi Advokat dalam melaksanakan tugasnja" [Difficulties for advocates in performing their functions] in *Hukum dan Keadilan* II, 5 (July/August 1971): 17–27. Others, conscious and proud of the private tradition of professional advocacy and resentful of the state, have opposed any law at all governing private practice; but they are a small minority. See Soemarno P. Wirjanto, "Fungsi dan organisasi Advokat" in the same issue of *Hukum dan Keadilan*, pp. 27–33. Also Abdurrahman, *Aspek-aspek Bantuan Hukum*, p. 189ff.

behalf of their clients and themselves, leading now and then to open conflict with judges.[24] Relatively little has ever come of their protests, for the judiciary is protected by the mantle of bureaucratic privilege. Prosecutors and judges have been transferred or even dismissed, occasionally, as the result of extraordinary efforts by private lawyers, but their institutions have gone relatively untouched, for to do more would challenge essential features of the regime itself.

Reform-minded advocates were (and still are) frustrated at every turn: politically because their *negara hukum* was not in the foreseeable future, and professionally, as barristers, because the one institution that meant most to them, the judiciary, was impervious to their wishes for fundamental reorientation and acceptance. Responding to this push factor, as well as to the pull of more lucrative and comfortable work, advocates who could do so turned to commercial legal counseling, where, at a distance from judicial wretchedness, their interest in reform either faded or decayed into cynicism.

Yet the efforts of advocates and allied reformers did not go entirely unrequited. PERADIN and its offspring, the Legal Aid Institute (LBH), had good press, and the Government's own purveyance of *negara hukum* rhetoric, regarded cynically by some officials but seriously by others, also lent credibility to its critics. At Parliamentary hearings PERADIN spokesmen were heard, often sympathetically, and their positions showed up fragmentarily in significant new legislation.

There have been statutory reforms, although no one committed to change regards them as unequivocal victories. Politically the most important of them have to do with criminal procedure, ideologically (as well as practically) important because it defines critical relationships between state and citizenry. Of all the laws promulgated since 1966, the two most heralded—largely as a result of debates set off by professional advocates and legal aid lawyers—were Law 14/1970 on judicial organization and the new code of criminal procedure of 1981. The first was a disappointment to reformers, in part because it failed to give the Supreme Court review powers, but also because concessions of principle favorable to accused persons were not implemented by the ancillary legislation required. A little over a decade later, the new code of criminal procedure (*Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Acara Pidana.* KUHAP) went further to meet demands for reform. A milestone in post-revolutionary legal history, it is Indonesia's first new major code, replacing at last the procedural regime of the HIR Rules of criminal procedure define the balance in relationships between state agencies and private citizens. The attention paid criminal process in Indonesia indicates how much political issues, or state/society issues, have dominated public debate about legal change.

Even the subdued satisfaction legal reformers drew from these statutory developments did not last, however, for they were accompanied by none of the political and institutional changes that might have made sense of them.[25] The Government

[24] See *Album Kongres V*, pp. 34–41, the opening address by Suardi Tasrif; Tasrif's *Menegakkan Rule of Law Dibawah Orde Baru*, especially pp. 22–42, 77ff; Yap Thiam Hien, "Hukum Acara Pidana" (Criminal Procedure) in *Penataran Pengacara Muda se-Indonesia*, pp. 8–16. *Hukum dan Keadilan*, PERADIN's late journal, frequently ran articles and commentaries by advocates on the difficulties of criminal and civil process. IKADIN's *ERA*, the independent *Forum Keadilan* (Justice Forum), and the daily press continue to do so.

[25] Among other innovations, for example, the KUHAP disentangled the functions of police and prosecution, making the police solely responsible for preliminary investigation—the result of criticism of the prosecution as well as police eagerness to extend their authority—and

itself felt no obligation to abide by spirit or even letter of the new procedural code on any issue of political concern. Not only did political dissidence remain subject to the extra-legal powers of the security apparatus, but even common criminality was treated without a blink of recognition of legal proprieties. During the early 1980s, with President Suharto's blessing, military death squads killed thousands of the petty criminals and racketeers living on the periphery of the New Order's prosperity.[26] The existence of a criminal code and the KUHAP, just promulgated, were rendered utterly trivial, but the murderous project won loud and widespread public applause before some in its audience had second thoughts. Legal reformers, prominent advocates above all, shouted their dismay into the wind.[27]

Legislative reform unaccompanied by institutional reform—and unreinforced by apposite political reform—is likely to prove a bit airy but not entirely meaningless. For all its failings in practice, the new code of criminal procedure nevertheless confirmed the growing importance of fundamental legal issues, and of legality itself, in political discourse; and it constituted a recognition, at least, of legitimate private (or citizen) interests in the organization of the legal system and of private rights as defenses against official abuse of power. The code established ideological footholds and commitments that are useful to reformers in continuing debates over political and legal change. It may be little, but it is not irrelevant in a long and complex political evolution.

The Advocacy and the State

Neither is the professional advocacy irrelevant to this evolution, but its influence necessarily depends on a receptive audience. The salience of the reform advocacy from the late 1960s has been precisely the result of an interested audience, a new middle class generated by the New Order's own economic policies.[28] As in Korea

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subject to suits for wrongful damages. In addition, it provided a wholly new procedure of pretrial judicial review of arrest and detention, potentially a means of control over repressive organs. Finally, the code implemented (within limits) the principle of legal representation of accused persons from the time of arrest. Not one of these innovations has worked according to promise, largely because of the resistance of the institutions responsible for them.

[26] President Soeharto takes credit for these *Petrus* [mysterious shootings] killings in his memoirs, *Otobiografi*, as related to G. Dwipayana and Ramadhan K. H. (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1988), pp. 364–367, in the first, withdrawn, edition. A persuasive analysis of the *Petrus* affair is available in an unpublished Monash University conference paper by David Bourchier, "Crime, Law and State Control in Indonesia" (1988).

[27] The *petrus* affair was hardly the only deviation, however. The reforms intended by the new code of criminal procedure are daily undercut by institutional resistance. For critical discussions of the KUHAP in practice, see A. C. 't Hart and Abdul Hakim G. Nusantara, *Hukum Acara Pidana dalam Perspektif Hak Asasi Manusia* [Criminal Procedure in the Perpsective of Human Rights] (Jakarta: YLBHI and LBH-Jakarta, 1986); Abdul Hakim G. Nusantara, Luhut MP. Pangaribuan, and Mas Achmad Santosa, *Studi Kasus Hukum Acara Pidana* [Case Studies in Criminal Procedure] (Jakarta: Djambatan, 1986); and ICJ, *Indonesia and the Rule of Law: Twenty Years of 'New Order' Government* (London: Frances Pinter, 1987) especially the chapter by J.'t Hart, "Aspects of Criminal Justice," at p. 166ff.

[28] Until the New Order period very little at all was written about the advocacy. Only a few standard law texts even mentioned private lawyers. During the late 1960s, however, PERADIN began to publish its own journal, *Hukum dan Keadilan* (Law and Justice), under the able direction of Suardi Tasrif, a former newspaper editor (*Abadi*) who took a law degree and began practice only in the early 1960s. The first book on the advocacy, Soemarno P. Wirjanto's *Profesi Advokat* (Bandung: Alumni, 1979) appeared only in 1979. See also Abdurrahman S. H., *Aspek-Aspek Bantuan Hukum*; Martiman Prodjohamidjojo, *Penasihat dan Bantuan Hukum*

and Thailand, for example, economic and social change unmatched by political change—an expanding private economy, a diversifying middle class, and an authoritarian monopoly for a governing class—was bound to create tension. The tension results, in part, from the incompatibility of two quite distinctive constructions of state/society relations, formulated earlier as divergent versions of an Indonesian *negara hukum*. As support for a more liberal construction has grown among private groups, often organized self-consciously in new NGOs, the Government has had a harder time riding herd over a slightly unruly and recalcitrant crowd. The regime has had no difficulty in asserting its prerogatives, but its claims to legitimacy for them are wearing thin. The recent history of the professional advocacy itself illustrates the stakes involved in conflicts between public and private claims to authority and the institutional consequences once the battle is joined.

In the politics of the legal system after 1965, as in the politics of nearly everything else, the motor of state ran on military fuel. From the start administrative institutions—the central bureaucracy and *pamong praja*—were subject to control by military appointees. The formal legal system followed suit more slowly. Early symptoms of independence among legal officials were simply suppressed. Then, one by one, public legal institutions were dealt to military officials, a policy which served the twin interests of political security and patronage. The national police had been incorporated into the armed forces since the late Guided Democracy period. After 1971, when the independently inclined police commandant, Hugeng Imam Santoso, was dismissed, his successors toed the line. In the case of the prosecution there was never any question of genuine autonomy. In 1966 General Sugih-Arto was appointed Chief Public Prosecutor (*Jaksa Agung*), and his successors were drawn from the military. The Ministry of Justice and Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung) were left in compliant civilian hands for a few years. In the late 1970s, however, the Ministry was turned over to retired Lt. Gen. Mudjono, succeeded by retired Lt. Gens. Ali Said and Ismail Saleh. Finally, the Mahkamah Agung, packed with several retired officers appointed after 1974, was given over to Mudjono in 1981 and, on his death in 1984, to Ali Said. By 1981 retired army officers were in command of the entire core of the legal system. Only in the early 1990s, particularly in the new cabinet of 1993, were amenable civilians back in the chief chairs of the Supreme Court (Purwoto Gandasubrata) and Ministry of Justice (Oetojo Oesman).

The silent notariat and peripheral Islamic judiciary aside, the one significant legal institution which the military did not dominate was the advocacy, a prime source of noisy and irritating criticism. Gradually the profession moved into focus on the regime's crosshairs.

Though still a moving target, the advocacy was weaker than its public voice implied. The stimulating effect of economic expansion on private legal practice also raised difficult issues of professional evolution and regulation. So quickly did the profession change, becoming vastly more heterogeneous and less intimate, that it lost organizational capacity to deal with its problems. Apart from consulting lawyers, who shared little of the tradition, many new litigating attorneys had joined the

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Indonesia: Latar Belakang dan Sejarahnya [Indonesian Legal Counsel and Assistance: Its Background and History] (Jakarta: Ghalia Indonesia, 1982); and Sintong Silaban, Aldentua Siringoringo, and Susy Mahyudiarni Devianty, *Advokat Muda Indonesia: Dialog tentang Hukum, Politik, Keadilan, Hak Asasi Manusia, Profesionalisme Advokat dan Liku-liku Keadvokatan* [Young advocates in Indonesia: dialogues on law, politics, justice, human rights, professionalism, and intricacies of the advocacy] (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992).

profession out of backgrounds in the civil service and military that did not fit well either. PERADIN, with about eight hundred members at peak, represented only a fifth or so of the graduated private lawyers actually practicing throughout the country. Other organizations were much smaller. None of the associations, including PERADIN, offered members substantial professional advantages. In PERADIN's case the inclination of senior advocates to enforce its ethical code discouraged some lawyers from joining and drove a few out.

The advocacy's inability to organize effectively and to discipline its members was due in part to lack of government interest in regulating the profession. The Ministry of Justice did little more than register advocates, from whom unofficial fees were extracted in the process, but as the procedural code did not preclude anybody else from practicing, it hardly mattered whether lawyers registered or not.

Most advocates hoped for limited Government intervention on their terms: a law governing practice, for example, that would lend the advocacy legitimacy, define its professional rights and responsibilities, and eliminate or restrict non-degreed bush-lawyers. PERADIN leaders also dreamed of a national bar association, whose establishment required Government assistance. The danger, however, given the antagonism to advocates in the courts, prosecution, police, and Ministry of Justice, was that any Government attention might take a bad turn. Exactly that happened in the early 1980s, as public law officials set about bringing the advocacy under control.

No one doubted the need for professional regulation, but there was good reason to suspect the motives behind sudden official interest in it. Available evidence indicates much less concern in the administration for protecting the public from disorderly legal practice than for extending bureaucratic authority, whose fullness was seriously challenged—not only in the legal system—by expanding private groups. Since the 1970s the NGO movement had aggressively taken hold, spawning independent reform organizations with little respect for either public policy or officialdom. The original model was PERADIN's Legal Aid Institute, which had grown into a national foundation with a dozen active branches around the country.

No less in the legal system than in other sectors of the public bureaucracy, the effect of these non-governmental rumblings was to reinforce corporatist urges to assert official predominance. The antagonism between public and private lawyers added intense animus. Judges and prosecutors resented professional advocates their independence, and even more, the constant accusations of official corruption, incompetence, and abuse of authority. They were eager to silence their critics and to run a test of prerogatives in which their parent institutions, including the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court, would have to back them. But there were other political reasons for reining in the advocacy. In political trials since 1966, defense attorneys from PERADIN and the LBH had embarrassed the Government at home and abroad by challenging the staged affairs and turning them into platforms of political criticism. Private lawyers were prominent among the human rights activists whom administration spokesmen regarded as a threat to the regime, along with hidden Communists and assorted other evils.

During the early 1980s legal officials initiated a strategy designed first to absorb PERADIN and other lawyers' organizations into a single national association and then to impose official disciplinary control over the entire profession. In 1981 at PERADIN's congress in Bandung, Mahkamah Agung chairman Mudjono, Minister of Justice Ali Said, and Chief Public Prosecutor Ismail Saleh each proposed that the

advocacy required a unified organization (*wadah tunggal*).[29] It was left to Ali Said, first as Minister of Justice and later as Supreme Court chairman, to achieve the new IKADIN (Ikatan Advokat Indonesia. Indonesian Advocates League).

Many advocates responded favorably in the hope that a national association sponsored by the government would improve professional opportunities and ease intercourse with the bureaucracy. Senior PERADIN leaders were skeptical, to put it mildly. The appeal of a national bar association was dampened by worry that Ali Said was mainly intent upon eliminating PERADIN's influence. The agents meant to accomplish this end, they feared, were military law graduates who, acting as a group with official support, would amass enough support to dominate the new association.[30]

PERADIN's misgivings delayed but could not avoid the inevitable. IKADIN was formally established in November 1985, with Harjono Tjitrosubeno of PERADIN, by prior agreement, as its first chairman.[31] Many lawyers nevertheless held IKADIN at arm's length. Despite pressure from Ali Said and Minister of Justice Ismail Saleh, PERADIN and other associations refused to disband and submerge themselves completely, as individual members, in IKADIN. Instead, they engaged in a slow battle with the Government for control of the organization. On every crucial issue IKADIN leaders fought for organizational autonomy and self-governance, to which the Ministry of Justice responded by tightening control over registration requirements, imposing quotas of advocates, like the notariat, for major cities, and dividing the profession organizationally.[32] Even so, the advocates held out. In IKADIN's first

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[29] The idea of a *wadah tunggal*—a single receptacle—was not new. In 1967, when PERADIN was riding high along with other aggressive critics of the old order of Guided Democracy, acting president Suharto had issued a statement recognizing PERADIN as the sole organization of professional advocates. A decade later, when PERADIN had lost favor in the regime, the approval was tacitly withdrawn as new associations were allowed and probably encouraged. At about the same time the notion of a *wadah tunggal* for advocates idea was resuscitated as an anti-PERADIN instrument. For a brief discussion of the history of the new association IKADIN see "Laporan Satu Tahun Berdirinya IKADIN 10 Nopember 1985–10 Nopember 1986" [First year report on the establishment of IKADIN, 10 November 1985–10 November 1986] in the first issue of *ERA HUKUM*, IKADIN's journal, November 1987, p. 212ff.

[30] Since the 1950s the Academy of Military Law [AHM] and College of Military Law [PTHM] had graduated a steady flow ofmilitary lawyers, as many as twelve hundred or more by the 1980s. On the political-administrative side of the army they have represented a large bloc of useful personnel, usually linked to such key regime figures as former vice-president Sudharmono and Ali Said, now both retired.

[31] For a slightly ironic review of IKADIN's history, see "Laporan Satu Tahun Berdirinya IKADIN 10 Nopember 1985–10 Nopember 1986" [First year report on the establishment of IKADIN] in the first issue of *ERA HUKUM*, IKADIN's journal, November 1987, pp. 212–214.

[32] Not all practicing advocates were quick to join IKADIN. As of late 1986, of 1,125 advocates registered in the Ministry of Justice and practicing in the jurisdiction of appellate courts (*Pengadilan Tinggi*) across the country, only 645 were enrolled as members of IKADIN. *ERA HUKUM* 1/1, 240. The Ministry of Justice brought compelling pressure to bear, however, both by requiring registration of all practicing lawyers and refusing it before registrants joined IKADIN. At about the same time, it imposed quotas, like those for the notariat, on the number of advocates for each major city. Jakarta lawyers especially had to search for cities nearby with vacancies. Still, the Ministry failed to squeeze all practicing lawyers into IKADIN. Although the initial plan was to incorporate both advocates and *pengacara praktek*—"practical lawyers," including *pokrol-bambu*—advocates predictably objected and won on the issue. In early 1988 the Ministry approved a separate organization established for *pengacara praktek*, the Ikatan

balloted elections, in 1988, the military law graduates did not come through as Ali Said had assumed and tried to assure they would. The winners were Harjono Tjitrosubeno and a slate of candidates in which PERADIN figured prominently.

In the meantime Ismail Saleh and Ali Said undertook to surround the profession with a fence of disciplinary requirements, which advocates contested fiercely. By any reasonable legal standard, the official actions were egregiously messy. The criteria applied, however, were not legal but political, in which case the administration had all the advantages.

An ad hoc opportunity to move against the advocacy, and a particularly bothersome advocate, arose in 1986, when Adnan Buyung Nasution, founder of the LBH, committed a breach of etiquette in the trial of Lt. Gen. Dharsono (ret.) for subversive complicity in the Tanjung Priok riots of September 1984. What followed was unprecedented, and clumsy, as the Minister and judicial officials, eager to make an example of Nasution, made up the rules as they went, oblivious to the least subtle legal questions.[33] A provision from a new law (2/1986 on the lower courts) was applied ex post facto, Ismail Saleh accused Nasution of contempt of court—a concept quite absent from Indonesian (and civil law) procedure[34]—and a first instance judge, without hearing Nasution, handed down an awkward "administrative decision"—which he later called a "report," though he had granted Nasution a right to appeal from it, but to whom was never made clear—recommending that the Minister of Justice revoke the advocate's certification. IKADIN leaders, denying the Government's sole authority to punish its members, insisted that the association would handle the matter itself. The ethics board of the Jakarta branch of IKADIN heard the case and recommended a reprimand for Nasution. But Ismail Saleh refused to be preempted. Setting aside even the limited (and in principle inapplicable) requirements of the law, and ignoring protests from IKADIN and abroad, he revoked Nasution's registration for a period of one year.[35]

A *coup de grace* aimed at the advocacy followed. In July 1987 the Minister of Justice and Chairman of the Supreme Court issued a "joint decision" on procedures

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Penasehat Hukum Indonesia [Indonesian Legal Advisors Association. IPHI]. See *Indonesia Reports* 36 (November 1988): 27, citing the weekly *Editor*, July 23, 1988. Consulting lawyers, distancing themselves from advocates, also were allowed to create their own organization.

[33] Nasution's case is dealt with briefly in Daniel S. Lev, "Adnan Buyung Nasution, Indonesian Civil Rights Lawyer Under Attack," in *Human Rights Internet Reporter*, vol. 11, no. 2 (June 1986): 4–5. Nasution, the founder of the Legal Aid Institute and a fiery, outspoken, occasionally grandstanding critic of the Government, was an ideal target, for damaging someone of his reputation might give all other activist advocates pause.

[34] Contempt of court is mentioned in passing, in English, in the general considerations of the elucidation to law 14/1985 (on the Supreme Court) at p. 4, where it is recommended that a law be drafted to provide for measures to be taken against acts undermining the authority or dignity of the courts. Ismail Saleh had no legal grounds at all to level the charge against Nasution. There is irony in the issue, however, for in earlier years advocates were the first to wonder whether the common law concept might help to strengthen the courts and assure efficient execution of judgments. But in the hands of the judicial bureaucracy, the notion of contempt took a nasty turn, appealing to judges as a weapon to be used against critics, advocates above all.

[35] Nasution later sued the Minister of Justice, on grounds *inter alia* that the law (2/1986) had been applied ex post facto. Predictably, the case was thrown out by the South Jakarta *Pengadilan Negeri*, in part on the significant reasoning that the ex post facto rule did not apply to administrative law in which public interest is the governing consideration. *Kompas*, July 22, 1988, from *Indonesia Reports* 36 (Nov. 1988): 26–27.

for supervising and regulating legal counsel.[36] The two officials construed article 54 (4) of Law 2/1986 to allow the judiciary far-reaching supervisory authority over private practitioners for the sake of "guiding and developing" the profession. A fundamental purpose of this supervision appears in article 3 (c) of the document, which provides that measures can be taken against legal counsel who "act, behave, bear themselves, speak, or issue statements that indicate lack of respect for the law, statutes, public authority, the courts, or their officials." For the rest, the joint decision essentially removed disciplinary authority from the advocates' association to the judiciary and the Ministry of Justice, vitiating the profession's claim to autonomy.

Advocates sent up an outraged howl of protest, attacking the joint decision as an unlawful attempt to destroy their independence, to reverse the entire history of the profession, and to silence them forever. Despite support for the profession from other groups, including of course legal aid circles, and the press, legal officials stood their ground. At hearings of Parliamentary Commission III on a new bill governing legal assistance, forty advocates, led by Harjono Tjitrosubeno, showed up to protest quietly with T-shirt messages. Members of the Parliamentary Commission were sympathetic and challenged the Government position represented by Ismail Saleh, who eventually conceded that the joint decision might give way to a new law but otherwise, like Ali Said, stonewalled criticism. Insisting that the joint decision would be administered impartially, he nevertheless made clear that the Government intended to have its way against the advocacy. Later in the year advocates were denied police permission to hold a retreat to discuss the issue.

On July 12, in reaction to the joint decision, IKADIN issued a hurried defense that made the case for professional independence:[37]

> The special character of the advocate and the profession of advocacy, recognized universally in various international conferences and declarations, lies in autonomy. . . .
> . . . in this joint decision no freedom is left to legal counsel, for every act, attitude, and expression is under the control and authority of the chairmen of the first instance courts, the chairmen of the appellate courts, the chairman of the Mahkamah Agung, and the Minister of Justice.
> . . . the wide authority vested by this joint decision [in the courts and Ministry] will cause legal counsel to lose moral courage to carry out their functions in and out of court in accord with the free and autonomous character of their profession. In turn legal counsel will always posture and proceed only according to the taste and whim of the judge, which will greatly damage those who seek justice in particular and legal development in general.

Thereafter the administration was unrelenting in its effort to tame the lawyers, whose main advantage by then lay in latent resources of unruliness, disorder, and disunity. The details are unnecessary here, but in short the Ministry of Justice, hoping to eliminate the influence of the PERADIN group, later supported its own

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[36] KMA/005/SKB/VII/1987–M.03–PR.08.05 tahun 1987. On November 25, 1987 the Mahkamah Agung issued a circular (no. 8, 1987) with an elucidation of the joint decision and instructions for implementing it.

[37] Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Ikatan Advokat Indonesia, *Pernyataan Pendirian IKADIN atas Keputusan Bersama Ketua Mahkmah Agung dan Menteri Kehakiman Republik Indonesia tentang Tata Cara Pengawasan, Penindakan dan Pembelaan Diri Penasihat Hukum*. July 12, 1987.

candidate for the chairmanship of IKADIN, setting off a conflict in the organization that led, in early 1991, to an embarrassing incident in which members of the rival factions came to unlawyerly (and largely incompetent) blows.[38] To the astonishment and dismay of the Minister, whose purpose all along had been to unite and control the advocacy, IKADIN promptly split into two organizations, one more or less amenable to official bidding, the other, the old PERADIN group, still defiant. When last heard from on the issue of advocates, not long before he retired, the Minister was said to be disgusted with the lot.

Lawyers and Change

It is not the end of the matter. If the battle of the lawyers were merely a sideshow in Indonesian politics, it might be forgotten, but the conflict is at the center of a struggle over the political and ethical dimensions of the Indonesian state.

Private lawyers, more consistently than most, have long challenged the terms of Indonesian political organization. They are among those most often accused of having lost touch with Indonesian culture, of being too "Westernized," the imprecation generally levelled against those who question the habits of authority. There is some truth in the charge. By education, training, and function, advocates trace their role back through the European middle ages, not to an Indonesian historical prototype. (IKADIN's motto, like PERADIN's, is *Fiat Justitia Ruat Coelum*—Let Justice be Done though the Heavens Fall.) But is any national political structure, including the state itself, the bureaucracy, parties, or army, without the historical stamp of European intervention? What is more to the point is that the uses of advocacy, the support for the ideas of private lawyers, and the impact of the legal aid movement set off by PERADIN are the result not of European influence but of distinctly Indonesian claims. Economic and social change in Indonesia has by now produced enough social power and ideological equipment to sustain a long argument over the limits of state authority.

In the debate thus far, state leaders have had the power to ward off challenges, but their ideological defenses are crumbling. Even officials, both military and civilian, have to admit (and do, increasingly) that corruption and abuse of authority are at levels that cannot be dismissed as trivial, and that it is getting harder—not impossible by any means, or even all that difficult yet, just harder—to buy the support of a middle class that is growing ambivalent about the regime and perhaps even doubtful about the existing state. It is for this reason that while reform advocates and others committed to political change seem to have made little headway, the Government itself appears to be on the defensive.

None of this means that the lawyers are close to success, or even, for that matter, that they are key players in the political drama. But the reformers among them provide the ideological rationalizations for political change, as indeed lawyers have done elsewhere through much of modern history. Legal systems, as they actually work, record essential codes of political relationship and authority. Indonesia's political codes, no less outmoded than legal ones from the colony, cannot be maintained without exacting too high a price for both regime and state. A small pride of professional advocates has had remarkable influence in framing the debates over legal and political change, and is likely to pursue them long into the future.

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[38] See *Tempo*, August 4, 1990.

REWIRING THE INDONESIAN STATE

Takashi Shiraishi

Unlike any other Southeast Asian state and like its more distant and larger neighbors of China and India, since the mid-1970s Indonesia has created a large state research and technology sector atop two pillars. One, its central agency, is the BPP Teknologi (Bureau for the Assessment and Application of Technology). The other is a powerful state strategic industrial sector, encompassing aircraft production, ship-building, telecommunications, weapons production, and several others, under the wing of the BPIS (Strategic Industries Agency). The development of both has been dominated by Baharuddin Jusuf Habibie, State Minister for Research and Technology, Chairman of the BPP Teknologi, Chairman of the BPIS, President-Director of IPTN (aircraft production), PT PAL (shipbuilding), and PT Pindad (weapons and ammunition production), and Chairman of the National Research Council, among others.

If Habibie's influence is apparent, however, its significance is only superficially understood. Because Habibie has been central to the development of the two state sectors and enjoyed President Suharto's patronage for more than twenty years, his projects are often dismissed as "big toys" given to the President's golden boy, billion dollar "white elephants" for building expensive, internationally uncompetitive airplanes, helicopters, ships, weapons, and the like, and causing severe strains on Indonesia's economic development.

Suharto's patronage is no doubt crucial to Habibie's rise to power and his hold over a huge bureaucratic empire. But to see Suharto as a simple soldier, a yokel who, fascinated by technology, just happened to pick Habibie because he knew him and let him do what he wanted is too easy. Suharto knows exactly what he wants. He chose the Berkeley mafia of economist-technocrats not merely because they were there but because he wanted economic expertise and access to foreign funds. For the same reason, Suharto chose Habibie, not because he happened to know him, but because he had technological expertise and a vision of Indonesia's industrial might. Even if Habibie's projects make no sense economically, as his critics say, and will need protection and state subsidy for years to come—he openly admits that his strategy for scientific and technological development assumes the existence of large "captive markets"—they may make sense politically.[1] After all, Suharto is a

[1] See, for instance, his "Science Policy Management in Indonesia," address before ASEAN ministers for science and technology, April 24, 1986, in *Military Technology* X, 7, Special Supplement (1986): 50–54.

politician, for whom economic rationality is not the goal itself but a means to a grander end.

Habibie's bureaucratic empire, the two state sectors of research and development and strategic industries, are not like the commercial monopolies given to Suharto's children, which might be dismantled overnight once the father is gone. White elephants or not, billions of dollars have been invested in these two sectors to create something—thousands of engineers, dozens of research laboratories, and capital-intensive manufacturing plants—which will survive Suharto and Habibie.

How have the research and technology and strategic industries developed over the last twenty years? What does their development tell us about the transformation of the Indonesian state under Suharto's New Order? To answer these questions, this essay relies on a combination of perspectives, joining a form of patron-client analysis with a structural argument about the security requirements of the modern state.

As Habibie is the key figure, let us begin by examining his career. His abbreviated curriculum vitae runs more or less as follows:[2] Born in Pare-pare, South Sulawesi, in 1936; went to the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) in 1954; left for Germany after a year at ITB; graduated from the Technische Hochschule (department of aeronautic light engineering), Aachen, West Germany, in 1960; doctor of engineering in 1965.

1960-1965	Assistant Research Scientist, Light Construction Depart-ment, Technische Hochschule, Aachen.
1965-1966	Special Scientist, Hamburger Flugzeubau (later merged with Messerschmitt to form MBB, Messerschmitt Bolkow Blom), Hamburg.
1966-1973	Department Head, Structure Analysis R&D, MBB; in 1969, Division Head, Methods and Technology for Airplanes.
1974-1978	Vice-President, Director of Technology Application, MBB.
1974-1976	Advisor to President-Director (Ibnu Sutowo) of Pertamina, Jakarta.
1974-1976	Head of Advanced Technology and Aeronautics, Pertamina.
1974-1976	Advanced Technology and Aeronautics Advisor to the President (Suharto).
1976	President-Director of Nusantara Aircraft Industry (IPTN).
1978	State Minister for Research and technology.
1978	Chairman of Batam Industrial Development Authority.
1978	President-Director, PT PAL (shipbuilding).
1978	Chairman, Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology (BPP Teknologi).
1983-1991	Chairman, Indonesian Aeronautics and Space Institute (LAPAN).
1983	President-Director, PT PINDAD (weapons production).
1983	Member, Board of Directors of Pertamina.
1983-1989	Chairman, Council for Strategic Industries (DPIS).
1989	Chairman, Agency for Strategic Industries (BPIS).

[2] Francois Raillon, *Indonesia 2000: The Industrial and Technological Challenge* (Jakarta: CNPF-ETP and Cipta Kreatif, 1990), p. 176. See also O. G. Roeder and Mahiddin Mahmud, *Who's Who in Indonesia* (Singapore: Gunung Agung, 2nd revised ed., 1980), p. 93.

Habibie was away from Indonesia for more than twenty years, between 1955 and 1976. Though reportedly quite active in the Indonesian student movement in Europe, he never experienced the turbulent, often bloody, politics of Indonesia from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s—regional rebellions, the rise of the Indonesian Communist Party, Soekarno's Guided Democracy, student politics, the killing of hundreds of thousands of "Communists," economic collapse, Suharto's silent coup, and so on, in which many died and many others forged political alliances. During those years he built a professional career in West Germany, rising in the corporate hierarchy of Messerschmitt Bolkow Blom. By the time Suharto consolidated his power, Habibie had become one of MBB's top engineers. Obviously he did very well as an engineer, was well paid, and enjoyed a job as prominent as any other Indonesian then had abroad. It must have been his success as an engineer in Germany that impressed Suharto and Ibnu Sutowo, then President-Director of Pertamina.

But this alone does not explain why, in 1974, while still in Germany, Habibie was appointed as an advisor to Ibnu Sutowo and President Suharto, let alone why a new Division for Advanced Technology and Aeronautics was created for him in Pertamina. After all, one who is away from home for twenty years is most likely forgotten, even when doing very well. Habibie evidently was remembered.

As Suharto says in his as-told-to autobiography, he had known Habibie as a teenager. When Suharto was commander of the Mataram Brigade (Diponegoro Division) in Makassar (Ujung Pandang) in 1950, his headquarters happened to be located across from Habibie's house. Habibie's father was Bugis-Makassarese, but his mother, R. A. Tuti Marini Puspowardojo, was Javanese, born in Yogyakarta to a *priyayi* family—her father was a school inspector—and spoke Javanese. Suharto and his staff often visited the Habibie household, and one of his staff, Capt. Subono, married Habibie's sister. It was thanks to this brother-in-law that Habibie maintained his connection with Suharto. In 1961 Suharto saw Habibie in Germany, while he was studying at the Aachen Technisch Hochschule. When he visited Germany as President in 1970, he again met Habibie, then working at the MBB, and told him to be ready to come home.[3] With the help of the Directorate General of the Aircraft Industry (Ministry of Industry), Habibie recruited some twenty Indonesian engineers, many of them trained in Europe, who joined MBB in order to train in aircraft production.[4]

But the real change came in January 1974, when Suharto summoned Habibie to ask personally whether he was prepared to return home. According to Suharto, since

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[3] Soeharto, "Beberapa Catatan Mengenai Prof. Dr. Ing. B. J. Habibie," A. Makmur Makka, ed., *Setengah Abad Prof. Dr.-Ing. B. J. Habibie: Kesan dan Kenangan* (Jakarta: Dharma Karsa Utama, 1986), pp. 1–4. See also Soeharto, *Otobiografi seperti dipaparkan kepada G. Dwipayana dan Ramadhan K.H.* (Jakarta: Pt Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989), p. 281.

[4] For instance, Djermani Sandjaja, deputy chairman in charge of planning at the Agency for Strategic Industries, studied aircraft production at the Kiev Aeronautical Institute; Sutadi Suparlan, deputy chairman in charge of technology at the BPIS, is also a graduate in engineering at the Kiev Aeronautical Institute; Gunawan Sakri, now head of planning at the Serpong science center, studied aeronautics partly in Czechoslovakia, and Rahardi Ramelan, longtime deputy chairman in charge of industrial assessment at the BPPT and now deputy chairman of Bappenas, the National Development Planning Agency, is a mechanical engineering graduate from Technical University in Prague. Raillon, *Indonesia 2000*, pp. 188–189. Indonesian engineering students whom Soekarno sent to Europe, especially to West Germany, the USSR, and Eastern Europe, in the 1950s, thus joined forces in the early 1970s to form the core of "engineers" to challenge US-trained economists.

1973 he had been thinking of creating an agency for technological assessment and application as a technological counterpart of the Bappenas, the National Development Planning Agency.[5] When the two of them met, Suharto decided to start an aircraft company, to set up an agency to plan and control all science and technology coming into Indonesia, and to establish a science center.[6] He made Habibie his technology advisor and let Ibnu Sutowo appoint him as advisor and create a new division of advanced technology in Pertamina as a future BPP Teknologi and aircraft industry.[7] The timing was crucial, though Suharto says nothing about it in his memoirs.

In the fall of 1973, when the first oil crisis erupted, oil prices shot up. The price of Indonesian crude, having risen gradually from US $1.70 a barrel in October 1970 to $4.75 in mid-1973, climbed steeply to $12.60 a barrel by mid-1974. Indonesia's gross foreign exchange earnings from oil rose from $965 million in 1972–73 to $5,200 million in 1974–75. Annual total investment by foreign companies in Indonesian oil rose also by a factor five to nearly $1 billion in 1975.[8] Government oil revenue also rose dramatically. In fiscal 1972/73 its oil income was Rp 198.9 billion, 33.7 percent of all government revenue, while foreign aid of Rp 157.8 billion provided 21.1 percent of revenue. Oil revenue rose to Rp 344.6 billion (29.4 percent) in 1973/74 and to Rp 973.1 billion (49 percent) in 1974/75, while foreign aid, Rp 203.9 billion (17.4 percent) in 1973/74 and Rp 232 billion (11.7 percent), steadily lost relative importance in public revenue.

This momentous oil bonanza meant two things. In the first place, Suharto suddenly obtained an enormous amount of money, billions of dolllars, which he could not have imagined a few years earlier. (In early 1971, on the eve of the general election, when he spoke of the "takeoff" of the economy in twenty-five years, oil income for the 1970/71 fiscal year was a mere Rp 68.8 billion, 14.8 percent of government income.) Second, the decline in relative importance of foreign aid meant that Suharto had more leeway for economic policies and was less constrained by the IMF, the World Bank, and the IGGI (the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia) international aid consortium. With its local mission established in 1968, the World Bank expert staff was deeply involved in economic planning in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Together with the IMF, the World Bank helped "technocrats" (Wijoyo Nitisastro, et al.) to prepare Indonesia's annual submission to the IGGI.[9] With their assistance, the government had introduced the first five-year development plan in 1969, setting out steps to consolidate the economy before further five-year plans took the country into higher stages of industrialization. The plan set a target of rice self-sufficiency by 1973. Industrial expansion was to be oriented to agricultural support materials and basic import replacements such as fertilizer, cement, and textiles.[10] With the oil windfall, however, IGGI foreign aid looked less crucial. Besides, the Japanese government under Tanaka, threatened by a crude oil supply shortfall,

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[5] Soeharto, *Otobiografi*, pp. 280–281.

[6] "Interview," *Military Technology*: X, 7, Special Supplement (1986): 5.

[7] Ibid., pp. 5–6.

[8] Hamish McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia* (Sydney: Fontana/Collins, 1980), p. 156.

[9] Ibid., p. 74.

[10] Ibid., pp. 79–80.

embarked on a program of "resource diplomacy" and became more than willing to provide aid to the Indonesian government.[11]

In late 1973 and early 1974, consequently, for the first time Suharto was in a position to do as he had long wished: to take short-cuts to industrialization through Pertamina. He entrusted new projects, many of them only remotely related to oil, to Ibnu Sutowo. Not only did Pertamina expand its operations in oil production, refining, and marketing, but it ventured into a wide range of other activities, including petrochemicals, fertilizers, a steel plant, a rice estate, an industrial estate, transport, hotels, and tourism. Work was begun to turn the island of Batam in the Malacca Straits into a new industrial entrepot to rival Singapore. An untried concept for a floating fertilizer plant, to be anchored over offshore gas fields, was adopted and European machinery manufacturers set to work. The Krakatau Steel project at Cilegon in West Java was begun anew.[12] It was during those heady days that Suharto bought Habibie's ideas for an aircraft industry, an agency for technological assessment and application, and a science center. Like many other projects unlikely to be approved by either the "technocrats" or the IMF and World Bank, they were also entrusted to Ibnu Sutowo, with Habibie as his deputy.

The short-cuts to industrialization did not work, however. In less than two years Pertamina went virtually bankrupt. By early 1975 Pertamina's total financial commitments had reached $10.5 billion, considerably more than the total government debt contracted during both the Soekarno and Suharto periods to that point, and Pertamina fell behind in repayments to commercial banks. The US State Department persuaded American banks not to call in their loans, while the Indonesian central bank assumed responsibility for meeting Pertamina's outstanding obligations. Many large non-oil projects were taken away from Pertamina and handed over to the economists. The Krakatau Steel project was transferred to Sumarlin, Widjojo Nitisastro's deputy in the National Development Planning Agency, and scaled back. Some projects were dropped altogether, while others were trimmed.[13]

But Pertamina's Division of Advanced Technology and Aeronautics headed by Habibie survived, thanks to Suharto's support. In the midst of the Pertamina crisis, Suharto merged part of the division with the Air Force Institute for the Preparation of an Aircraft Industry (RAPIP) and created a new aircraft company, IPTN, under Habibie. And when Habibie was appointed State Minister for Research and Technology in 1978, the rest of the division was separated from Pertamina and made into Habibie's secretariat, the BPP Teknologi, Agency for Technological Assessment and Application.

In his first term as State Minister for Research and Technology (1978-1983), however, Habibie was just another minor state minister, his job very much confined to building IPTN and the Agency for Technological Assessment and Application. Although he was appointed President-Director of PT PAL shipbuilding, the company itself came into existence only in 1980, inheriting outmoded facilities and docks

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[11] And indeed the Japanese government promised to provide soft loans to Indonesia's resource-related projects, sometimes outside the IGGI framework: 23 billion yen for oil development in 1972, and 39 billion yen and 56 billion yen respectively for oil development and LNG development in 1973. See Gaimusho, Keizai Kyoryoku-kyoku, *Wagakuni no Seifu Kaihatu Enjo*, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Kokusai Kyoryoku Suishin Kyokai, 1990), pp. 29–30.

[12] McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia*, p. 157, and Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 327–328.

[13] On the Pertamina crisis, see McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia*, pp. 159–164.

from the historic Marine Establishment. Similarly, the Batam development project, which he inherited from Sumarlin in 1978, remained underdeveloped well into the 1980s.[14] The reason was simple. When Habibie was appointed state minister, the government was still reeling from the Pertamina crisis. While the tight ceilings on offshore borrowing were allowed to rise for the first time in 1978, the government did not recover from the blow until after the second oil crisis in 1980.[15] By that time, the third five-year development plan had been decided upon in 1978/1979. Even though Indonesia's oil revenues again shot up in 1980, following the Islamic revolution in Iran, Suharto therefore did not change government investment priorities until after he was reelected president in 1983 and the fourth five-year development plan was formulated in 1983/1984.

When Habibie was appointed State Minister for Research and Technology for the second time in 1983, Suharto had money and, quite as important, no equals in the cabinet. (All major allies to whom he owed his rise to power were dropped from the cabinet in 1983.) In the second oil crisis government oil revenue rose sharply again—from Rp 2.1 trillion (42.8 percent of total government revenue) in the 1978/79 fiscal year and Rp 3.3 trillion (48.2 percent) in 1979/1980 to Rp 7 trillion (60.9 percent) in 1980/81 and Rp 8.6 trillion (61.7 percent) in 1981/82. Suharto once again sought short-cuts to industrialization, this time with Habibie as his lieutenant.

What constitutes Habibie's bureaucratic empire? Instead of tracing the expansion of his bureaucratic power in the 1980s chronologically, let us now look at it institutionally. As of 1990, it consisted of three major arms: research and technology with the BPPT as its center, strategic industries under the BPIS, and the Batam Island Industrial Estate Authority. Of these, the Batam authority is of minor importance for our purposes, though it emerged as a (minor) side of the "growth triangle" after 1989, when the government approved one hundred percent foreign investments in Batam, and foreign firms squeezed by rising labor costs in Singapore began to shift their production base there.

The research and technology sector consists of non-departmental state research institutions formally under the jurisdiction of the State Minister for Research and Technology. By statute, the State Ministry for Research and Technology, established in 1978 (Presidential Decree No. 28/1978), is responsible for formulating all government policies on scientific research, particularly as they have to do with national development, and consolidating these policies into a comprehensive plan. It is also responsible for coordinating research and technology activities of all Government agencies and non-departmental state research institutions. The Ministry is assisted by the National Research Council established in 1984 (Presidential Decision No. 1/1984) outside the formal state structure and chaired by Habibie. Modeled after the US National Academy of Science, it advises the Ministry on the formulation of national scientific research and technology; prepares, monitors and evaluates new and ongoing programs; and advises on direction and adequate supervisory mechanisms for scientific and technological research.

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[14] In 1986 Habibie said: "When I took over Batam, I stopped promotion: there was nothing to be promoted!" *Kaleidoscope, Indonesia meeting the 21st Century* (Hongkong, 1986) quoted in Raillon, *Indonesia 2000*, p. 166.

[15] McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia*, p. 164.

The non-departmental state research institutions under the jurisdiction of the State Minister for Research and Technology are the Agency for Technological Assessment and Application (BPP Teknologi), the National Atomic Energy Agency (BATAN, established in 1968), the National Institute of Aeronautics and Space (LAPAN, established in 1963), the Indonesian Institute for Science (LIPI, established in 1973), the National Coordinating Agency for Survey and Mapping (Bakosurtanal, established in 1969), the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS, established in 1968), and the Center for Science and Technological Research (Puspiptek) in Serpong.

Of all science and engineering researchers in Indonesia, including those who belong to state and private universities under the Ministry of Education and Culture, eighty to ninety percent are affiliated either with these non-departmental state research institutions or with research institutes of government departments (such as industry, agriculture, health, forestry). According to a survey done by the Office of the State Minister for Research and Technology in 1987, the six non-departmental research institutions had 3,419 scientists and engineers with university degrees (3,089 university graduates, 221 masters, and 109 doctors), which equals about ten percent of all the engineers (35,000) in Indonesia.[16] The concentration of research activities in the six non-departmental institutions is also clear from the budget. During the 1980s, the development budget for these institutions saw a modest increase: from Rp 47 billion, 1.91 percent of the total development budget for the 1978/79 fiscal year, to Rp 405.7 billion, 2.5 percent for 1990/91, which was 41 percent of the Armed Forces development budget. At the same time, Habibie, with Suharto's approval, also obtained soft loans from the World Bank and Japan's OECF (Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund) for overseas fellowship programs to train future scientists and engineers in the US, Japan, and Europe. In contrast, more than 90 percent of forty-seven state universities have no research budget, and the budget for research institutions of government departments remains very small.

By statute, the non-departmental state research institutions report directly to the President and maintain their budgetary and other institutional autonomy. The State Minister for Research and Technology is only responsible for overseeing their management, but they benefitted substantially under Habibie's reign in terms of budget, staff increase, and overseas training. Coupled with the appointment of his proteges and allies to top positions in these research institutions, this goes a long way to explain his growing domination of the government research and technological sector during the 1980s.[17]

None of this means, however, that the Office of the State Minister for Research and Technology emerged as a powerful agency for coordinating and directing state research activities. In fact, the staff of the Minister's office numbered less than a hundred in 1989, of whom only thirty-one full-time personnel had academic qualifications. Its budget also remained small, fluctuating between $450,000 and $650,000 for 1984/85 to 1989/90. Nor was the National Research Council ever up to its job, for its budget steadily decreased from $336,000 for 1985/86 to $140,000 for 1988/89.[18]

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[16] Office of the Minister of State for Research and Technology, *Implementation Plan: Science and Technology Manpower Development Program* (Republic of Indonesia, December 1987), p. 32.

[17] LIPI chairman Samaun Samadikun and BATAN chairman Djali Ahimsa, for instance, are Habibie's close allies, while LAPAN chairman Harsono Wiryosumarto was Habibie's long-time deputy for technological development at the BPPT.

[18] About sixty percent of the annual budget was spent on supplementary salaries to its members (63 members in total) and staff of the secretariat, while forty percent was spent on

What happened instead was the emergence of the BPP Teknologi (with a staff of 2,700 in 1989), not only as the major coordinating mechanism for state research activities, but also and more importantly as a super non-departmental agency with the task of micro-economic planning, the counterpart and rival of Bappenas, the National Development Planning Agency in charge of macro-economic planning.[19]

The key to understanding the emergence of the BPP Teknologi as a major rival of Bappenas lies in its name: assessment and application of technology. Its responsibilities and functions are defined by Presidential Decree No. 31/1982 as follows:[20]

> The BPPT has the following responsibilities:
>
> a. to formulate *general policies* for consideration by the President regarding programs for the assessment and application of technology requisite *for national development;*
>
> b. to provide overall and integrated coordination of the execution of programs for the assessment and application of technology;
>
> c. to provide *services to both government and private organizations* in the assessment and application of technology for national development;
>
> d. to conduct activities in technology assessment and application which *support government policy* on the application of technology for *development.*
>
> The BPPT shall perform the following functions:
>
> a. to control and evaluate the execution of programs for the assessment and application of technology and to foster technology transfer;
>
> b. to encourage cooperation between government and private organizations at home and abroad in the assessment and application of technology;
>
> c. to develop and foster basic and applied sciences relevant to the application of technology and *to coordinate programs for their successful application in technology and industry;*
>
> d. *to assess, apply, and further develop technology for* improving the quality of life and human settlement, *industrial processes,* energy conversion and conservation, *electronics and informatics,* and to develop laboratories and physical facilities;
>
> e. to *assess and apply technology in industry* and in the utilization of natural resources for development;
>
> f. to assess, develop and apply operation-research, management, systems-analysis, and technology-regulation methods as well as to develop simulations and models for national development;
>
> g. to develop capabilities and skills of scientific personnel and to develop and manage facilities required for the functions of the BPPT.

As these provisions make clear, the responsibilities and functions of the BPPT go far beyond technological assessment and application, coordination of research

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operational costs associated with numerous expenses, including travel by members to regional and national meetings, organization of meetings, publications, and so on

[19] Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology, BPPT (Jakarta: Office of the Minister of State for Research and Technology), p. iv. See also Office of the Minster of State for Research and Technology, *Implementation Plan,* pp. A2–A5; Soeharto, *Otobiografi,* pp. 280–281.

[20] Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology, BPPT, p. 3. Italics are mine.

programs, and technology transfer narrowly understood. The BPP Teknologi can claim that any program, any project, and any problem that has something to do with "technology" pertains to its job. Hence its assertion that the task of the BPPT is micro-economic planning, because it involves the choice of appropriate technologies, while the task of the Bappenas is macro-economic planning.

The BPP Teknologi, consequently, can and does involve itself in many projects, from the selection of jet fighters for the Air Force to a study of the utilization of sago and the cultivation of shrimp. In defense procurement, for example, Suharto decided to purchase F-16s from General Dynamics upon Habibie's recommendation in 1986, overriding the Air Force's wish to have the French Mirage 2000.[21] Studies have also been made of the possibilities of manufacturing light weapons with precision casting, powder metallurgy, and the use of carbide tools, the capacity for a centralized ballistics laboratory, the manufacture and testing of prototypes of tank caterpillars, nonmilitary industries for military needs, weapons systems, territorial surveillance, and logistic lines. A system of territorial water control is being developed based on sophisticated remote sensing technology, and the Teluk Ratai naval base in Lampung is being planned in cooperation with the navy.[22]

In industrial policy and national development planning, Habibie heads the National Council for Standardization and the power generation team (established in October 1987 to coordinate and supervise the implementation of electric power generation projects), while his deputies represent the BPP Teknologi in the National Telecommunication Council, the Indonesian Sugar Council, the National Productivity Council, the National Council of Apprenticeship, and the National Council for Work Safety, among others. The BPP Teknologi is also represented in many interdepartmental committees such as those concerned with the automotive industry, the second digital telephone exhange system, and the manufacture of rolling stock for the Jakarta metropolitan railway system. Technical aspects of large government projects also come under BPP Teknologi examination: the Serpong experimental nuclear reactor, the purchase of F-16 jet fighters, the feasibility of a nuclear power plant (to be built in Central Java), the three islands linkage project, and the acquisition of civilian aircraft by Indonesian airline companies Garuda and Merpati.[23] In short, wielding "assessment and application of technology" as bureaucratic magic words, during the 1980s Habibie transformed the BPP Teknologi from one among several non-departmental state research agencies into a small Indonesian version of MITI.

The other arm of Habibie's bureaucratic empire is the Agency for Strategic Industries (BPIS) and the companies under its control. It began in 1983 as the secretariat (located in the BPP Teknologi) of the ministerial Council for Strategic Industries (DPIS). Consisting of seven ministers—the State Minister for Research and Technology [chair], Ministers of Industry, Defense and Security, Transportation, Post and Telecommunication, State Secretary, and Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief—the council was allotted administrative and managerial functions relating to eight

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[21] Nihon Indonesia Kagaku Gijutsu Foramu, *Nihon Indonesia Kagakusha Koryu ni kansuru Hokoku* (Tokyo: Nihon Indonesia Kagaku Gijutsu Foramu, 1986).

[22] Agency for the Assessment and Application of Tecbnology, BPPT, p. 16. Also Raillon, *Indonesia 2000*, pp. 69 and 162.

[23] Raillon, *Indonesia 2000*, pp. 68–71, 89.

strategic companies placed under its control.[24] It evolved further in 1989 when the new Agency for Strategic Industries (BPIS) was created out of the DPIS secretariat, while the old DPIS was refashioned to design policies to be implemented by the BPIS. At present, the chairman and vice-chairman of the DPIS are respectively the President and State Minister for Research and Technology, while nine ministers (Industry, Defense and Security, Transportation, Finance, Post and Telecommunications, State Secretary, State Minister for National Development Planning, and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) serve as members.

As "technological assessment and application" explains the bureaucratic power of the BPP Teknologi, "strategic industries" works magic for the BPIS. Two distinct meanings are wedded in it. The first is defined by Habibie, who envisages technological development as passing through four successive stages: existing technologies for assembly/manufacture of products already on the market, application of existing technologies in the design of new products, improvement of existing technologies and development of new technologies, and finally, basic scientific and technological research. He understands this progression to take place, moreover, during the process of industrialization itself, starting with assembling end products and moving towards the progressively full manufacturing of components. For the implementation of this strategy Habibie identifies eight industrial sectors with large domestic markets that will allow domestic producers to develop until they reach a level of international competitiveness. These sectors are land transportation, shipbuilding, the aircraft industry, electronics, and telecommunications, the energy industry, the engineering industry, agricultural equipment, and the defense industry. In Habibie's parlance, they form "vehicles for industrial transformation," in effect key or strategic industries.[25]

The other meaning of "strategic industries" is conventionally security related. Suharto refers to "strategic industries" that "will produce aircraft, ships, communication equipment, and weapons which fit our own needs as an archipelagic state [*negara Nusantara*]."[26] Indeed, the companies classified as strategic are required to devote some 20 percent of their activities to defense production, and in an emergency up to 80 percent.

In Indonesia's bureaucratic politics the term "strategic industries," joining these two meanings, has proved to be exceedingly powerful and therefore the source of conflict. Habibie's identification of the eight industrial sectors has not easily won the support of other ministries, which do not necessarily agree or acquiesce in the transfer of their jurisdictions to his authority. For example, the automotive industry, a major sector in land transport, remains under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Industry. And although Habibie refers to construction, agro-industry, pharma-

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[24] For more on the DPIS, see Nihon Indonesia Kagaku Gijutsu Foramu, *Nihon Indonesia Kagakusha Koryu ni kansuru Hokoku*.

[25] B. J. Habibie, "Science Policy Management in Indonesia," *Military Technology*: 53. Also see Wardiman Djojonegoro, "Comprehensive `Catch-up' Science and Technology Development Strategies: an Indonesian perspective," paper presented at the Science and Technology Policy Asian Network meeting, August 20–22, 1990, Bangkok, Thailand, pp. 3–5. Wardiman had long served as Habibie's deputy at the BPP Teknologi before he was appointed Minister of Education and Culture in 1993.

[26] Soeharto, *Otobiografi*, p. 280.

ceuticals, and all kinds of service industries including health as "constituting a ninth derivative vehicle," none of these sectors has yet come under his BPIS.[27]

Moreover, the "technocrats" or economists who run the National Development Planning Agency, Ministry of Finance, and the Bank of Indonesia fundamentally disagree with "engineers" about Indonesia's industrialization strategy.[28] Habibie's progressive manufacturing plan assumes protection of domestic markets ("captive markets" in his terms) for these industries over many years.[29] But economists insist on efficiency and comparative advantage for Indonesia's industrialization. In their view, what needs to be promoted is not technology-intensive industries but labor-intensive and/or resource-based industries. Ultimately, however, the choice is political; and Suharto decided to promote strategic industries in the name of enhancing "national resilience."

It should not be surprising, then, that BPIS control extends not only over strategic industries identified by Habibie—IPTN (aircraft production), PT PAL (shipbuilding), PT INKA (rolling stock–land transport), PT INTI and LEN production units (telecommunications and electronics), PT PINDAD and PT DNA (defense), PT BARATA and PT Boma Bisma Indra (machinery and engineering)—but also Krakatau Steel, Suharto's pet project since the early 1970s. A major purpose of the BPIS is to shield these "strategic industries"—viewed by some as "white elephants"—from intervention by the economists, and to permit Habibie to run the companies as he pleases.

This point becomes clearer when we look at shareholding and management oversight in these projects. At present, the Ministry of Finance is the share-holder of all state corporations (223 in total) except for those under the BPIS, while other ministries retain responsibility for management oversight over firms that come under their respective jurisdiction.[30] The BPIS is the sole shareholder of all the strategic industries, however, and moreover is responsible for management control. In other words, the BPIS acts as a "holding company" for these industries, and even though some companies are formally within the jurisdiction of other ministries, these latter have no say in management except in the DPIS, the sole function of which is to give general policy guidelines to the BPIS.

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[27] Habibie, "Science Policy Management in Indonesia," p. 53.

[28] The technocrats' control over the National Development Planning Agency was broken in 1993 with the appointment of Ginandjar and Rahardi Ramelan as its chairman and deputy chairman.

[29] See "Interview," *Military Technology:* 10. According to Paramajuda, IPTN's director of commerce, the break-even point of CN-235 aircraft will be 300 units, while the IPTN sold twenty-nine units (ten for domestic buyers and nineteen for export) by the end of 1989. Since the IPTN was scheduled to produce thirty-six units for 1990, it would need 708 years to reach break-even in the manufacturing of the CN-235. Raillon, *Indonesia 2000,* p. 118. Another example of protection is the shipbuilding industry. To protect its domestic market, a ban on ships over twenty-five years of age was imposed in 1984, and a joint decree issued by three ministers (Transportation, Industry, and Research and Technology) prohibited imports of both new and used ships and required the use of domestically produced ships. In 1988 this decree was revoked by the Minister of Transportation, and shipowners were provisionally allowed to lease ships of 5,000 DWT or more from foreign firms. But the ban on the importation of vessels under 10,000 DWT remains in force. Raillon, *Indonesia 2000,* p. 125.

[30] For example, sixty-three state corporations come under the control of the Ministry of Industry.

Now we can return to the question: why has the development of the state research and development and strategic industrial sectors accelerated since 1983. Habibie did not have the bureaucratic clout to expand his turf alone. Neither a military officer nor a US-trained economist, he could not count on the support of the Armed Forces or of such international financial agencies as the IMF and the World Bank. But he enjoyed Suharto's patronage. Indonesian decision making authority became highly concentrated in the Presidency as Suharto's old allies disappeared from the scene and junior officials were promoted to ministerial positions in the 1980s. Direct access to Suharto became one of the most important qualifications for any real player in bureaucratic politics. Habibie enjoyed such access. The question is why Suharto supported Habibie and his BPP Teknologi and the BPIS even when Indonesia experienced a tough structural adjustment in the face of the post-oil boom recession during the mid-1980s.

Part of the reason, as we saw earlier, lies in Suharto's wish for short cuts to industrialization and his propensity for taking them whenever he can afford to. He relied on Ibnu Sutowo for short cuts in the 1970s and now relies on Habibie. But there is, I believe, a deeper reason for his support of Habibie. Suharto has been in power since 1966, longer than Indonesia's first President, Soekarno, and yet in a curious way has remained in Soekarno's shadow. Nothing demonstrates this point more clearly than the title of his autobiography, *Autobiography as told to G. Dwipayana and Ramadhan K.H.*, reminiscent of *Soekarno's Autobiography as told to Cindy Adams*.[31] He has enjoyed more power and money than Soekarno ever had, and as a nationalist, in his own way, has a different vision for Indonesia. If Soekarno believed that the key to making Indonesia great lay in the masses and their revolutionary will, Suharto believes it lies in development. His Indonesia produces "planes, ships, communication equipment, and weapons."[32] Suharto visited the 1986 Indonesian air show (which marked the tenth year of the IPTN as well as Habibie's fiftieth birthday) three times in a week, and in his autobiography boasts his achievement in developing strategic industries, especially the IPTN.[33] This may also explain why Krakatau Steel, a notorious "white elephant," remains his pet project.[34] Begun by Soekarno in 1960 with Soviet aid, it was left to rust after 1966 until Suharto revived the project in the early 1970s, only to see it scaled back again when Ibnu Sutowo led Indonesia to the brink of bankruptcy. Yet he persisted, completing the financially burdensome project in 1978 and then classifying it as "strategic" in 1983.

Yet this analysis does not account for everything, for Suharto is an entrepreneur who does not hesitate to scrap any project that is not a paying proposition. Why were the responsibilities and functions of the BPPT redefined and expanded in August 1982, and why was the old Council for Strategic Industries established in the fall of 1983?

The timing is intriguing. The Indonesian economy went into recession in late 1981 and 1982. Oil prices fell from $35 a barrel in 1981 to $29 a barrel in 1983. Confronted with deterioration of the balance of payments, the government was

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[31] But there are important differences beteeen the two autobiographies. Suharto's autobiography was told to two Indonesian bureaucrats and published in Indonesian, while Sukarno's was told to a Hollywood gossip journalist, Cindy Adams, and first published in English.

[32] Soeharto, *Otobiografi*, p. 280.

[33] Ibid., pp. 280–282 and 451–454.

[34] But Raillon says it became profitable in 1985. See Raillon, *Indonesia 2000*, p. 101.

forced to devalue the rupiah and to postpone four big projects indefinitely and scale back many others in 1983. Suharto must have given long thought to the pros and cons of money-losing large-scale state projects. He decided to establish the DPIS and made clear that he regarded all the companies in its jurisdiction "strategic" and therefore not to be meddled with by Bappenas and the Ministry of Finance technocrats.[35]

To understand why, it is important to consider a more momentous development about to take place at that time. Significant changes were begun in the armed forces from March 1983 onwards in two distinct but related processes: a generational shift in the military hierarchy which saw the political coming of age of the "men of AMN (National Military Academy)," post-revolutionary officers who began to graduate from the Military Academy in Magelang in 1960 and 1961, and institutional reforms intended to produce a professional military establishment constructed along conventional lines.[36] The officers who came to dominate the military in these years were a different breed from their forebears. Born between 1934 and 1938—the same generation as Habibie—and much better schooled professionally, many received considerable training overseas, much of it in specialized fields—intelligence, logistics, electronics, tank warfare, and so on. Such field experience as they had was also significantly different from that of most veterans of the Revolution. Where the latter had won their spurs in a popular, semi-guerrilla struggle for national independence, some of the former served abroad in international forces and many participated in a variety of internal counter-insurgency campaigns and fought against the popular, semi-guerrilla struggle for national independence of the East Timorese.

The establishment of the Council for Strategic Industries should be understood against this background, for General Murdani, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, declared in August 1983 that in the future a major effort would be made to build up Indonesia's defense industry so as to avoid dependence on outside sources for supply.[37] Given that he was implementing momentous reforms of the military and that he often voiced the interests of the Military Academy graduates to whom he would eventually hand over military leadership, it is significant not only that his remarks were likely to appeal to AMN graduates and to national sentiment in general, but also that they implied a criticism of thirty years of military dependence on the US for weapons, training, and logistical support under Suharto's military regime.[38] The DPIS, it seems, was Suharto's answer to this criticism; it was designed to serve the aspirations of AMN men, contributing to the formation of a professional military establishment.

Examining the production of strategic industries will illuminate the point. Three types of companies are classified as "strategic" and have come under the Council.

The first is the munitions industry, narrowly defined around PT PINDAD and PT DAHANA. PINDAD manufactures small firearms, rifles, revolvers, mortars,

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[35] Neither Bappenas nor the Ministry of Finance were represented in the Council for Strategic Industries.

[36] The following account of the changes in the armed forces is entirely based on Editors, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite, *Indonesia* 36 (0ctober 1983): 99–107; *Indonesia* 37 (April 1984): 145–152; and Ben Anderson, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite, *Indonesia*, 40 (October 1985): 131–145.

[37] "Current Data," *Indonesia* 37 (April 1984): 148.

[38] Anderson, "Current Data," *Indonesia* 40 (October 1985): 142.

explosives, ammunition, powder, and bullets of several calibers, including above all the army standard 5.56 mm assault rifle FNC under license from the Belgian Fabrique Nationale Herstal. DAHANA produces explosives (dynamite, safety and detonating fuses, and detonators).[39] After PINDAD and DAHANA came under the wing of the DPIS, however, a new goal was prescribed of devoting eighty percent of their production to civilian products. PINDAD assembles generator alternators under license from Siemens for PLN (National Electricity Corporation) and Pertamina, rail fastenings for the state railway corporation, tools for the IPTN, and large pumps for the state tin-mining corporation.

The second type is Krakatau Steel, the integrated steel mill that Suharto classified as "strategic."

The third and most interesting category of strategic industry consists of companies engaged in transportation, electronics and telecommunications, and engineering and machinery.

IPTN, the flagship of strategic industries, which had invested a billion dollars for equipment, facilities, and working capital by 1990, started with production of the eighteen- seater NC-212 under license from Spain's CASA and NBO-105 helicopters under license from MBB.[40] The corporation then established a joint venture with CASA that now produces the twin turboprop thirty-five-seater CN-235, a short take-off and landing plane with a rear ramp door appropriate for mixed transport. IPTN also assembles Puma/Super Puma helicopters under license from the French Aerospatiale, NBell-412 helicopters under license from Bell-Textron, parts of the F-16 (Fighting Falcon) air frame as an offset order for the twelve F-16 units bought by the Indonesian air force, components of the Boeing 737 airframe, and so on. Needless to say, the helicopters and planes produced by IPTN are both for military and civilian use. Moreover, IPTN's Weapon System Division manufactures surface underwater torpedoes under license from AEG Telefunken (West Germany), Sura D rockets under license from Oerlikon (Switzerland), and 2.75-inch Fin Folding Aircraft Rockets under license from FZ, Belgium.[41] Although ninety percent of IPTN production is geared to commercial interests, the Armed Forces remain one of its biggest customers. Up to January 1986, for instance, the IPTN produced seventy-eight NC-212 planes, ninety NBO-105 helicopters, eleven Ruma NSA-330 helicopters, and six Super Puma NAS-332 helicopters, of which the military bought eighteen NC-212, twenty-two NBO-105, seven NSA-330, and two NAS-332.[42]

PT PAL produces tankers, utility vessels, tugboats, and general cargo carriers under license from Mitsui Shipbuiding for civilian use. PAL also co-designed with Mitsui and now produces one thousand-, two thousand-, and three thousand-ton coasters for inter-island shipping. But it has its own Warship Division which builds 28- and 57-meter fast patrol boats under license from the German Friedrich Lurssen Werf and assembles the Boeing 120-ton jet foil as a troop transport and patrol ship for the Navy, Customs, the Ministry of Transportation, and Police. It also plans to design and build 2,500-ton frigates, six hundred-ton minesweepers and 1,200-ton submarines in view of the long-term Navy program to create two fleets by the year

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[39] Raillon, *Indonesia 2000*, p. 161.

[40] "Industrialization Policy Focuses on Aircraft Sector," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, April 16, 1990, p. 36.

[41] *Bulletin IPTN*, No. 84 (1986). Also see Raillon, *Indonesia 2000*, p. 161.

[42] *Military Technology*: 21.

2000 and beyond, with eleven frigates each for the Eastern and Western fleets and one in reserve at a cost of over $5 billion.[43] PAL docking services, the main activity of the Surabaya shipyard since the Dutch era, have also been expanded, and now its repair and maintenance division overhauls both warships and commercial vessels.

PT INTI, formed out of a post- and telecommunication laboratory created in 1926, was made a limited company under the Ministry of Post and Telecommunication in 1974 in cooperation with Siemens. It produces Siemens digital telephone switching exchanges as well as standard desk telephones, public pay phones, marine radio equipment, small satellite earth stations, multiplex transmission equipment, digital PABX, and mobile telephone systems under license agreements with Siemens, the Japan Radio Company, and Nippon Electric Company (NEC). The company also manufactures fire-fighting systems under Italian license for installation on navy ships by PAL and has negotiated with Westinghouse to manufacture avionic components for the F-16 fighter planes.[44]

The LEN (National Electronics Institute) Production Unit, which is separated from the LEN-LIPI research institute when classified as "strategic," works on telecommunications, strategic electronics, components and materials. Along with assessing electronic technologies, it manufactures telecommunication equipment, develops electronic systems for defense, and builds mini ground satellite stations, radio TX and studio equipment, and TV broadcast stations for domestic use.

All these companies thus devote part of their activities to military production, but the strategic industries are not solely intended to create Indonesia's future military-industrial complex.[45] It is too costly and not in fact in line with present military needs. This becomes clear in light of the "mission" of the Armed Forces defined in 1984. Explaining the reorganization of the armed forces, General Murdani stated on record that the reforms were "based on the assumption that a conventional war, such as World War II, the Korean War, or the Iran-Iraq conflict, would not occur in island Southeast Asia for the indefinite future" and, therefore, "today, the emphasis remains on internal security—problems of social disorder, subversion, and so on".[46] For this reason the Air Force and Navy, designed primarily for wars against external enemies, took a back seat in the reforms; long-term modernization programs for the Navy and Air Force fleets will start only in 2000.[47] As for the Army, the most powerful service, at present it does not need sophisticated weapons systems. As Murdani said in 1985, "if this [development of strategic industries] proves successful, in the year 2000, we will no longer need to buy munitions from abroad," implying that the strategic industries are not of immediate military concern but a long-term project.[48] Given the Army's "mission" of internal security, it is most important to

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[43] "Interview," *Military Technology*: 10, and *Info PAL*, Edisi No. 4, September 1990.

[44] For PT INTI, see PT Industri Telekomunikasi Indonesia, *INTI Key Information*, and RailIon, *Indonesia 2000*, pp. 154–157.

[45] Habibie makes this point clear in "Interview," *Military Technology*: 11.

[46] Ben Anderson, "Current Data," *Indonesia*, 40 (October 1985): 136.

[47] Ibid., p. 136. Habibie says in "Interview": "And at some stage in the 90s, the defense budget will be large enough to enable us to the point where we find we require say 10 or 20 squadrons of fighters, that is the kind of scale when this becomes of interest to me." *Military Technology*: 10. In the wake of German unification, however, Suharto decided to purchse the former East German fleet from Germany.

[48] "Benny Moerdani: Korbankan Beberapa Kebutuhan," *Swasembada*, 3–1 (June 1985): 8–9.

locate trouble as soon as it happens anywhere in Indonesia and to send troops as quickly as possible to manage it. What the Army needs for this job is assault rifles for infantry operating without continuous logistic support or in forests, mountains, and other difficult terrains, military transport planes which can take off and land on short airstrips, helicopters with high maneuverability, jet foils for troop transport, and such telecommunication equipment as telephones and radio phones. Strategic industries fulfill all these needs adequately.

The Agency for Strategic Industries thus institutionally embodies two different concerns: those of Suharto to take short-cuts to industrialization and to make Indonesia great, and those of internal security to make Indonesia less dependent on foreign sources for military procurement. It is true that the relationship between Suharto and the armed forces has become strained recently, and Habibie himself has repeatedly stepped on the toes of the armed forces by recommending the purchase of F-16s to Suharto and negotiating, on Suharto's behalf, the purchase of the former East German fleet. Habibie might have to go, consequently, once his patron is gone. But the BPP Teknologi and the BPIS (or perhaps their components) have by now established their own course and political significance apart from Habibie. Even without him, it is unlikely that they will be entirely dismantled.

In *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson compared the state to "the complex electrical-system in any large mansion," involving "sometimes functionaries and informers, but always files, dossiers, archives, laws, financial records, censuses, maps, treaties, correspondence, memoranda, and so on."[49] His image of the state is modern, but in this post-modernist era we can perhaps extend his metaphor somewhat to understand the significance of the BPP Teknologi and the BPIS. With technological development, the complex electrical system can and needs to be upgraded. Rewiring the state and extending its reach ever deeper and more effectively into society is what ultimately makes political sense of the BPP Teknologi and the BPIS in the transformation of the Indonesian state under Suharto's New Order.

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[49] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983), p. 145.

COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION, INDIGENOUS IDEOLOGY, ACTIVIST POLITICS: INDONESIAN NGOS IN THE 1990S

Frederick Bunnell

With Assistance from Alice Bunnell

Indonesian NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) in the 1990s may further consolidate their role as catalysts for the democratization of New Order military authoritarianism.[1] The opportunity to do so, however, depends on the persistence of several supportive domestic and international political and economic trends. But equally critical is the ability of NGOs themselves to meet three urgent challenges. First is to maintain the priority at the grassroots of promoting community participation through flexible, innovative *kader* (cadre) programs. Second is to formulate an ideology more attuned to a changing indigenous culture, striking a better balance between the rights and duties of the individual and those of the community. Third is to risk becoming more politically active. At a minimum, grassroots organizing, coalition building, and public advocacy of constituent and institutional interests are a precondition for both NGOs political survival and fulfillment of their democratizing mission.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Non-governmental, voluntary, social organizations have played a major part in shaping modern Indonesian social and political history, as they have through much

[1] We will use the imprecise, but internationally recognized generic term NGOs for "non-governmental organizations" to refer to a wide variety of non-profit organizations engaged in various types of development in Indonesia. NGO leaders decided in 1983 to abandon the term "non-governmental" because of its implicit connotation of opposition to the government. They substituted the more neutral term *LPSM/LSM [Lembaga Pengembangan Swadaya Masjarakat]* or "self-reliant community development support institution/self-reliant community development institution." Although cumbersome, the Indonesian terminology does make a useful conceptual distinction between the truly grassroots community organizations (LSMs) and the generally larger and urban-based organizations (LPSMs) which function mainly to support the LSMs. See Ismid Hadad, "Development and Community Self-Help in Indonesia," *Prisma: The Indonesian Indicator* 28 (June 1983), especially pp. 7–10.

of the Third World.[2] Boedi Utomo, Sarekat Islam, Muhammadiyah, and Taman Siswa, for example, as well as the Islamic *pesantren* schools, contributed directly to the socio-economic development, political consciousness, and organizational base of the pre-war nationalist movement. From the revolution through the parliamentary period of the 1950s, social organizations flourished but tended towards the political ideological *aliran* (currents) of the major political parties, until the bloody upheaval following the abortive coup of October 1965 launched the New Order period.

The late 1960s and early 1970s brought the revival or initiation of religiously inspired groups, both Islamic and Christian, including the Yogyakarta-based Protestant Bethesda hospital's community development program (CD Bethesda) discussed below. Especially after the severe government repression of student political activism following the 1974 and 1978 protests, student activists began to redirect their energy into *kelompok studi* (study groups) and community-based NGO social-economic projects—in a pattern reminiscent of the 1930s.[3] These 1970s grassroots activists defined the dominant ideological tenets of the NGO movement as "alternative" to those associated with the New Order. Most conspicuous in their credo were social democratic values centered on redistributing power from the state to civil society and from the rich to the poor. This NGO movement prided itself on being less bureaucratic, less expensive, and more experimental than government development agencies, as well as being more effective in reaching the poorest of the poor and stimulating community (or "bottom-up") participation.[4] Concurrently, a more technocratic development movement also emerged by the mid-1970s. Especially prominent were the environmental NGOs which enjoyed the protection of the Minister of Environment and Population, Emil Salim, one of the most progressive-minded members of the technocratic faction within the government.[5] Initially led by the Yogya-based Dian Desa, the environmental NGOs soon became more participatory and politically effective, largely through the advocacy work of the coalition WALHI (the Indonesian Environmental Forum).[6]

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[2] See John Clark, *Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organizations* (West Hartford, Ct: Kumarian Press, 1991), chs. 1–3. For a brief review of Indonesian NGOs before the New Order, see Russell Betts, Dawam Rahardjo, et al., *A Strategic Assessment of NGO Development in Indonesia* (Washington: Development Alternatives, 1987), Appendix One, pp. V–VIII.

[3] For an overview of NGO history during the New Order period, see Peter Hannam, "Pengembangan Bentuk Pembangunan Alternatif: Pengalaman LSM di Indonesia"[The Emergence of An Alternative Form of Development: The Experience of NGOs in Indonesia], *Prisma: The Indonesian Indicator* 4 (1988): 3–14. For a more radical overview, see NGO activist Mansour Fakih, *NGOs in Indonesia: Issues in Hegemony and Social Change* (Amherst, Ma: Center for International Education, 1991).

[4] Peter Hagul, ed., *Pembangunan Desa Dan Lembaga Swadaya* (Jakarta: CV Rajawali, 1985), pp. 187–188. Compare the similar identification of core shibboleths in the overviews cited above.

[5] For a representative sample of the technocrat perspective on NGOs, see Emil Salim, "Common Aims, Different Approaches," *Prisma: The Indonesian Indicator*, 28 (June 1983): 70–72.

[6] For a brief overview of the Indonesian environmental movement, including the emergence of WALHI and its more militant offshoot, SKEPHI (the Network for Forest Conservation in Indonesia), see James Rush, *The Last Tree: Reclaiming the Environment in Tropical Asia* (New York: The Asia Society, 1991), pp. 82–84. For a more detailed account by a leading Indonesian environmental activist, see George J. Aditjondro, "The Emerging Environmental Movement in Indonesia," typescript, April 1991.

Reinforcing this multi-faceted domestic growth of NGOs after the mid-1970s was an important shift in the orthodox development strategy of the international aid establishment or donor community.[7] While maintaining their faith in the liberal capitalist priority of economic growth, the World Bank, the United States, and other OECD donors placed new emphasis on meeting "the basic human needs" of neglected poor majorities in the Third World. Through the IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia) consortium of international aid donors to Indonesia, this new humanitarian emphasis soon influenced the direction of Indonesia's national development plans.[8] By 1978 the New Order had signalled its conformity to this new donor concern by revising the official guidelines of its Third Five-Year Development Plan (Pelita III) and by allocating a larger share of its 1970s OPEC "oil bonanza" to expenditures for education, health, and rural development. This trend in turn provided crucial legitimation and funding for an expanded role for both northern NGOs and the Indonesian NGO movement.[9]

By the mid-1980s several circumstances forced the government to adopt a more favorable policy toward the rapidly expanding NGO movement.[10] Most critical was the sharp decline in the government development budget caused by the drop in oil prices. These financial constraints compounded the endemic weaknesses of the government's "top-down" bureaucratic approach to development.[11] While the over-regulated system stifled local initiative and flexibility, the military elite's preoccupation with political stability reinforced the patrimonial culture of the bureaucratic class.[12] These political, economic, bureaucratic, and cultural factors limited the government's ability to fulfill its recently proclaimed commitment to basic human needs and equity, especially for the estimated 30 to 40 percent of the peasantry living at or below the poverty line.[13]

By 1988 the government had further committed itself to the goals of participation and decentralization articulated by both domestic and foreign critics. These objectives were included in the guidelines for the fifth development plan (Pelita V); and

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[7] A survey of the shifting emphases in orthodox development strategies appears in John Lewis, "Overview—Strengthening the Poor: Some Lessons for the International Community" in John Lewis, ed., *Strengthening The Poor* (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1988), esp. pp. 3–7.

[8] Philip J. Eldridge, *Aid, Basic Needs and the Politics of Reform in Indonesia,* Working Papers, Center of Southeast Asian Studies (Melbourne: Monash University, 1980), pp. 1–11.

[9] Sjahrir, *Basic Needs in Indonesia Economics, Politics and Public Policy,* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986) Also see Eldridge, *Aid, Basic Needs and the Politics of Reform,* pp. 11–12, and Soedjatmoko, "National Policy Implications of the Basic Needs Model," *Prisma: The Indonesian Indicator* 2 (April 1978): 56–68.

[10] Moeljarto Tjokrowinoto, "Kondisi Sosial-Ekonomi Pedesaan di Tahun 1987 Menuju Strategi Alternatif," *Prospek Pedesaan 1987* (Yogyakarta: P3PK, University of Gadjah Mada, January 1987).

[11] Joan Hardjono, "Rural Development in Indonesia: the `top-down' approach," in David G. M. Lee and D. P. Chandhri, *Rural Development and the State* (New York: Methuen, 1983), pp. 38–65. For a more recent survey by veteran Western consultants in public administration, see Colin McAndrews, *Central Government and Local Development in Indonesia* (Singapore: Oxford UP, 1986), especially pp. 1–78.

[12] Harold Crouch, "Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia," *World Politics* 31, 4 (July 1979): 571–587.

[13] See the relatively balanced assessment of the past and future in *Indonesia: A Strategy for Sustained Reduction in Poverty* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1990).

some ministers now spoke of NGOs as "partners" of the government in promoting participatory development. Increasingly the future of NGOs emerged as one of the major issues in the ongoing debate among academics and politicians about the prospects for democratization of the New Order.

This debate continues, along with government ambivalence about the role of NGOs.[14] Perhaps the most plausible prediction is one by Professor Mochtar Mas'oed, who, discounting the likelihood that a coalition of the business class and the NGO movement will act as a countervailing force against the state, concludes:

> . . . the most we can expect is probably a kind of representative corporatism, a system of interest representation whereby business is given room to manoeuvre when dealing with the state and in which bargaining with societal forces is not taboo.[15]

Since 1988 trends have been mixed. IGGI appeals for more rapid decentralization and democratization of both economic and political systems intensified after the "democratic revolution of 1989" in Europe.[16] Moreover, international economic conditions provided renewed incentive for New Order reform. Despite a brief spurt in oil prices due to the Gulf War in early 1991, Indonesia's debt-service ratio continued to rise, highlighting the structural problem of over-dependence on oil and natural gas exports. Meanwhile, the annual largess of IGGI, totalling about $4 billion in grants and loans, faced erosion as OECD capital assistance and private investment shifted to the more attractive markets and geo-politically appealing experiments in democratic capitalism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Internally, New Order leadership, whatever its factional conflicts, presumably recognizes that its perpetuation as a political-economic elite hinges on its ability to reform the system substantially. The direct and indirect effects of current international political and economic trends are to fuel the arguments and hopes of reformist groups within both state and civil society, especially those of an expanding middle class.

There are indications of developments, however, that threaten to derail, if not reverse, these general trends favoring the NGO movement. One, for example, was a dramatic incident in April 1992.[17] Moved by its antipathy to liberal democratic values, as well as an enduring nationalist sensitivity, the New Order regime abruptly rejected all further official governmental assistance from Holland, which it accused

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[14] For a sampling of the academic debate about democratization among Indonesian intellectuals, see Mohtar Mas'oed, "The State Reorganization of Society under the New Order," *Prisma: The Indonesian Indicator*, 47 (December 1988): 3–24. For provocative views by two foreign scholars, see the optimistic Herb Feith, "Democratisation In Indonesia: Misleading Rhetoric or Real Possibility?," unpublished paper, Monash University, 1990, and the pessimistic Francois Raillon,"Democracy and Capitalism in Indonesia: The Impracticable Model," unpublished paper presented at the Asian Studies Association Meetings in Washington, DC on April 4, 1992. Compare William Liddle, "The Politics of Shared Growth: Some Indonesian Cases," *Comparative Politics* (January 1987): 127–146 and Philip Eldridge, "NGOs and the State in Indonesia," *Prisma: The Indonesia Indicator* 47 (December 1988): 34–56.

[15] Mohtar Mas'oed, "The State Reorganization of Society under The New Order," pp. 23–24.

[16] The following discussion of contradictory trends draws heavily from the academic debate cited above and media coverage of recent developments in Indonesian politics For a recent survey see "Indonesia: The Long March," *Economist* (April 17, 1993): 1–18.

[17] *Far Eastern Economic Review* (May 14, 1992): 20.

of infringing upon Indonesian sovereignty by attaching political strings to its assistance. The ban affected official aid channelled through Dutch NGOs to Indonesian NGOs. Significantly, over 80 percent of the funding for Indonesia's most vocal NGO, the Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH. Legal Aid Institute), came from the Netherlands. It was unclear, however, whether the ban signalled a temporary petulance or a fundamental shift against NGOs. Whatever the outcome of the debate between reform and security factions within the regime, NGOs can already claim to have redefined the relationship between the state and civil society in Indonesia, if only to a system of "representative corporatism."

A Representative NGO's Approach to the Challenges of the 1990s

To secure and and expand their influence, Indonesian NGOs must deal with a number of challenges in the 1990s.[18] Often overlooked by political analysts is the need to professionalize such institutional capabilities as management, budgeting, logistics, and fundraising. Equally critical are issues of democratic governance, as they affect, for example, the problem of "succession" to the first generation of leadership. Finally, there are even more vexing problems of development strategy, ideological purpose, and political strategy.[19] How these three challenges are met will likely determine the success of NGOs in transforming the New Order approach to development.

To ground our analysis, we draw extensively on the experience of a representative NGO operating in two remote districts outside the Central Javanese city of Yogyakarta. Known popularly as "CD Bethesda," or simply "CD," this NGO is the community development branch of R. S. Bethesda, a Protestant hospital in Yogyakarta.[20] Founded in 1974, CD has won international recognition for its innovative ideas in promoting primary health programs. Yet, it is relatively typical of the many urban-based NGOs that support grassroots development. It has only a modest professional staff; it relies, with ambivalence, on funding from northern NGOs; and it avoids local and national politics.[21] Although CD's Protestant affiliation does reflect the Christian motivation of some of the staff, political and cultural constraints

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[18] Hannam discusses such problems in "Pengembangan Bentuk Pembangunan Alternatif," pp. 3–14, and also Hadad, "Development and Community Self-Help in Indonesia," pp. 9–18. For a broader discussion of problems facing NGOs generally, see Clark, *Democratizing Development*, especially chapter 4.

[19] Philip Eldridge treats such political issues in "The Political Role of Community Action Groups in India and Indonesia: In Search of a General Theory," *Alternatives: A Journal of World Policy*, X, 3 (Winter 1984–1985): 401–434. Eldridge's more recent thinking appears in "NGOs and the State in Indonesia," pp. 34–56. Compare the radical perspective and tentative political typology given by Mansour Fakih, *Indonesian NGOs: Issues in Hegemony and Social Change* (Amherst, Ma: Center for International Education, University of Massachusetts, 1991).

[20] Most of the information and commentary about CD Bethesda derives from the participant-observation of Alice Bunnell who served as a volunteer with CD through most of the academic year 1987–1988. In addition the Indonesian-speaking authors have benefited from the CD staff's generosity in sharing freely of their experience and views. To respect their privacy only formal interviews are cited directly. Apart from a few internal documents, the primary written sources are the published speeches and essays of Drs. Santosa as cited below.

[21] As such it provides a more representative case study of Indonesian support NGOs than YIS [*Yayasan Indonesia Sejahtera* or Institute for Indonesian Well-Being], Indonesia's most prestigious NGO in the health field. Dwarfing CD in size of staff and scope of operations, YIS is a major participant in the national politics of NGO-New Order relations. See Eldridge, "NGOs and the State in Indonesia," p. 45.

preclude any theological coloration of CD's development strategy, field operations, and politics.[22] Most important for our concerns, CD is representative of Indonesian NGOs in the problems it faces as it tries to promote the common NGO goal of meeting basic human needs by empowering communities within the confines of an authoritarian government and a hierarchical social structure.

Our discussion benefits not only from extensive participant-observation of CD operations in 1987–1988, but from the published essays and speeches of CD's founder, Dr. Paulus Santosa.[23] Like many NGOs elsewhere, during its first decade CD depended on the charismatic personality and visionary ideology of its leader. After Santosa's departure in 1986, predictable problems of morale and leadership arose, but his thinking continued to define CD's approach to community development as it moved, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, into a second stage of professional maturation and expansion.[24] Our focus here is not on the institutional history of CD, but on the CD-Santosa approach to the three NGO challenges of the 1990s: sustaining community participation, shaping a culturally syncretic ideology, and creating an activist political strategy.

Community Participation: CD's Kader Program

Learning from the People

> It is precisely from the simple village community that I learn about what development of the whole man means, because the pattern of development created by the learned [academic] people has broken down the human being into inhuman elements. Man is seen as an incomplete object, as lumps of flesh or cases of disease. From the village community, I learn to see man as a whole individual and as a social being. I learn that we cannot separate man as an individual from his family, from his community, and from his living environment, and man cannot be separated even from his God. I learn that the essence of the holistic development of man is exactly to recover man's relations with his family, his community, his living environment and his God so as to become harmonious and dynamic.[25]

In this revealing speech in 1984, on the occasion of his receipt of the annual Paul Hoffman Award from the Society of International Development, CD Director Paulus Santosa spelled out the conception of "holistic development" underlying the Santosa/CD approach to primary health care in rural Yogyakarta. Both health and

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[22] Both participant observation and many informal interviews underscored CD's caution in exhibiting any missionary agenda

[23] Born in 1946, Paulus Hidayat Santosa grew up in East Java and received his degree in dentistry in 1974. From then until 1986 he served as CD's director while working as a dentist at Bethesda Hospital. He also held leadership positions in several national Protestant organizations, Canadian Crossroad International, and the YMCA, as well as frequently lecturing at international conferences on primary health care. In 1986 he left CD and Yogyakarta to pursue graduate studies in Australia. His speeches and essays are collected in Paulus Santosa, *The Unsolved Dilemma: Participation from Below and Bureaucracies Organizing* (Yogyakarta, Indonesia: CD RS Bethesda, 1987). The Indonesian version of these writings is: Paulus H. Santosa, *Rumah Sakit Tanpa Dinding* (Yogyakarta: UPKM/CD RS Bethesda, 1986).

[24] For insight into the current CD ideology and operations, see UPKM/CD, *Laporan Program 1991 [1991 Programme Report]* (Yogyakarta, Indonesia: 1992).

[25] Santosa, *Unsolved Dilemma*, p. 72.

health services are seen as holistic in the sense of extending beyond conventional notions of physical well-being to include social, environmental, and spiritual dimensions. For our purposes here, however, Santosa's emphasis on the role of the village poor in teaching him the concept of the holistic man is particularly significant.

Although Santosa acknowledges the influence of both the international primary health care movement[26] and Protestant theology[27] on his development ideology, he and CD are consistent in underscoring the importance of "learning from the people." Why? There are two reasons. CD exhibits the characteristic NGO commitment to community participation conceived *both* as a cardinal value, an end in itself, and as the central means for achieving sustainable development.

Central to the struggle of all participatory-minded NGOs are *kader*—the village volunteers responsible both for providing services and for promoting community control over those services.[28] CD's *kader* are thus both health providers and empowerment agents. Scrutiny of the selection, retention, training and performance of CD's *kader* illustrates the formidable cultural, as well as political-economic obstacles to implementing community participation, the *raison d'etre* of the NGO mission,[29] and one of the crucial challenges for NGOs in the 1990s.

Kader Recruitment and Retention: Elite Control and Economic Constraints

CD's express goal of democratizing the selection of health *kader* through popular "election" by the community predictably clashes with the values and power interests of Javanese village elites. Common practice is for the *lurah* (village head), in consultation with the heads of each *dusun* (hamlet), to choose from among qualified applicants. Consequently, over half the people who become *kader* are village officials, their

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[26] The Alma Ata Declaration of the 1978 WHO-UNICEF conference on primary health care has been the guiding manifesto for a progressive international movement. On the origins and spread of the movement, see David Morley, Jon Rohde, and Glen Williams, *Practising Health for All* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1983. Reprinted 1987).

[27] For a local sample of Protestant theological thinking about the role of the church in society, see the publications of LPM Universitas Kristen Duta Wacana. Compare Catholic theologians such as Franz Magnis Suseno, SJ, "Tanggung Jawab Kristiani dalam Masyarakat Pancasila," unpublished paper, Yogyakarta, October 1987. For an overview of trends in Indonesian Islam since 1965, see N. Nasir Tamara, *Indonesia in the Wake of Islam: 1965–1985* (Kuala Lumpur: Institute for Strategic and International Studies, 1986).

[28] For an array of rich case studies of "people's participation" in primary health care programs throughout the third world, see Morley, et al., *Practicing Health for All*, especially Part II.

[29] Many academics have urged a more democratic development strategy which stresses empowering human beings along with providing basic human needs In Indonesia, Soedjatmoko was one of the early pioneers as reflected in his 1978 essay cited above. Among the Westerners who have attracted close attention in Indonesia in the last few years is Robert Chambers from the University of Sussex in England. See Robert Chambers, *Rural Development: Putting the Last First* (New York: Longman Group Limited, 1983). The translation is: Robert Chambers, *Pembangunan Desa Mulai Dari Belakang*, Pengantar M. Dawam Rahardjo (Djakarta: LP3ES, 1987). Even more influential has been David Korten, a veteran American consultant on development issues who has benefited from the active dissemination of his ideas by Adi Sasono, Director of *Lembaga Studi Pembangunan* [Institute of Development Studies]. See David C. Korten, "Third Generation NGO Strategies, A Key to People Centered Development," *World Development* (October 1987).

wives, other relatives, or government employees.[30] CD sees little choice but to bow to the political reality of the entrenched power of village elites. Although on occasion NGOs have persuaded village leaders to accept popular selection, the costs in time and energy can be heavy, and there is reason to worry about political reprisal.[31]

Complicating CD's efforts to democratize *kader* recruitment is the severe shortage of *kader* recruits. Consistent with the national pattern, CD had an average of only three workers per *dusun* in 1987–1988, well short of the modest government goal of five *kader* per *dusun*. Moreover, the CD staff director estimated that approximately 20 percent of the *kader* were inactive.[32] Although this compares favorably with the Health Department's admitted drop-out rate of up to 50 percent, it still imposes a heavy burden on CD recruitment and training programs.[33]

Among the causes of this *kader* shortage is elite control itself. Appointment by the *lurah* rather than popular election tends to restrict the pool of applicants and to produce workers with limited motivation. As Judd's field study of village *kader* in West Java showed, elite selection means that "most villagers become *kader* not for altruistic reasons, but out of an intricately interwoven sense of obligation, shame (*malu*), and fear."[34] Moreover, CD identified another motivational problem: the *lurah* lacked understanding and recognition of *kader* work. To deal with this problem, CD has had some success in enlisting *lurah* to attend *kader* training programs. This official interest in their work has spurred appointed *kaders* to better performance. Still, commitment to the job is more likely where villagers volunteer and are chosen by fellow villagers.[35]

The shortage of health workers is affected even more by the demanding nature of the job. Anecdotal data from the CD working area in 1987–88 tends to corroborate the West Java research report that 60 percent of the *kader* serve more than one village development program at the same time.[36] Consequent stress and a sense of inadequacy among *kader* weakens morale and performance, and also deters potential volunteers.

In addition, much frustration goes with trying to sell a relatively unappealing message. Villagers understandably resist the burdens of time and energy required for community participation. Moreover, while villagers welcome outside help when a family member is sick, they are at best indifferent to the preventive concepts of primary health care. Preoccupied with family survival and often ignorant of the germ theory of disease, most villagers do not see the urgency of preventive measures. Consider the difficulty in persuading a young mother who hates the idea of

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[30] Mary Judd, "Village Kader Study," unpublished report prepared for USAID/Indonesia, 1987. These West Java findings coincide with the authors' impressions of CD's working area. See also UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1990* (UNICEF, 1990), p. 54.

[31] The training director of YIS, Indonesia's largest primary health care NGO, tells of their efforts to have the *kaders* selected by the method of a door-to-door poll taken as part of a village survey. Despite the *lurah*'s initial objections to the poll nominations, he eventually agreed to accept them—but only after six months of delicate diplomatic persuasion! Interview, May 1988.

[32] Widodo Hardjoseputro, interview with the writer, February 19, 1988

[33] Interview with Dr. Tonny Sadjimin Medical School Faculty, UGM, January 7, 1988.

[34] Judd, "Village Kader," p. viii.

[35] In the case of YIS's use of popular selection mentioned above in note 31, for example, the *kader* were markedly more active and successful than in the average village.

[36] Judd, "Village Kader," p. 24.

needles that she must take her baby to the *posyandu* (village health post) so both can be given (painful) injections; or convincing a family to draw on their meager budget to build a latrine. Such frustrations affect *kader* morale and performance, and raise the drop-out rate.

To make the *kader* job more appealing, CD employs several measures. *Kader* status is enhanced, for example, by allowing them to supply more curative health services. *Kader* are now encouraged to distribute medicine at newly established *dusun* medical posts. In addition, *kader* receive expanded training in preparing *jamu* (herbal medicines) and in acupuncture. Sanctioning the charge of modest user fees for these services adds an economic incentive for the otherwise unpaid volunteers. Finally, CD ensures regular field staff contact and support for the village *kader*. Along with district meetings every three months, there is an annual two day workshop at Bethesda Hospital's mountain retreat conference center from which *kader* draw recognition and prestige.[37]

Despite CD ingenuity in making the *kader* job more attractive, volunteers remain in short supply, a circumstance which reinforces the political prudence of acquiescing in elite control of *kader* selection.

Kader Training Programs in Theory and Practice

CD's conception of *kader* as both health service providers and empowerment agents sets the prime guidelines for its *kader* training program.[38] In the first phase of training the focus is on equipping *kader* with the basic knowledge of health indispensable to establishing a primary health program. Consistent with Dr. Santosa's idea of "holistic health," trainees learn a little about fundamental medical science and interpretive techniques, such as the symptoms associated with major diseases and how to use baby weight charts to detect abnormal growth patterns. In addition, trainees study the physical and social environment of health. The goal is to imbue *kader*, and through them the village community, with a comprehensive multi-sectoral approach to health care rather than a narrow, technocratic one.

The second phase of the training focuses on teaching *kader* the participatory learning process approach to community development. The pedagogy employed by CD is itself participatory, for *kader* learn the approach by putting it into practice in a demanding fieldwork exercise. Each trainee must visit the homes of ten families in his or her neighborhood. The goals are to gather data for a village health assessment and to involve both *kader* and villagers through the participatory learning approach. The means should not be a stiff formal interview of villagers by the newly trained *kader* "expert," but an informal discussion involving a two-way exchange of knowledge. Where resources permit, *kader* share their holistic conception of health with the aid of Indonesian translations of such Third World primary health care manuals as David Werner's *Where There Is No Doctor* and *Helping Health Workers Learn*.[39] At the same time, however, *kader* are instructed not only to gather data from the villagers

[37] "CD Health Kader Workshop at Pakem," internal CD report, December 10, 1987. Both authors were privileged to attend as participant-observers.

[38] Martinus Manggo, "Program Pelayanan Kesehatan Primer Yang Berbasis Masyarakat Desa" [Community-Based Primary Health Care Programs], unpublished paper, April 2, 1987.

[39] David Werner, *Where There Is No Doctor* (Palo Alto, Ca: Hesperian Foundation, 1977) and David Werner, *Helping Health Workers Learn* (Palo Alto, Ca: Hesperian Foundation, 1982). For the latter in translation, see David Werner, *Menuju Masyarakat Sehat: Panduan Bagi Tenaga Kesehatan Masyarakat Desa* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1987).

about their nutrition and sanitation, but also to solicit villager views about community priority needs and strategies.

Once trained, CD *kader* join with CD staff in making decisions about program priorities and design. When the grassroots-informed health survey is completed, CD *kader* persuade village leaders to convene a community meeting to discuss the results of the survey, along with data provided by the government's district health center. Although *kader* typically do most of the speaking for the village people at these meetings, ordinary villagers do attend and do speak out. In these ways, the CD learning process approach promotes popular influence over the programs that directly affect people's lives.

Significantly, popular influence extends to the follow-up actions that grow out of the community meeting. First, the *kader* conduct an informal educational program, including theatrical skits, on methods to prevent the ten most common diseases identified by the village survey. Second, the community debates the choice and design of two types of projects typically promoted by CD as the first tangible steps in the CD program. One project directly targets family health by addressing problems given priority at the village meeting, such as scabies or tuberculosis. The other project, consistent with holistic health and participation concepts, seeks to assist the community as a whole through environmental or social improvements.

An example of CD's approach to project selection is a recent water supply project in the dry, rocky, impoverished area of Gunung Kidul. For two or three months every year the only water available there is deep in the underground river of a limestone cave. The daily chore of fetching even a few liters of water for a household of nine or ten involved first a dangerous climb down slippery rocks into the cave and then a more perilous ascent after the water had been collected. Villagers agreed that this water supply was their worst health problem, as several people had suffered broken bones from falls. When CD field staff asked them to propose a solution, they requested cement to build a stairway with a railing. Although CD and its OXFAM(UK) funder initially preferred a more efficient solution, namely a generator and a pump, they eventually deferred to the villagers' insistence on a stairway. OXFAM financed the cement, and the villagers built their stairs with a strong rail. They proudly show the stairway to any visitor to the village as evidence of what they can accomplish on their own. The cave project demonstrated to the villagers themselves, as well as interested NGOs, their capacity to improve their own community. It also won CD the trust of a community initially skeptical of the claim that NGOs, unlike the government, were truly interested in local rather than "expert" solutions to village problems.

Rethinking Notions of Power and Culture

To understand the import of CD's efforts to promote community participation at the village level, issues of both power and culture require attention. CD and its Western funders can take justifiable satisfaction in achieving at least some modest empowerment of the community. In the village meeting and follow-up projects there appears to have been a discernible shift in power relations between the village elite on one hand and villagers and *kader* on the other. Although conceived by some observers as an incipient democratization of a still quasi-feudal society, the new voices heard at village meetings in Gunung Kidul should perhaps be understood somewhat differently. They are not the first expressions of peasant power but the expansion of existing resources of consciousness and capability—including the subtle acts of daily

resistance illuminated in James Scott's *Weapons of the Weak*.[40] If it is dangerously misleading to romanticize the exploited poor, it is equally misleading to conceive the poor as passive objects, whether as victims of exploiting classes or beneficiaries of social reformers or revolutionaries.

As for culture, in both project decision-making and local resources policy one can discern elements of new "hybrid" institutional forms and concepts that deviate from the reductionist models dubbed "Western" and "Javanese" with their value-laden tags of "modern" and "traditional." These terms imply monolithic cultures instead of the rich diversities of reality.[41] No less in Java than elsewhere, diversity complicates and invigorates contemporary society. It is this at once exhilarating and vexing cultural eclecticism that Clifford Geertz has unveiled in a recent essay updating his classic deciphering of Javanese culture in *The Religion of Java*.[42] If Javanese culture is pluralistic, it is also not stagnant but changing. Accelerated by two decades of "development" under the New Order, this change does involve the insinuation of new values into Javanese life, but it also entails the ongoing evolution of indigenous values. The result is a collage of diverse cultural hybrids. The process is thus not a simple struggle in which the "modern" replaces the "traditional." As in the past, "borrowed forms" and "local genius," as one historian marked them, interact variously to produce the uncertain contours of Java's future.[43]

Perhaps most important, reframing our understanding of cultural change entails reconsidering normative assumptions as well. Advocates of social change in and out of Indonesia often assume that "modernization" is both inevitable and superior to whatever else exists.[44] But NGO experience with "community participation" in village Java poses questions about the universality of the dominant Western ideology of individual rights and social equality.[45] One need not slip into a dogmatic cultural relativism to predict and applaud the growing ability of local genius in Java, and elsewhere, to redefine the institutional forms and core values of individual liberty and social equality.

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[40] James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). Also see the general theory which Scott has since developed in his *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* (New Haven: Yale Press, 1990).

[41] Not only are there notable differences among the several cultures lumped under "Western," but each of those embraces several changing "traditions" engaged in an historical contest for predominance—as Robert Bellah has demonstrated for American culture in his call for a revival of communitarian and religious traditions long subordinated to our assertive individualism and commercialism. Robert Bellah, *The Habits of The Heart* (Berkeley: University of California, 1986).

[42] Clifford Geertz, " 'Popular Art' and The Javanese Tradition," *Indonesia* 50 (October 1990): 29–60. Compare Clifford Gertz, *The Religion of Java* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1960).

[43] Quaritch Wales cited in John Legge, *Indonesia* (Melbourne: Prentice Hall, 3rd edition, 1980), p. 46.

[44] Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," *The National Interest* 16 (1989): 3–18.

[45] For the distinction between "those rights that derive from the specifically Western values of liberty and equality and those that pertain to the human condition as such," see Peter Berger, "Are Human Rights Universal?," *Commentary* (September 1977): 60–63. Also see the subtle comparative analysis of Indian and western conceptions of the individual in R. Pannikar, "Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?," *Diogenes* 120 (Winter 1982): 75–102.

A More Indigenous Ideology

Rethinking notions of power and culture in Central Java raises questions about an appropriate ideology for NGOs. Significantly, CD's approach, which relies on learning from the people, has stimulated rethinking not only development strategy and tactics, but philosophical principles, including the NGO shibboleth of community participation.[46] What is the nature of such revisionism, and how politically viable is it?

The brief and selective reflections here on ideological restructuring will serve also to highlight some issues in the ongoing debate within the NGO community and the potential for a common platform of (at least) core ideological principles and strategic guidelines for an NGO popular movement. Our discussion will examine the thinking of two NGOs, CD and LBH, which represent the major schools of thought in the most important debate among NGOs, that between the more reform or "development" minded NGOs and the more radical or "mobilization" oriented NGOs.[47] We will argue that the CD/Santosa holistic theory of development, by incorporating both "Western" and "indigenous" values, suggests the kind of syncretism required by NGOs to respond to the cultural flux of the 1990s. Yet, we will also contend that the more Western values and radical social analysis of LBH provides a necessary corrective to uncritical indigenization, as reflected in its resistance to the New Order's use of the national credo of Pancasila to construct a hegemonic corporatist state ideology.

Towards a Culturally Syncretic NGO Ideology

Santosa finds the Western notion of the autonomous and self-reliant individual too limited. For Santosa the individual is also a relational being. "We cannot separate man as an individual from his family, from his community, and from his living environment, and man cannot be separated even from his God . . . "[48] This holistic view of the individual necessarily leads to a concept of development as holistic as well, indeed, a process ". . . to recover man's relations with his family, his community. . . . "[49] Santosa's emphasis on the social character of the individual does not, however, lead to a rejection of the narrower conception of the autonomous individual. Avoiding the challenge of rendering the two divergent concepts compatible, Santosa simply asserts his allegiance to both. Outlining the first two of his "standards for holistic development," he offers what is tantamount to a syncretic ideology in which man's essence is at once autonomous and communal. Participation, in this view, is not only a right but a duty.

> *Autonomy* or *independence* means that every man must become a subject to his own being [sic]. Relations among people are relations among subjects and not between subject and object. Everyone must know his rights and duties and must

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[46] On the evolution of the concept of community participation in Indonesian political discourse, see M. Dawam Rahardjo, "The Role of the Community in Modernization," *Prisma: The Indonesian Indicator* 36 (1985): 3–7.

[47] See the discussion below on political activism and note 63. We will not deal here with the important ferment in Islamic NGO circles, especially in *pesantren* religious schools.

[48] Santosa, *The Unsolved Dilemma*, p. 72.

[49] Ibid.

respect other people's rights and duties. Everyman has the right and duty to *participate* in the social life of his community.[50]

Although unarticulated in Santosa's 1984 speech, it is evident that his philosophical fusion is also a cultural one. He taps both the Western celebration of the individual and the Indonesian, especially Javanese, emphasis on community. Significantly, however, for Santosa communal priority does not suggest an organic connection of the individual with the state, but rather only with civil society. Given the New Order's preference for a corporatist state ideology based on traditional Indonesian communal cultural values, as reflected in current interpretations of the Pancasila,[51] Santosa's silence on the issue of man's relationship to the state suggests his likely rejection of a statist ideology.[52] If so, CD and LBH are in agreement, along with virtually all NGOs that prize their organizational and ideological autonomy.

Paralleling his syncretic conception of the individual as both autonomous and relational, Santosa construes human rights as both individual and social. His first guideline for holistic development asserts that the autonomous or independent individual must achieve control over his/her own being. The vehicle for achieving this ideal is "the right of *participation*" in the decisions that vitally affect one's well-being. Although Santosa refrains from labeling this an individual political right, he clearly understands it as precisely that, consistent with the Western liberal idea of human rights founded in a democratic process of decision making.[53] This liberal concept is for Santosa coupled with the Western social-democratic tradition of socio-economic rights, a view that emerges in one of Santosa's guidelines emphasizing "the *equitable distribution* of the results of development."[54] The general and abstract affirmation of an entitlement to social justice finds its particular and concrete expression in Santosa's insistence on the right of all people to primary health care, as well as in his condemnation of inequality in access to and quality of health care between urban elites and the poor rural majority.[55] Here too Santosa is in tune with the substance, if not the language and tone, of LBH statements on human rights.

The measure of the LBH's commitment to the universalization of Western-derived human rights is evident in its annual reports on human rights in Indonesia, as well as in the aides memoire of the annual conferences of INGI (International NGO Forum on Indonesia) a coalition of NGOs mobilized by LBH and NOVIB, the Dutch external aid organization.[56] Addressed to IGGI, the consortium of

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[50] Ibid.

[51] Too often radical critiques reduce "culture" to an ideological instrument of ruling elites. I believe that ideology generally, and Pancasila in particular, must be regarded also as an independent variable influencing the behavior of ruling elites. Moreover, the values affirmed often possess moral and social merit. See Michael Merfit, "Pancasila Orthodoxy" in Colin McAndrews, ed., *Central Government and Local Development in Indonesia* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 42–54. Compare the discussion of radical views below.

[52] The New Order's statist or corporatist ideology is often linked historically with the "integralist" nationalism espoused by Dr. Supomo before and during the Indonesian revolution. See Rahardjo, "The Role of the Community in Modernization," pp. 5–6.

[53] Berger, "Are Human Rights Universal?," pp 1–4.

[54] Santosa, *The Unsolved Dilemma*, p. 72.

[55] Ibid., pp. 171–173.

[56] For the history, ideology, and strategies of LBH as the prime NGO challenger to the New Order, see Daniel Lev, *Legal Aid In Indonesia* (Melbourne: Monash University Working

international aid donors to Indonesia, one INGI memorandum included the following cryptic summary of INGI/LBH development ideology. Comparison with Santosa's summary credo, quoted above, highlights the choices facing the framers of an Indonesian NGO ideological platform. The INGI memoire states:

> [The participants] . . . underline their conviction that a development strategy based on the denial of civil, political, social, economic, or cultural rights not only violates international human rights standards but is also a negation of the very concept of development; note that alleviation of "structural poverty" should be an essential element of every development strategy, and stress that structural poverty is indicated by a lack of access to social, economic, political, legal, and cultural resources. Call attention to the essential role of people's participation in general and women's participation in particular at the community level in the development of objectives and strategies for development . . . [57]

What most distinguishes Santosa's concept of rights, and his overall ideology of development, from that of LBH and the INGI NGO coalition is his consistent and prominent linkage of rights (both political and social-economic) to duties. Such linkage is a logical, if not necessary, corollary to Santosa's assumptions about the individual as a social being. Moreover, apart from the influence of Santosa's Protestant theology, is there not a connection with the indigenous culture of the village poor? The values of mutual cooperation, for example, imply a linkage between rights and duties, a sense of mutual obligation among individuals that lends coherence to the social harmony prized by the Javanese. Such values resonate with Santosa's evocation of duties. Yet, CD and other indigenously oriented NGOs must deal with the critique raised by more radical NGOs, such as the LBH, that traditional social values are inescapably infected with the "feudalism" of the hierarchial society in which they originated.[58]

Whatever the risks, Santosa's cultural syncretism is at least suggestive of the process by which multi-cultural societies can forge a minimal cultural consensus. What is needed in Indonesia, for example, is a serious dialogue between culturalists and structuralists over how to explicate and implement Santosa's vague call for "mutual respect among individuals and groups" and "the preservation of individual and community identity," another of his guidelines for holistic development.[59] The

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Paper,1987). Among the many publications by LBH, see T. Mulya Lubis, *Bantuan Hukum dan Memiskinan Struktural* [Legal Aid and Structural Poverty] (Djakarta: LP3ES, 1986). Eldridge proposes a political classification of LBH in "NGOs and The State in Indonesia," especially pp. 49–51.

[57] "Aide-Memoire," Inter-NGO Conference on IGGI Matters (INGI), from the Third INGI Conference, April 27–29, 1987, in Zeist, The Netherlands, pp. 2–3. This is consistent with more recent INGI/LBH thinking in "Aide Memoire," International NGO Forum On Indonesia (INGI), from the Eighth INGI Conference, March 21–23, 1992, in Odawara, Japan, pp. 1–10. See *Democratisation through People's Participation: INGI Aide Memoires, 1985–1992* (The Hague: International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development, July 1993).

[58] The radical or "transformist" Indonesian NGO critique of the New Order's "hegemonic developmentalist" ideology is baldly asserted in Mansour Fakih, *NGOs In Indonesia*, especially pp. 7–13. For a biting critique of the New Order's cultural politics, see the translation of the 1978 trial speech of student leader Heri Akhmadi in *Breaking The Chains of Oppression of the Indonesian People* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1980).

[59] Santosa, *The Unsolved Dilemma*, p. 72.

implicit emphasis on indigenous local knowledge of culture, as well as politics, seems to inform and support Santosa's convictions about the linkage of rights to duties, convictions that are muted, if not entirely absent, from the ideology of the LBH school of NGOs.

While motivated perhaps by political prudence, a statement by another NGO leader can serve as an illustration of the cultural and political syncretism at issue here. In a speech to a conference of NGOs in the spring of 1988, Sutjipto Wirosardjono, a high level government technocrat and media columnist, presented his reflections on the substance of an NGO common platform. Most germane to the question of cultural content raised here is Sutjipto's proposal to relate the bottom-up participatory development strategy of NGOs like CD to the cultural nationalism of Pancasila. Strategically, he seemed to urge NGOs to compete with the state for the legitimizing umbrella of Pancasila.

> Another element in the common platform for which we should take responsibility and develop is an approach which stresses people's participation to achieve consensus (i.e. *musjawarah untuk mufakat*) as the implementation of Pancasila's principle of democracy (*kerakyatan*). In the jargon of programs and projects, this approach is often called "the bottom-up approach." But for the large majority of NGOs in Indonesia, this has become a kind of conviction that the needs assessment, project implementation, and program evaluation constitute a portion of the educational process by which society experiences directly and intensively the process of social change in a conscious way.[60]

Soetjipto in effect addresses both Santosa's CD Bethesda and LBH. He understands and endorses Santosa's preoccupation with community participation as both an end and a means of development, but adds an explicit conceptual connection with the indigenous cultural values enshrined in Pancasila. Santosa left that relationship implicit, omitting all reference to Pancasila, while the LBH's silence on Pancasila may reflect a wider dismissal of "traditional culture" as irrelevant except for purposes of political tactics. Soetjipto does not offer a rationale for joining Western and Indonesian formulations of participatory democracy, but even if his motives have to do with political tactics, his formulation adds concreteness to the more abstract appeal of Santosa to "learn from the people." A broad interpretation of this appeal might well be open to a reconsideration of the theory and institutional forms of "democracy."

In concluding these reflections on Santosa's development ideology to a common NGO platform three issues—environment, gender, and religion—require brief attention.

His view of man encompasses not only a social but a natural being, separable neither from family and community nor "his living environment." Although it falls short of such holistic ecological theories as Lovejoy's controversial gaya hypothesis, which informs the environmental movement of the early 1990s, Santosa should win applause from environmentalists for picturing man as part of nature. Moreover, as early as 1984 he elevated this ecological dimension of man and development to a prominence rarely accorded it in Indonesia outside the environmental movement. Finally, the integration of environmental into development issues occurs within CD

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[60] Soetjipto Wirosardjono, "Peran Serta LPSM: Peluang dan Tantangan" [The Role of NGOs: Challenge and Opportunity], unpublished paper, December 1987.

operations—for example, the inclusion of family planning and water problems in the primary health care agenda.

If Santosa is virtually an Indonesian pioneer in the incorporation of environmentalism into his development ideology, he is remarkably conventional in his muted perspective on gender.[61] Unlike the environmental NGOs, women's NGOs have lagged substantially behind their counterparts in the Philippines and Thailand. Part of an explanation for Santosa's blindness to gender in the mid-1980s lies in his dedication to learning from the village poor as an approach to development. Presumably even the women recurited as health *kader* tended to echo the agenda of the Third World women who dialogued with their First World Western sisters at the 1985 United Nations Conference on Women in Nairobi. Faced with multiple oppressions and usually accorded minimal political space to organize, Third World women placed the physical and economic survival of their families well ahead of campaigns for "women's rights." The Nairobio dialogue helped also to sensitize the predominantly urban professional women leading the feminist movement in the Third World to embrace the doctrine shared by Santosa to learn from the people. As in the ideology and strategy advocated by DAWN, the leading Third World women's umbrella organization, flexibility is the watchword for shaping strategy and priorities amid the diverse circumstances of women within particular Third World societies and globally.[62] In defining "flexibility" for NGOs in the 1990s, what does seem "absolute" is the imperative sounded above for a dialogue across both cultural and class lines—a dialogue among "subjects."

Finally, there is the issue of religion.[63] Beyond the very special cultural and political vulnerabilities that attend all Christian NGOs in a predominantly Islamic society, Santosa's CD faces the shared NGO challenge throughout Indonesia of how to deal with the deep spirituality of the multiple cultures. Whatever the religious or secular motivation of NGO leaders and members, this spiritual aspect inevitably intrudes into debates about political ideology and strategy. Since it is potentially the most sensitive and explosive of the cross-cultural encounters, religion should sometimes be left outside of dialogue, at least as a *modus operandi*, as illustrated by CD's experience. Nonetheless, what can be achieved is mutual respect and empathetic undersanding among "subjects"—among "I" and "thou."

Risking Political Activism

Perhaps the most formidable challenge confronting NGOs in the 1990s is the need for a more activist political strategy.[64] For CD, as well as other NGOs that profess to

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[61] By the late 1980s we observed growing attention to gender issues. Most notable, however, was the empowerment of women health *kader* which we witnessed in CD training workshops and in their village work.

[62] On related issues about poor Third World women, see Gita Sen and Caren Grown, *Development, Crises, and Alternative Visions: Third World Women's Perspectives* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987).

[63] See the theological works cited above in footnote 27 and references to Islamically inspired NGOs in Mansour Fakih, *NGOs in Indonesia.*

[64] The case for a pragmatic, radical social democratic politics for NGOs advanced below closely parallels the views of several other commentators For a very recent exposition by a veteran Oxfam (UK) activist, see Clark, *Democratizing Development*, especially chapters 10–14. For an analysis and prescription centered on Indonesian NGOs, but sharing Clark's pragmatic

abjure politics, moving towards a political strategy requires first of all a more realistic "structural" analysis of conflicts of power and class, the stuff of politics everywhere. One such analysis leads to a cautiously optimistic assessment, sketched at the outset, that domestic and international pressures will drive the New Order toward further democratization. To exploit these trends, while guarding against suppression, like the spring 1992 crackdown on Dutch assistance, Indonesian NGOs will have to shed their fear of politics in favor of a new political activism.

Our comments below identify some issues in the debate within the NGO community and between it and the New Order government over the limits and shape of political activism.[65] As in our discussion of ideology, we focus on the benefits and costs of the two divergent but overlapping approaches represented by CD and LBH. Reflecting the precarious political situation of most grassroots oriented NGOs, CD is exceedingly cautious or accommodationist in its posture toward government authority. Following the classification devised by Philip Eldridge, CD seeks "high level partnership and grassroots development"—i.e., it "cooperates in official development programmes while seeking to influence their design and implementation in more participatory directions."[66] By contrast, LBH is more inclined to oppose, pressure, and, at times, confront the government. In Eldridge's terms, LBH seeks from government little more than legal "empowerment from above" in order to pursue "mobilization from below." Drawing more on radical social theory than "the mainstream social work theory" which informs the first approach, NGOs like the LBH seek to mobilize a self-reliant grassroots social movement. As Eldridge explains:

> Social and political change is seen as ultimately less dependent on 'persuasion' and policy changes by the government as on self-reliant group formation, with the hope of eventually building a strong though informally structured popular movement . . . [67]

Like their ideologies, CD and LBH strategies are not polar opposites, but reflect two dominant currents in the NGO community that are not necessarily contradictory. What is needed is a flexible general strategy that recognizes the legitimacy and political benefits of both reformist and more radical perspectives. But if further democratization of the New Order requires NGO political engagement, what kind? One option is involvement as quasi-interest groups self-consciously committed to building a social movement.[68] To pursue power as political parties would clearly

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rejection of orthodoxies of both the left and the right, see above in footnote 19 the articles by Australian political scientist Philip Eldridge.

[65] See Betts, Rahardjo, et al., *A Strategic Assessment of NGO Development in Indonesia*, pp. 10–11. This analysis, based on the debates at a 1984 Indonesian NGO Forum, highlighted two dominant tendencies which closely resemble the "development" and "mobilization" perspectives which Eldridge perceived in 1984 as "the great watershed" dividing NGOs in both India and Indonesia. See Eldridge, "The Political Role of Community Action Groups," pp. 412–414, and "NGOs and The State in Indonesia," pp. 34–56. Compare Mansour Fatih, *NGOs in Indonesia*, p. 10.

[66] Eldridge, "NGOs and The State in Indonesia," 1988, p. 41.

[67] Ibid., p. 42.

[68] For a thoughtful and detailed proposal that NGOs expand their current *de facto* role as interest or pressure groups, but act in tandem with political parties, see *Kompas*, April 23, 1985.

violate the terms of the new "partnership" with the government, playing into the hands of the more authoritarian security faction of the regime.[69] To do less than active interest groups would forfeit the opportunity for expansion of the NGO role and risk the erosion of even the limited democratic space that now exists.

What expanded activities are implied for NGOs conceived as interest groups? Among many possibilities four are most essential and, in some measure, already practiced by some NGOs. The four functions of NGO "interest groups" are: *mobilization* of support, *advocacy* or representation of the constituents' special interests, *lobbying* on public issues of development policy and political reform, and *coalition-building* of networks with and without government participation.

Mobilization essentially requires the larger NGOs to expand their professional cultivation of participation and self-reliance in their target groups among the rural and urban poor. Ideally this work should gradually extend beyond CD's promotion of community control over local projects into Paulo Freire's type of conscientization education about the fundamental socio-political-economic structures and forces influencing the villagers' lives.[70] Realistically, however, most grassroots NGOs, like CD, will remain preoccupied with the challenges of their community self-reliance agenda. Moreover, CD speaks for many NGOs in warning that "conscientization" and training in political tactics endangers the well-being of both their organization and their constituencies. As Santosa has explained, CD, as a branch of Bethesda Hospital, has a responsibility not to risk the hospital's good name by open political opposition:

> Aside from the problem of the validity of concepts and the difference of opinions as to the methods of community development, I frankly admit that I am somewhat apprehensive towards the attitude maintained by a number of radical foundations. Without giving up our ideals, we must also take into account the problem of existence of our respective organizations which involves the life of employees, etc. Radical foundations which apply the CO (Community Organizing) principle and openly oppose the government politically tend to place partners like us in a difficult position. Other foundations may hide themselves behind their PO Box address, but this is a difficult thing to perform for our hospital with its 500 employees.[71]

Clearly such prudence has ethical as well as political merit. As such it must command respect from both radical theorists and the relatively politically secure NGOs like LBH. Nonetheless, from a longer term perspective, the survival of the NGO movement and its grassroots constituents may hinge on deepening their political sophistication and courage. Even limited "pre-mobilization" of peasants can

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[69] Both Emil Salim and Erna Witoelar reflect this judgement in their rejection of the political party model for NGOs. See *Prisma: The Indonesian Indicator* 28 (June 1983): 70–75.

[70] For a clear illustration of the way in which Freire's approach has been integrated into the development strategy of NGOs committed to social transformation, see Djodi Wuryantoro, "Pembangunan Masyarakat Pedesaan Sebagai Subyek Pembangunan Nasional" [The Development of Rural Society As A Subject of National Development], a speech in seminar on role of NGOs, in Mataram, December 21–23, 1987. Djodi is Director of the Yayasan Lembaga Kemanusiaan Masyarakat Pedesaan (Institute for the Humanity of Rural Society) in Lombok.

[71] Santosa, *Unsolved Dilemma*, p. 28.

strengthen the popular pressures for democratization during the unpredictable course of post-Suharto New Order politics in the mid-1990s.

A less risky and more familiar interest group function for NGOs to embrace is advocacy of their constituents' special interests. This is the approach pioneered and legitimized by LBH. It begins with careful investigation of an alleged abuse, lending credibility to the subsequent appeal to governmental authorities or private employers involved or to the legal action that may follow. Publicity is used both for advancing the particular case and raising public consciousness about the type of abuse involved. Even this carefully formulated LBH approach to advocacy runs risks for NGOs, as it has many times provoked governmental harassment of LBH. Nonetheless such advocacy makes sense as a standard professional and political response by NGOs to the victimization of the vulnerable and deprived groups which they claim to serve.

More boldly, NGOs may consider lobbying on broader national issues. On development policy issues, there are already notable cases of NGO lobbying effectively both nationally and locally to alter the direction and the practice of government policy.[72] An example is the influence of NGOs in shaping and accelerating the evolution of a national health policy built around community-based primary health care. More risky but also crucial is increased NGO lobbying for political reform, especially liberalization of restrictions on the media, parties, and elections. An urgent national political challenge for NGOs is to sustain their opposition to the 1985 legislation on mass organizations which allows the regime wide authority to restrict the activities of all major organizations.[73]

To enhance their overall effectiveness as political interest groups and as community development organizations, NGOs need to consolidate and expand the numerous networks and coalitions established over the last several years.[74] Such coalitions are often required by government regulations to include not only NGO representatives but also government officials. There are, however, NGO coalitions that are autonomous from the government. Both types merit discussion.

A promising model of a local NGO coalition encompassing both NGOs and government agencies is the Yogyakarta Province NGO Forum. Established in 1986 at

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[72] Two veteran YIS leaders, Lukas Hendrata and Mary Johnston, discuss their tactics for influencing health policy at both the local and national level in Jon E. Rohde and David Werner, eds., *Practicing Health For All* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), respectively pp. 168–189 and pp. 251–272. For WALHI's strategy for influencing government policy, see Erna Witolar's claims of affecting parliament's views in *Prisma: The Indonesian Indicator* 28 (June 1983): 70–72.

[73] For a succinct summary of the social organization legislation and alternative NGO interpretations of the regime's intent, see Delia Richard, "The New Restrictions for NGOs," *Inside Indonesia* (Summer 1987): 10–12. A pessimistic assessment appears in George Aditjondro, "Networking to Promote or to Control Indonesian NGOs? Questions Concerning the Networking and Coordinating Rush Among Jakarta-Based NGO's, Ministries and Donor Agencies," Working paper for Inter-NGO conference on IGGI Matters, April 27–29, 1987, Zeist, the Netherlands, especially p. 9. Also see M. M. Billah and Abdul Hakim G.N., "State Constraints on NGOs in Indonesia: Recent Developments," in *Prisma: The Indonesian Indicator* 47 (December 1988): 57–66. As noted above in the preface, the New Order's spring 1992 banning of Dutch NGO aid to Indonesian NGOs understandably reawakened NGO fears of strict application of the Ormas legislation. See *Far Eastern Economic Review* (May 14, 1992): 20.

[74] An historical overview of NGO networking appear in Aditjondro, "Networking to Promote or Control Indonesian NGOs," especially pp. 5–10 and 19–22.

the initiative of a group of smaller NGOs led by Drs. Amir Effendi Siregar, Director of LP3Y (Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information-Yogyakarta), the Yogya Forum has concentrated on providing training courses for village-level *kader* working for either NGOs or government agencies.[75] Both participants and observers testify to the Forum's success in raising not only *kader* skills but also lifting their morale by bringing hitherto isolated activists into close association. The Yogya Forum has also been effective in constructing a close working relationship with government agencies at both district and village levels.

Significantly, such intimacy with the government apparently has not compromised the autonomy of the NGOs in the Forum. By maintaining a loose formal structure and confining its collaboration primarily to ad hoc arrangements, they have limited the opportunity for government interference with NGO agendas.[76] Government cooptation and manipulation remain a real danger, as radical critics constantly warn, but the reality is that the NGOs often influence the government. Government officials who participate in the Forum's training courses acquire a new respect for the professionalism and commitment of the NGO community. The Forum also hopes and assumes that at least some of the government participants absorb some of the values and techniques of an "alternative, more participatory" approach to development. Basic to the Forum's strategy, however, is the calculation that cultivating cooperative relations with local officials is the only way to secure the political sanction required to carry out village-level projects. The Yogykarta NGOs' approach to coalition-building that involves government agencies is a useful example for other NGOs throughout Indonesia that are now required to participate in such forums at the provincial level.[77]

NGOs also must expand the formal and informal networks or coalitions of NGOs without government participation. Here two models seem appropriate. One is that of WALHI (National Forum for Environment), which demonstrates the collective advantage of coalitions specializing in the same type of development activity. Not only are such networks often indispensable vehicles for sharing technical information and trading new concepts, but they can function as influential lobbies on public issues in their area of expertise. WALHI has functioned consistently as a support for

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[75] The most complete account of Yogjakarta NGO networking comes from the founder of the Forum, who is a journalism professor at the University of Gadjah Mada and also director of the small research-oriented NGO LP3Y. See Amir Effendi Siregar, "The Communication Patterns Among NGOs In Yogyakarta: A Pilot Study," Master's Thesis, University of Iowa, 1987. A summary of this thesis appears in Indonesian in Amir Effendi Siregar,"Pertumbuhan dan Pola Komunikasi (LSM/LPSM)," *Prisma: The Indonesian Indicator* 4 (1988): 24–51. Also see the report by other Yogya NGO leaders: Imam Yudotomo, et.al., "Laporan Penyelenggaran Pertemuan LSM/LPSM Seluruh Propinsi Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta" [Report on The Organization Meeting of NGOs in the Special Province of Yogyakarta], November 24–26, 1986 di Kaliurang, unpublished internal report. We are indebted to both Pak Amir and Pak Imam for the many hours they spent answering my questions about the Forum's activities.

[76] Interviews with Yogya NGO leaders. Also see Imam Yudotomo, et al., "'Mitos LSM' Harus Dipertahankan" [The Myth of Grassroots NGOs Must Be Maintained], in "Laporan Penyelenggaran Pertemuan LSM/LPSM Seluruh Propinsi Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta," pp. 12–14. See Aditjondro, "Networking to Promote or to Control Indonesian NGOs?," p. 7.

[77] In 1984 the Interior Minister instructed all governors to establish "provincial coordinating bodies for all NGOs active in social welfare." See Aditjondro, "Networking to Promote or Control Indonesian NGOs?," pp. 4–5 and 20–22. An account of such an official provincial NGO forum in Central Java appears in *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, November 15, 1987.

many of the environmental initiatives advanced by WALHI's ministerial patron, Emil Salim. More recently, WALHI has adopted a more activist approach to advocacy and extended its reach to international forums.[78]

What is most lacking, however, are cross-sectoral NGO coalitions capable of formulating consensus positions on public policy issues that affect all types of NGOs. Here existing national networks, such as Bina Desa (Indonesian Secretariat for the Development of Human Resources), and the NGO members of the regional forums have not yet consistently joined individual NGOs in speaking out and lobbying on public issues.

One notable example of a national, and international, coalition of NGOs that fits the model of a more activist interest group is INGI (International NGO Forum on Indonesia).[79] Formed in 1985 on Dutch initiative, INGI's Indonesian network has from the start been led by LBH and several of the more progressive NGOs. Accordingly INGI has tended to emphasize human rights and pressure politics. Still, as a coalition INGI has had to function domestically as a forum for the airing and mediating of various NGO differences.[80] There has been a chronic tension between the large Jakarta-based national NGOs, like LBH, and the more grassroots rural NGOs, like CD Bethesda.

Despite its somewhat uncertain domestic NGO support, the Indonesian NGO contingent in INGI has joined with its European and other foreign NGO partners to forge an international NGO coalition on behalf of a more equitable, just, and sustainable Indonesian development strategy.[81] Gathering every spring in the Netherlands just prior to the annual meeting of IGGI (Intergovernmental Donors Group on Indonesia), INGI has hammered out strong NGO consensus critiques of New Order policies. These critiques form the basis of intensive campaigns conducted through an expanding number of "dialogues" with international organizations and governments involved in the IGGI aid consortium. In the spring of 1991, for example, INGI representatives, including Indonesian NGO leaders, conducted such dialogues in New York with UN agencies and in Washington with the World Bank and US Congressional committees.

One measure of the influence of INGI is the visible irritation of the Indonesian government with its activities, and regular harassment of its members. Precisely because of its extensive international alliances, INGI has been exempt from direct repression, but it is not clear to its Indonesian members just how much political activism and international criticism the government will tolerate.

This uncertainty is precisely the key problem that Indonesian NGOs must face in the 1990s. At stake is not only consolidation of the gains of the last two decades, but

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[78] Evidence of WALHI's activism, as well as its international reach, is the prominent role its representative played in the April 1991 Asia Society conference: "Beyond Boundaries: Issues in Asian and American Environmental Activism."

[79] For invaluable overviews of INGI's political roles, see Mochtar Mas'oed, "INGI and Indonesia's Development Politics," and Daniel Lev, "INGI and International Development Policies," in *Democratisation through People's Participation*, pp. 1–14 and 15–20.

[80] The author's interviews with several INGI leaders have consistently stressed this function

[81] The discussion below of INGI's international lobbying role is based on the author's informal interviews with Indonesian NGO leaders in Jakarta in June 1988 and limited, but rewarding talks with both Indonesian and American NGO activists in 1991 and 1992 in New York and Washington. Understandably they asked not to be cited. Also see Daniel Lev, "INGI and International Development Policies."

also the prospects for a more participatory, just, and sustainable alternative to government development programs. The influence of NGOs in bringing about progressive social change in Indonesia will depend on integrating a more culturally balanced ideology and activist political strategy with the efforts of dedicated *kader*, like those of CD, to promote community participation.[82] This is the means and the end of the NGO "alternative development" agenda of empowering the poor to design and control their own futures.

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[82] Such an integration of these three recommendations will compel both analysts and activists to face the question neglected here of the compatibility of the three in theory and practice.

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

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